The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is a ‘dirty bomb’ waiting to happen – a nuclear expert explains
The Conversation, Tilman Ruff July 13, 2023
After the explosion at the Kakhovka Dam in Ukraine last month, many Ukrainians feared the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant could be next.
These concerns have been heightened in recent weeks as both Ukraine and Russia have accused each other of planning an attack of the plant, which has been under Russian control since March 2022.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not found any evidence of explosives in recent inspections, but also said it had yet to be granted access to all parts of the huge plant.
So, how serious are the risks of an attack at the power plant? And how disastrous would this be for Ukraine and the wider world?
Europe’s largest nuclear power plant
Construction of the Zaporizhzhia power plant began in 1981. Five reactors were commissioned between 1984-89, and a sixth in 1995. The reactors are more modern than the graphite-moderated reactors at Chernobyl, and are similar to the pressurised water reactors in widespread use in the United States and Europe.
The plant is Europe’s largest, built on the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir on the Dnipro River, from which it draws its cooling water. Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine generated about half its electricity from 15 nuclear power reactors across four sites, with Zaporizhzhia generating almost half of this.
The plant has cooling ponds for spent nuclear fuel, which require continuous power and water (like the reactors themselves). It also has a dry cask storage facility for spent reactor fuel when it no longer requires continuous water cooling.
In 2017, Ukraine reported there were just over 2,200 tons of highly radioactive spent fuel at Zaporizhzhia, in the spent fuel pools and dry cask storage.
How quickly a meltdown could happen
Barely a week after the invasion began, Russian forces captured Zaporizhzhia. During heavy combat, a fire broke out in a training facility, while other parts of the plant were damaged.
In September 2022, the plant was fully disconnected from the electricity grid. Five reactors were put into cold shutdown. The sixth was maintained in hot shutdown at around 200 degrees Celsius, producing steam for the plant.
The Ukrainian nuclear regulator ordered a cold shutdown of this reactor last month, but this has not happened. Extensive maintenance work on the reactors is overdue.
The fuel inside nuclear reactors needs continuous, active cooling for many months after a reactor shutdown because of the heat that continues to be produced by the decay of hundreds of different fission products. The longer the fuel is inside a nuclear reactor, the more radioactive it becomes. That is why when fuel is removed from a reactor, it still requires continuous, active cooling for years.
The world saw in dramatic fashion in Fukushima, Japan, in 2011 what can happen when continuous, active cooling of nuclear reactors is disrupted.
More than 70% of the total radioactivity at the Fukushima power plant was in the spent fuel ponds, which have none of the carefully engineered containment layers that reactors typically have.
In his classic 1981 book Nuclear Radiation in Warfare, Nobel Peace Prize-winning physicist Joseph Rotblat documented how
in a pressurised water reactor, the meltdown of the core could occur within less than one minute after the loss of coolant.
The radioactivity released from damaged spent fuel ponds could be even greater than from a meltdown at the reactor itself, he wrote.
His study makes clear that a military attack on a reactor or spent fuel pond could release more radioactivity – and longer-lasting radioactivity – than even a large (megaton range) nuclear weapon.
As nuclear physicist Edwin Lyman makes clear, if the Zaporizhzhia reactor cooling was interrupted, there might be a day or two before the spent fuel began to overheat and degrade.
The melting reactor core would then collapse onto the floor inside its steel primary containment vessel and melt through to the floor of the building. Large amounts of radioactive gases and aerosols would be released into the environment, potentially explosively.
The radioactive release could possibly be at Chernobyl-scale or even larger amounts if multiple reactors and spent fuel ponds were involved. This could then spread across borders and continents with the wind, rivers and currents, and come down in hotspots in rain and snow.
A nuclear plant under continuous assault
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first time war has engulfed operating nuclear plants and, in a real sense, weaponised them as potential radiological weapons, or “dirty bombs”…………………………………………………………..
The other three nuclear power plants in Ukraine have also experienced interruptions to their electricity supply. In addition, other nuclear facilities have been shelled, struck by missiles or otherwise damaged.
A wake-up call to the dangers of nuclear power
Some nuclear experts have inappropriately downplayed the risk of deliberate or accidental breach of the containment structures at Zaporizhzhia.
However, the IAEA and independent experts have highlighted the very real risk of a catastrophe.
………………………………………………………………………. No other energy technology is associated with such extreme safety and security risks. If Zaporizhzhia were a wind farm or solar array, the risk of a severe accident with global and intergenerational consequences – not to mention weapons proliferation or intractable waste issues – would be precisely zero.
https://theconversation.com/the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-is-a-dirty-bomb-waiting-to-happen-a-nuclear-expert-explains-209236
Red alert at Zaporizhzhia?
The threatened deadly scenarios could not happen at a wind farm
By Linda Pentz Gunter, 10 july 23 https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2023/07/09/red-alert-at-zaporizhzhia/
Amidst accusations from both the Russian and Ukrainian sides that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southeastern Ukraine has been wired for detonation or could be deliberately attacked during the current war there, one absolute truth remains: nuclear power plants are inherently dangerous.
Whether the rhetorical threats are real or not remains subject for debate. What is incontrovertibly real is the danger a nuclear power plant poses. After all, that is why the two sides are making these threats in the first place: because the outcome would be so deadly. If Zaporizhzhia was a wind farm, it wouldn’t even be mentioned.
Each nuclear reactor contains a lethal radioactive inventory, in the reactor core and also in the fuel pools into which the irradiated fuel is offloaded and, over time, densely packed. Casks also house nuclear waste offloaded from the fuel pools.
Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe with at least 2,204 tons of highly radioactive waste within the reactors and the irradiated fuel pools.
Depending on the severity of what transpires, any or all of this radioactive fuel could be ignited.
Amidst the confusion and unreliability of any pronouncements uttered through the “fog of war”, there remain several unanswered questions that have led to heightened rumor and speculation:
Has the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in fact been wired for detonation and whose interests would be served by blowing up the plant?
Why is there an exodus of both Russian and Ukrainian plant personnel?
Will the sabotage of the downstream Kakhovka dam that resulted in catastrophic flooding, also lead to an equally catastrophic loss of available cooling water supplies for the reactors and fuel pools?
Will the backup diesel generators, frequently turned to for powering the essential cooling each time the plant has lost connection to the electricity grid, last through each crisis, given their fuel must also be replenished, potentially not possible under war conditions?
None of these threats would make headlines if Zaporizhzhia was instead home to a wind farm or utility scale solar array. This perhaps explains the rush now to downplay the gravity of the situation, with claims in the press that a major attack on the plant would “not be as bad as Chornobyl” and that radioactive releases would be minimal and barely travel beyond the fence line.
This is an irresponsible dismissal of the real dangers. The measured assessment of Dr. Edwin Lyman at the Union of Concerned Scientists confirms that an attack on Zaporizhzhia could indeed be catastrophic.
The graphite moderator used at Chornobyl undeniably worsened the outcome of that explosion and its aftermath. The graphite fueled the fire and the smoke further suspended what became the radioactive fallout that traveled far and wide across the former Soviet Union and all of Europe.
The part played by the graphite moderator in increasing the severity of the Chornobyl disaster has led to an assumption that major fires and explosions at Zaporizhzhia would result in less serious consequences, given the reactors are not of the same design. All six at Zaporizhzhia are Russian VVERs, similar to the Pressurized Water Reactor used here in the United States. (Chornobyl was the older RBMK.)
However, while Zaporizhzhia may be a less primitive design, it is not harmless. (Absurdly, these 1980s reactors are described in the press as “more modern.”)
If the uranium fuel in the Zaporizhzhia reactors or irradiated fuel storage pools overheats and ignites, it could then heat up the zirconium cladding around it, which would ignite and burn fiercely as a flare at temperatures too hot to extinguish with water.
The resulting chemical reaction would also generate an explosive environment. The heat of the release and any subsequent detonations could breach concrete structures, then loft radioactive gas and fallout into the environment to travel on the weather.
Radioactive fallout could contaminate crucial agricultural land in Ukraine and potentially also in Russia should prevailing winds travel eastward at the time of the disaster. As we have learned from the Chornobyl fallout, this is an enduring harm that enters the food chain and human bodies and remains harmful in the environment indefinitely, as exemplified by the 1,000 square mile Chornobyl Exclusion Zone.
Who then consumes that food is also of critical importance. While Europe allows an already too high 600 becquerels per kilogram (Bq/kg) of radioactive cesium in food, contaminated food supplies from Ukraine that read at higher levels after a nuclear disaster could be exported to countries with even weaker standards, including the US where the limit is an unacceptable 1200 Bq/kg. But will those consuming such foodstuffs be counted among the victims of such a nuclear disaster? Likely not.
The true numbers of those harmed by the Chornobyl disaster will never be known due to institutional suppression and misrepresentation of the numbers and the absence of record-keeping in the former Soviet countries affected. Therefore, to suggest that a major nuclear disaster at Zaporizhzhia would be “not nearly as bad as Chornobyl” is too broad and speculative without looking at the specifics.
Those specifics depend on whether the disaster involves hydrogen explosions such as happened at Fukushima, or fires resulting from a bombing raid or missile attack, which could disperse more radioactivity further. It would also depend on whether all six reactors suffered catastrophic failures, whether all of the fuel pools were drained and caught fire and whether the storage casks were breached.
It would further depend on which way the wind was blowing, and if, when and where it subsequently rained out a radioactive plume, all factors that influenced where the Chornobyl radioactive fallout was deposited.
If Zaporizhzhia comes to harm, each side in the conflict will almost certainly hold the other responsible. But ultimately, the responsibility we all share is to reject the continued use of a technology that has the potential to wreak such disastrous consequences on humanity.
Nuclear power is the most dangerous way to boil water. It is unnecessary, expensive, and an obstacle to renewable energy development. It is intrinsically tied to the desire for — and development of — nuclear weapons, the use of which could be the other lethal outcome in this war.
Zaporizhzhia is in the news almost every day. The propaganda may be deliberately alarmist, but the basis for the alarm is very real or it would not be in the headlines in the first place.
It is time to see sense. Calling for a no-fire zone around Zaporizhzhia is not enough. We must call for no nuclear power at all.
Linda Pentz Gunter is the international specialist at Beyond Nuclear and writes for and curates Beyond Nuclear International.
Russia calls on NATO to discuss Ukraine nuclear plant
Canberra Times, 9 July 23
The leaders of the United States-led transatlantic NATO defence alliance should discuss Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant at their summit, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova says.
NATO leaders will meet in Vilnius on Tuesday and Wednesday to tackle a wide range of topics, from divisions over Ukraine’s membership bid and Sweden’s accession to boosting ammunition stockpiles and reviewing the first defence plans in decades.
Accusing Ukraine of “systematic infliction of damage” to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, Zakharova said “the NATO summit’s key attention should be devoted to it”.
“After all, the vast majority of the alliance members will be in the direct impact zone” (if something were to happen at the plant), Zakharova said on the Telegram messaging app.
Vilnius is some 1000 kilometres from the nuclear plant, Europe’s largest.
Both Russia and Ukraine have accused each other of planning to attack the plant, which is located on Russian-held territory in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, near the front line of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine………….
The International Atomic Energy Agency experts based at the plant said they had yet to observe any indications of mines or explosives at the plant but needed more access to be sure. https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/8263420/russia-calls-on-nato-to-discuss-ukraine-nuclear-plant/
An Attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant Could Still be Catastrophic (- nuclear promoters minimise the risk)
Ed Lyman, July 7, 2023 https://blog.ucsusa.org/edwin-lyman/an-attack-on-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-could-still-be-catastrophic/
Ukraine has accused Russia of planning to carry out a sabotage attack at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant that it has controlled since it seized it by force in March 2022. Although it reports this morning that this current threat is decreasing, the situation is fluid and the plant remains vulnerable to both accidents and attacks. While this ongoing crisis should not lead to panic, there is no cause for complacency either.
Unfortunately, the American Nuclear Society (ANS) and other commenters have been busy attempting to dismiss the risks that either an accident or a deliberate attack could lead to a significant radiological release with far-reaching consequences. Simply put, the ANS is dead wrong here, and by minimizing the potential risk it is endangering Ukrainians and others who may be affected by lulling them into a false sense of security and undermining any motivation to prepare for the worst. Effective emergency preparedness requires a clear-eyed understanding of the actual threat.
As I have pointed out previously, the fact that the six reactors have been in shutdown mode for many months (with one in “hot”, as opposed to “cold,” shutdown) does reduce the risk somewhat compared to a situation where reactors are operating or have only recently shut down. The decay heat in the reactors’ cores decreases significantly over time, although the rate of decrease slows down quite a bit after a few months. However, this does not mean, as ANS misleadingly implies, that there is no risk of a major radiological release that could disperse over a wide area. What it does mean is that if cooling were disrupted to one or more of the reactors, then there would be a longer period of time—days instead of hours—for operators to fix the problem before the cooling water in the reactor cores would start to boil away and drop below the tops of the fuel assemblies, causing the fuel to overheat and degrade.
Timely operator actions are even more critical for reactors that are shut down than for reactors that are operating, since some automatic safety systems are not functional during shutdown. Indeed, in a 1997 report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) points out that “acceptable results for most of events during shutdown modes cannot be achieved without operator intervention.” The IAEA report states that both “preventive and mitigatory capabilities are somewhat degraded” in shutdown conditions, and lists a number of shutdown accident initiators for VVER-1000s.
One class of events of particular concern are “boron dilution” accidents, in which the concentration of boron in cooling water necessary to maintain reactors in a subcritical state becomes reduced and nuclear fission inadvertently begins in the core. This would not only increase the reactor temperature and the amount of heat that would have to be removed, but would also generate new quantities of troublesome short-lived fission products, such as iodine isotopes, which have previously decayed away in the months since shutdown. (This is why it remains important that potassium iodide—a drug that can block uptake of radioactive iodine in the thyroid—continue to be available to communities who may be in the path of any plume.)
It is also important to note that it is very unusual for reactors to be maintained for any length of time in either hot or cold shutdown modes with fuel remaining in the core, as is the case at Zaporizhzhia. Whenever nuclear reactors operate in unusual conditions that have not been thoroughly analyzed, risks increase.
Unfortunately, because of the incredible stress that the greatly reduced staff at Zaporizhzhia are under, and the unclear lines of command under Russian occupation, their ability to efficiently execute all the actions necessary to mitigate any accident or sabotage attack is in grave doubt. And if timely operator intervention does not occur, and the fuel assemblies are exposed, then a core melt accident similar to what was experienced in three of the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi is certainly possible.
Once the water level has dropped below the tops of the fuel assemblies, the original decay heat in the reactor core is no longer a relevant factor because when the zirconium cladding surrounding the fuel rods overheats and reacts with steam or air, it produces additional heat through a so-called exothermic reaction. The heat released in this way would soon become far greater than the original decay heat load and would accelerate the heat-up and degradation of the reactor core. At that point, it would be much harder for operators to arrest the progression of the core melt. Eventually, the molten core would drop to the floor of the steel reactor vessel and melt through it onto the floor of the containment building, where it would react with concrete to generate hot gases. Then, there are multiple ways in which the radioactive gases and aerosols generated during the core melt could be released into the environment, including a containment melt-through mode that is possible in VVER-1000 reactors such as Zaporizhzhia.
There is no technical reason why any resulting radioactive releases could not disperse at least as far as occurred at Fukushima, depending on the meteorological conditions. The heat of the radioactive plumes, which determines how high they will rise in the atmosphere and hence how far they can travel, largely come from the heat released by zirconium oxidation. The magnitude and extent of the resulting environmental contamination would depend on the “source term,” or the inventory and characteristics of the radioactive materials released from the site. Since up to six reactors and six spent fuel pools could be involved—especially if the site is deliberately sabotaged—the source term could ultimately be larger than that of Fukushima, where only three reactors were involved and containments remained largely intact.
Thus it is imperative that the international community take Ukraine’s warnings seriously and provide all the assistance it needs for emergency preparedness. Unjustified complacency could lead to a lack of resolve for addressing the danger, only increasing the potential for a long-lasting disaster that will compound the misery of the Ukrainian people.
One of the world’s worst nuclear disasters is likely something you’ve never heard of.
This is, of course, the Goiânia Accident of 1987. This
happened in the city of Goiânia in the Goiâs region of Brazil, which
surrounds the Federal District containing the purpose-built capital
Brasilia. In 1985, a hospital in the city moved locations, leaving behind a
radiotherapy unit which used the substance caesium-137 to treat cancer. Two
years later in 1987, two men broke into the abandoned building looking for
items with scrap value, and stole the machine – including its radioactive
component which they were not aware of.
Unilad 4th July 2023
https://www.unilad.com/news/nuclear-disaster-goiania-brazil-accident-918843-20230704
IAEA: Europe’s largest nuclear power plant regains back-up electricity feed
Despite the dramatic claims of Mr Zelensky, the IAEA finds no evidence of Russians’ sabotage of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant
UN News , 3 July 23,
The Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in Ukraine is now reconnected to its only back-up power line after four months, but the power situation at the site remains “highly vulnerable”, warned Rafael Mariano Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Monday.
“While the reconnection of the back-up power line is positive, the plant’s external power situation remains highly vulnerable, underlining the precarious nuclear safety and security situation at the site,” Mr. Grossi said.
Much needed back-up
According to IAEA, the plant’s connection to the single remaining 330 kilovolt (kV) power line out of six that existed before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 was restored on Saturday……………………….
Since February 2022, the plant has experienced seven instances of complete power loss from external sources, compelling temporary reliance on emergency diesel generators for electricity, according to IAEA.
‘So far’ no mines or explosives observed
No mines or explosive devices have been detected around the plant by a team of agency experts, Mr. Grossi had announced on Friday. The IAEA inspection team had also noted that the plant had the reserves of water available for use despite the destruction of the downstream Kakhovka dam more than three weeks ago, he said….. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138307
Especially in USA, nuclear reactors are getting very old – past their use-by dates
When will the world wake up to the unaffordable cost of this industry?
They’re keeping creaky old nuclear reactors going, so that our grandchildren will cop the astronomic costs of getting rid of the radioactive dead reactors.
So the current nuclear power industry people can get out of this problem!
Notably, 88 of the 92 reactors in the U.S. have received approvals to operate for up to 60 years, and some have applied for additional 20-year extensions to operate for up to 80 years
How Old Are the World’s Nuclear Reactors?, Elements, June 27, 2023, By Govind Bhutada
“………………………………………………… The Age Distribution of the Global Reactor Fleet
Nuclear power saw a building boom in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s as countries expanded their energy portfolios and sought to capitalize on the advancements in nuclear technology. As a result, the majority of the world’s nuclear reactors began operating during this period.
Of the total of 422 reactors, 262 reactors have been in operation for 31 to 50 years. In other words, about 62% of all current nuclear reactors were connected to the grid between 1973 and 1992.
Nuclear power’s growth slowed down at the turn of the 21st century, with decreasing public support and increasing concern over nuclear safety. As a result, only a small number of reactors fall into the 11-to-20-year-old age group.
The oldest operating reactors (five of them) are 54 years old and entered commercial service in 1969. Two of these are located in the United States, two in India, and one in Switzerland.
How Long Can Nuclear Reactors Last?
Although specific lifespans can vary, nuclear reactors are typically designed to last for 20 to 40 years.
However, reactors can operate beyond their initially licensed periods with lifetime extensions. Extending reactor lives requires rigorous assessments, safety evaluations, and refurbishments.
Some countries have granted license renewals for aging reactors. Notably, 88 of the 92 reactors in the U.S. have received approvals to operate for up to 60 years, and some have applied for additional 20-year extensions to operate for up to 80 years…… https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/how-old-are-the-worlds-nuclear-reactors/
Watchdog group has concerns over nuclear micro-reactor plans
Monday, June 26th 2023, By Nestor Licanto, https://www.kuam.com/story/49121972/watchdog-group-has-concerns-over-nuclear-microreactor-plans
U.S. defense department proposal to use a nuclear micro-reactor as a power backup for the planned missile defense system on Guam is now being considered by Congress.
But a local watchdog group is sounding the alarm over the danger of the largely untested technology.
Leland Bettis of the local think tank and research group, pacific center for island security has been tracking the missile defense system plans for Guam and the potential for a nuclear micro-reactor.
“That’s not been disclosed by the MDA yet but we’ve sorta been tracking this. I think what really drew our attention was over the weekend the Senate Armed Services Committee’s executive summary, their NDAA language includes this piece which asks for a briefing for the Senate about the possibility of placing microreactors in Guam. 109
Bettis acknowledges that nuclear power has proven to be safe, and can provide huge cost savings even for private commercial use. [??]
But he believes a red line is crossed if they become targets in a combat situation.
“Just imagine if these reactors are a principal source of power for some of the measures, and counter-measures that the military is operating they’re certainly gonna be a target,” Bettis said. “That means that the environmental impact is not just about how does the nuclear reactor perform in producing power but how might a micro nuclear reactor perform if it’s targeted and hit.”
An article last year in the “Military Times” mentions Guam as a potential site for the mobile nuclear equipment.
It describes a 40-ton reactor that can fit into three to four 20-foot containers and can provide up to 5 megawatts of power.
The army has been considering the use of mobile nuclear power for years in a program called project pele, ironically named after the Hawaiian goddess of fire and volcanoes.
The benefits as a power source in remote, austere locations is clear, but there are drawbacks in battle situations.
If however that reactor is struck during conflict all the troops that are around that will be affected. So I think the concerns that they had about the use of these particular power devices for military people is magnified ten-fold when you think about the possibility that these might be placed in proximity to a civilian community.
And the military has confirmed that the planned 360-degree missile defense system could have as many as twenty different sites scatttered across the island.
Bettis says we need to know now more than ever, what’s going into each of these sites.
The people that I’ve talked to talk about a micro nuclear reactor and say if it hits you need a set-aside that’s at least a mile. That’s gonna be a very different sort of thing then if you had command and control module in your neighborhood, so I think as a community we need better transparency about what is being planned at all these locations.
IAEA Director General Grossi discusses nuclear safety with Russia’s Director of Rosatom, at Zaporizhzhia, in new consultations
MOSCOW, June 23 https://english.news.cn/20230624/19c5c0119ce24b04a7ab10e6a08f9a0b/c.html — General Director of Russia’s Rosatom State Corporation Alexey Likhachev discussed the current nuclear safety situation around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi in Russia’s Kaliningrad on Friday.
During the discussion, both delegations addressed issues raised by Grossi at the UN Security Council briefing on May 30, in which the official discussed the security situation at the nuclear facility, Rosatom said in a statement.
Likhachev emphasized that the Russian side “expects the IAEA Secretariat to take specific steps to prevent strikes by the Ukrainian armed forces both on the ZNPP and on the adjacent territory,” it added.
He informed Grossi about the specific measures currently being taken by the Russian side to ensure the nuclear facility’s safe operation, particularly its water supply “after the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant dam was destroyed by the Ukrainian armed forces,” Rosatom said.
Both sides further discussed the outcomes of Grossi’s visit to the plant on June 15. During his visit, Grossi was able to personally verify whether the plant could continue operating safely, and confirm among other things that the water supply in the cooling pond was sufficient for the safe operation of the facility
Russia asks IAEA to ensure Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant security
Reuters, June 23, 2023 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-asks-iaea-ensure-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-security-2023-06-23/
June 23 (Reuters) – Russia urged the International Atomic Energy Agency on Friday to ensure Ukraine does not shell the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, saying it was otherwise operating safely.
Alexei Likhachev, chief executive of the Russian state nuclear energy firm Rosatom, made the comments at a meeting with IAEA chief Rafael Grossi in the Russian city of Kaliningrad, Rosatom said in a statement, after Grossi visited the plant last week.
“We expect concrete steps from the IAEA aimed at preventing strikes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, both on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and on adjacent territory and critical infrastructure facilities,” Rosatom quoted its chief as saying in a statement.
The IAEA said this week that the power plant was “grappling with … water-related challenges” after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam emptied the vast reservoir on whose southern bank the plant sits.
It also said the military situation in the area had become increasingly tense as Kyiv began a counteroffensive against the Russian forces that have seized control of swathes of eastern and southern Ukraine.
Moscow and Kyiv have regularly accused each other of shelling Europe’s largest nuclear power station, with its six offline reactors. International efforts to establish a demilitarised zone around it have so far failed.
Ukraine this week accused Russia of planning a “terrorist” attack at the plant involving the release of radiation, while Moscow on Friday detained five people who it said were planning to smuggle radioactive caesium-137 at the request of a Ukrainian buyer in order to stage a nuclear incident.
Reporting by Reuters; Editing by Kevin Liffey
Building nuclear plant would increase costs in the need for guards, police and rescue workers
If a nuclear power plant is to be constructed in Estonia, this would lead to an increased need for rescue workers and police officers, according to an analysis by the Ministry of the Interior on nuclear security and emergency preparedness. This is in addition to the specialists, who would be required to ensure all the necessary procedures are in place to safeguard against any potential risks involved.
Earlier this year, a sub-group on nuclear security and emergency preparedness was established under the Ministry of the Interior. The sub-group’s aim is to prepare an analysis and provide an expert assessment of the situation related nuclear security and emergency preparedness for the final Estonian national nuclear energy report.
Estonian Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets (SDE) said, that by the end of the year, the report would make it clear what the cost of a nuclear power plant would be for the country.
“In light of this expert assessment, it has to be said that, given the situation with the state budget, finding the money to build a nuclear power plant seems questionable, to say the least,” said Läänemets.
According to Läänemets, the one-off investment needed to build a nuclear power plant would be just shy of €100 million, with millions of additional euros needed each year to cover maintenance costs.
The minister noted, that unless Estonia’s population protection plans are developed, building a nuclear power plant will not be possible.
The issue of human resources would also become increasingly important. “We need experts and nuclear scientists. We need more police officers and Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitsei) officers. We need to upgrade the rescue teams, and we need to be able to offer them salaries to match. Building a nuclear power station means hiring more staff within the Ministry of the Interior. A lot of money will also be needed when it comes to internal security,” Läänemets said.
Viola Murd, secretary general for rescue and crisis at the Ministry of the Interior, said that Estonia currently does have an emergency plan in case an accident involving nuclear power plant occurs in a neighboring country.
Murd explained, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has regulated practically everything in advance. Therefore, it would be up to Estonia to abide by these rules and regulations. “As far as security risk management and accident prevention are concerned, the Ministry of the Interior’s would not be able to cope with the tasks foreseen today. Above all, these concern human resources and competences, which the agency cannot provide us with. We would need to create them ourselves and that takes time,” Murd said.
“The construction of a nuclear power plant will require the development of top specialists and experts but also staff throughout the program more broadly. This would include the need to ensure security by conducting background checks, the number of which will increase significantly as the program progresses,” added Murd.
There will also be a need to establish an independent national body with the power to assess license applications and make decisions on safety and security issues.
Ministry of the Interior advisor Aigo Allmäe said, that when it comes to security, Estonia’s main responsibility is to protect nuclear material from theft and sabotage. “We have to provide physical protection and control over the material. Physical protection means surveillance and control. The security of personnel also has to be guaranteed,” Allmäe said.
Allmäe stressed, that there are a number of safety aspects that must be considered when designing and constructing a nuclear power plant in order to minimize any potential risk of an accident taking place.
—
“Radioactive” is compelling viewing
New film spotlights women’s experiences with the Three Mile Island nuclear accident
By Karl Grossman
Radioactive: The Women of Three Mile Island is the title of a newly-released documentary feature film directed, written and produced by award-winning filmmaker Heidi Hutner, a professor of environmental humanities at Stony Brook University, a “flagship” school of the State University of New York.
With greatly compelling facts and interviews, she and her also highly talented production team have put together a masterpiece of a documentary film.
It connects the proverbial dots of the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear plant disaster—doing so brilliantly.
The documentary has already received many film awards and has had a screening in recent months in New York City—winning the “Audience Award for Best Documentary” at the Dances With Films Festival—and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Sarasota, Florida; Dubuque, Iowa; Long Island, New York; First Frame International Film Festival in New York City; the Environmental Film Festival in Washington D.C., and is soon the featured film at Kat Kramer’s #SHEROESForChange Film Festival in Los Angeles and the Cinequest Film Festival in San Jose, California, as well as the Uranium Film Festival in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. And there will be tours across the U.S.
Resident after resident of the area around Three Mile Island is interviewed and tells of widespread cancer that has ensued in the years that have followed the accident—a cancer rate far beyond what would be normal. Accounts shared in the documentary are heartbreaking.
A whistleblower who had worked at the nuclear plant tells Hutner of the deliberate and comprehensive attempt by General Public Utilities, which owned TMI, to cover up the gravity of the accident and its radioactive releases, especially of cancer-causing Iodine-131 and Xenon 133.
An attorney, Lynne Bernabei, involved in litigation in the wake of the accident, says the Three Mile Island “cover-up was one of the biggest cover-ups in history.” Meanwhile, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which is “supposed to protect the public” has then and since been just “interested in is promoting the [nuclear] industry. This is corrupt,” says attorney Joanne Doroshow, now a professor at New York Law School and director of the Center for Justice & Democracy. Many examples of this are presented.
The documentary’s focus on women includes women being far more at risk to the effects of radioactivity than men. Mary Olson, a biologist, founder, and director of the Gender & Radiation Impact Project, says in the film that those setting radiation standards in the U.S. from the onset of nuclear technology in 1942, based impacts on a “25 to 30 years-old” male “defined as Caucasian.” She said, “It has come to be known as the ‘Reference Man.” However, Olson cites research findings that “radiation is 10 times more harmful to young females” and “50 percent more harmful to a “comparable female” than it is to “Reference Man” who is “more resistant” to radioactivity than a woman.
There’s the scientist Dr. Aaron Datesman, who is now pursuing a major chromosomal study regarding the impact of the disaster on the health of people in the area and how people have been harmed despite the denials of the nuclear industry. This study is based on his recent ground-breaking work, “Radiological Shot Noise,” in Nature.
And more and more…………………………………………………………………………. more https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2023/06/18/radioactive-is-compelling-viewing/—
Safety issues for 9 French nuclear reactors make their lifetime extension doubtful
Up to nine French nuclear reactors (9 GW) may not be suitable for lifetime
extensions beyond their 50-year operating stint due to safety issues, said
the country’s ASN nuclear regulator.
The safety body – which would make a
final decision by late 2026 on plans by operator EDF to extend the lives of
as many if the country’s 56 reactors to 60 years or more – was particularly
concerned about certain pipe bends in the primary circuit of five reactors,
it added in a report late on Wednesday.
The reactors were Blayais 3,
Dampierre 4, St Laurent 2, Tricastin 4 (around 900 MW each), and Paluel 2
(1.3 GW). Meanwhile, in southeastern France, the 3.7 GW Cruas nuclear plant
could also be shut down if a fault line was discovered where the unit was
sited, said the ASN. Investigations were underway following an earthquake
that occurred 15km away in November 2019.
Montel News 15th June 2023
https://www.montelnews.com/news/1505270/9-french-reactors-may-not-be-suitable-for-extensions–asn
U.N. nuclear chief visits Ukraine nuke plant after dam explosion, to “help prevent a nuclear accident”
BY PAMELA FALK, JUNE 16, 2023 CBS NEWS
United Nations — The head of the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency made his third trip to Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe’s largest atomic power station, this week in a bid to “prevent a nuclear accident.” Ukraine accused Russia of blowing up the Kakhovka Dam, which Russian forces had occupied for months, a week and a half ago, threatening the vital cooling water supply to the sprawling nuclear plant………………
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi completed his latest visit to Zaporizhzhia Thursday and was expected to issue a full report on the safety of the facility in the coming days.
“We believe that we have gathered a good amount of information for an assessment of the situation and we will continue permanently monitoring the situation there in order to help prevent a nuclear accident,” Grossi said in one of several videos he posted from the plant.
Russia’s TASS news agency said Grossi was shown fragments of Ukrainian shells allegedly found on the grounds of the plant. Ukraine and Russia have accused each other of endangering the plant with artillery fire for months.
Grossi’s long-standing appeal to the 15-nation U.N. Security Council to establish a safety zone around the nuclear plant has gone unheeded, and he said this week that he did not expect Moscow and Kyiv to sign a document on the site’s security. ……..
He recently presented a new plan of “five principles” to beef up the IAEA presence at the Russian-occupied facility, and a new team of international inspectors was rotated into the mission during his visit this week.
“My visit to Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is the first after I established the IAEA 5 principles for protecting the plant and avoiding a nuclear accident, which reinforce the essential role of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission at Zaporizhzhia,” Grossi said.
He said the situation around the plant was “serious” but being “stabilized” after the blast at the dam. ………… https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-grossi-iaea-visit-after-kakhovka-dam-explosion/
U.S. Congress caves in to nuclear industry pressure for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to dumb down standards, and shift fees to tax-payers.
“they want the NRC to dumb down its own standards and just rubber-stamp anything that they put before the agency, no matter how flimsy.”
The industry has long argued that NRC fees are an impediment to innovation……the 2023 Appropriations Act…. allows the NRC to shift certain fees from the applicant to the taxpayer.
US Nuclear Push Brings Regulatory Growing Pains, Energy Intelligence Group ,Jun 16, 2023, Jessica Sondgeroth,
Congressional pressure on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has intensified in recent years, with pro-nuclear lawmakers pressuring the independent government regulator to further reduce regulatory review times, update its regulatory philosophy and minimize fees for developers of next-generation reactor vendors and small modular reactors (SMRs). Lawmakers have already passed new laws to this effect, and proposed legislation would increase the agency’s role in nuclear technology exports. All the while, the NRC is struggling to hire new staff with morale low and older staff members retiring.
“We have seen major shifts in NRC’s workload, budget, staff size, hiring, and overall outlook for the future,” Jeff Baran, NRC’s longest-serving commissioner said last month at his third renomination hearing on Capitol Hill. When Baran was first appointed to the NRC’s five-member board in 2014, “there was little talk of new construction beyond Vogtle. There was some interest in small modular reactors, but almost no real discussion of advanced, non-light-water reactors. Today, we are in a very different situation.”
Indeed, Congress is pushing the NRC to lean away from its traditional, more deterministic regulatory model and shift toward an increasingly risk-informed approach to rulemaking that supports applications for advanced reactors, SMRs and new fuel designs. Meanwhile, a suite of new reactor designs are in early pre-application talks with the agency. And thanks to new policies supporting nuclear in the energy transition, owners of existing reactors are incentivized to extend operating lives from 60 to 80 years rather than retire. All of this means that the NRC’s “overall workload is increasing,” Baran said.
But so too is the pressure on the agency to further minimize the regulatory burden on new reactor vendors and developers, and not all of these changes are being welcomed. “I think it is outrageous that the nuclear industry continues to scapegoat the NRC for its own failures and incompetence,” Union of Concerned Scientists Director of Nuclear Power Safety Ed Lyman told Energy Intelligence. “Instead of improving its applications and doing the hard and time-consuming work to provide sufficient technical justification for the safety of experimental, paper reactor designs, they want the NRC to dumb down its own standards and just rubber-stamp anything that they put before the agency, no matter how flimsy.”
Below are only some of the challenges the agency now faces:
- Advanced Reactor Rulemaking The NRC is in the middle of developing a two-part regulatory framework for advanced reactor designs…………. Advanced reactor and SMR vendors are pushing for more flexibility in the rules, citing advancements in computational modeling, but that is still a challenge given the lack of operational data and staff. ……….
- Review Times
- There are now new generic review milestones in place as mandated by the 2019 Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act. The NRC has shortened review schedules from approximately five years for conventional LWR designs to 30-42 months, depending on the application and design. With pre-application engagement, those timeframes can be shortened even further…………………………….But the industry is pushing for more. Nuclear Energy Institute Senior Policy Director John Kotek told Energy Intelligence last month that another way to trim regulatory reviews is through less rigorous environmental reviews and fewer hearings.
- Fees The industry has long argued that NRC fees are an impediment to innovation. Congress has already alleviated some of this burden on new reactor applicants with $5 million from the 2023 Appropriations Act for the Advanced Nuclear Energy Cost-Share Grant Program. ………….. This allows the NRC to, on a case-by-case basis, shift certain fees from the applicant to the taxpayer………………………………..
- Staffing
- The agency’s 9.6% attrition rate “is well above the average for federal agencies,” with one-third of the NRC’s workforce eligible for retirement,……………………………….
All of this means that the regulator remains under constant pressure to further streamline and minimize review times and limit environmental and safety reviews. Such pressure will only increase with the proposed Advance Act, introduced by a bipartisan group of senators. The bill cleared the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee in a May 31 business meeting by a vote of 16-3, but must still be passed by both the full Senate and the House of Representatives before becoming law. https://www.energyintel.com/00000188-c325-d38d-a58b-df3509750000
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