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Trident nuclear warhead numbers set to increase for first time since cold war

March 13, 2021 Posted by | UK, weapons and war | Leave a comment

How the world came close to nuclear war catastrophe

Stanislav Petrov.

Bilinovich: Averting nuclear apocalypse  https://observer.case.edu/bilinovich-averting-nuclear-apocalypse/  How the world came close to catastrophe, Beau Bilinovich, Staff Columnist, March 12, 2021 

No one wants to be the cause of a nuclear apocalypse. It is our responsibility to avoid one at all costs. But what happens when we don’t have a choice?

There have been numerous times throughout history where we have, by some stroke of luck and fortune, avoided catastrophe. Each of these instances tells a story, an insightful tale of human folly that culminates in one important lesson: We cannot trust ourselves with the most dangerous weapon ever invented.

There is one story which is bittersweet—in the end, everything is okay, yet it leaves everyone with a feeling of unease and urgency. Nonetheless, this story must be told, because we absolutely should learn from it.

The story began on Sept. 26, 1983 and took place deep inside the former Soviet Union. Operations were normal at Serpukhov-15, a military outpost just outside Moscow. The hero of the story was Stanislav Petrov, the officer on duty at the military installation. He and a group of other officers were monitoring Oko, the Soviet Union’s nuclear alert system.

Suddenly, the computer flashed a bright red warning: “Launch.” Alarms wailed. The officers were in shock. The United States had launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Oko detected no doubt.

The officers stood there, frozen, despite being trained for such a harrowing event. They could not believe what was happening.

Two, three, four, five—Oko had detected more missiles. In total, five ICBMs were reported to have been launched towards the Soviet Union on a path of destruction. Petrov had to make a decision soon: inform his higher-ups or wait.

In those crucial moments, Petrov decided not to do anything at all, despite the possibility of catastrophe looming over him. He did not even notify those higher in the chain of command. He waited.

Minutes passed, but no strike ever occurred. Relief. The warning was just a false alarm. No need to worry anymore.

Investigations concluded that the false alarm was triggered by the reflection of sunlight off the tops of clouds. Though this seems like a small mistake, it was not an isolated incident. There have been many other times where the world came close to nuclear war. One false alarm was caused by a computer playing a military training tape, and another by a faulty computer chip—tiny errors that could have bore serious consequences.

But simple mistakes are only one element that makes nuclear weapons so unfathomably dangerous and risky.

Just as concerning is the gross negligence of nuclear missile launch officers. A two-star general responsible for America’s nuclear arsenal was caught on a drunken bender while on a visit to Russia in 2013. Two launch officers were investigated as part of a narcotics scandal, where they reportedly used drugs and other illegal substances. Around 100 officers were implicated in cheating on their proficiency exams; only nine of the officers were duly dismissed.

There are also threats from outside the U.S.

Andrew Futter, associate professor at the University of Leicester, suggested that America’s nuclear weapons system could be hacked to gather information, shut down the system and even launch missiles. In fact, the National Nuclear Security Administration, which controls and maintains the nuclear weapons system, was hacked in December by Russian intelligence services, exposing the country’s most sensitive information regarding nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are risky, dangerous and destructive. In total, there are 14,525 nukes across the world, with the U.S. and Russia possessing the vast majority—over 6,000 each. That is enough explosive power to end the world multiple times over. Humanity would cease to exist in the event of a nuclear war.

This is precisely why the exceptional judgment of Stanislav Petrov is heroic. Most people don’t know him, yet he secretly saved the entire world from a disastrous future. Despite his commendable behavior, we should not rely on one person to protect us.

We are left with no other option than to confront the truth.

Those entrusted with the authority to deploy and launch these missiles at a moment’s notice cannot be trusted. The systems designed to monitor attacks cannot be trusted. Foreign nations in possession of this same deadly tool cannot be trusted. While we may think we can handle nuclear weapons, reality shows the opposite. In truth, no one can be trusted with nuclear weapons. If we do not realize this, we may not have any more stories to tell.

Our inability to trust anyone with these weapons demands that we abolish them. The sooner we accomplish this goal, the safer the world becomes. Getting rid of these weapons is the only way to avoid a nuclear apocalypse.

March 13, 2021 Posted by | 2 WORLD, history, weapons and war | Leave a comment

French Nuclear tests: revelations about a cancer epidemic

March 11, 2021 Posted by | France, health, OCEANIA, Reference, weapons and war | Leave a comment

110, 000 people in French Polynesia affected by the radioactive fallout from atomic bomb tests

BBC 9th March 2021, Researchers used declassified French military documents, calculations and testimonies to reconstruct the impact of a number of the tests. They
estimated that around 110,000 people in French Polynesia were affected by
the radioactive fallout. The number represented “almost the entire”
population at the time, the researchers found.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56340159

March 11, 2021 Posted by | France, health, OCEANIA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

USA’s new $100billion nuclear missile – a white elephant?

 

March 11, 2021 Posted by | USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

New Zealand groups oppose launch of U.S. military nuclear satellite

a security expert has suggested it puts New Zealand into “the kill chain” and makes New Zealand a military target. 

March 9, 2021 Posted by | New Zealand, politics international, Reference, space travel, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The war-mongering lobby embraces AI (artificial intelligence)

The testimony is generously spiked with the China threat thesis

the note of warning in not being too morally shackled becomes a screech. 

War Mongering for Artificial Intelligence,   https://www.counterpunch.org/2021/03/02/war-mongering-for-artificial-intelligence/  BY BINOY KAMPMARK-2 March 21,

The ghost of Edward Teller must have been doing the rounds between members of the National Commission on Artificial Intelligence.  The father of the hydrogen bomb was never one too bothered by the ethical niggles that came with inventing murderous technology.  It was not, for instance, “the scientist’s job to determine whether a hydrogen bomb should be constructed, whether it should be used, or how it should be used.”  Responsibility, however exercised, rested with the American people and their elected officials.

The application of AI in military systems has plagued the ethicist but excited certain leaders and inventors.  Russian President Vladimir Putin has grandiloquently asserted that “it would be impossible to secure the future of our civilization” without a mastery of artificial intelligence, genetics, unmanned weapons systems and hypersonic weapons.

Campaigners against the use of autonomous weapons systems in war have been growing in number.  The UN Secretary-General António Guterres is one of them.  “Autonomous machines with the power and discretion to select targets and take lives without human involvement,” he wrote on Twitter in March 2019, “are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law.”  The International Committee for Robot Arms Control, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and Human Rights Watch are also dedicated to banning lethal autonomous weapons systems.  Weapons analysts such as Zachary Kallenborn see that absolute position as untenable, preferring a more modest ban on “the highest-risk weapons: drone swarms and autonomous chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons”.

The critics of such weapons systems were far away in the Commission’s draft report for Congress.  The document has more than a touch of the mad scientist in the bloody service of a master.  This stood to reason, given its chairman was Eric Schmidt, technical advisor to Alphabet Inc., parent company of Google, which he was formerly CEO of.  With Schmidt holding the reins, we would be guaranteed a show shorn of moral restraint.  “The AI promise – that a machine can perceive, decide, and act more quickly, in a more complex environment, with more accuracy than a human – represents a competitive advantage in any field.  It will be employed for military ends, by governments and non-state groups.”

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 23, Schmidt was all about “fundamentals” in keeping the US ascendant.This involved preserving national competitiveness and shaping the military with those fundamentals in mind.  But to do so required keeping the eyes of the security establishment wide open for any dangerous competitor.  (Schmidt understands Congress well enough to know that spikes in funding and outlays tend to be attached to the promotion of threats.)  He sees “the threat of Chinese leadership in key technology areas” as “a national crisis”.  In terms of AI, “only the United States and China” had the necessary “resources, commercial might, talent pool, and innovation ecosystem to lead the world”.  Within the next decade, Beijing could even “surpass the United States as the world’s AI superpower.”

The testimony is generously spiked with the China threat thesis.  “Never before in my lifetime,” he claimed, “have I been more worried that we will soon be displaced by a rival or more aware of what second place means for our economy, our security, and the future of our nation.”  He feared that such worries were not being shared by officials, with the DoD treating “software as a low priority”.  Here, he could give advice on lessons learned in the spawning enterprises of Silicon Valley, where the principled live short lives.  Those dedicated to defence could “form smart teams, drive hard deliverables, and move quickly.”  Missiles, he argued, should be built “the way we now build cars: use a design studio to develop and simulate in software.”

This all meant necessarily praising a less repressible form of AI to the heavens, notably in its military applications.  Two days of public discussion saw the panel’s vice chairman Robert Work extol the virtues of AI in battle.  “It is a moral imperative to at least pursue this hypothesis” claiming that “autonomous weapons will not be indiscriminate unless we design them that way.”  The devil is in the human, as it has always been.

In a manner reminiscent of the debates about sharing atomic technology in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Committee urges that the US “pursue a comprehensive strategy in close coordination with our allies and partners for artificial intelligence (AI) innovation and adoption that promotes values critical to free and open societies.”  A proposed Emerging Technology Coalition of likeminded powers and partners would focus on the role of “emerging technologies according to democratic norms and values” and “coordinate policies to counter the malign use of these technologies by authoritarian regimes”.  Fast forgotten is the fact that distinctions such as authoritarianism and democracy have little meaning at the end of a weapon.

Internal changes are also suggested to ruffle a few feathers.  The US State Department comes in for special mention as needing reforms.  “There is currently no clear lead for emerging technology policy or diplomacy within the State Department, which hinders the Department’s ability to make strategic technology decisions.”  Allies and partners were confused when approaching the State Department as to “which senior official would be their primary point of contact” for a range of topics, be they AI, quantum computing, 5G, biotechnology or new emerging technologies.

Overall, the US government comes in for a battering, reproached for operating “at human speed not machine speed.”  It was lagging relative to commercial development of AI.  It suffered from “technical deficits that range from digital workforce shortages to inadequate acquisition policies, insufficient network architecture, and weak data practices.”

The official Pentagon policy, as it stands, is that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems should be “designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”  In October 2019, the Department of Defence adopted various ethical principles regarding the military use of AI, making the DoD Artificial Intelligence Centre the focal point.  These include the provision that, “DoD personnel will exercise appropriate levels of judgment and care, while remaining responsible for the development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities.”  The “traceable” principle is also shot through with the principle of human control, with personnel needing to “possess an appropriate understanding of the technology, development processes, and operational methods applicable to AI capabilities”.

The National Commission pays lip service to such protocols, acknowledging that operators, organisations and “the American people” would not support AI machines not “designed with predictability” and “clear principles” in mind.  But the note of warning in not being too morally shackled becomes a screech.  Risk was “inescapable” and not using AI “to solve real national security challenges risks putting the United States at a disadvantage”.  Especially when it comes to China.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

 

March 8, 2021 Posted by | technology, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Battle coming in U.S. Congress over spending on nuclear weapons

March 8, 2021 Posted by | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

How Scotland’s Dunoon became an American nuclear base, and a target

March 8, 2021 Posted by | Reference, UK, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Bill in U.S. Congress to stop new nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile

March 8, 2021 Posted by | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The American media sanitises the Biden administration’s killings in Syria

March 6, 2021 Posted by | media, politics international, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Why the US wastes $billions on nuclear weapons it doesn’t need

Why the US wastes billions on nuclear weapons it doesn’t need https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/06/why-the-us-wastes-billions-on-nuclear-weapons-it-doesnt-need/?__cf_chl_captcha_tk__=8e1f6ced7fb78c22d8ac3d4037ffcf46f77449be-1614929046-0-AZABHKV4aYtUa0Prc0Aghu6GdOuAqNKkLcImI5jaNYOawX3Kv1wTCS89zeyDWczWumlm-Idy9-J8PvA8khsD8YLXkgdQyN6C3WAdWw

JANUARY 6, 202  Joe Cirincione    There’s a myth in Washington that America’s nuclear posture is developed though sober consideration of complex strategic imperatives. There are risks, we are told, but we need thousands of nuclear weapons to keep America safe. They are our ultimate security. Wise men (it is almost always men) have objectively arrived at the minimum necessary deterrent based on decades of tested theory and practice.

None of this is true. As Randy Newman sang years ago, it’s money that matters. Contracts, not strategy, drive America’s nuclear force posture.

Strategy was never the sole determinant of America’s nuclear arsenal, but in the early decades of the Cold War, however flawed, it was arguably the major driver. No longer. It is now a thin veneer of justification for a collection of legacy systems and new programs promoted for financial and political profit. The entire process is guided by an army of lobbyists. “The defense sector employed 775 lobbyists and shelled out more than $126 million to influence Congress in 2018,” reports John Carl Baker from the Ploughshares Fund,

The path to a saner nuclear strategy, therefore, goes through the budget, not the other way around. Time spent debating alternative postures will be wasted if not joined by equal or greater efforts to shrink the budgets that fuel current and future weapons plans.

The evidence is everywhere. In the midst of a raging pandemic and economic collapse, Congress last month passed a $740.5 billion Pentagon budget that lavishes almost $70 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs, with little debate and few changes to Donald Trump’s request.

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, for example, held just three hearings last year and only called government witnesses. It then approved Trump’s budget in full. Major challenges to Trump’s policies and budgets were like pebbles thrown at a closed window: noticed but ignored.

It was similar in the Senate. The testimony of the head of the Strategic Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee provides an example of the vapid justification offered for the dozens of different weapon types and scores of options for thermonuclear war that Congress approved.

“Our deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our national defense,” Gen. Charles Richmond said, arguing that the United States needs to maintain “a credible [nuclear] deterrent” that “requires us to modernize and recapitalize our strategic forces to ensure our Nation has the capability to deter any actor, at any level.”

That was pretty much it for strategy. Thin gruel, but enough to get his budget approved — and keep a river of money flowing through Washington. The modest $88 billion “modernization” program that President Barack Obama authorized in 2010, as a bridge to the major nuclear reductions he wanted, has metastasized into a $2 trillion plan to replace every Cold War submarine, bomber, missile, and warhead with an entirely new generation of the deadliest weapons ever invented. Obama’s cuts died, but the contracts continued.

This plan will keep thousands of weapons deployed until near the end of this century — and, thus, lucrative deals for Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics, the big five contractors that dominate military and nuclear policy.

They sell nuclear weapons like Kellogg’s sells cereal. It’s not a question of whether we need the product; they just need to convince us to buy it.

They do this in three ways. The first is a pitch that relies on product differentiation, a way to sell essentially the same goods in a variety of shapes, sizes, and packaging. You like shredded wheat? Then maybe you’d like it frosted, or bite-sized, or both. Thus, the familiar triad of bombers, land-based missiles, and submarines is now supplemented by cruise missiles launched from air and sea, a growing variety of ranges and yields, and a new campaign for nuclear hypersonic missiles and weapons in space.

The second is control of the market. These firms dominate in ways that Kellogg’s could only dream of doing. Corporations have thoroughly penetrated the military services generating the weapons requirements through decades of revolving doors and increasing dependence on contractors for core analysis, communication, and even administrative functions. The same is true of the civilian departments that purchase and oversee the weapons development and productions programs.

The Project On Government Oversight, for example, documented at least 380 high-ranking Department of Defense officials and military officers who went to work for weapons contractors. “The truth is,” says Senator Elizabeth Warren, “our existing laws are far too weak to effectively limit the undue influence of giant military contractors at the Department of Defense.”

The third is to do what Facebook and Amazon do so well: eliminate the competition. Contractors have basically absorbed or bought off institutional threats to their programs. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the American public and politicians engaged more fully in nuclear strategy, the contractors learned how to game the system. They backed groups and politicians who promoted bogus threats, like a “window of vulnerability” that would allow the Soviet Union to win a nuclear war with a devastating first strike. But the real genius was to place sub-contracts for their biggest, most controversial systems like the MX missile or the B-1 bomber in most or even all of the 435 congressional districts.

The jobs and revenues of these contracts and bases quickly dominated the decision-making processes in these states, They were supplemented by generous campaign contributions that — were they given to a judge and not a congressperson — would be grounds for recusal. Coupled with the fear establishment Democrats have for appearing “weak” on national security, this system of contracts, contributions, and campaigns has effectively gutted meaningful congressional oversight.

Contractors over the past few decades have also constrained the formerly independent analytical establishment. Just as the fossil fuel industry muted criticism of climate change and established alternative experts, when the Cold War ended and bipartisan movements to eliminate nuclear weapons arose, weapons firms flooded think tanks and universities with grants, compromising their independence.

Over just the past five years, at least $1 billion in U.S. government and defense contractor funding went to the top fifty think tanks in America. The key funders from the government, according to a report from the Center for International Policy, “were the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force, the Army, the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department.” The defense contractors contributing the most were Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Airbus.

It worked. Once sources for alternative military budgets and exposés, it is rare to find a major think tank report today that is critical of military spending or, even more rare, a specific weapons program. Institutes that benefit from this largess now churn out reports and events favorable to increased military budgets and “great power competition.” This last argument works perfectly for most centrist politicians and analysts. It has just the right amount of fear and nationalism to provide sound bites on television or the campaign trail.

This lavish funding has created a new generation of advocates for super-sizing the arsenal. While there are some brilliant analysts at the large institutes who are truly independent and do not take contractor funding, it is hard to name a significant nuclear weapons proponent who has not benefited directly or indirectly from corporate or government funding. Experts are not asked to disclose these personal or institutional conflicts of interest in their articles or quotes.

This should not be a cause for despair, but for recalibration.

It could start with a simple step every journalist could take: Disclose conflicts of interest in your sources. If an expert won’t disclose their funding, don’t quote them. In Washington, this is practically a death sentence.

It could come from the research institutes themselves: Reaffirm your independence. Decline donations from weapons firms and military departments. If that is too hard, disclose all such grants up front in your reports. We need the intellectual rigor of alternative analysis, but it must be truly independent — and complete the analysis by including the material factors shaping the current posture, not just the stated strategic justifications.

President Joe Biden could assert his power by cutting the nuclear budget and not rubber-stamping Trump’s weapons. “By acting swiftly to cancel or suspend these programs, and to cut the overall Pentagon budget accordingly, Biden will create considerable leverage for negotiations with Congress,” I wrote recently for The American Prospect. “He will arrive at a much better deal by starting at zero and negotiating up rather than by trimming the programs and negotiating down.”

Finally, the independent non-government groups that represent the last, truly independent organizations promoting a saner nuclear policy must recognize a simple fact of life: No alternative nuclear posture or clever op-ed will impact policy, no matter how brilliant. The only strategy that can succeed is to focus on the money. That means teaming up with those fighting to redefine what makes and keeps us safe, who advocate for increased funding to combat climate change, to battle the pandemic, to improve health care, and to address social inequities. They need the funds that are currently locked up in obsolete and dangerous weapons programs.

By linking up, by making cuts to the Pentagon budget part of the strategy of these groups (and by reimaging national security to include these issues), it may be possible to forge a broad united front that is more powerful than the contractors. It can identify alternative revenue streams for states and districts, shame Congress into restoring investigations and oversight, press journalists to disclose conflicts of interest of the experts they quote, convince experts that their work is not complete if it does not factor money into their analysis, and pressure the government to spend taxpayer money on programs that improve our lives, not threaten them.

And if this is too long a list to remember, just hum a little Randy Newman.

March 6, 2021 Posted by | USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

French report on the unfairness of France’s nuclear history in Algeria

French report grapples with nuclear fallout from Algerian War  https://thebulletin.org/2021/03/french-report-grapples-with-nuclear-fallout-from-algerian-war/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=ThursdayNewsletter03042021&utm_content=NuclearRisk_AlgerianWar_03042021&__cf_chl_captcha_tk__=32bfe924bf6171eab26d9deb08cd73459b5e69dc-1614896664-0-AWxxiguytXLkG_ERcOpFeDyCqmv7X1FYZmZBNGAnlwY6ZlI8PgWd2By Austin R. Cooper | March 4, 2021 n January, the French historian Benjamin Stora filed a report commissioned by the French President Emmanuel Macron aimed at “reconciliation of memories between France and Algeria,” which France ruled as the jewel of its colonial empire for more than 130 years.

The Stora Report addressed several scars from the Algerian War for Independence (1954–62), a bloody struggle for decolonization that met savage repression by French troops. One of these controversies stems from French use of the Algerian Sahara for nuclear weapons development.

France proved its bomb in the atmosphere above this desert, naming the inaugural blast , or Blue Jerboa, after the local rodent. Between 1960 and 1966, France detonated 17 nuclear devices in the Algerian Sahara: four atmospheric explosions during the Algerian War, and another 13 underground, most of these after Algerian Independence.

French nuclear ambitions became inextricable from the process of Algerian decolonization. The Saharan blasts drew international outrage, stalled ceasefire negotiations, and later threatened an uneasy peace across the Mediterranean.

The Stora Report signaled that radioactive fallout from the Algerian War has remained a thorn between the two nations. But the document comes up short of a clear path toward nuclear reconciliation.

A United Nations dispute. The French bomb collided with the Algerian War before the first mushroom cloud rose above the Sahara. In November 1959, Algerian allies representing independent states in Africa and Asia contested French plans for the desert in the First Committee on Disarmament at the United Nations.

Part of the French strategy at the United Nations was to drive a wedge between the nuclear issue and what French diplomats euphemistically termed the “Question of Algeria.” French obfuscation continued for decades.

France would not, until 1999, call the bloodshed a war, preferring the line that what happened in Algeria, as part of France, amounted to a domestic dispute, rather than UN business. Macron became, in 2018, the first French president to acknowledge “systemic torture” by French troops in Algeria.

The Afro-Asian challenge to Saharan explosions hurdled France’s diplomatic barricades at the United Nations. The French delegation tried to strike references to the Algerian War as irrelevant. But their African and Asian counterparts painted the desert blasts as a violation of African sovereignty.

The concern was not only for contested territory in Algeria, but also for independent states bordering the desert, whose leaders warned that nuclear fallout could cross their national borders. Radiation measurements taken in the wake of Gerboise bleue proved many of them right.

Nuclear weapons represented another piece of French imperialism on the continent.

Secret negotiations resumed in September 1961, with US Ambassador to Tunisia Walter N. Walmsley serving as France’s backchannel. The US State Department worried that French attachment to the test sites might thwart the decolonization process.

Lead Algerian negotiator Krim Belkacem asked Walmsley if prospects for a ceasefire still hinged on France retaining control of the test sites. Krim got his answer when Franco-Algerian talks resumed the following month, at the end of October 1961.

France did not abandon its goal to continue nuclear explosions in the Sahara. But the Algerian position appeared to have softened. So long as further blasts did not impinge on Algeria’s “eventual sovereignty” over the desert, as one archival document put it, a deal looked possible.

The Evian Accords marked a nuclear compromise. Finally signed in March 1962, the landmark treaty granted France a five-year lease to the Saharan test sites but did not specify terms of use.

Going underground. Advice from the French Foreign Ministry played a key role in pushing France’s weapons program beneath Saharan mountains. French diplomats suggested that underground explosions would present, according to one archival document, “significantly less serious” challenges than atmospheric ones for future relations with Algeria and its African neighbors.

This did not stop Algeria’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, from winning political capital with the nuclear issue. In public, Ben Bella cast Saharan blasts as an intolerable violation of Algerian sovereignty, as had his allies at the United Nations. In private, however, Ben Bella acquiesced to the Evian terms and reportedly tried to squeeze French financial aid out of the deal.

The Hoggar Massif shook 13 times before France handed over its two Saharan test sites to Algeria in 1967. An accident occurred during one of these underground blasts, dubbed Béryl, when containment measures failed. Several French soldiers and two high-ranking French officials suffered the highest radiation exposures, but roughly 240 members of “nomadic populations” in the region received lower doses.

Meanwhile, France began construction on its Pacific test range in French Polynesia, the site of nearly 200 nuclear explosions between 1966 and 1996. Most took place underground, but France also conducted atmospheric detonations in Polynesia, and these continued into the 1970s. Even though the Limited Test Ban Treaty had gone into effect in 1963—prohibiting nuclear blasts in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space—France refused to sign it.

Contamination and compensation. As part of its reconciliation proposal, the Stora Report encouraged Franco-Algerian cooperation on environmental remediation of the Saharan test sites. An expert report from the International Atomic Energy Agency, however, concluded in 2005 that environmental interventions were “not required” unless human traffic near the sites should increase.

The Stora Report briefly mentioned compensation linked to radiation exposure from French nuclear weapons development, but this deserves a closer look. In 2010, the French Parliament passed a law recognizing these victims and establishing funds and procedures to provide compensation for illness and injury. So far, France has earmarked 26 million euros for this purpose, but almost none of that has gone to Algerians.

Decades earlier, France’s nuclear allies turned to compensation programs in an attempt to reconcile with marginalized groups affected by weapons development without disclosure or consent. In 1993, for example, the United Kingdom settled with Australia as redress for indigenous people and personnel involved in UK explosions conducted in the former colony.

Facing similar lawsuits, the United States provided monetary compensation and health benefits to the indigenous people of the Marshall Islands, where US nuclear planners “offshored” their most powerful blasts during the Cold War arms race. Other US programs have made compensation available to communities “downwind” of the Nevada Test Site and surrounded by the uranium mines fueling the US nuclear arsenal, including Tribal Nations in the Four Corners region.

Compensation programs map a global history of colonial empire, racial discrimination, and dispossession of indigenous land, but postcolonial inequalities look particularly stark from the Sahara. Including appeals, France has granted 545 of 1,739 total requests filed by French soldiers and civilian participants in the nuclear detonations, as well as exposed populations in Algeria and Polynesia. Only 1 of 52 Algerian dossiers has proven successful.

French officials responsible for evaluating these files report that the ones from Algeria often arrive incomplete or in a shoddy state, and pin the blame on the Algerian government’s inability or unwillingness to provide the geographical, historical, and biomedical evidence that French assessment procedures demand. Claims must demonstrate that an individual worked or lived in a fixed area surrounding one of the two Saharan test sites, between February 1960 and December 1967, and suffered at least one of 21 types of cancer recognized as radiation-linked by French statute.

A step toward reconciliation. If Macron really wants to tackle France’s nuclear history in Algeria—and its aftermath—his government should start here. The French Parliament opened the door to Algerian compensation in 2010, and important revisions to the evaluation procedures took place in 2017, but there has never been a level playing field. Macron could, for example, require that French diplomats posted in Algeria help Algerians build their cases and locate supporting documents.

Another option: Macron could declassify archival materials documenting the intensity and scope of radioactive fallout generated by French nuclear blasts. Draconian interpretations of French statutes on the reach of military secrecy continue to block access to the vast majority of military, civil, and diplomatic collections on France’s nuclear weapons program—including radiation effects. Foreign archives have provided useful information, but official documentation from the French government would help exposed populations—like those in the Sahara—understand what happened, evaluate the risks, bolster their claims, and likely find these more successful.

The Stora Report did well to acknowledge nuclear fallout from the Algerian War. Giving Algerians a fair shot at compensation should mark France’s first step toward reconciliation.

March 6, 2021 Posted by | AFRICA, civil liberties, environment, France, history, indigenous issues, investigative journalism, Reference, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Biden’s first budget should reduce excessive expenditure on nuclear weaponry

March 6, 2021 Posted by | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Russia’s most high-tech multi-purpose nuclear submarine further delayed

Russia’s most high-tech multi-purpose nuclear sub further delayed

The first upgraded cruise missile submarine of the Yasen-M class, the Kazan, will for unknown reasons have to sail another test-voyage before being handed over to the Northern Fleet.  Barents Observer, 3 Mar 21, By  Thomas Nilsen

New date for possible handover is set for May-June 2021, TASS reports with a source in the military-industrial complex. The state-affiliated news agency is known voicing military insights, but also for sugarcoating facts.

Another factory sea trial is planned, to be followed by an audit of the components and mechanisms, the source said without elaborating on which technical design flaws are to be fixed this time.

The “Kazan” was expected to be handed over from the submarine builder Sevmash yard to the Northern Fleet last Friday.

“The lead nuclear submarine “Kazan” can be handed over to the Russian Navy on February 26, the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, Aleksey Rakhmanov told RIA Novosti as late as on February 10.

Why the prestigeous submarine is hold back for more testing is unkown……..

Since first scheduled for delivery to the navy in 2017, the submarine has been notoriously delayed. A planned delivery in 2018 was postponed to 2019. That year came with another announcement that the “Kazan” would probably need all of 2020 to fix a number of auxiliary parts and assemblies which did not met the tactical and technical requirements set by the Ministry of Defense, the Barents Observer reported at the time……… https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/03/russias-most-high-tech-multi-purpose-nuclear-sub-further-delayed

March 4, 2021 Posted by | politics, Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment