You may have never heard of the National Nuclear Security Administration, but its work is crucial to your safety—and to that of every other human being on the planet. If Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) hasn’t yet come across the NNSA, it surely will before too long. What happens after that could be alarming.
As recently as yesterday morning, Musk made clear that DOGE will go line by line through the government’s books looking for fat targets for budget-cutting, including those that are classified—especially those that are classified. DOGE employees are bound to notice NNSA, a 1,800-person organization that sits inside the Department of Energy and burns through $20 billion every year, much of it on classified work. But as they set out to discover exactly how the money is spent, they should proceed with care. Musk’s incursions into other agencies have reportedly risked exposing sensitive information to unqualified personnel, and obstructing people’s access to lifesaving medicine. According to several nuclear-security experts and a former senior department official, taking this same approach at the NNSA could make nuclear material at home and abroad less safe.
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) – Moscow´s renewed attacks on Ukraine´s electricity infrastructure this winter have heightened scrutiny over the Ukrainian Energy Ministry’s failure to protect the country´s most critical energy facilities near nuclear power sites.
Despite more than a year of warnings that the sites were vulnerable to potential Russian attacks, the Energy Ministry failed to act swiftly, current and former Ukrainian officials in Kyiv told The Associated Press.
Two years of punishing Russian strikes on its power grid have left Ukraine reliant on nuclear power for more than half of its electricity generation. Especially vulnerable are the unprotected nuclear switchyards located outside the perimeters of its three functioning nuclear plants, which are crucial to transmitting power from the reactors to the rest of the country.
“The switchyards that handle electrical routing from nuclear power plants are a vital component of Ukraine´s nuclear energy infrastructure – powering homes, schools, hospitals and other critical civilian infrastructure,” said Marcy R. Fowler, head of the office for research and analysis at Open Nuclear Network, a program of the U.S.-based NGO PAX sapiens that focuses on reducing nuclear risk.
“Given Ukraine´s heavy reliance on nuclear energy, military attacks on these switchyards would be devastating, severely impacting civilian life and undermining the resilience of the energy grid,” she said.
Even more worrying, nuclear switchyards also have a second critical function: delivering electricity to nuclear plants from the offsite grid that is essential to cooling their reactors and spent fuel. A disruption could potentially spell disaster, the U.N. nuclear agency has repeatedly warned since the Russian attacks began in August.
And while Ukraine’s nuclear plants have backup emergency power systems, these “are designed to provide temporary support,” Fowler said. “Without functioning switchyards, the backup systems alone would not be sufficient to sustain operations or prevent safety risks during an extended outage.”
Lawmakers cited failure to protect these sites in a resolution last month calling for the removal of Energy Minister Herman Haluschenko. The list of grievances, which also censured Haluschenko for alleged systematic corruption and inadequate oversight of the energy sector, must still be voted on by parliament.
Haluschenko maintained at a news conference Tuesday the allegations were “a manipulation” and that fortifications for the electrical grid were “done.” But he would not answer direct questions about whether Ukraine’s nuclear switchyards in particular were protected.
Russian attacks in November and December came dangerously close to the country´s nuclear power plants, causing five out of its nine operating reactors to reduce power generation. The attacks did not strike the nuclear switchyards about a kilometer (half-mile) away from reactor sites but came alarmingly close.
The task of building protections for energy transmission substations, both nuclear and non-nuclear, fell to state and private companies, with the Energy Ministry supervising.
Three layers of fortifications were ordered: sandbags followed by cement barricades capable of withstanding drone attacks and – the most costly and least complete – iron-and-steel-fortified structures.
Following a government decree in July 2023, many state energy companies began immediately contracting to build first- and second-layer fortifications for their most critical power facilities. In the spring of 2024, the government repeated the urgent call to get the work done.
But nuclear switchyards, under the responsibility of Ukraine’s state nuclear company Energoatom, did not issue contracts to build second-layer concrete fortifications until this fall. By then, state energy company Ukrenergo, which manages the high-voltage substations that transmit power from the nuclear reactors to the grid, had already completed 90% of its 43 sites.
The bidding process for two nuclear plants – in Khmelnytskyi and Mykolaiv – only started in early October, according to documents seen by the AP. The tender for the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant was even later, at the end of November.
Construction is not expected to be completed until 2026, the contract documents said.
Ministers are preparing to relax planning rules to make it easier to build mini nuclear power plants in more parts of the country in order to hit [?] green energy targets and boost the industry.
They are also examining whether it is possible to streamline the process for approving the safety of new nuclear power plants as a way to reduce construction delays. At present rules state that only the government may designate sites for potential nuclear power stations, of which there are eight, severely limiting where they can be built. T
his is seen as a serious barrier to developing small modular reactors (SMRs) that could be placed in various locations across the country, providing power for remote areas or power-hungry developments such as data centres for artificial intelligence.
Under plans to update the planning regime with a new national policy statement on nuclear power, companies would be free to develop SMRs in most areas of the country outside built-up areas and would also benefit from fast-tracked planning approval, as the power plants would be designated nationally significant infrastructure.
Rachel Reeves, the chancellor, is expected to use the government’s spending review to announce funding for one of two small modular reactors designs. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy and Rolls-Royce are among companies competing for the funding in a process being run by Great British Nuclear. Reeves is also expected to make a final funding decision on Sizewell C.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi said late on Monday that he was on his way to visit Kyiv and inspect a key substation that is critical for the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power. “On my 11th visit to Ukraine since the war began,” Grossi wrote on X. “I’m heading to Kyivska substation, critical for the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power, to assess damage and help prevent a nuclear accident.” Last week, the IAEA said in a statement that Grossi would visit Kyiv for “high-level” meetings to ensure nuclear safety in the war that Russia started in February 2022.
Yet, in recent months highly placed government officials have expressed their concerns over the possibility that drones flying near or over conventional and nuclear electric generating facilities could cause damage to the facilities, leading to power blackouts or worse.
drones operated with malicious intent present two distinct threats to critical infrastructure sites such as power-generating facilities.
drones can be equipped with weapons or explosives to devastating effect.
Are nuclear power plants, other electric facilities at risk from drones?
By DRONELIFE Features Editor Jim Magill
This is the third in a series of articles, examining the problems posed to critical infrastructure sites and other significant potential targets of drone incursions by hostile actors. Part one described current federal laws pertaining to the use of counter-drone technology. Part two looked at the threats from UAVs faced by jails and prisons.
This article will explore whether drones operated with malicious intent present a danger to nuclear power plants and other facets of the U.S. electric grid.
Counter-drone series – Part 3
Earlier this month the Nuclear Regulatory Commission put out a statement in an effort to reassure the public that nuclear power plants are safe from potential attacks from the sky in the form of drones flown by bad actors.
“While nuclear power plant security forces do not have the authority to interdict or shoot down aircraft, including drones, flying over their facilities, commercial nuclear power plants are inherently secure and robust, hardened structures,” the statement reads.
They are built to withstand hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes. Nuclear plants maintain high levels of security measures, which ensure they can defend against threats,” up to and including threats to the plant’s basic structure.
The statement notes that last year, the NRC updated its regulations to require its nuclear power plant licensees, which are largely private companies, to report sightings of drones over their facilities. These reports are sent to the NRC, the FAA, the FBI and local law enforcemen
Yet, in recent months highly placed government officials have expressed their concerns over the possibility that drones flying near or over conventional and nuclear electric generating facilities could cause damage to the facilities, leading to power blackouts or worse. In early January, Louisiana Gov. Jeff Landry brought the question up to then President-elect Donald Trump at a dinner meeting of Republican governors at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach. Landry reported that suspicious drone activity had been spotted over or near Entergy’s River Bend nuclear power plant in West Feliciana Parish.
Scott Parker, chief of unmanned aircraft systems at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), said drones operated with malicious intent present two distinct threats to critical infrastructure sites such as power-generating facilities.
A drone “can be used to either compromise the site’s secret protocols, or it can also be used to capture information that that organization may want to protect, like intellectual property,” Parker said. “There’s also the added capability of cyber-attack tools.” Drones can easily be equipped with a number of capabilities that could identify and exploit wireless communications to gain access into sensitive systems or networks.
Earlier this month the Nuclear Regulatory Commission put out a statement in an effort to reassure the public that nuclear power plants are safe from potential attacks from the sky in the form of drones flown by bad actors.
“While nuclear power plant security forces do not have the authority to interdict or shoot down aircraft, including drones, flying over their facilities, commercial nuclear power plants are inherently secure and robust, hardened structures,” the statement reads.
“They are built to withstand hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes. Nuclear plants maintain high levels of security measures, which ensure they can defend against threats,” up to and including threats to the plant’s basic structure.
The statement notes that last year, the NRC updated its regulations to require its nuclear power plant licensees, which are largely private companies, to report sightings of drones over their facilities. These reports are sent to the NRC, the FAA, the FBI and local law enforcement.
“Additionally, in late 2019, the nuclear industry began coordinating with the Department of Energy (DOE) and the FAA to restrict drone overflights over certain nuclear power plants,” the statement says.
Yet, in recent months highly placed government officials have expressed their concerns over the possibility that drones flying near or over conventional and nuclear electric generating facilities could cause damage to the facilities, leading to power blackouts or worse. In early January, Louisiana Gov. Jeff Landry brought the question up to then President-elect Donald Trump at a dinner meeting of Republican governors at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach. Landry reported that suspicious drone activity had been spotted over or near Entergy’s River Bend nuclear power plant in West Feliciana Parish.
Scott Parker, chief of unmanned aircraft systems at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), said drones operated with malicious intent present two distinct threats to critical infrastructure sites such as power-generating facilities.
A drone “can be used to either compromise the site’s secret protocols, or it can also be used to capture information that that organization may want to protect, like intellectual property,” Parker said. “There’s also the added capability of cyber-attack tools.” Drones can easily be equipped with a number of capabilities that could identify and exploit wireless communications to gain access into sensitive systems or networks.
In addition, as demonstrated in overseas conflicts in recent months, drones can be equipped with weapons or explosives to devastating effect. “It could also be used to some degree in order to attack critical infrastructure, especially when you think about a close-in blast capability of a drone targeting a specific asset,” Parker said……………
Are Drones a Threat to Nuclear Power Plants? Examining Risks to the U.S. Electric Grid
Are nuclear power plants, other electric facilities at risk from drones?
By DRONELIFE Features Editor Jim Magill
This is the third in a series of articles, examining the problems posed to critical infrastructure sites and other significant potential targets of drone incursions by hostile actors. Part one described current federal laws pertaining to the use of counter-drone technology. Part two looked at the threats from UAVs faced by jails and prisons.
This article will explore whether drones operated with malicious intent present a danger to nuclear power plants and other facets of the U.S. electric grid.
Counter-drone series – Part 3
Earlier this month the Nuclear Regulatory Commission put out a statement in an effort to reassure the public that nuclear power plants are safe from potential attacks from the sky in the form of drones flown by bad actors.
“While nuclear power plant security forces do not have the authority to interdict or shoot down aircraft, including drones, flying over their facilities, commercial nuclear power plants are inherently secure and robust, hardened structures,” the statement reads.
“They are built to withstand hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes. Nuclear plants maintain high levels of security measures, which ensure they can defend against threats,” up to and including threats to the plant’s basic structure.
The statement notes that last year, the NRC updated its regulations to require its nuclear power plant licensees, which are largely private companies, to report sightings of drones over their facilities. These reports are sent to the NRC, the FAA, the FBI and local law enforcement.
“Additionally, in late 2019, the nuclear industry began coordinating with the Department of Energy (DOE) and the FAA to restrict drone overflights over certain nuclear power plants,” the statement says.
Yet, in recent months highly placed government officials have expressed their concerns over the possibility that drones flying near or over conventional and nuclear electric generating facilities could cause damage to the facilities, leading to power blackouts or worse. In early January, Louisiana Gov. Jeff Landry brought the question up to then President-elect Donald Trump at a dinner meeting of Republican governors at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach. Landry reported that suspicious drone activity had been spotted over or near Entergy’s River Bend nuclear power plant in West Feliciana Parish.
Scott Parker, chief of unmanned aircraft systems at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), said drones operated with malicious intent present two distinct threats to critical infrastructure sites such as power-generating facilities.
A drone “can be used to either compromise the site’s secret protocols, or it can also be used to capture information that that organization may want to protect, like intellectual property,” Parker said. “There’s also the added capability of cyber-attack tools.” Drones can easily be equipped with a number of capabilities that could identify and exploit wireless communications to gain access into sensitive systems or networks.
In addition, as demonstrated in overseas conflicts in recent months, drones can be equipped with weapons or explosives to devastating effect. “It could also be used to some degree in order to attack critical infrastructure, especially when you think about a close-in blast capability of a drone targeting a specific asset,” Parker said.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the trade association for nuclear power industry, downplays the potential hazards associated with UAV flights over its facilities. ……………………………
The United States is estimated to have spent more than $400 billion on the kinds of antimissile goals that the president now says will provide “for the common defense.”
Star Wars is back, with an executive order from President Trump that the White House said “directs the building of the Iron Dome missile defense shield for America.”
The order, issued on Monday night, didn’t quite do that. It was more a vaguely worded set of instructions to accelerate current programs or explore new approaches to defending the continental United States than a blueprint for arming the heavens with thousands of antimissile weapons, sensors and tracking devices.
But two blocks away, on the same evening, the Office of Management and Budget issued a 56-page spreadsheet that detailed the suspension of funding for thousands of programs. They included most of the major U.S. efforts to reduce the amount of nuclear fuel that terrorists might seize, to guard against biological weapon attacks and to manage initiatives around the globe to curb the spread of nuclear arms.
The two announcements seemed to encapsulate the administration’s conflicting instincts in its opening weeks. Mr. Trump wants to build big and take the Space Force he created to new heights, even at the risk of new arms races. That effort has been underway since Ronald Reagan’s day, with only mixed results.
But in its drive to shut down programs it believes could be creations of the so-called deep state, the administration wants to cut off funding for many programs that seek to reduce the chances of an attack on the United States — an attack that could very well come in forms other than a missile launched from North Korea, China or Russia.
A judge paused Mr. Trump’s spending freeze on Tuesday, but the president’s intentions are clear.
Though Mr. Trump calls his plan the Iron Dome, it has little if any resemblance to the Israeli system of the same name that has succeeded in destroying small missiles that move at a snail’s pace compared with the blinding speeds of intercontinental warheads………………………………………………………..
Missile defense has long been a favorite topic for Mr. Trump, who has envisioned the project as the next step for the Space Force, which he created in his first term.
But it could also trigger a new arms race, some experts fear. And unaddressed in Mr. Trump’s new initiative is the threat of nuclear terrorism and blackmail with an atomic bomb, which might be smuggled into the United States on a truck or a boat. Many experts see the terrorism threat as far bigger than an enemy firing a single missile or a swarm.
In 2001, after Sept. 11 attacks, the federal government scrambled to get wide-ranging advice on how outwit terrorists and better protect Americans from the threats of germ, computer, chemical and nuclear attacks.
“The combination of simultaneously deploying a missile defense system of questionable effectiveness against any real threat” while “suspending operative programs against nuclear or bioterrorists, sophisticated cyberattackers or others” is a “terrible trade-off,” said Ernest Moniz, the energy secretary under President Barack Obama who now heads the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
“The Iron Dome reference conjures up the success of the Israeli missile defense, but that’s misleading given the relatively short-range missiles that Israel defends against and the small territory it needs to defend,” said Mr. Moniz, a former professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with long experience in nuclear weapons ………………
Critics of the executive order say it is more a list than a program, and includes systems that have never panned out. In an interview, Theodore A. Postol, an emeritus professor of science and national security at M.I.T., called Mr. Trump’s missile plan “a compendium of flawed weapons systems that have been shown to be unworkable.”…………………………………………
The nuclear watchdog has issued an improvement notice after two railway wagons carrying nuclear waste crashed.
It happened on the Sellafield site, in Cumbria, which manages more radioactive waste in one place than any other nuclear facility in the world.
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) said although no-one was injured and there were no radiation risks during the incident, which happened in November, it could have had “serious consequences”.
A Sellafield spokesman said: “An internal investigation was initiated to understand the root cause and to prevent this from happening again in future.”
The ONR said one of the wagons on the site’s railway had not been properly secured and it rolled about 200ft (60m), hitting a stationary wagon.
They added the wagons were left with minor damage and the nuclear containers were unaffected “due to their robust construction”, however health and safety improvements were needed to prevent future incidents.
Ian Bramwell, ONR’s head of regulation for Sellafield, said: “This will include improving how Sellafield plan, organise, monitor and review the measures in place to protect personnel directly and indirectly involved in rail activities on the site.”
The ONR will reinspect the site in the coming months and Sellafield has until 13 June to comply with the notice.
A Sellafield spokesman said it was working with the ONR to review its processes.
Recent events on the Ukraine-Russia war front have drawn widespread attention to a terrifying new reality: According to a dispatch from C.J. Chivers published by The New York Times Magazine in December, remote drone operators can now overcome virtually any defensive barrier or evasive maneuver, fundamentally altering the nature of warfare between the two countries and raising new concerns about nuclear reactor safety in the region.
From safe bunkers that are sometimes as far as miles away, Ukrainian operators have begun sending small unmanned devices that cost as little as US $400 to destroy tanks and heavy artillery pieces worth millions. While militaries have traditionally relied on larger, “purpose-built” drones in the past, fighters in Ukraine have recently turned to small, relatively inexpensive hobbyist drones used around the world for everything from firefighting to aerial photography. Many of the drone operators are young and not extensively trained. But their work has allowed the vastly outnumbered Ukrainian fighters to overcome highly complex, sophisticated defensive barriers, and inflict brutal, lethal, and enormously expensive damage with shocking ease.
This new turn in weaponized drone use bears startling implications in relation to nuclear reactor safety. There are eight atomic power plants in the Russo-Ukrainian war zone—six at the Zaporizhzhia site in Ukraine, and two at Kursk in Russia—whose security is continually threatened by the ongoing conflict and by a lack of skilled, reliable operators in the area. If severely damaged, deprived of cooling water, or cut off from back-up power supplies, any one of these plants could melt or explode. Such an event could blanket large swaths of the planet and many of Europe and Asia’s largest cities with deadly radiation, inflicting tremendous human suffering as well as permanent ecological devastation. The damage could exceed that of the 1986 explosion at Chernobyl Unit Four, which contained significantly less core radiation than at Zaporizhzhia and Kursk, both of which have operated far longer.
Reactor containment domes are often constructed with thick, reinforced concrete. But they are far from invulnerable. The routes to major catastrophe—from loss of coolant and back-up power to operator error and structural defects—are too numerous to delineate or discount. A combination of these risks plagues each of the more than 400 nuclear power plants licensed worldwide, including the more than ninety in the United States.
Another recent Times report warns that weaponized drones have become part of a “hybrid” global conflict operating in an amorphous “Gray Zone.” The ability of these drones to wreak lethal and exorbitantly expensive havoc is virtually unlimited. With easily deployed drones like those now ravaging Eastern Europe, hostile nations, rogue armies, small terror groups, or even a lone psychopath could handily turn any number of commercial reactors into lethal engines of a radioactive apocalypse.
Atomic technology has been in civilian use since the 1957 opening of Pennsylvania’s Shippingport reactor. The U.S. Congress at the time promised the public that the “Peaceful Atom” would have comprehensive liability insurance within fifteen years. But nearly seven decades later, no commercial U.S. atomic power plant has blanket private accident insurance against a major catastrophe. Homeowners policies nationwide specifically exempt a nuclear disaster: When push comes to shove, homeowners will pay for their own irradiation.
All atomic power plants cause environmental damage on both the local and global level. They emit radioactive Carbon-14, expand global CO2 levels in the mining and fuel fabrication process, burn at 540-plus degrees Fahrenheit that heats the atmosphere and nearby bodies of water, bathe their neighborhoods in “low level” radiation, and create unmanageable wastes. What’s more, they cost far more than renewables by factors of 2 to 400 percent, while producing inflexible “baseload” power that clogs the grid.
Atomic power plants have always been vulnerable to explosion due to natural disasters such as the one at Fukushima in 2011, systemic mismanagement such as that at Chernobyl, or military and terror attacks. The advent of drone warfare in addition to all of this has raised the threat level to a terrifying new height. But in spite of this, Congress approved a forty-year extension of the original federal insurance exemption in 2024. This means that by the 2060s, the industry may have operated an entire century without ever obtaining the basic private insurance necessary to protect the public from a major radiation release.
A new level of terror is now being inflicted in the Ukraine-Russian war zone by drones once considered to be harmless, frivolous techno-gadgets. The nuclear industry’s insistence that we have nothing to fear from military or terror attacks on its uninsured fleet has lost any residual credibility. Given the horrific new reality of drone warfare, generating hyper-expensive radioactive power and waste from hot, dirty, decrepit reactors is less defensible than ever.
The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said he is growing increasingly concerned that the organisation’s efforts to prevent a major nuclear incident in war-torn Ukraine in under increasing threat.
It comes as Rafael Mariano Grossi (above) revealed the agency’s team based at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has heard frequent explosions from outside the site over the past week.
He added The team reported hearing multiple instances of such military activity in recent days, at varying distances from the ZNPP. There was no damage reported to the plant itself. Although the sound of nearby military action has been a common occurrence ever since the IAEA established a continued presence at the ZNPP in September 2022, it has happened virtually daily in recent weeks.
“For almost three years now, we have been doing everything we can to help prevent a nuclear accident at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and elsewhere in Ukraine,” Grossi explained. “An accident has not occurred, but the situation is not improving. It is still precarious. I remain seriously concerned about nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, including at the Zaporizhzhya site. Our work is far from over.”
He continued as part of the ongoing work to monitor developments relevant for nuclear safety and security, the IAEA team has continued to conduct walkdowns across the site – including but not limited to the main and emergency control rooms of four reactor units and one turbine hall – and observed and discussed various safety-related maintenance activities with the plant.
The IAEA team was also informed that the ZNPP is procuring three new mobile diesel generators, similar to those received late last year. They are in addition to the site’s 20 fixed emergency diesel generators that are designed to provide on-site power if there is a total loss of off-site power.
Separately, the ZNPP said that four diesel steam generators were put into operation for ten days to provide the steam needed to process liquid radioactive waste. These generators were commissioned a year ago.
Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA said air raid alarms were heard on several occasions at Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – as well as at the Chornobyl site. At the Khmelnytskyy NPP, the IAEA team members have taken shelter at their residence three times in recent days due to such alerts.
At the Khmelnytskyy and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site, the IAEA teams were informed of instances of drones being detected at distances ranging from 2 to 30 km from the sites.
Despite such military activities, Ukraine’s nine operating nuclear power reactors have been operating at full capacity this week, safely generating much-needed electricity during the cold winter months.
Separately, the Agency continued with deliveries under its comprehensive programme of nuclear safety and security assistance to Ukraine. Last week, the Chornobyl site received equipment to enhance its nuclear security system. The delivery, the 104th organised by the IAEA since the start of the armed conflict, was supported with funds from the United Kingdom.
Russia and Ukraine continue to swap daily barrages, with the prospects of ceasefire talks appearing slim.
Aljazeera, 29 Jan 2025
A nuclear power plant was among targets during a massive Ukrainian drone attack, Russian officials have said.
Moscow said on Wednesday that the country’s energy infrastructure had come under attack by at least 100 drones overnight. Ukraine also reported strikes. The continuing barrages were accompanied by barbs from the two countries’ presidents, suggesting little prospect of peace talks.
The Russian Ministry of Defence said on Telegram that 104 drones were involved in raids across western Russia, many targeting power and oil facilities.
Local officials claimed that air defence systems had destroyed one drone that had attempted to strike the nuclear power plant in the western region of Smolensk.
“According to preliminary information, one of the drones was shot down during an attempt to attack a nuclear power facility,” Governor Vasily Anokhin said on the Telegram messaging app. “There were no casualties or damage.”
The Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant, the largest power generating plant in Russia’s northwest, was working normally on Wednesday morning, RIA state news agency reported, citing the plant’s press service.
Russia’s air defences reportedly destroyed drones over nine regions, including 11 over Smolensk, which sits on the border with Belarus. Nearly half were hit over Kursk, where Ukrainian troops have occupied several villages for months following an incursion.
Ukraine and Russia have been swapping drone and missile strikes on an almost daily basis, with energy infrastructure a particular target amid winter.
The new artificial intelligence (AI) model from China called DeepSeek created a stock market meltdown on Monday, with the Nasdaq composite dropping 3% and the S&P 500 falling 1.5%. Beyond hammering the share prices of the world’s most valuable companies, DeepSeek has potential implications on vast swaths of America’s innovation industries—including energy.
While U.S. technology companies must quickly respond to the challenges posed by the new DeepSeek model, and the AI innovations to come, other businesses—like the energy companies currently exploring uses for AI in their operations—have a different responsibility. Utilities, independent power producers, and energy companies of all stripes, must take a more measured approach and use this as a teachable moment for their employees to understand the safety and security risks inherent in AI tools. They have to underscore that employees should treat new AI tools no differently from other technologies that enter the enterprise, and use the safety and security standards that inform every decision on technology adoption.
Artificial intelligence has the incredible potential to make energy facilities—and particularly nuclear energy facilities—easier to develop, operate, orchestrate, and maintain. But only if these applications can adhere to the strictest standards of data security, privacy, and operational integrity. Nowhere is this more important than among the nation’s nuclear fleet operators……………………………………………………………………………. more https://www.powermag.com/deepseek-launch-should-prompt-ai-security-reviews-across-the-nuclear-industry/
The dramatic collision happened at 03.51 am on the night to January 26 but did not become known to the public before the press service of Rosatomflot confirmed the facts to several Russian media in the evening of January 28.
Murmansk-based Arctic Observer said in its Telegram channel that the collision happened as the powerful icebreaker was assisting a cargo ship sailing through the ice-covered waters.
According to Rosatomflot, the nuclear powered icebreaker continues to operate in normal mode along the Northern Sea Route, despite the damage to the hull.
Rosatomflot says in the press statement that “seaworthiness has not been lost” and “there were no casualties.”
The state owned operator of Russia’s icebreaker fleet underlines that the two onboard reactors were not harmed in the collision. The information has not been confirmed by independent sources.
Rosatomflot does not provide any information about what caused the navigation mistake leading to the huge icebreaker smashing into the smaller cargo ship.
The 50 Let Pobedy is the newest of the older Arktika-class nuclear-powered icebreakers. Construction of the vessel started in the late Soviet era (1989), but she was not commissioned before 2007.
The icebreaker has Murmansk as homeport, but can operate independently for months at a time during the icy navigation season along the Northern Sea Route.
The cargo vessel Yamal Krechet was according to MarineTraffic.com on her way from Arkhangelsk towards Sabetta, the port where Novatek’s Yamal LNG production facilitates are located.
There are no public reports about the possible damages to the cargo vessel. Several tens of containers can be seen on deck of the Yamal Krechet at the time of the collision, but it is not known immediately known what content the cargo includes.
EDF has signalled that Britain’s fleet of ageing nuclear power plants can keep running into the next decade amid a scramble to hit Ed Miliband’s [?]clean power targets. The company on Monday said it aimed to “maximise output” from the remaining gas-cooled nuclear reactors to “2030+”, providing this can be agreed with regulators.
It is the strongest sign yet that EDF, which is owned by the French state, believes the plants can go even further beyond their planned lifespans after extensions were most recently announced in December. Further extensions would deliver a boost to Mr Miliband, the Energy Secretary, as he seeks to make the electricity grid at least 95pc reliant on “clean” sources of power – including wind, solar, batteries and nuclear – in just five years.
Two of EDF’s oldest nuclear power stations, Heysham 1 in Lancashire and Hartlepool in Teesside, have had their shutdowns postponed from spring 2026 to 2027, while the other two, Heysham 2 and Torness in East Lothian, were extended from 2028 to 2030. But in a newly-published fleet update, EDF says there is a potential opportunity for all four plants to remain online until at least 2030.
The Norwegian rocket incident, which took place on this day in 1995, marked the only known activation of a nuclear briefcase in response to a possible attack
When the Cold War ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it greatly reduced the threat of global nuclear war. But on January 25, 1995, that threat once again came front and center when Russian officers mistook a Norwegian rocket sent to study the aurora borealis for a weapon of mass destruction.
In the early morning hours of January 25, a team of Norwegian and American scientists launched a Black Brant XII four-stage sounding rocket from Norway’s Andoya Rocket Range, a launch site off the country’s northwestern coast. Its purpose: to study the northern lights over Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean.
Although the scientists had notified dozens of countries, including Russia, in advance of their high-altitude scientific experiment, the information never made its way to Russia’s radar technicians.
Just four years after the Cold War’s end, tensions between the former USSR and the United States remained high. So when Russian officers at the Olenegorsk Radar Station detected a fast-moving object that was traveling on a high northbound trajectory above the Barents Sea, near Russia’s northern border, they feared it might be a nuclear attack from U.S. submarines. After all, it was similar in speed and flight pattern to a missile. It reached an altitude of 903 miles, separating into several sections as it flew, in the same way warheads would detach from a submarine-launched Trident missile.
Russia’s modus operandi was to identify an attack, assess it and decide whether to retaliate, all within ten minutes. Tracking the trajectory of the “missile” had already taken up the bulk of that time.
As a result, Russian submarine commanders were put on alert and ordered to prepare for a nuclear response. Russian President Boris Yeltsin was notified and given the Cheget, Russia’s nuclear briefcase—typically kept near the leader of a nuclear-weapons state at all times. This holds the launch codes for the country’s missile arsenal, which can be used to order a nuclear strike. To this day, it’s the only known activation of a nuclear briefcase in response to a possible attack.
After conferring with his top advisers, Yeltsin concluded that the rocket was heading away from Russian airspace and didn’t pose any threat to the country.
Twenty-four minutes after its launch, the rocket fell into the sea near Spitsbergen, the only permanently inhabited island on the Svalbard archipelago. The entire incident was over as quickly as it seemingly began.
It was a harrowing false alarm, and one that had the potential to cause widespread casualties. Though the incident has largely flown beneath history’s radar, it did lead to the re-evaluation and redesign of notification and disclosure protocols in both the U.S. and Russia
“US nuclear weapons at RAF Lakenheath will present a major threat, not only to communities near the base but to Britain as a whole, by putting us all on the US/Nato nuclear front line.”
Matt Precey, BBC News, Suffolk, 25th Jan 2025
The government is facing fresh demands to disclose whether US nuclear weapons are on British soil.
It comes as a senior American official confirmed the deployment of a new generation of bombs had been completed.
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) has written to the prime minister and the defence secretary to ask whether RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk is housing B61-12 munitions.
The UK and Nato have a long-standing policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.
……………………………..The B61-12 is a thermonuclear bomb which can be carried by F-35A Lightning II aircraft, which are stationed at RAF Lakenheath.
US Department of Defense documents revealed $50m was being allocated to build new facilities at RAF Lakenheath known as “surety dormitories”, which the Federation of American Scientists claimed pointed to the arrival of nuclear weapons.
Another document seen by the BBC, which has since been removed from the internet, stated there was related work at the base in preparation for its “upcoming nuclear mission”.
The US and its Nato partners do not disclose figures for their European-deployed weapons but the Washington-based Center for Arms Proliferation and Control estimates there are 100 warheads stored across five countries.
Security risks
In a letter to the government, CND general secretary Sophie Bolt said Ms Hruby’s disclosure suggested the nuclear bombs could now be in the UK.
She said: “There has been no information presented to local communities about the new security risks that they face.
“US nuclear weapons at RAF Lakenheath will present a major threat, not only to communities near the base but to Britain as a whole, by putting us all on the US/Nato nuclear front line.”
The letter added that the public “has a right to know about the risks posed by such a deployment – and the right to express their opposition to it”.
In November, the US Air Force confirmed that unidentified drones had been spotted over three of its airbases in the UK, including RAF Lakenheath.
No further information has emerged as to the origin or intentions of these aircraft.
But CND said the sightings “increased risks” at the base.
Ms Bolt told the BBC: “An accident involving drones and an aircraft carrying nuclear material, or drones causing aircraft to crash on the base near where nuclear weapons are stored, could have catastrophic consequences.” https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c20kwzyg721o
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