Nuclear weapons proliferation: the great danger in the USA exporting advanced fast nuclear reactors
Letter to the Secretary of Energy Regarding Advanced Reactors, Fast Reactors, Nuclear Proliferation https://npolicy.org/letter-to-the-secretary-of-energy-regarding-advanced-reactors-fast-reactors-nuclear-proliferation/ November 29, 2021

Earlier last month, Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm touted the Department’s commercialization of advanced fast reactors at the COPO26 Glasgow Climate Conference as a demonstration of America’s commitment to decarbonizing the planet. The State Department announced it’s organizing itself to support the export of such reactors. Yet, a day after Secretary Granholm’s COPO talk, the Pentagon determined that Beijing would acquire at least 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030, in part, because of the super weapons-grade plutonium China could produce in its advanced fast reactors.
If the United States is serious about preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, something has got to give. In June, I, Victor Gilinsky (NPEC’s Program Advisor), and 11 other of the nation’s leading nuclear nonproliferation experts wrote the Biden Administration and Secretary Granholm noting the nuclear weapons proliferation dangers posed by the Energy Department’s fast reactor commercialization efforts. The administration has yet to reply to that note, which called for a policy review.
Last week, I sent yet another note (below) to Secretary Granholm recalling the June 20th letter, the Pentagon’s latest China warhead findings, and fast reactor concerns.
It would be best if the United States dropped its plans to export fast reactors as these machines can be used to produce copious amounts of weapons plutonium. At a minimum, such reactors should not be exported unless and until our government can certify that it can technically assure timely warning of possible nuclear military diversions from such plants. This was the requirement that Presidents Ford and Carter demanded be met before the United States ever commercialized plutonium-based fuels. If we are still serious about preventing nuclear proliferation, our government should demand no less today.
It would be useful for the Secretary and the letter’s other addresses to clarify their position as the Department of State has already announced a $25 million-program to promote the export of U.S. advanced reactors and is presently in this business.
Letter to the Secretary of Energy Regarding Advanced Reactors, Fast Reactors, Nuclear Proliferation
November 29, 2021
The Honorable Jennifer M. Granholm
Secretary of Energy
US Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, DC 20585-1000
Re: Advanced reactors, fast reactors, nuclear proliferation
Madam Secretary:
Among the Energy Department’s “advanced reactors” that are being supported for commercialization and export are some — sodium-cooled fast reactors — that shouldn’t be for international security reasons. The natural fuel of such reactors is plutonium. In this mode they are called “breeder” reactors. If they are successful in becoming an export product—which the Department of Energy and the companies designing them advertise as a desirable goal—they will provide easy access around the world to nuclear weapons-grade plutonium. As far back as 1976, President Gerald Ford said we should not rely on plutonium fuel until the world can cope with the proliferation consequences. This determination was subsequently backed by President Jimmy Carter. Does anyone think we are anywhere near meeting this test and that we should now reverse that policy? The short answer is no.
Certainly, the Energy Department’s current enthusiasm to develop and export fast reactors is in direct conflict with the Pentagon’s trepidation about these reactors’ utility as nuclear weapons material production plants. In specific, Pentagon’s latest China military power report, released earlier this month, spotlighted two Chinese fast reactors and their associated reprocessing plants under construction and their role in helping to supply China with the weapons plutonium Beijing needs to acquire more than 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030.
The head of the Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, amplified this point earlier this year before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “With a fast breeder reactor,” he noted, “you now have a very large source of weapons grade plutonium available to you, that will change the upper bounds of what China could choose to do if they wanted to, in terms of further expansion of their nuclear capabilities.” In speaking of “a large source of weapons-grade plutonium,” Admiral Richard is referring not only to copious plutonium production, but to the “super weapons-grade” quality of about half of plutonium produced in fast reactors, a circumstance that simplifies weapon design and production. Imagine if such facilities spread globally, including to dangerous regions in Asia and the Middle East. We certainly cannot exclude the possibility that some future owners of such reactors may be interested in using these plants to make bombs.
With light water reactors, there is no need to extract plutonium. Also, as noted previously in letter to you with multiple signatures sent June 20th, there’s a major economic penalty for recycling plutonium in light water reactors versus using fresh uranium. As a result, international inspections to afford timely warning of military diversions are feasible. In contrast, with the copious quantities of “super-grade” plutonium that fast reactors produce, no such warning is yet practicable. Nor is there some technical modification of reprocessing technology that promises to make it substantially harder to access the plutonium to make bombs. Exporting “smaller” advanced nuclear plants also won’t help: Nuclear facilities, which are small in commercial terms, can, nonetheless pose very large military threats. A “small” 300 megawatt (electrical) fast reactor, for example, can produce upwards of 300 kilograms of plutonium annually, about half of which is “super-grade.” Contrast that with the requirement for a warhead, which can be as little three kilograms.
Unfortunately, nuclear enthusiasts intrigued with the breeding potential of fast reactors, especially the sodium-cooled category, have largely ignored these international security issues. Instead, they’ve lobbied for “advanced” fast reactors and reprocessing for decades. Yet, their “advanced” design dates back to the mid 1940s and so predates the light water reactor. In the 1970s, a fast reactor demonstration plant, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, then the largest US energy project ever, was the Atomic Energy Commission’s main focus. Congress canceled it in the early 1980s because it made no economic sense. The Department of Energy, then, tried to revive the fast reactor concept during the George W. Bush administration on grounds that it would help in nuclear waste management, but that got nowhere.
The current Department of Energy flagship fast reactor commercialization demonstration project, TerraPower’s Natrium reactor, is based on an earlier General Electric-Hitachi design for a Prism reactor which is classified as a plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor. TerraPower executives say they intend to fuel Natrium not with plutonium, but with uranium enriched to below 20 percent and that it would not require reprocessing of spent fuel. They also plan on exporting the reactor.
But fast reactors are very flexible regarding fuel use, and its customers, especially its foreign customers, will view the reactor as a potential “breeder” reactor, indeed it is the main attraction of such machines, and we expect the exporters will accommodate the customers. Consider that while TerraPower is taking advantage of the “small modular reactor” label’s cachet, TerraPower’s CEO expects customers to want the larger 1000 megawatt (electrical) size and expects to accommodate them. It is apparently still true—despite the enthusiasm over small modular reactors—that the larger sizes are more economic. I believe that once the design is established the fuel choice will revert the same way.
The Biden administration and Congress have decided to support nuclear energy as part of the effort to combat climate change. You have said that you are “very bullish on advanced nuclear reactors.” But our government’s support for advanced reactors should not be extended to fast reactors, much less their export, which would make it much easier for those so inclined to manufacture nuclear weapons. At a minimum, our government should not push their export unless and until it can certify that it can technically assure timely warning of possible nuclear military diversions. This was the requirement that Presidents Ford and Carter demanded be met before the United States ever commercialized plutonium-based fuels. If we are still serious about preventing nuclear proliferation, our government should demand no less today.
Sincerely, Henry Sokolski
Executive Director
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
CC: Secretary of State Antony Blinken
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration Jill Hruby
Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Christopher Hansen
USA considers deploying nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

US weighing nuclear in Ukraine to deter Russia Mirage News, 9 Dec 21, ”…………… Last week U.S. President Joe Biden pledged to make it “very, very difficult” for Russia’s Vladimir Putin to take military action amid spiralling tensions with Ukraine……
“Deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in Ukraine as [deployed] on Turkish soil in 1959 to deter Soviet aggression is among the last-resort options being considered. This would make [invasion] “very, very difficult” for Russia as President Biden put it. However, this would not be a decision to take lightly.”……… https://www.miragenews.com/us-mulling-nuclear-deployment-in-ukraine-to-688776/
Scenarios of the release of radioactive ions if high precision missiles were to strike Middle East nuclear reactors.
Report: Missile strike risks to Middle East nuclear reactors, A new study explores potential radiological fallout and evacuations from a missile strike on commercial nuclear power plants. Aljazeera, By Patricia Sabga, 8 Dec 21 ” ………………Scenarios and reactors
To illustrate the potential vulnerability of a nuclear power facility to a high precision missile strike, NPEC analysed four current and planned nuclear power plants in the region for three scenarios involving the radiological release of caesium-137 (Cs-137) into the atmosphere.
“Caesium-137 is one isotope that is particularly concerning for several reasons and it’s one of the most common isotopes looked at when evaluating the danger of a nuclear accident or some kind of radioactive release,” the report’s lead researcher Eva Lisowski told Al Jazeera. “It’s dangerous enough and lasts long enough that it can cause a significant increase in the chances of developing cancer.”
Significant contamination with Cs-137 can result in hundreds of thousands of people being evacuated from their homes, the report warns, and they may not be able to return for decades, given it has a 30-year half-life.
The first scenario Lisowski modelled examined what would happen if a nuclear reactor containment building is breached by an air strike, resulting in the core being released. The second scenario mapped what would happen if a spent fuel pond were hit and a fire broke out. The third scenario assessed what would happen if a spent fuel pond that is densely packed with radioactive rods were targeted and caught fire.
The four facilities chosen for the scenarios include the UAE’s Barakah power plant, Iran’s Bushehr, the plant under construction at Akkuyu in Turkey, and the site of Egypt’s planned commercial nuclear power station at El Dabaa.
The study focused only on select commercial nuclear power reactors. Research reactors, such as the one Israel maintains at the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center near the city of Dimona, Iran’s Tehran Research Reactor, Egypt’s research reactor at Inshas, or Algeria’s research reactor at Es-Salam were not included in the study.
Sokolski also notes that containment buildings and spent fuel ponds are not the only targets for potential sabotage.
“You can go after the electricity lines that go into the plant that are necessary to keep the cooling system operating. You can go after the emergency generators, you can calibrate any number of effects with precision against that kind of sympathetic target,” he said.
The findings
The amounts of Cs-137 released in each scenario, as well as the estimated number of evacuees in each contamination zone, were simulated for four different months of the year based on 2020 weather patterns: March, June, September and December.
The simulations all include neighbouring countries that could be affected by mandatory evacuations.
The report examined scenarios for both a large release of Cs-137 (75 percent) and a smaller release (10 percent or 5 percent) to illustrate the potential differences between a densely-packed spent fuel pool catching fire, versus one that is not full.
The three scenarios involving a missile or drone attack on the Barakah nuclear power plant predicted average population displacements ranging from 800 mandatory and 40,000 voluntary evacuations in a low-radiological release simulation involving a core breach, to 4 million mandatory and 8 million voluntary evacuations if a densely packed spent fuel pond is hit resulting in a high release of Cs-137.
The three scenarios involving a missile or drone attack on the Bushehr nuclear power plant predicted average population displacements ranging from 53,000 mandatory and 120,000 voluntary evacuations in low-radiological release simulation involving a core breach, to 6.7 million mandatory and 4.8 million voluntary evacuations if a densely packed spent fuel pond is hit resulting in a high release of Cs-137.
The three scenarios involving a missile or drone attack on the Akkuyu nuclear power plant predicted average population displacements ranging from 1,000 mandatory and 28,000 voluntary evacuations in low-radiological release simulation involving a reactor core breach, to 4.6 million mandatory and 10 million voluntary evacuations if a densely packed spent fuel pond is hit resulting in a high release of Cs-137. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/12/8/report-missile-strike-risks-to-middle-east-nuclear-reactors
US Ex-Senator warns – US, NATO allies risking ‘all-out nuclear conflict’ with Russia
US, NATO allies risking ‘all-out nuclear conflict’ with Russia: Ex-senator, Press TV Sunday, 05 December 2021 The United States’ belligerent policy toward Russia is driven by an amorphous array of bureaucrats and lobbyists, says a former US state senator, adding that Washington does not comprehend the gravity of its provocative moves in siding with Ukraine.
The United States, its NATO allies and Ukraine accuse Moscow of massing troops near Ukraine’s border for a possible invasion. The US also claims that NATO allies are “prepared to impose severe costs” on Moscow if it attempts an invasion.
Russia says there is no such plan, but it has warned against any provocation from Ukraine that could trigger such an invasion.
“It is not clear that Western officials understand the gravity of what they are doing. It is unlikely that Russia can accept stationing of nuclear weapons or even large-scale movements of NATO troops into Ukraine,” Richard H. Black, a former state senator from Virginia, told Press TV.
“Ukraine is not a part of NATO, but the alliance increasingly talks of war to help Ukraine recover areas that have seceded from it. If NATO were to make war against Russia, the chances of escalation into an all-out nuclear conflict would be high,” he added.
Black pointed the finger of blame at Ukraine for the escalation between Moscow and NATO, stressing that the US-led military alliance’s talk of war is aimed at helping Kiev recover the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Crimean Peninsula, which rejoined Russia in a 2014 referendum.
“The Ukrainian army is moving aggressively against this small pocket of Russian-speaking people. Ukraine has deployed heavy mortars and artillery to shell the enclave, and has carried out 200 unprovoked attacks in recent weeks,” the former senator said………… https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2021/12/05/672022/Russia-policies-driven-US-bureaucrats-powerful-lobbyists
NATO foreign ministers meeting ends with veritable declaration of war
NATO foreign ministers meeting ends with veritable declaration of war, more https://antibellum679354512.wordpress.com/2021/12/01/nato-foreign-ministers-meeting-ends-with-veritable-declaration-of-war/
Rick RozoffAnti-bellum
There is no transcript that includes the question-and-answer session that followed NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s comments. But they can be heard here. Excerpts from Stoltenberg’s closing statement are featured below.
That the NATO foreign ministers meeting was held in a member state bordering Belarus and Russia at this critical juncture is significant in its own right; that the main focus of the meeting was on Ukraine and Georgia and their “territorial integrity” is eerily reminiscent of statements and land claims last made in Europe in 1938-1939.
Stoltenberg;s comments about NATO not tolerating any nation establishing and maintaining a sphere of influence approaches the surreal given the Pentagon turning all of Europe except Belarus and Russia into satrapies under the NATO aegis. In denouncing the very prospect of Russia having any influence in nations that border it and that not long ago were part of the same country, Stoltenberg became demonstrably and uncharacteristically condemnatory and bellicose, pounding the podium repeatedly. In general, the NATO secretary general’s statements – diktat, ultimata and threats – over the past few weeks, reaching a crescendo at the Riga meeting, may well be the most inflammatory ones ever made by a NATO leader.
During the session with journalists a comment is made by a reporter that unless Bosnia is press-ganged into NATO “we will have Russian forces there.” Along with similar statements regarding Moldova, the war front is constantly expanding from the Baltic-to-Black Sea front further inland to the Balkans and elsewhere.
Urgent need to correct exaggerated claims about China’s nuclear arsenal and its intentions.

In the months ahead, as the Biden administration attempts to draft a new Nuclear Posture Review and Congress votes on a proposed $715 defense bill for FY 2022, we can expect to hear a lot more about China’s “breathtaking” nuclear buildup. If we are to reduce the risks of nuclear war and lower the costs of nuclear weapons procurement, we must challenge such assertions and provide a balanced, realistic assessment of Chinese developments. We must also urge Biden to work with Xi in developing the “guardrails” that both agree are necessary to avert catastrophe.
Placing “Guardrails” on the US-China Nuclear Competition, A failure to challenge inflated claims about China’s nuclear arsenal will have serious and painful consequences. The Nation By Michael T. Klare , 1 Dec 21,
With the United States and China both speeding up the acquisition of new nuclear weapons, some analysts predicted that Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping would discuss limits on those munitions during their virtual summit on November 15. However, they barely touched on the matter, agreeing only that both sides should take steps to prevent the unintended escalation of future crises. As Biden told Xi during their three-hour exchange, the two sides need “commonsense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict.” Yet no plans were made for negotiations leading to the adoption of such measures, so the US-China arms race will only gain further momentum.
Historically, talk of nuclear arms racing has applied almost exclusively to the United States and the Soviet Union, and now Russia. Indeed, the US and Russia still possess the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear warheads, along with its most advanced nuclear delivery systems. But now China—long a minor player in the nuclear arena—appears to be bolstering its capabilities, while the United States is developing new weapons with the Chinese, as well as the Russians, in mind. The risk of a war between the US and China has also been growing, especially due to tensions over Taiwan, increasing the danger of nuclear weapons use.
Fueling these dangerous trends is a steady stream of alarmist pronouncements by US officials about China’s nuclear buildup. The Chinese are engaged in a “remarkable expansion of [their] nuclear and strategic capabilities,” Adm. Charles A. Richard, commander of the US Strategic Command, told the House Armed Services Committee last April. As a result of these initiatives, “China is capable of executing any plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally now, and soon will be able to do so at intercontinental ranges.”
But while China is certainly undertaking the modernization of its relatively old and meager nuclear arsenal—as compared to those of Russia and the United States—it can hardly be described as undertaking a “remarkable expansion” of its arsenal nor is it capable of “executing any plausible nuclear employment strategy” in a US-China war. Yet these inflated claims by senior Pentagon officials are helping spur Congress—which doesn’t really require much nudging—to finance a vast expansion of America’s own nuclear capabilities.
A failure to challenge these inflated claims and to slow the burgeoning US-China nuclear competition will have serious and painful consequences for both sides. If nothing else, it will lead to the massive allocation of resources for nuclear weapons procurement, with no end in sight. Any hope of trimming the Pentagon’s proposed $1.7 trillion modernization of all three “legs” of the nuclear “triad”—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range strategic bombers—will disappear. And the emphasis on ever-more-capable conventional weapons, combined with new developments in cyber, space, and surveillance technology, will increase the likelihood that future crises trigger an unrestrained escalatory spiral terminating in nuclear annihilation.
Fortunately, the US-China nuclear arms race is still at a relatively early stage, at least when compared to the long-running US-Soviet/Russian competition. It is possible, then, to conceive of measures that might constrain this contest before it gathers additional momentum. Before considering such measures, however, we must possess a clear understanding of this dynamic and dispel various misconceptions regarding China’s nuclear capabilities.
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE
For starters, bear in mind that China currently maintains a relatively modest nuclear arsenal. In its latest tally of world nuclear stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) calculated that China possessed approximately 350 nuclear warheads—a bit more than the number deployed by France (290), but a very small fraction of the 5,550 warheads possessed by the US and the 6,375 by Russia. China has also chosen to limit its arsenal of nuclear delivery systems. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), it has deployed only about 100 ICBMs and 48 SLBMs, compared to 400 ICBMs and 336 SLBMs in the US inventory. China also has a few dozen heavy bombers, but none with a range or nuclear payload comparable to the US B-2 and B-52 bombers.
That China maintains such a modest strategic arsenal has long provided confirmation for Beijing’s claim that it seeks nuclear armaments solely to implement a “minimum deterrence” posture—one that requires sufficient weapons to survive an enemy first strike and deliver intolerable damage on the attacker but not enough to conduct a disarming first strike on an adversary.
China’s arsenal has remained relatively unchanged for several decades, but now is being substantially modernized—allowing US military officials to claim that it is engaged in a major expansion along with a shift in its weapons employment doctrine. China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding at a“breathtaking” rate, Admiral Richard declared in August, and will soon achieve a “strategic breakout,” allowing Beijing to execute “any plausible nuclear strategy” it wishes to pursue……………
In sum, the evidence for a vast and rapid buildup in Chinese nuclear capabilities is underwhelming, to say the least. Also lacking is any indication that Beijing has abandoned its “minimum deterrence” strategy. What recent Chinese developments do suggest, however, is that Chinese officials fear that their existing nuclear force is becoming increasingly vulnerable to a first strike—sometimes called a “counterforce” strike—and so must be strengthened in order to safeguard its retaliatory capability.
US NUCLEAR INITIATIVES AND CHINA’S RESPONSE
In contrast to China, the United States has long maintained that its nuclear forces should be capable of many functions beyond just “minimum deterrence.” Current doctrine, as encapsulated in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2018, states that nuclear weapons could be employed in response to an overwhelming conventional, as well as a nuclear, attack on the United States; even a major cyber assault on the United States might justify such usage…………….
| Under these circumstances, China’s nuclear buildup can largely be viewed as an attempt to overcome the vulnerabilities of its deterrence force, ensuring that enough of its weapons can survive an enemy first-strike assault and penetrate enemy defenses. This would explain both of the developments noted above: the replacement of single-warhead missiles with multiple-warhead variants and the construction of multiple silo holes in the desert. By equipping their ICBMs and SLBMs with a number of independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVed missiles, in Pentagon-speak), the Chinese evidently hope to ensure that even if only a few of their weapons escape American missile defenses, those survivors will still be able to launch multiple warheads against US targets; likewise, by constructing hundreds of additional silos and moving their ICBMs from one to the other on a random basis, they can circumvent a US first strike. None of this, however, suggests an intent to acquire a US-style counterforce capability. TAKING ACTION NOW As suggested by this analysis, China’s nuclear modernization does not pose the same sort of threat to the United States as US nuclear and conventional initiatives pose to China. True, China is capable of inflicting catastrophic damage on this country in the event of a nuclear war, but it does not appear to be seeking a first-strike or damage-limiting capacity akin to that possessed by the United States. Nevertheless, the danger of a US-China war is growing, and any major confrontation between US and Chinese forces could result in colossal losses on one or both sides, precipitating the early use of nuclear weapons. This is the perfect time, then, for the Biden administration to seek talks with Beijing aimed at eliminating or curtailing weapons developments that are placing both countries at greater risk. The goal—at least in the early stages of such engagement—should not be the adoption of conventional arms control agreements, like those signed between the US and the USSR during the Cold War era. Rather, the two sides should engage in high-level talks aimed at identifying the greatest risks of precipitous or unintended escalation, and in devising strategies for minimizing those dangers. (Reportedly, the Biden administration has been considering the initiation of such talks with China, but there is no indication that formal plans have yet been made to proceed with this.) Such high-level conversations—sometimes called “strategic stability” talks—could focus, for example, on the expected deployment on both sides of numerous hypersonic missiles aimed at each other’s high-value targets, and pursue ways to curtail their numbers or mode of employment, to minimize the risk of rapid escalation. Both sides could also agree to eschew cyberattacks on each other’s nuclear command-and-control systems, with the same goal in mind. Mutual restraints could also be crafted to reduce the danger of escalation during a crisis, for example through limitations on the scale of air and naval maneuvers in the area surrounding Taiwan. In the months ahead, as the Biden administration attempts to draft a new Nuclear Posture Review and Congress votes on a proposed $715 defense bill for FY 2022, we can expect to hear a lot more about China’s “breathtaking” nuclear buildup. If we are to reduce the risks of nuclear war and lower the costs of nuclear weapons procurement, we must challenge such assertions and provide a balanced, realistic assessment of Chinese developments. We must also urge Biden to work with Xi in developing the “guardrails” that both agree are necessary to avert catastrophe. https://www.thenation.com/article/world/china-nuclear-competition/ Michael T. Klare, The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. Most recently, he is the author of All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change. |
9 top US nuclear no-proliferation experts write to Prime Minister Trudeau requesting a review of Canada’s planned nuclear reprocessing to recover plutonium.

| The latest of three open letters to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau from US non-proliferation. experts is copied below [on original] . The previous two letters are linked in footnotes #1 and #2. [on original] In these three letters, a group of nine distinguished nuclear policy experts are asking for a top level Canadian government review of the nuclear weapons proliferation dangers associated with the planned reprocessing of Canadian used nuclear fuel to recover the plutonium for use in a proposed new reactor in New Brunswick. These nine experts have worked under six U.S. presidents: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama; and hold professorships at the Harvard Kennedy School, University of Maryland, Georgetown University, University of Texas at Austin, George Washington University, and Princeton University. CCNR 30th Nov 2021 http://www.ccnr.org/request_plute_nov_24_2021.pdf |
President of Belarus – ready to host Russian nuclear weapons if NATO moves atomic bombs to Eastern Europe.
The longtime president of Belarus said Tuesday that his country would be
ready to host Russian nuclear weapons if NATO moves U.S. atomic bombs from
Germany to Eastern Europe.
Independent 30th Nov 2021
At the Global Alliance of Leaders for Nuclear Security and Nuclear-Weapons-Free World (GAL) meeting, Nursultan Nazarbayev proposes Global Forum on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament

Nazarbayev proposed to launch the Global Forum on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmamenthttps://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nazarbayev-proposed-to-launch-the-global-forum-on-nuclear-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-301433017.html
Astana Club , Nov 29, 2021, NUR-SULTAN, Kazakhstan, Nov. 29, 2021 /PRNewswire/ — The Global Alliance of Leaders for Nuclear Security and Nuclear-Weapons-Free World (GAL) was held on the platform of the VI meeting of the Astana Club in the capital of Kazakhstan.
Addressing the members of the GAL, Nursultan Nazarbayev noted that negotiations on nuclear strategic stability on inter-state level are facing a stalemate, and there is a strong need for an alternative form of dialogue on this issue.
To break this deadlock, Mr. Nazarbayev proposed to set up the Global Forum on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the capital of Kazakhstan.
Forum should bring together all key international NGOs and world moral authorities in the anti-nuclear field to forge a unified global agenda.
In his statement Nazarbayev also called on the world community to develop a step-by-step Plan for a comprehensive reduction of strategic offensive arms with the participation of all nuclear states under the auspices of the UN.
Nazarbayev expressed confidence that the GAL can become the central platform and driving force in the development of this document.
Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also addressed the Alliance members with the support of the Nazarbayev’s initiative and noted that without the elimination of the nuclear threat, the world community will never be able to guarantee its security.
The address of the former President of the USSR, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mikhail Gorbachev to Nursultan Nazarbayev and members of the Alliance became a significant moment at the GAL session.
Mr. Gorbachev expressed his full support for the initiative of the First President of Kazakhstan to establish GAL, noting that “there can be no other final goal than a world without nuclear weapons.”
He also noted that the meeting of Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in June this year in Geneva marked a positive trend. According to Gorbachev, it is extremely important that the meeting of two presidents reiterated the idea that “there will be no winners in a nuclear war,” which was first voiced in 1985 at his meeting with US President Ronald Reagan.
The meeting of GAL was also attended by the leaders of the global anti-nuclear movement such as Nobel Peace Prize laureates Mohamed ElBaradei and ICAN Executive Director, Beatrice Fihn, as well as former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and UN Under-Secretary-General Angela Kane, and many others.
All the meeting participants unanimously acknowledged that Kazakhstan, which voluntarily renounced the world’s fourth largest nuclear military arsenal of 1,200 atomic warheads in 1990s, has the full moral right to undertake such global anti-nuclear initiatives.
This year’s GAL meeting refers to the Doomsday Clock, the symbol of likelihood of nuclear war – One Minute to Midnight: Time for Action for the Nuclear Dialogue. This is because at the beginning of 2021, the Doomsday Clock moved the closest it has ever been in its history since 1947: 100 seconds to midnight.
Nursultan Nazarbayev.
GAL’s mission is to provide impetus to the anti-nuclear agenda through the joint efforts of the leaders of major international NGOs, well-known politicians, and world moral authorities in the anti-nuclear field.
In 2020, GAL’s Open Call to world leaders to demand the need for strengthening joint efforts on nuclear safety, non-proliferation and disarmament was registered as an official document of the UN and the IAEA.
To date, the GAL is supported by over seventy prominent international figures, including politicians, experts, and Nobel Peace Prize laureates..
France’s Foreign Minister in Indonesia, raises concerns about AUKUS, nuclear submarines, and risks of weapons proliferation.
the theme of ‘betrayal’ in terms of both being ‘cheated’ out of a deal and being deceived by NATO allies and, in Australia’s case, a historical ally.

AUKUS was about ‘pressing a sense of confrontation with China’
if tomorrow Australia has some nuclear-powered submarines, why not, some other countries could ask for similar technology, it could be Indonesia, why not?’
Australia needs an entente cordiale with Indonesia over nuclear propulsion and non-proliferation, The Strategist, 29 Nov 2021, |David Engel However relaxed and comfortable Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto might be about Australia’s plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), the visit to Jakarta of French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has probably validated the very different view of Le Drian’s counterpart, Retno Marsudi.
……………………………………………. the most striking moment of the visit came during Le Drian’s address to Indonesia’s leading international affairs think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). While his speech focused on issues such as multilateralism and the EU’s position on the Indo-Pacific, his response to a question on ‘minilateralism’—specifically, AUKUS and the Quad—took on a very different tone.
Ignoring the Quad, he levelled his remarks at AUKUS, stressing four points. The first two reiterated the theme of ‘betrayal’ in terms of both being ‘cheated’ out of a deal and being deceived by NATO allies and, in Australia’s case, a historical ally. He talked about American efforts to restore trust through various US commitments to France. He didn’t mention Australia in this context.
More significantly, his third point was that AUKUS was about ‘pressing a sense of confrontation with China’ (as the simultaneous translation put it). He said that, while France was not oblivious to China’s military threats and risks, he believed that the best way to respond to these threats was to ‘develop an alternative model rather than to first of all oppose’.
Perhaps his most significant point for Australian interests was his fourth, which went to the transfer of nuclear technology for submarine propulsion. He pointed out that until now no nuclear-weapon state had done this. But ‘if tomorrow Australia has some nuclear-powered submarines, why not, some other countries could ask for similar technology, it could be Indonesia, why not?’ He continued that, even though this technology was not covered by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the risk the arrangement posed of starting a trend was nonetheless of concern.
Irrespective of Le Drian’s intentions in answering the question in this manner—and it’s noteworthy that he didn’t cover AUKUS in his formal address—he would surely have known that his words would resonate powerfully with his audience, both at CSIS and more generally among Indonesia’s foreign policy establishment. While his depiction of Australia as duplicitous was evidently personal and heartfelt, it would also have struck a chord with those Indonesians who have characterised Canberra the same way over such issues as East Timor, Papua and spying allegations, irrespective of how justified that judgement might be.
Le Drian’s last point went directly to concerns about nuclear proliferation—issues that Indonesia highlighted in its official statement on AUKUS and the planned submarines. It corresponds closely ‘in spirit’ with subsequent official commentary to the effect that Indonesia was considering advocating a change to the NPT aimed at preventing non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring SSNs………
whoever governs in Canberra now and into the future should at least make a priority of assuaging Jakarta’s worries on this subject, however overstated and unbalanced they are. While Indonesia’s prospects of changing the NPT and precluding Australia from having SSNs look remote at best—not least because several of its ASEAN colleagues do not share its views of Australia’s ambitions—the sooner the two countries can put this latest irritant to rest the better.
In the circumstances, the onus for doing so must primarily rest with Canberra………https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-needs-an-entente-cordiale-with-indonesia-over-nuclear-propulsion-and-non-proliferation/
Australian government using a loophole to evade international non-proliferation treaties, to get nuclear submarines?

“interesting interpretation” that the government would try to qualify for an exemption from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection regime by claiming military submarines, which will be fuelled with weapons grade uranium, are for peaceful purposes.”
Labor questions whether nuclear subs breach international law, AFR, Andrew Tillett, Political correspondent, 30 Nov 21, Labor MPs have raised concerns about Australia breaching its non-proliferation obligations under the Morrison government’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines from Britain and the United States.
Parliament’s Treaties Committee has begun a snap inquiry into the first element under the AUKUS deal, an agreement between the three countries to allow the sharing of highly classified nuclear technology with Australian officials.
The nuclear agreement also covers training opportunities for Australian submariners and technicians with the British and American programs.
Under the AUKUS pact, the government will acquire up to eight nuclear-powered submarines, promising they will be built in Adelaide. The first is due to be delivered sometime before 2040.
The government is adamant the nuclear submarine deal will not be a precursor to acquiring nuclear weapons.
The inquiry is due to report by December 17 but at its first hearing on Monday, Labor MP Josh Wilson highlighted significant uncertainty over the government’s plan to use a loophole in the international nuclear safety regime, which had never been used before, to acquire the submarines.
Mr Wilson and fellow Labor MP Peter Khalil grilled officials from the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Attorney-General’s departments over how Australia could acquire nuclear-powered submarines while still complying with its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Training ‘needs to start now’
Mr Wilson said it was an “interesting interpretation” that the government would try to qualify for an exemption from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection regime by claiming military submarines, which will be fuelled with weapons grade uranium, are for peaceful purposes.
“If it was determined that was acceptable, we will have broken new ground in weakening the existing non-proliferation regime,” Mr Wilson observed……….. https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/questions-over-whether-nuclear-subs-breach-international-law-20211129-p59d0h
UN chief calls for nuclear weapons-free Middle East
UN chief calls for nuclear weapons-free Middle East, UN News, The UN Secretary-General on Monday called on all Middle East States to transform the vision of a region with no nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, into a working reality.
Antonio Guterres was speaking in New York at the second session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Since 1967, five such zones have been established around the world: Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia. They include 60 per cent of all UN Member States and cover almost all of the Southern Hemisphere.
For the Secretary-General, expanding such zones would help build a safer world.
“That is particularly the case in the Middle East, where concerns over nuclear programmes persist, and where conflicts and civil wars are causing widespread civilian casualties and suffering, undermining stability and disrupting social and economic development”, Mr. Guterres explained.
The UN chief also reiterated his call for all parties to exercise restraint and avoid escalation.
In this context, he highlighted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as Iran Nuclear Deal, saying that the return to dialogue is “an important step.” ………. https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1106732
26 UK investment funds pouring money into nuclear weapons companies: some have links to UK government.

“It is unsurprising that the same financial institutions who continue to pour funding into companies like BAE Systems also have close links with senior Conservative party members and is yet another example of the cosy relationship between the arms industry and the UK government,”
The Ferret, November 28, 2021 Twenty-six financial firms in London have been accused of funding a “new nuclear arms race” including investment funds with links to the UK Government, The Ferret can reveal.
The Ferret found that 26 were based in London and six have links to the Conservative Party, which plans to increase Britain’s nuclear weapons arsenal.
They include Schroders UK which holds shares in the arms giant, BAE Systems. Schroders chair is Lord Geidt, who was an advisor to BAE Systems until April this year. He is now an advisor to Prime Minister Boris Johnson, whose plan to produce more nuclear weapons has been condemned by peace organisations.
Netherlands-based peace group, PAX, produced the study with the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Their report warns that financial institutions continuing to invest in companies involved with the nuclear weapons industry could face “regulatory risks” because of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force in January 2021.
The treaty – which the UK has not ratified – bans nuclear weapons and has been signed by 86 states so far.
The UK Government — which claims it is “committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons” — said in March it would lift the cap on its nuclear arsenal by 40 per cent, from 180 to 260 warheads. In a statement in November the government claimed it had “played a leading role by pioneering work in nuclear disarmament”.
Perilous Profiteering says that Schroders UK had investments in 2020 worth $125.3 million (£93.97m) in BAE Systems which is building new Dreadnought submarines that will be armed with nuclear missiles. The company also provides logistics support for the US Trident and Minuteman missiles. BAE Systems stressed that it does not make nuclear warheads.
The report also names Royal London Group UK which had shares in 2020 worth $98.6m (£74m) in BAE Systems. In June the insurance company appointed Ruth Davidson, former leader of the Scottish Tories , as a non-executive director. Davidson is now a peer.
Others with links to the Tories include the Children’s Investment Fund Management (CIFF) which has shares in Safran, a French firm. Safran owns 50 per cent of ArianeGroup which has contracts for French nuclear weapon production.
Emma Cockburn, Scotland co-ordinator for Campaign Against Arms Trade
CIFF’s investment assets are managed by TCI Fund Management, where Rishi Sunak MP, chancellor of the exchequer, was a partner from 2006 to 2009.
Investment firm Janus Henderson, which has shares in General Dynamics, L3 Harris and Leidos, gave the Tories £3,500 in 2018, a payment which was registered in the House of Commons as required. General Dynamics, L3 Harris and Leidos all operate within the nuclear sector, says the new report.
According to the new report, the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in January 2021, is an “historic shift” in the way the world “deals with nuclear weapons”. It points out that while nuclear weapons are controlled by governments, their production is often contracted to private companies. “They (nuclear weapons) are now comprehensively outlawed, as is any assistance with producing, manufacturing or developing them,” the report says.
“Financial institutions that continue investing in companies building nuclear weapons face regulatory risks as more countries join the treaty. They also face an increased reputational risk as clients learn of their support for weapons of mass destruction and terminate their relationships.”
The report also reveals that 338 institutions have financing or investment relationships with the 25 nuclear weapon producing companies, down from 390 the previous year – a fall of 52, which the authors welcomed……….
Other critics of the nuclear weapons industry include Emma Cockburn, Scotland co-ordinator for Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT). She said the report provides a “damning insight to the endless billions available for the nuclear and arms manufacturers.”
“It is unsurprising that the same financial institutions who continue to pour funding into companies like BAE Systems also have close links with senior Conservative party members and is yet another example of the cosy relationship between the arms industry and the UK government,” she added……………………….. https://theferret.scot/revealed-27-london-companies-funding-nuclear/
British military moving closer and closer to, nuclear bombers 12 miles from Russian border: envoy — Anti-bellum
Deployment of British troops in Germany doesn’t alleviate tension with Moscow – ambassador The deployment of British Armed Forces in Germany won’t reduce tension between NATO countries and Russia, Russian Ambassador to the UK Andrey Kelin said in an interview with the Times Radio station. “NATO is stepping up its presence along the borders of […]
British military moving closer and closer to, nuclear bombers 12 miles from Russian border: envoy — Anti-bellum
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