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Nuclear Twilight – the ”limited” nuclear war

‘Nuclear twilight’: Something else to worry about, Stuff  Gwynne Dyer05:00, Dec 30 2021  ”………………… A different team of researchers discovered nuclear winter almost 40 years ago, and it helped to convince the great powers they must never fight a nuclear war.

The reason we don’t worry much about nuclear winter now is that we think they have finally learned that lesson.

True, there are now other countries with nuclear weapons that don’t seem immune to outbreaks of major war, like India and Pakistan. However, everybody assumed the damage would be confined to their own region.

If we don’t let it escalate into a superpower clash, the rest of the world should be all right.

Wrong.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals each amount to about 150 warheads now. That’s a modest number compared to the thousands held by the superpowers, but it turns out to be quite enough to cause…let’s call it a nuclear twilight.

What makes this so worrisome is that India and Pakistan have already fought three full-scale wars and half a dozen major skirmishes since they got their independence.

Another is entirely possible, and the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons would be very high, for two reasons.

First, most of their nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles are vulnerable to being destroyed on the ground in a surprise attack.

Secondly, the two countries are so close together that only a very brief warning time is available. In these circumstances, a policy of ‘launch on warning’, with all the risk of mistakes that entails, is the only rational option for both sides

The first victims of such a war would be Pakistani and Indian civilians, because cities will be on the target lists: that’s where the major ports, airfields and critical infrastructure are.

Robock’s team calculated that those burning cities would loft enough ‘black carbon’ into the stratosphere to create a shroud of soot over the whole world within a few weeks.

t wouldn’t be the full-dress nuclear winter of superpower war, with ‘darkness at noon’. However, 300 nuclear explosions in the Indian subcontinent, most of them airbursts over cities, would dim the sun enough to drop temperatures and severely damage crop yields in the main food-producing regions of the planet.

The main effects would be a severe drop in the average global temperature and a comparable decline in global food production – with the worst-hit areas being in the Northern Hemisphere, north of latitude 30°N. (Almost all of India and Pakistan are south of that.)

It’s counter-intuitive, but that’s the way the climate system works.

The most important ‘breadbaskets’ of the planet – grain-growing areas that produce a big crop surplus for export – are the United States, Canada and Europe (including European Russia) – and they are all just north of 30.

The dimming effects of an Indo-Pak nuclear war in 2025, say, would drop the average global temperature by 5 °C over all the continents, but in the key regions of North America and Europe it could reach 10 °C colder.

That maximum cooling would be reached in the fourth year after the war, and would gradually return to ‘normal’ by around year 15.

Australia, Brazil and Argentina, the Southern Hemisphere’s bread-baskets, might still be able to export some grain, but they would not be remotely capable of compensating for the huge shortfalls of food in the Northern Hemisphere.

Tens, maybe hundreds of millions would starve in the poorer parts of the north, and scrabbling for food in the cold and the dark would certainly take our minds off our longer-term problem: global heating.

But when the effects of the local nuclear war in the Indian subcontinent finally faded, it would be right back to that bigger climate crisis.

And it would be bigger, for carbon dioxide would not have stopped accumulating during the hungry years. Indeed, the world might find that it was returning not to the average global temperature of +1.3 °C that prevailed when the Indo-Pak war started, but to a climate that was now hovering on the brink of +2.0 °C. https://www.stuff.co.nz/manawatu-standard/opinion/300487679/nuclear-twilight-something-else-to-worry-about

December 30, 2021 Posted by | 2 WORLD, climate change, weapons and war | Leave a comment

A Ukrainian invasion could go nuclear: 15 reactors would be in a war zone

A Ukraine Invasion Could Go Nuclear: 15 Reactors Would Be In War Zone  https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/12/28/a-ukraine-invasion-will-go-nuclear-15-reactors-are-in-the-war-zone/?sh=1c9a8a0a27aa&fbclid=IwAR1k5sz1_5PLOb7Lg6qMjULu_lj0nqF-6SXx7NifPxr6uakDliSUlgyHFqI Craig HooperSenior Contributor
As Russia’s buildup on the Ukrainian border continues, few observers note that an invasion of Ukraine could put nuclear reactors on the front line of military conflict. The world is underestimating the risk that full-scale, no-holds-barred conventional warfare could spark a catastrophic reactor failure, causing an unprecedented regional nuclear emergency.

The threat is real. Ukraine is heavily dependent upon nuclear power, maintaining four nuclear power plants and stewardship of the shattered nuclear site at Chernobyl. In a major war, all 15 reactors at Ukraine’s nuclear power facilities would be at risk, but even a desultory Russian incursion into eastern Ukraine is likely to expose at least six active reactors to the uncertainty of a ground combat environment.

The world has little experience with reactors in a war zone. Since humanity first harnessed the atom, the world has only experienced two “major” accidents—Chernobyl and Japan’s Fukushima disaster. A Russian invasion, coupled with an extended conventional war throughout Ukraine, could generate multiple International Atomic Energy Agency “Level 7” accidents in a matter of days. Such a contingency would induce a massive refugee exodus and could render much of Ukraine uninhabitable for decades. 

Turning the Ukraine into a dystopian landscape, pockmarked by radioactive exclusion zones, would be an extreme method to obtain the defensive zone Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to want. Managing a massive Western-focused migratory crisis and environmental cleanup would absorb Europe for years. The work would distract European leaders and empower nativist governments that tend to be aligned with Russia’s baser interests, giving an overextended Russia breathing room as the country teeters on the brink of technological, demographic, and financial exhaustion. 

Put bluntly, the integrity of Ukrainian nuclear reactors is a strategic matter, critical for both NATO and non-NATO countries alike. Causing a severe radiological accident for strategic purposes is unacceptable. A deliberate aggravation of an emerging nuclear catastrophe—preventing mitigation measures or allowing reactors to deliberately melt down and potentially contaminate wide portions of Europe—would simply be nuclear warfare without bombs.  

Such a scenario can’t be ruled out. Russia has repeatedly used Ukraine to test out concepts for “Gray Zone” warfare, where an attacker dances just beyond the threshold of open conflict. Given Russia’s apparent interest in radiation-spewing nuclear-powered cruise missiles, robotic undersea bombs with a radiological fallout-oriented payload, destructive anti-satellite tests and other nihilistic, world-harming weapons, Russia’s ongoing dalliance with “Gray Zone” warfare in Ukraine may, for the rest of Europe, become a real matter of estimating radiological “grays,” or, in other words, estimating the amount of ionizing radiation absorbed by humans. 

When War Comes To Zaporizhzhia 

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is a particular risk. It is the second-largest nuclear power plant in Europe (essentially tied with a French reactor complex near Calais), and one of the 10 largest nuclear power plants in the world. The site has little protection, and the six VVER-1000 pressurized water reactors could easily be embroiled in any Russian invasion. 

If war comes, the fight will be close by. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is located only 120 miles from the current “front line” in the Donbass region and is on the hard-to-defend east bank of the Dnieper River. Aside from the geographical hazards, the power plant provides about a quarter of Ukraine’s total electrical power. Given the importance of the electricity, plant managers will be reluctant to shut it down, securing the reactors only at the very last possible second. Ukraine’s desperate need for energy only compounds the opportunities for an accident. 

Outside of direct battle damage, cyber and other Russian-sourced “grey zone” mischief could make the plant unmanageable even before the battle arrives at the reactor gates. 

Though unlikely, direct bombardment could cause serious damage to reactor containment structures. While the reactor structures themselves are strong, warfare at the plant could kill key personnel and destroy command-and-control structures, monitoring sensors or critical reactor-cooling infrastructure. And, as an operating power plant, the reactors are not the only threat. Dangerous spent fuel rods are sitting in vulnerable cooling ponds, while older fuel sits in the site’s 167 dry spent fuel assemblies. 

If the reactors suffer any operational anomalies, crisis management is not going to happen. Support infrastructure needed for safe reactor management will collapse during conflict. Plant security forces will disappear, operators will flee, and, if an accident occurs, mitigating measures will be impossible. 

It seems unlikely that Russia has mobilized trained reactor operators and prepared reactor crisis-management teams to take over any “liberated” power plants. The heroic measures that kept the Chernobyl nuclear accident and Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster from becoming far more damaging events just will not happen in a war zone. 

Again, the risks are very high. The world has never dealt with an unmanaged meltdown at a large nuclear power plant. The very real prospect of an extended and unmitigated incident at a six-reactor powerplant in a war zone is worth urgent and immediate consultations throughout Europe and NATO.  

Gray Zone Nuclear Conflict Can Happen

The world has never experienced war that threatens active nuclear power infrastructure, and world leaders may be underestimating the peril conventional warfare presents to these powerful and perilous assets.

On the other hand, heedless purveyors of “gray zone” warfare may be underestimating the risk themselves, all too eager to determine just how degraded nuclear infrastructure might serve as a “less risky” surrogate for nuclear conflict.

To them, it’s not nuclear war, but just a series of unfortunate nuclear accidents.

December 28, 2021 Posted by | politics international, Ukraine, weapons and war | 1 Comment

Thorium and nuclear weapons.

The Hype About Thorium Reactors, by Gordon Edwards, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, December 26 2021.

There has recently been an upsurge of uninformed babble about thorium as if it were a new discovery with astounding potentiality. Some describe it as a nearly miraculous material that can provide unlimited amounts of problem-free energy. Such hype is grossly exaggerated.

Thorium and Nuclear Weapons

One of the most irresponsible statements is that thorium has no connection with nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the initial motivation for using thorium in nuclear reactors was precisely for the purposes of nuclear weaponry.

It was known from the earliest days of nuclear fission that naturally-occurring thorium can be converted into a powerful nuclear explosive – not found in nature – called uranium-233, in much the same way that naturally-occurring uranium can be converted into plutonium.

Working at a secret laboratory in Montreal during World War II, nuclear scientists from France and Britain collaborated with Canadians and others to study the best way to obtain human-made nuclear explosives for bombs. That objective can be met by converting natural uranium into human-made plutonium-239, or by converting natural thorium into human-made uranium-233. These conversions can only be made inside a nuclear reactor. 

The Montreal team designed the famous and very powerful NRX research reactor for that military purpose as well as other non-military objectives. The war-time decision to allow the building of the NRX reactor was made in Washington DC by a six-person committee (3 Americans, 2 Brits and 1 Canadian) in the spring of 1944.

The NRX reactor began operation in 1947 at Chalk River, Ontario, on the Ottawa River, 200 kilometres northwest of the nation’s capital. The American military insisted that thorium rods as well as uranium rods be inserted into the reactor core. Two chemical “reprocessing” plants were built and operated at Chalk River, one to extract plutonium-239 from irradiated uranium rods, and a second to extract uranium-233 from irradiated thorium rods. This dangerous operation required dissolving intensely radioactive rods in boiling nitric acid and chemically separating out the small quantity of nuclear explosive material contained in those rods. Both plants were shut down in the 1950s after three men were killed in an explosion.

The USA detonated a nuclear weapon made from a mix of uranium-233 and plutonium-239 in 1955. In that same year the Soviet Union detonated its first H-bomb (a thermonuclear weapon, using nuclear fusion as well as nuclear fission) with a fissile core of natural uranium-235 and human-made uranium-233.

In 1998, India tested a nuclear weapon using uranium-233 as part of its series of nuclear test explosions in that year. A few years earlier, In 1994, the US government declassified a 1966 memo that states that uranium-233 has been demonstrated to be highly satisfactory as a weapons material. 

Uranium Reactors are really U-235 reactors

Uranium is the only naturally-occurring material that can be used to make an atomic bomb or to fuel a nuclear reactor. In either case, the energy release is due to the fissioning of uranium-235 atoms in a self-sustaining “chain reaction”. But uranium-235 is rather scarce. When uranium is found in nature, usually as a metallic ore in a rocky formation, it is about 99.3 percent uranium-238 and only 0.7 percent uranium-235. That’s just seven atoms out of a thousand!

Uranium-238, the heavier and more abundant isotope of uranium, cannot be used to make an A-Bomb or to fuel a reactor. It is only the lighter isotope, uranium-235, that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction. If the chain reaction is uncontrolled, you have a nuclear explosion; if it is controlled, as it is in a nuclear reactor, you have a steady supply of energy. 

But you cannot make a nuclear explosion with uranium unless the concentration of uranium-238 is greatly reduced and the concentration of uranium-235 is drastically increased. This procedure is called “uranium enrichment”, and the enrichment must be to a high degree – preferably more than 90 percent U-235, or at the very least 20 percent U-235 – to get a nuclear explosion. For this reason, the ordinary uranium fuel used in commercial power reactors is not weapons-usable; the concentration of U-235 is typically less than five percent.

However, as these uranium-235 atoms are split inside a nuclear reactor, the broken fragments form new smaller atoms called “fission products”. There are hundreds of varieties of fission products, and they are collectively millions of times more radioactive than the uranium fuel itself. They are the main constituents of “high-level radioactive waste” (or “irradiated nuclear fuel”) that must be kept out of the environment of living things for millions of years.

In addition, stray neutrons from the fissioning U-235 atoms convert many of the uranium-238 atoms into atoms if plutonium-239. Reactor-produced plutonium is always weapons-usable, regardless of the mixture of different isotopes; no enrichment is needed! But that plutonium can only be extracted from the used nuclear fuel by “reprocessing” the used fuel. That requires separating the plutonium from the fiercely radioactive fission products that will otherwise give a lethal dose of radiation to workers in a short time.

Thorium Reactors are really U-233 reactors

Unlike uranium, thorium cannot sustain a nuclear chain reaction under any circumstances. Thorium can therefore not be used to make an atomic bomb or to fuel a nuclear reactor. However, if thorium is inserted into an operating nuclear reactor (fuelled by uranium or plutonium), some of the thorium atoms are converted to uranium-233 atoms by absorbing stray neutrons. That newly created material, uranium-233, is even better than uranium-235 at sustaining a chain reaction.  That’s why uranium-233 can be used as a powerful nuclear explosive or as an exemplary reactor fuel.

But thorium cannot be used directly as a nuclear fuel.  It has to be converted into uranium-233 and then the human-made isotope uranium-233 becomes the reactor fuel. And to perform that conversion, some other nuclear fuel must be used – either enriched uranium or plutonium

Of course, when uranium-233 atoms are split, hundreds of fission products are created from the broken fragments, and they are collectively far more radioactive than the uranium-233 itself – or the thorium from which it was created.  So once again, we see that high-level radioactive waste is being produced even in a thorium reactor (as in a normal present-day uranium reactor). 

In summary, a so-called “thorium reactor” is in reality a uranium-233 reactor. 

Some other nuclear fuel (enriched uranium-235 or plutonium) must be used to convert thorium atoms into uranium-233 atoms. Some form of reprocessing must then be used to extract uranium-233 from the irradiated thorium. The fissioning of uranium-233, like the fissioning of uranium-235 or plutonium, creates hundreds of new fission products that make up the bulk of the high-level radioactive waste from any nuclear reactor. And, as previously remarked, uranium-233 is also a powerful nuclear explosive, posing serious weapons proliferation risks. Moreover, uranium-233 – unlike the uranium fuel that is currently used in commercial power reactors around the world – is immediately usable as a nuclear explosive. The moment uranium-233 is created it is very close to 100 percent enriched – perfect for use in any nuclear weapon of suitable design.

Uranium-232 — A Fly in the Ointment

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December 27, 2021 Posted by | Reference, thorium, Uranium, weapons and war | 1 Comment

USA is examining its ”nuclear declaratory policy”, while Biden considers how to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear declaratory policy examined as Biden eyes curbing nukes, By Ryohei Takagi, KYODO NEWS , 26 Dec 21,  The United States is examining its “declaratory policy” on the use of nuclear arms under President Joe Biden’s commitment to seeking to reduce the role of such weaponry, the State Department’s top arms control official Bonnie Jenkins said recently.

Her remarks came as focus is increasing on whether the Biden administration will declare the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter or respond to nuclear attacks in its upcoming nuclear posture review, a guideline for American nuclear policy for the coming years………….

The U.S. nuclear declaratory policy has so far centered on what is known as “strategic ambiguity” regarding the exact circumstances that might lead to a nuclear response, though efforts have been seen in the past to offer clarification.

Former President Barack Obama, who pledged in 2009 to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons, considered adopting a “no first use” policy, which would mean limiting the U.S. use of nuclear weapons only in response to nuclear attacks on itself or allies.

But his administration gave up the idea in the face of objections from some allies including Japan.

The Financial Times reported early this month that U.S. officials have reassured allies in Europe and Asia that Biden, who was vice president during the Obama administration, will not adopt a “no first use” policy. The officials will provide the president with options for a “sole purpose” declaratory policy, the newspaper said.

The sole purpose posture could leave open the possibility of using nuclear weapons first, if it were the only way to preempt an imminent nuclear attack by a country such as North Korea, pundits say.

Still, it could demonstrate a more restrained approach toward the use of U.S. nuclear weapons compared with the 2018 nuclear posture review compiled under Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump. Under the former leader, the possibility remained nuclear weapons could be used not only against nuclear attacks but against “significant” non-nuclear attacks…………………………   https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/12/3b69a0d35603-nuclear-declaratory-policy-examined-as-biden-eyes-curbing-nukes.html

December 27, 2021 Posted by | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Iran Simulated Attack On Israel’s Dimona Nuclear Site In Recent Wargames


Iran Simulated Attack On Israel’s Dimona Nuclear Site In Recent Wargames, Iran International, 26 Dec 21,  Iran simulated an attack against Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor during extensive military drills this week, that included launching multiple ballistic missiles.

Fars news agency, an affiliate of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, published a video on Sunday that shows a mock-up of the Israeli nuclear site as the target of the simulated operation.

The Dimona reactor, officially known as the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center, was marked as “WMD production center” in the high-resolution video.

Sixteen ballistic missiles and five suicide drones were launched against the mock target in the operation.

Rhetoric has intensified between Iran and Israel in recent weeks as nuclear talks between Tehran and world powers have stalled in Vienna. Israel has vowed that if Iran’s nuclear program reaches a statge close to production of weapons, it will act regardless of an agreement the United States and other world powers reach with Tehran……………. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202112260336

December 27, 2021 Posted by | Iraq, politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Depleted uranium exports to Russia are not a ”resource” – they are radioactive waste

Our conclusion is that this form of TENORM (technically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive material) should be considered in principle as a waste material, for which full transparency should be assured over its complete chain of management,

DU Exports to Russia – A case of lack of transparency and research Nuclear Transparency Watch By Jan Haverkamp (Greenpeace, WISE) December 21,

From 1996, the uranium enrichment facilities URENCO Almelo (Netherlands) and URENCO Gronau (Germany) regularly sent shipments of depleted uranium (DU) in the form of UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) to TENEX, later TVEL, in Russia, where this was stored in the open air in Seversk in the Krasnoyarsk region. Protests in Europe then halted these transports in 2009. TVEL is since 2007 a subsidiary of the Russian nuclear giant Rosatom. URENCO carries out enrichment for nuclear fuel production from natural uranium to low-enriched uranium for clients all over the world and has facilities in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK.

In 2019 and 2020, these transports were resumed from the enrichment facility of URENCO Gronau and URENCO UK in Capenhurst.

URENCO Almelo currently has a permit for export, but does not use it. Its DU is sent to France for conversion into stable U3O8 (depleted tri-uranium-octo-oxide or uranium oxide), which is returned to the Netherlands and handed over to the waste management organisation COVRA for interim storage in the VOG facility, awaiting final disposal after 2100.

The claim is that the DU is sent to TENEX, later TVEL, for re-enrichment to natural level and reuse of the resulting double depleted uranium (DDU). Rosatom furthermore claims[2] that DDU and DU are used industrially and that the UF6 also delivers fluorine for reuse purposes. It furthermore, describes in detail how it wants to convert its UF6 stockpile into uranium oxide for waste treatment before 2057.

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December 24, 2021 Posted by | depleted uranium, Russia, wastes | Leave a comment

USA puts pressure on Japan to not attend nuclear ban treaty meeting, not even as an observer

U.S. urges Japan not to join nuclear ban treaty meeting: sources  KYODO NEWS 20 Dec 21, The United States has urged Japan not to attend as an observer the first meeting of signatories to a U.N. treaty banning nuclear weapons, according to U.S. government sources, reflecting Washington’s opposition to the pact.The Japanese government has suggested it will come into line with the United States and take a cautious approach to the issue, the sources said. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida told a parliamentary committee on Thursday that Tokyo has no “concrete plans” to attend the meeting as an observer.

The sources said the U.S. administration of President Joe Biden made the request to Japan through diplomatic channels after German political parties announced Nov. 24 that the deal for the new ruling coalition included taking part as an observer at the meeting scheduled for March in Vienna.

Maybe because of the request, Kishida also suggested last week that participation in the meeting would be premature “before building a relationship of trust with President Biden.”

Germany’s move has put Japan — which has stated it aspires to a world free of nuclear weapons as the only country to have suffered the devastation of atomic bombings — in the spotlight. Both countries are key U.S. allies that rely on American nuclear forces for protection.

The U.S. government has maintained its opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in January this year, even as Biden has pledged to strive for a world without nuclear weapons………..

The U.S. government is also calling on the new three-party German government, launched in December, to give up on the idea of taking part in the March 22-24 meeting in Vienna, according to the sources.

The new U.N. treaty completely outlaws the development, testing, possession and use of nuclear weapons. It only binds states that have formally signed and ratified it.

More than 50 countries, including Austria, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa and Vietnam, have ratified the pact, according to the website of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs.

But nuclear weapon states, including the United States, Russia and China, are not signatories. Japan has also refrained from signing the pact in consideration of its long-standing security alliance with the United States.  https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/12/54ab486540a3-us-urges-japan-not-to-join-nuclear-ban-treaty-meeting-sources.html

December 21, 2021 Posted by | politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Report:  “Moving Beyond Missile Defense and Space Weapons”

Report of the International Working Group “Moving Beyond Missile Defense and Space Weapons”http://inesglobal.net/MBMDS-report/

Read the executive summary of the report: Executive Summary MDMDS-Report.

On November 20, 2000, the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 97 to 0 with 65 abstentions, adopted a resolution demanding a comprehensive approach to missiles that would “contribute to international peace and security.” The resolution gave impetus to civil society to take up the issue. One such initiative was a project by the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP)1. They produced a report called Beyond Missile Defense by an international team of scientists and policy analysts. Jayantha Dhanapala, then U.N. Under-Secretary General for Disarmament, forwarded the report to the U.N. General Assembly in 2002. They made a number of far-reaching recommendations, summarized later, to develop a verifiable global treaty to ban the development, testing, proliferation, and the acquisition of missiles.

It has been two decades since the above-mentioned U.N. resolution and the publication of the INESAP report. During this time there has been little or no action toward controlling missiles and missile defense systems. On the contrary, a signal event took place within a short time after the U.N. resolution. It was the U.S. unilateral withdrawal on July 1, 2002 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which served for thirty years as a landmark in the history of arms control agreements. In the post-ABM treaty years, there has been proliferation of both missiles and missile defense systems. Our focus for this report is global missile defense systems, because of their adverse impact on strategic stability.

Similar to the previous effort, INES organized anew an international working group in the summer of 2016 to study the consequences for international peace and security resulting from both the ongoing development and deployment of missile defense systems globally as well as the programs to develop weapons in space. From the start, the group reached a conclusion that, as desirable as it might be, it would not be practical to advocate a global missile ban in the present internationa

l situation. The focus instead should be on banning missile defense systems and space weapons. In a nutshell, this report focuses on two subject areas, namely, missile defense and the weaponization of space. It explores the linkages between the two in the larger context of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The membership of the working group is described elsewhere. It is important to note that the membership represents a broad spectrum of people who are individually affiliated to civil society organizations and universities. Some are former government officials and others are independent analysts.

Because of unforeseen circumstances, the work of the group could not proceed as planned. The present report is the product of mostly individual efforts in writing specific sections. In addition to the members of the original group, who contributed to the report, we invited several scholars outside the group to contribute. While we generally agree on the broad parameters of our analysis, it is by no means a consensus document. Therefore, the views expressed in the articles are solely those of the respective authors.

Download the Sections of the Report

  1. The 2001-2006 INESAP project Moving Beyond Missile Defense
    A brief summary – Jürgen Scheffran
  2. The U.S. missile defense systems – history, politics, waste, and fraud
    1. Why does Missile Defense Still Enjoy Bipartisan Support in Congress? – Subrata Ghoshroy
    2. The Price for Blowing the Whistle – Subrata Ghoshroy
  3. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
    The impact of the ABM treaty on the nuclear arms race – Claus Montonen
  4. The U.S. missile defense programs
    The status of the U.S. missile defense programs – Christian Alwardt
  5. European and NATO Missile Defense Programs
    The Deployment of missile defense systems and its implications for European Security and Nuclear Disarmament – Götz Neuneck

  1. Missile proliferation and missile defense systems in East Asia
    Missile Proliferation and the Security Dilemma in East Asia – Masako Ikegami
  2. A critical examination of the U.S. missile defense program: a view from Moscow
    Evolution of the U.S, Missile Defense Systems: a Russian Perspective – Vladimir Kozin
  3. Ballistic Missile and Missile Defense programs in India
    Ballistic Missile and Ballistic Missile Defense capability in India – Rajaram Nagappa
  4. The evolution of the public perception of space as a battleground
    Public Acceptance of Space as a Battleground – Monica Zoppe
  5. Preventing weaponization and an arms race in outer space
    Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space: obstacles and options – Dave Webb and Jürgen Scheffran
  6. Weaponization of space: a view from India
    India and weaponization of space – Rajaram Nagappa
  7. The interchangeability of antisatellite and missile defense systems
    Anti-Satellite Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defense: the Siamese Twins? – Dave Webb and Jürgen Scheffran
  8. Weaponization of space: a Russian view
    The United States seeks domination in space – Vladimir Kozin
  9. Nuclear weapons, disarmament, and missile defense: a Chinese perspective
    China’s nuclear weapons strategy and modernization program – Hui Zhang
  10. The Pentagon’s secret X-37B space plane program tocdevelop space weapons technology
    X-37B: Backdoor weaponization of space? – Subrata Ghoshroy
  11. International Control of Delivery Systems: Towards a Ballistic Missile Ban
    Jürgen Scheffran

Do you want to have printed copies of the executive summary of the report?

Please contact us at lucas.wirl@inesglobal.net.

December 21, 2021 Posted by | 2 WORLD, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Iran holds air defence drill near Bushehr nuclear plant

Iran holds air defence drill near Bushehr nuclear plant

Drill comes days after latest round of talks in Vienna to restore Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers ended without an agreement.  Aljazeera,  Maziar Motamedi 20 Dec 2021

Tehran, Iran – Iran has held an air defence drill in the vicinity of its southwestern Bushehr nuclear power plant amid ongoing tensions over the country’s nuclear programme.

State media reported that the drill was conducted in the early hours of Monday to the south of the Bushehr province and also over parts of the Persian Gulf.

The drill comes days after the latest round of talks in Vienna to restore Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers which ended with some modest gains but no agreement.

Israel has opposed efforts to revive the 2015 deal, which lifted sanctions on Tehran in exchange for curbs on its nuclear programme and has continued to threaten direct military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Nournews, a media outlet close to Iran’s security forces, reported last week that security forces assess there may be a credible possibility Israel would launch an attack in an effort to thwart the talks in Vienna.

On Monday, it quoted Gholamali Rashid, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Khatam al-Anbiya military base, as also mentioning the Vienna talks, and adding that any potential Israeli attack

would not be possible without the US giving its approval………..

The Natanz facilities were the target of two main sabotage attacks, which Iran blamed on Israel, in 2020 and 2021. There was also another sabotage attack in June, also blamed on Israel, on a centrifuge parts assembly workshop in Karaj near capital Tehran.

The seventh round of nuclear talks in Vienna between Iran and the world powers party to the accord the US abandoned in 2018 closed with modest progress on Friday. Talks are expected to resume in the coming days before the end of the current year.

Iran and Western powers have so far been at odds in the talks over which sanctions need to be lifted, and what measures Iran needs to take to scale back down its advancing nuclear programme. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/20/iran-holds-air-defence-drill-over-bushehr-nuclear-plant

December 21, 2021 Posted by | Iran, safety, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: Assessing Risks

Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: Assessing Risks, Insights from Herbert Lin. The Diplomat By Mercy A. Kuo, December 20, 2021   Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Herbert S. Lin – senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, and author of newly published “Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons” (Stanford University Press, 2021)  ̶  is the 301st in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Define key elements of the U.S. nuclear enterprise.

The nuclear enterprise consists of everything that touches nuclear weapons issues, including nuclear weapons design and stewardship; nuclear delivery systems (e.g., missiles, submarines, bombers); nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); nuclear planning and decision-making; and nuclear operations. Information technologies (also known as computing and communications technologies) are critical for all of these elements of the nuclear enterprise.

Identify plausible cyber risk scenarios of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. irst, an adversary may conduct a deliberate cyberattack against some element(s) of the U.S. nuclear enterprise that could compromise the U.S. ability to use its nuclear weapons when appropriate (e.g., in retaliation). A report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office probed cyber vulnerabilities in U.S. weapons systems (including some nuclear systems), noting that the Department of Defense routinely finds mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities during operational testing of weapons systems that are under development, pointing out that “using relatively simple tools and techniques, testers were able to take control of systems and largely operate undetected.” Exploitation of such vulnerabilities could cripple nuclear weapons delivery systems on the ground or in flight.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review also identifies adversary offensive cyber capabilities as creating new challenges and potential vulnerabilities for U.S. NC3, calling out challenges to network defense, authentication, data integrity, and secure, assured, and reliable information flow. Compromises to NC3 could disconnect the National Command Authority from U.S. nuclear forces, fail to provide warning of incoming nuclear attack, or falsely signal the existence of a nuclear attack.

A second type of cyber risk arises from the integration of nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities, which is often enabled by computing and communications technology. Such integration likely raises the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation in times of conflict. For example, integrating nuclear and conventional systems confers operational advantages in warfighting, and is also generally less expensive than acquiring separate nuclear and conventional systems. But such advantages trade off against an increased possibility that cyberattacks directed against a dual-purpose system for non-nuclear reasons could be interpreted by U.S. decision-makers as an attack on U.S. nuclear capabilities, especially if those cyberattacks are coming from another nuclear power. Thus, they may feel more pressure to escalate up the nuclear ladder.

A second scenario is based on the fact that cyberattacks and cyber espionage/intelligence gathering use the same penetration techniques and differ only in what they seek to accomplish. Thus, any given cyber penetration carries with it an unknown potential for attack, for intelligence gathering, or both. A cyber penetration from China or Russia detected in U.S. NC3 system could be part of a relatively benign attempt to gather intelligence, or it could be the start of a serious cyberattack that is intended to degrade NC3. But it is impossible for U.S. decision-makers to know China’s or Russia’s intention before we observe the actual results of the penetration. If the United States detects a cyber penetration of its NC3 during a crisis or during the initial phases of a kinetic conflict, U.S. decision-makers may jump to a worst-case assessment.

Analyze the capabilities of China and North Korea in generating cyber nuclear risks.

Chinese and North Korean capabilities to generate cyber risks to the U.S. nuclear enterprise are not known in the unclassified literature. However, it is known that Chinese offensive cyber capabilities are world-class, and North Korea’s capabilities are substantial, even if not necessarily on a par with China’s at every level and for every contingency.

Furthermore, certain operational scenarios involving China in particular implicate a number of dual-purpose systems. ……………. https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/cyber-threats-and-nuclear-weapons-assessing-risks/

December 21, 2021 Posted by | 2 WORLD, safety, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Archbishop calls for nuclear disarmament

Archbishop calls for nuclear disarming, Santa fe New Mexican By Robert Nott rnott@sfnewmexican.com, Dec 20 , 2021   

Looking up at the sky as a young teen one day in Daly City, Calif., Archbishop John C. Wester had one thought as he saw military planes overheard.

Were they ours, or were they Russian planes?

The year was 1962, perhaps the first time nuclear war between the two superpowers seemed likely to erupt as the Cuban Missile Crisis played out and students were taught to prepare for an atomic attack by diving under their desks at schools.

“I don’t think going under our desks was very helpful,” Wester said Sunday in Santa Fe, moments before issuing a call for the world to rid itself its nuclear weapons.

Now, some 60 years later, he said he wants to do more to end the threat of an atomic war. Wester spoke and prayed during a 30-minute prayer service and ceremony at the Shrine of Our Lady of Guadalupe before he unveiled a sign bearing an image of Pope Francis and a quote uttered by the pope in Hiroshima in 2020: “The possession of nuclear arms is immoral.”

Wester said “our archdiocese needs to be facilitating, encouraging an ongoing conversation” about nuclear disarmament.

He urged people to “pray for God’s intervention” to keep that conversation going.

At least 125 people were present for the service, many bearing roses in honor of the Lady of Guadalupe. Among them was Karen Weber, who said it’s “highly symbolic” for Wester to speak out on the “abolishment of nuclear weapons.”

The shrine is across the street from the Firestone building at West Alameda and Guadalupe streets in downtown Santa Fe, where Los Alamos National Laboratory recently opened a small office. The proximity of the two locales was not lost on Mary Riseley, who described herself as a Quaker and an Episcopalian and who handed out roses to participants in Sunday’s event.

Calling Wester a “prophet in the Catholic Church,” she said it’s important for him to stand up “for peace and understanding” during these times of turmoil.

In his comments, Wester alluded to the growing tension around the Russia-Ukraine border and said there are at least “40 active conflicts in the world.”

“We need to be instruments of peace,” he said, especially as we head into the Christmas season, a “season of peace.”

The current arms race, he said “is more ominous” than any that came before……..   https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/archbishop-calls-for-nuclear-disarming/article_0aabf9f0-60e8-11ec-9e5f-5f7820707fca.html

December 21, 2021 Posted by | Religion and ethics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

U.S. congressional delegation arrives in Ukraine to discuss threat of war with Russia — Anti-bellum

US Congress delegation arrives in Ukraine to discuss threat of war with RussiaA group of congressmen announced Washington’s readiness to take tough measures in response to any encroachment on sovereign Ukrainian territory *** “Representative Jason Crow led a U.S. Congressional delegation to Kyiv to discuss Russia’s aggressive military buildup in and around Ukraine and hear […]

U.S. congressional delegation arrives in Ukraine to discuss threat of war with Russia — Anti-bellum

December 21, 2021 Posted by | politics international, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

How to keep US-China rivalry from starting a nuclear arms race

The US needs to understand the Chinese government’s deeply anxious view of its own nuclear and wider geostrategic vulnerability.

China’s strategic culture is deeply realist. Moral appeals to China about doing the right thing will not get American negotiators anywhere, but cold, pragmatic arguments can.

The deepening US-China rivalry might itself create an incentive for Beijing to come to the table. That is provided the US can convince China it would be less vulnerable with an arms-control agreement than without one.


How to keep US-China rivalry from starting a nuclear arms race,   https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3159963/how-keep-us-china-rivalry-starting-nuclear-arms-race

With tensions threatening to undermine strategic nuclear stability, talks are urgently needed to prevent the situation from spinning out of controlEven if the relationship is destined to be marked by mutual suspicion, establishing strategic transparency is still possible  Kevin Rudd

19 Dec, 2021  China’s recently reported tests of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in July and August, though officially denied, are threatening to undermine strategic nuclear stability. They have already added to escalating tensions between the United States and China.

Throughout the summer, satellite images revealed that China was in the process of building as many as 300 new missile silos in its northern deserts. Some of these silos are likely to be used merely as empty decoys. But, if even half of them become sites for nuclear-armed missiles, it would represent a near-tripling of China’s nuclear arsenal.

China’s recently reported tests of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in July and August, though officially denied, are threatening to undermine strategic nuclear stability. They have already added to escalating tensions between the United States and China.

Following these revelations, the US State Department warned that, “This build-up is concerning. It raises questions about the PRC’s intent … We encourage Beijing to engage with us on practical measures to reduce the risks of destabilising arms races and conflict.”

China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs, Li Song, responded the same day. He described the new Aukus pact between Australia, Britain and the US to help Australia acquire nuclear submarines as a “textbook case” of nuclear proliferation spurring a regional arms race.

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December 20, 2021 Posted by | politics international, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

We the People: What led to the Cold War?

We the People: What led to the Cold War? Fear of nuclear weapons annihilating all life on Earth, for one thing https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2021/dec/19/we-the-people-what-led-to-the-cold-war-fear-of-nuc/ 19 Dec 21   By Pip CawleyFor The Spokesman-Review

Each week, The Spokesman-Review examines one question from the Naturalization Test immigrants must pass to become United States citizens.

Today’s question: During the Cold War, what was one main concern of the United States?

There are two official answers to this question. One is that the U.S. was concerned about the spread of communism. The other is that the U.S. was concerned with the possibility of nuclear war. The myriad ways the fear of communism influenced the United States are too numerous and complex for this brief article.

Instead, I want to discuss the fear of nuclear war. It is easy to forget that since the invention and proliferation of nuclear weapons, we now have the technology available to exterminate our entire species. The fear of nuclear war was ever-present and influenced every aspect of American life. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, the celebrated author William Faulkner stated, “Our tragedy today is a general and universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up?”

Let’s discuss how we got to this point.

The Cold War, so named because the two major powers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, never “heated up” or fought open war in Europe, lasted from 1945 to 1990.

Some historians argue the Cold War started during the end of World War II and that the use of the first nuclear weapons on Japan was intended, among other things, to intimidate the Soviets.

The Cold War impacted not just military concerns but was a ubiquitous concern for everyday Americans. A real fear of nuclear war was ever-present in American society. Government-backed films like “The Red Menace” reminded the public of the threat of nuclear war, and families built bomb shelters in their yards and basements.

Schools practiced drills where children were taught to hide under their desks in the case of nuclear war. Obviously, a small desk won’t protect a child from nuclear bombs, but it was part of what is called “security theater.” Security theater is the performance of security or safety measures that realistically do nothing to increase the individual’s safety but give a small sense of control and comfort. They are doing something, and even if what they’re doing is useless, it still helps them feel better.

In reality, there is nothing we could do to protect ourselves from the devastation nuclear weapons bring. Those not killed in the blast instead die of radiation exposure. If enough nuclear weapons are detonated, it will cause a nuclear winter in which the sun’s rays are blocked by clouds of dust and debris. Without warmth from the sun, temperatures on Earth would radically drop, killing all plant and animal life on the planet. This was, and still is, a new and frightening reality.

We arrived at this new reality thanks to what is called the arms race. The U.S. and the USSR sought to get or maintain a technological and tactical advantage over each other. Both countries invested immense amounts of resources to develop new and more powerful weapons. For example, if the U.S. built one aircraft carrier, the USSR would build two, which would prompt the U.S. to build three more even larger aircraft carriers, and so on. The constant one-upmanship of the arms race led to the development of nuclear weapons, first in the U.S. and then in the USSR.

Eventually, these stockpiles of weapons became so large that the two countries each had the capability of destroying all human life on Earth. If one country attacked, the other would retaliate and the conflict could eventually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, which would then lead to our own extinction.

For that reason, the two countries agreed not to directly attack each other in what is called Mutually Assured Destruction.

Since neither side wanted to end all life on Earth, they agreed not to directly attack each other. This kept an all-out war from breaking out between the two countries.

They did wage proxy wars against each other all over the globe. The U.S. and the USSR demanded that other countries pick a side, theirs or their enemy’s. The USSR expanded its sphere of influence toward Europe, drawing an Iron Curtain across the territory.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan and spent 10 years fighting for control of the country. On the other hand, the U.S. invaded Korea and later Vietnam in order to prevent the countries from “falling to communism.” Meanwhile, the push for decolonization in Africa led to armed conflicts, often funded or supplied by one of the major powers. In Iran and several South American countries, clandestine plans and espionage were used to unseat governmental leaders, some of whom were democratically elected, and replace them with new leaders who would be friendly to U.S. interests.

Today, the U.S. and Russia possess the most nuclear weapons, and despite disarmament treaties and downsizing of stockpiles, both still possess enough nuclear devices to destroy the planet several times over. In the years since the Cold War ended, other countries have obtained nuclear capabilities. There are nine countries with nuclear weapons; some others are seeking to obtain their own.

While fear of nuclear war no longer influences our daily lives, as it did during the Cold War, it remains a real concern in international relations.

Pip Cawley received her Ph.D. in political science from Washington State University in Pullman.  This article is part of a Spokesman-Review partnership with the Thomas S. Foley Institute of Public Policy and Public Service at Washington State University

December 20, 2021 Posted by | history, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Hundreds of Scientists Ask Biden to Cut the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

Hundreds of Scientists Ask Biden to Cut the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal, New York Times, 

In a letter, the scientists also urged President Biden to declare that the United States would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict., By David E. Sanger 17 Dec 21,

WASHINGTON — Nearly 700 scientists and engineers, including 21 Nobel laureates, asked President Biden on Thursday to use his forthcoming declaration of a new national strategy for managing nuclear weapons as a chance to cut the U.S. arsenal by a third, and to declare, for the first time, that the United States would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.

The letter to Mr. Biden also urged him to change, for the first time since President Harry S. Truman ordered the dropping of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima, the American practice that gives the commander in chief sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. The issue gained prominence during the Trump administration, and the authors of the letter urged Mr. Biden to make the change as “an important safeguard against a possible future president who is unstable or who orders a reckless attack.”

But while Mr. Biden has often declared that he will be guided by scientific advice alone when it comes to managing the Covid-19 pandemic, he has made no such pledge in the nuclear arena, where strategists, allies protected by the American nuclear umbrella and members of Congress all have views — many of them diametrically opposed to the ones described by scientists…………………..   https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/us/politics/scientists-letter-nuclear-arsenal.html

December 18, 2021 Posted by | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

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