US to stay in Iran deal for now: officials, (Reuters) THE AUSTRALIAN, RICHARD COWAN AND DAVID MORGAN, 16 OCT 17, Senior Trump administration officials say the United States is committed to remaining part of the Iran nuclear accord for now, despite President Donald Trump’s criticisms of the deal and his warnings that he might pull out.
Nikki Haley, US ambassador to the United Nations, says Tehran is complying with the 2015 nuclear accord intended to increase Iran’s accountability in return for the lifting of some economic sanctions.
“I think right now, you’re going to see us stay in the deal,” Haley told NBC’s Meet the Press.
In a speech on Friday, Trump laid out an aggressive approach on Iran and said he would not certify it is complying with the nuclear accord, despite a determination by the UN’s nuclear watchdog that Tehran is meeting its terms.
The Republican president threw the issue to the US Congress, which has 60 days to decide whether to reinstate US sanctions. He warned that if “we are not able to reach a solution working with congress and our allies, then the agreement will be terminated”.
Hillary Clinton: Trump will provoke ‘nuclear arms race’ over North Korea,Guardian, 15 Oct 17,
Former secretary of state refuses to say if successor Tillerson should go, as she decries Trump approach to Iran nuclear deal. Hillary Clinton has denounced Donald Trump’s bellicose language toward North Korea, believing his verbal aggression has rattled American allies and will set off a nuclear arms race in the region.
“We will now have an arms race – a nuclear arms race in East Asia,” Clinton said in an interview with CNN due to be broadcast on Sunday, in which she also criticised Trump’s threat to pull out of the international nuclear deal with Iran. “We will have the Japanese, who understandably are worried with missiles flying over them as the North Koreans have done, that they can’t count on America.”
Clinton, who was secretary of state under Barack Obama from 2009 to 2013, stressed that she preferred a diplomatic solution; suggested Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric played into Kim Jong-un’s hands; and bemoaned Trump’s public undercutting of his secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, regarding his attempts to work with China and establish talks with Pyongyang.
“Diplomacy, preventing war, creating some deterrents is slow, hard-going, difficult work,” said Clinton, who declined to answer when asked if Tillerson should resign. “And you can’t have impulsive people or ideological people who basically say, ‘Well, we’re done with you.”’
On Friday Bob Corker, the Tennessee Republican who chairs the Senate foreign relations committee, continued his war of words with the president when he told the Washington Post Trump had “castrated” Tillerson.
“The greatest diplomatic activities we have are with China, and the most important, and they have come a long, long way,” Corker added. “Some of the things we are talking about are phenomenal. When you jack the legs out from under your chief diplomat, you cause all that to fall apart.”…….. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/hillary-clinton-trump-nuclear-arms-race-north-korea
Britain and Germany agreed on Sunday they remained committed to the nuclear deal with Iran
The U.S. decided earlier this week that it would decertify the agreement
Britain and Germany agreed on Sunday they remained committed to the nuclear deal with Iran after a U.S. decision to decertify the agreement, a spokeswoman said after a call between Prime Minister Theresa May and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
“They agreed the UK and Germany both remained firmly committed to the deal,” the spokeswoman said in a statement.
“They also agreed the international community needed to continue to come together to push back against Iran’s destabilizing regional activity, and to explore ways of addressing concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile program.”
Perhaps it is his progress in fixing the North Korea crisis via Twitter, that has emboldened Donald Trump to choose now of all times, to ratchet up tensions with Tehran.Trump’s derision of what he has previously called the “worst deal ever” is characteristically inconsistent. Even the good bit. For example, balance his contemporary position on Iran against his contention that the crisis with Pyongyang should have been resolved before the rogue state had a nuclear capability. This makes sense. Yet Trump is blind to the argument’s obvious application to Iran – a country that was on the path to a nuclear capability but has agreed to stop, in exchange for sanctions being lifted, and its international bank accounts unfrozen.
While there are concerns over Iran’s behaviour (mostly outside the agreement’s purview, but not entirely), its nuclear retreat is a real-time, real-world example of how coordinated international pressure, coupled with a willingness to
While the Obama Administration was the locomotive force behind the 2015 agreement, it was a settlement between Tehran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – China, France, Britain, Russia and the US – with the European Union tagging along.
Thus, it is a multi-lateral instrument annexed to UN Security Council resolution 2231, the text of which welcomes inter alia diplomatic efforts by the five plus Iran “to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA]”.
It also notes explicitly “Iran’s reaffirmation in the JCPOA that it will under no circumstances ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons”.
Over the weekend, Trump threw that process into new uncertainty, by demanding that Congress and America’s allies introduce new tests for Iran’s compliance, including by dragging in elements outside the nuclear purview.
In so doing Trump has achieved the dysfunctional trifecta by: (i) putting the JCPOA deal at risk, and thus potentially increasing the prospect of Tehran’s return to a nuclear weapons path, (ii) showing contempt for America’s closest allies by demonstrating that he will act unilaterally against their interests at a whim, and (iii) signalling to North Korea, Iran, and any other adversary that there is little point in negotiating because even after a deal is made and complied with, the US can simply renege.
Brexit Is a Game Changer for the British Nuclear Industry, Bloomberg, By, Jonathan Stearns and Nikos Chrysoloras,
U.K. withdrawal from nuclear treaty mirrors EU-exit challenges
Going it alone signals higher costs for companies, taxpayers
To understand the implications of Brexit, it helps to go nuclear.
Of all the international regulatory challenges created by the U.K.’s impending departure from the European Union, the atomic-energy industry may best encapsulate the decision’s bottom-line effect: more bureaucracy and costs for a country that has long fought to curb both within the EU.
Untwining the U.K. from decades of centralized European supervision of nuclear material for civilian use mirrors the broader Brexit process. Each involves abandoning treaty-bound organizations, re-establishing links on less integrated terms and, in the meantime, creating uncertainty for everybody from executives to researchers.
“Brexit is a complete game changer for the nuclear industry in Britain, altering the regulatory environment, creating major complexity and leading the way to higher costs for businesses, the state and ultimately the British taxpayer,” said Simone Tagliapietra, a research fellow on energy at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels. “It’s a huge, self-inflicted problem.”
Brexit Microcosm
The EU’s nuclear framework is a microcosm of the Brexit hurdles because, like Europe’s single market and free-trade deals, it offers the U.K. benefits that the British government is keen to retain after the country withdraws from the 28-nation bloc in March 2019. Yet the act of leaving makes preserving those advantages difficult or even impossible.
With negotiations on the divorce terms stalled, numerous industries in Europe are stepping up calls for transitional arrangements that would maintain the status quo between the time of Brexit and the entry into force of any permanent agreements on future U.K.-EU ties.
While the EU’s national governments retain many of the policy powers associated with nuclear energy, the Euratom treaty creates a federal structure for some key elements. The centralized features include non-proliferation inspections, supply agreements with non-EU nations and research funding, all of which will fall on Britain to arrange for the first time in four decades.
When notifying its plan to withdraw from the EU, the government of British Prime Minister Theresa May also announced its intention to quit Euratom, which is governed by the bloc’s institutions. The move disappointed the U.K. nuclear industry, which had argued that post-Brexit Britain should stay in Euratom.
Risk of Disruption
Britain is a leading European nuclear nation, with 15 reactors accounting for about a fifth of domestic electricity production. The British atomic-energy industry employs more than 65,000 people and features companies ranging from plant operator EDF Energy and developer Horizon Nuclear Power — a unit of Hitachi Ltd. — to fuel producer Westinghouse Electric Co. and uranium enricher Urenco Ltd…….
The U.K., Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency are united under a single non-proliferation agreement. Under the three-party accord, Euratom helps carry out IAEA-mandated inspections on civil nuclear facilities in Britain to ensure that no material is diverted for atomic weapons.
In leaving Euratom, the U.K. will have to negotiate an inspection agreement of its own with the Vienna-based IAEA and beef up the national nuclear authority. Britain held an initial discussion with the IAEA on a new accord in September, according to the agency. The country also published draft legislation on Oct. 11 to create a domestic nuclear-safeguards system to replace provisions under Euratom.
Nuclear Accords
Post-Brexit Britain will also no longer be covered by cooperation accords that Euratom has with a range of non-EU countries including Australia, Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Africa and the U.S. As a result, the U.K. will have to negotiate its own such deals, known as Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, or NCAs, including with the EU itself…….
The outlook for nuclear research in the U.K. is also hazy. As a member of the EU and host of a nuclear-fusion project known as Joint European Torus, the country sees 56 million euros ($66 million) a year directed from the Euratom research budget to the JET site in Oxfordshire where around 500 people are employed and about 350 scientists from Europe visit annually.
The funds for JET, which is a prototype for the world’s largest nuclear-fusion project called ITER in France, are part of a 1.6 billion-euro Euratom research budget for 2014-2018. Britain will have to negotiate access as of 2019 to this scientific network with the EU, which requires non-member countries participating in its research programs to make a financial contribution. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-15/brexit-takes-bureaucracy-to-the-atomic-level-for-u-k-industry
Iran nuclear deal: Trump decertifies Obama-era agreement and accuses Tehran of spreading ‘death and chaos’ The President’s more confrontational strategy toward Iran is likely to complicate relations with European allies, Independent UK, Alexandra Wilts Washington DC , 14 Oct 17, Donald Trumphas struck a blow against the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement – in defiance of other world powers – by choosing not to certify that Tehran is complying with the deal.
During a speech at the White House, Mr Trump accused the “fanatical regime” in the Iranian capital of spreading “death, destruction and chaos around the globe” as he again called the nuclear pact “one of the worst” agreements the US has ever entered into.
However, he stopped short of scrapping the agreement altogether, saying he wanted his administration to work with Congress and other nations to address the “deal’s many serious flaws”. ……Federica Mogherini, the EU’s foreign policy chief and one of the deal’s chief negotiators, said the agreement will remain valid regardless of Mr Trump’s decision. ……
The move by Mr Trump was part of his “America First” approach to international agreements which has led him to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate accord and the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico……
Mr Trump’s more confrontational strategy toward Iran is likely to complicate relations with European allies while strengthening ties with Israel.A vocal opponent of the agreement when it was signed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed Mr Trump’s “courageous” decision.
“I congratulate President Trump for his courageous decision today. He boldly confronted Iran’s terrorist regime,” the prime minister said in a video statement he released in English.
But both UK Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron this week had tried to persuade Mr Trump to re-certify the deal. Ms May has called the agreement “vital”, while Mr Macron has said it is “essential for peace”. …….
Russia’s foreign ministry said there was no place in international diplomacy for threatening and aggressive rhetoric such as that displayed by Mr Trump and said such methods were “doomed to fail”, in a statement issued after Mr Trump’s speech……
John McLaughlin, a former acting CIA director under Republican President George W Bush, called the decertification of the Iran deal one of Mr Trump’s “worst decisions”.
By Associated Press 14 October 2017, WASHINGTON (AP) – President Donald Trump offered a questionable reading of Iran’s past economic condition Friday when he blamed the Obama administration for lifting sanctions just as Iran’s government was facing “total collapse.”
A look at some of his points in remarks Friday that denounced Iran’s behavior but stopped short of fulfilling his campaign promise to get the U.S. out of the multinational deal that eased sanctions on Iran in return for a suspension of its nuclear program:
TRUMP: “The previous administration lifted these sanctions, just before what would have been the total collapse of the Iranian regime.”
THE FACTS: An imminent collapse of Iran’s economy was highly unlikely, according to international economists and U.S. officials.
International penalties on Iran in response to its nuclear program did drive its economy into crisis earlier this decade. But even before the nuclear deal, Iran had cut budget expenditures and fixed its balance of payments. It was still exporting oil and importing products from countries such as Japan and China.
The multinational deal froze Iran’s nuclear program in return for an end to a variety of oil, trade and financial sanctions on Tehran. Iran also regained access to frozen assets held abroad. The deal was conceivably an economic lifeline for the state, but international economists as well as U.S. officials did not foresee an imminent economic collapse at the time.
Among those experts, Patrick Clawson at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy said Iran’s leaders worried about the potential for social unrest at the time, but that the economy was sustainable.
TRUMP: “The Iranian regime has committed multiple violations of the agreement. For example, on two separate occasions, they have exceeded the limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water.”
THE FACTS: Iran is meeting all of its obligations under the deal, according to International Atomic Energy Agency investigators, who noted some minor violations that were quickly corrected.
Trump is right that Iran exceeded the limit on heavy water in its possession on two occasions. Both times, international inspectors were able to see that Iran made arrangements to ship the excess out of the country so that it could come back into compliance.
Deal supporters argue this shows the agreement works. Deal opponents say that because Iran sells the surplus on the open market, Iran is therefore being rewarded for violating the deal.
Trump and other critics of the agreement point in particular to Iran’s continuing missile tests, which may or may not defy the U.N. Security Council resolution that enshrined the deal. But those tests do not violate the deal itself.
TRUMP on the deal: “It also gave the regime an immediate financial boost and over $100 billion its government could use to fund terrorism. The regime also received a massive cash settlement of $1.7 billion from the United States, a large portion of which was physically loaded onto an airplane and flown into Iran.”
THE FACTS: The “financial boost” was from money that was Iran’s to begin with. It was not a payout from the U.S. or others but an unfreezing of Iranian assets held abroad.
The $1.7 billion from the U.S. is a separate matter. That dates to the 1970s, when Iran paid the U.S. $400 million for military equipment that was never delivered because the government was overthrown and diplomatic relations ruptured.
The rupture left people, businesses and governments in each country indebted to partners in the other, and these complex claims took decades to sort out in tribunals and arbitration. For its part, Iran paid settlements of more than $2.5 billion to American people and businesses.
The day after the nuclear deal was implemented, the U.S. and Iran announced they had settled the claim over the 1970s military equipment order, with the U.S. agreeing to pay the $400 million principal along with $1.3 billion in interest. Find AP Fact Checks at http://apne.ws/2kbx8bd
WASHINGTON: White House Chief of Staff John Kelly said on Thursday the Trump administration thinks the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability is currently manageable but Pyongyang cannot be allowed to develop the ability to strike the U.S. homeland.
“A state that has developed a pretty good ICBM (missile) capability and is developing a pretty good nuclear re-entry vehicle, I would believe … that that state simply cannot have the ability to reach the homeland,” Kelly said.
“Right now we think the threat is manageable but over time if it grows beyond where it is today, well, let’s hope that diplomacy works,” said Kelly, a retired Marine Corps general. (Reporting by Steve Holland; Writing by David Alexander; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama)
Rouhani says Iran will stay in nuclear deal only if it serves interests – TV, Parisa Hafezi, ANKARA (Reuters) 13 Oct 17, – Iran harshly reacted to President Donald Trump’s decision not to certify its nuclear deal with six major powers, and President Hassan Rouhani said Tehran might walk away if the continuing agreement does not serve the country’s national interests.
Defying Trump, Rouhani said Tehran will double its efforts to expand the country’s defence capabilities, including the country’s ballistic missile programme despite the U.S. pressure to suspend it.
Trump said in an address at the White House that he would not continue to certify the multinational agreement and warned he might ultimately terminate it.
“No president can revoke an international deal … Iran will continue to respect it as long as it serves our interests,” Rouhani said in a live television address, adding that Trump’s speech was full of “insults and fake accusations” against Iranians.
While Trump did not pull the United States out of the agreement, aimed at preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb, he gave the U.S. Congress 60 days to decide whether to reimpose economic sanctions on Tehran that were lifted under the pact.
Mr Trump is expected to announce additional economic sanctions against Iran
He has previously called the pact “the worst deal ever negotiated”
The deal saw Iran limit its nuclear program in exchange for fewer economic sanctions
Mr Trump announced the major shift in US policy in a speech that detailed a more confrontational approach to Iran over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and its support for extremist groups in the Middle East.
Mr Trump said in an address at the White House that his goal was to ensure Iran never obtained a nuclear weapon.
While Mr Trump did not pull the United States out of the agreement, aimed at preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb, he gave the US Congress 60 days to decide whether to reimpose economic sanctions on Tehran that were lifted under the pact.
That would increase tension with Iran as well as put Washington at odds with other signatories of the accord such as Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union.
Mr Trump warned that if “we are not able to reach a solution working with Congress and our allies, then the agreement will be terminated.”
The US military said it was reviewing the “entire breadth” of its security cooperation activities, force posture and plans to support the new strategy.
“We are identifying new areas where we will work with allies to put pressure on the Iranian regime, neutralise its destabilising influences, and constrain its aggressive power projection, particularly its support for terrorist groups and militants,” Major Adrian Rankine-Galloway, a Pentagon spokesman, told Reuters.
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani is expected to respond to Mr Trump’s speech on live television in the coming hours.
Mixed responses to policy shift
The European Union’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said the US could not unilaterally cancel the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers.
Ms Mogherini chaired the final stages of the landmark talks that brought the deal to fruition. She told reporters she spoke to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson immediately after Mr Trump’s speech.
“We cannot afford, as the international community, to dismantle a nuclear agreement that is working,” she said.
“This deal is not a bilateral agreement … The international community, and the European Union with it, has clearly indicated that the deal is, and will, continue to be in place.”
Mr Trump’s announcement was praised by politicians from countries that have strained relationships with Iran.
Saudi Arabia welcomed the new policy towards Iran and said lifting sanctions had allowed Iran to develop its ballistic missile program and step up its support for militant groups, state news agency SPA reported.
The kingdom said Iran took advantage of additional financial revenues to support for the Lebanese Shi’ite movement Hezbollah and the Houthi group in Yemen.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu congratulated Mr Trump for his speech, seeing an opportunity to change the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran as well as Iranian conduct in the region.
“[Mr Trump] boldly confronted Iran’s terrorist regime [and] created an opportunity to fix this bad deal, to roll back Iran’s aggression and to confront its criminal support of terrorism,” Mr Netanyahu said in a Facebook video.
Israel’s intelligence minister Israel Katz said the speech was “very significant” and could lead to war given threats that preceded it from Tehran.
Israel’s Channel 2 TV asked Mr Katz whether he saw a risk of war after the US leader’s speech.
“Absolutely, yes. I think that the speech was very significant,” he said.
“Iran is the new North Korea. We see where things are goings.” Reuters
UAE severs North Korea ties over nuclear & missile threats – thousands of workers at risk THE UNITED Arab Emirates (UAE) has announced plans to cut ties with North Korea amid international outrage at Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programmes. By WILL KIRBY, orth Korea’s ambassador in the country has been told to leave and the UAE will terminate its own envoy’s services in Pyongyang, according to a statement from the Foreign Ministry.
The statement also said the UAE will stop issuing new visas or company licenses to North Korean citizens.
Several thousand North Korean workers live in the country, with many working on construction sites.
They earn a significantly better wage than they would for the same job in their own country, but are forced to make so-called “loyalty payments” to Kim Jong-un’s regime…….
The measures taken by the UAE come after President Trump urged United Nations members to ramp up pressure on the hermit state to give up its nuclear weapons.
The UAE foreign ministry statement reads: “The measures… come within the context of its obligation as a responsible member of the international community to strengthen the international will and to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile programs.”
The withdrawal from Euratom, as part of the Brexit process, threatens to leave British firms without a framework through which to navigate the tightly regulated trade of nuclear materials.
UK ministers presented a Nuclear Safeguards Bill to Parliament this week which sets up a domestic nuclear safeguards regime. Industry insiders told The Daily Telegraph that they are monitoring the Government’s efforts to replicate the Euratom standards in an attempt to maintain access to the global nuclear market, but the slow progress means urgent contingency plans are likely to be required.
The risk of a 2019 cliff edge could paralyse work building the new Hinkley Point C new nuclear project and leave nuclear fuel suppliers without stocks.
“We are facing disruption to absolutely everything,” Tom Greatrex, chief executive of the Nuclear Industries Association, told Sky News. “Fifteen months to two years sounds like a lot of time. It’s not. The clock is ticking and it has been since the referendum and we’ve made very little progress so far.”
Nuclear giant Westinghouse, which runs the Springfields nuclear fuel plant in Cumbria, is working closely with the Government, regulators and its customers to ensure it can still import raw materials and export fuel even after leaving Euratom.
The Springfields facility is the first plant in the world to produce fuel for a commercial nuclear power station and has supplied products and services to customers in 11 countries since 1946. Without a replacement deal the facility, which employs a workforce of 1,200, would be unable to import the uranium needed to make enriched nuclear fuel or be able to export to customers.
“As part of these discussions we will evaluate any contingency arrangements which need to be in place to ensure we continue to successfully deliver to our customers in the UK and overseas,” the spokesman said.
But for the UK’s first new nuclear power plant to be built in a generation a regulatory gap following Brexit could raise major issues securing construction materials and skilled labour.
The NIA estimates that the £20bn Hinkley Point project will source around £5bn of its component parts from European countries.
Typically the UK imports graphite components from Germany using feedstock produced in France. Stainless steel castings are also manufactured in France and stainless strips, used to manufacture certain fuels and stringer components, are imported from Sweden.
The exit will also pose problems recruiting skilled labour.
It is estimated that Hinkley Point will need 1,400 steel fixers at the peak of its construction phase. The NIA has said only 2,700 registered and certified steel fixers are based in the UK and the project will be forced to compete with other major infrastructure projects in the UK for these individuals. Many are nearing retirement with an average age of 57.
“The best outcome for the nuclear industry would be if the UK could remain within the Euratom Treaty,” said a spokesman for EDF Energy, the French state-backed developer backing Hinkley Point.
“If the UK withdraws from the Treaty, it is essential that alternative and transitional arrangements are put in place in a pragmatic fashion, and before the existing arrangements are terminated. We stand ready to assist the development and timely delivery of the appropriate solution,” he added.
The escalating tensions over North Korea have brought the United States closer to war on the Korean peninsula than at any other time in decades. Yet Washington is just as likely as Pyongyang, if not more likely, to initiate the first strike — and would almost certainly use nuclear weapons to do so. Such a strike may be the only way to decisively end the North Korean nuclear program, but its incalculable effects would extend far beyond the devastation and destruction in Korea. Its political, economic, and moral consequences would permanently and disastrously undermine U.S. interests for generations to come — and must be avoided at all costs.
These very real threats would have confronted any president occupying the Oval Office in 2017, but President Donald Trump has chosen to react to this perilous situation in dangerously provocative ways……..
The possibility of a first strike against North Korea has long been discussed as one way to address its growing nuclear threat. Yet very few understand the grim military logic that only an overwhelming surprise nuclear strike provides a decisive option. There is simply no other way to destroy North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while minimizing the risk of massive conventional or nuclear retaliation.
There are two crucial reasons why a conventional first strike cannot be effective. First, the timelines involved are too long. It would require weeks or even months of preparation: building up troops, aircraft, and ships, as well as evacuating tens of thousands of U.S. citizens. Any of these highly visible preparations for war could lead Pyongyang to launch a preemptive strike of its own — including massive artillery and chemical attacks on Seoul, and nuclear strikes across the region, including against U.S. territory. The same logic would hold even if the United States could somehow pull off a surprise conventional attack, since most experts envision such an attack lasting days or weeks. In either case, Kim would have absolutely no incentives to hold back any of his military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. His regime’s survival would be at stake, leading to a classic “use-it-or-lose-it” scenario.
Second, and more important, a conventional first strike simply cannot destroy enough North Korean military capability to prevent a retaliatory second strike. North Korean nuclear weapons have been deliberately dispersed throughout the country, including on mobile launchers and in locations deep underground, to prevent this exact scenario. ……..
A nuclear first strike, then, may seem like an attractive military option to a president who has vowed to end the North Korean nuclear threat once and for all. Yet its political, economic, and moral consequences would be so devastating that it would be hard for any American to imagine, in retrospect, why this ever seemed like a good idea.
First and foremost, the human costs would be catastrophic. Millions of North Koreans would either be killed or grievously wounded from the effects of fires, blasts, and radiation. The radioactive fallout from such a strike could spread contamination thousands of miles, directly affecting South Korea, Japan, and China, as well as countries and populations across the region and beyond. Global or regional weather patterns could also be disrupted, affecting agriculture and the environment for years to come.
Even if those tragic human costs could somehow be set aside, the cascading range of other consequences would be sufficient to avoid such an attack. China could respond militarily, by moving forces into the parts of North Korea less affected by the strike, for example. This could result in a risky confrontation with U.S. forces seeking to confirm the complete destruction of North Korean nuclear capabilities. Chinese troops could also collide with a potential influx of U.S. and South Korean ground troops trying to establish civil order and provide humanitarian relief to the North Korean populace in the aftermath of the strikes. China might also respond to an attack on its ally more forcefully, by striking U.S. bases in the region or possibly even the U.S. homeland, especially since radiation would inevitably blanket some of its territory………
Is nuclear war on the Korean peninsula inevitable? No, but only if the Trump administration recognizes that a nuclear first strike cannot be a viable alternative, because its consequences are simply unfathomable. Deterrence is the vastly preferable option. The United States faced similar challenges after World War II, when the Soviets and then the Chinese developed nuclear weapons and the ability to strike U.S. targets. In both cases, arguments for American first strikes to remove these threats were soundly rejected in favor of long-term policies of deterrence — which have successfully avoided a nuclear conflagration for many decades. Effective deterrence requires only an adversary who is rational enough to seek his own survival — a threshold that even Kim Jong Un meets.
Trump’s most trusted advisors and experienced veteran military men, John Kelly and James Mattis, should repeatedly make this argument to the president while there is still time. There is virtually no likelihood that North Korea can be pressured to give up its nuclear program at this juncture. Given that reality, the best way to advance U.S. national security and protect American lives is to publicly commit to deterring the Korean regime while privately removing threats to its survival. The alternative is a deadly nuclear first strike from which there will be no winners.https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/the-growing-danger-of-a-u-s-nuclear-first-strike-on-north-korea/
Trump breaks with allies as US goes it alone on Iran, Channel News Asia, 13 Oct 17 WASHINGTON: President Donald Trump will unveil a new US Iran strategy on Friday (Oct 13) and is expected to withdraw backing from the Iran nuclear accord, undermining a landmark victory of multilateral diplomacy.White House spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders said Trump would unveil a broad plan to counter Iran at 12.45pm (1645 GMT).
She did not elaborate, but Trump is expected to declare to Congress that retaining the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement is no longer in the US national interest.
This in itself does not mean the deal will collapse. US lawmakers will have 60 days to decide whether they want to “snap back” the sanctions Washington has suspended.
But it will mark a clear break with America’s allies, who have pleaded with Trump to respect the accord, and a fierce blow to the multilateral international order.
The agreement was signed between Iran and six world powers – Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the US – at talks coordinated by the European Union.
UN nuclear inspectors say Iran is meeting the technical requirements of its side of the bargain, dramatically curtailing its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
So, while US officials still insist that “America First” does not mean “America Alone,” on this issue they are starkly isolated. The other signatories all back the deal.
……… On Tuesday, British Prime Minister Theresa May called the White House to impress upon it her government’s “strong commitment to the deal alongside our European partners.”
In parallel, her foreign minister, Boris Johnson, told his US counterpart Secretary of State Rex Tillerson “that the nuclear deal was an historic achievement.”
“It was the culmination of 13 years of painstaking diplomacy and has increased security, both in the region and in the UK,” he argued.
But the US administration barely acknowledged the calls, and European diplomats in Washington privately complain that their message is not getting through.
………Last week, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis was asked whether he believes the Iran deal remains in the US national interest.
Can the Iran deal work without the US? http://thebulletin.org/can-iran-deal-work-without-us11184, 12 OCTOBER 2017 Navid HassibiMedia reports say that President Donald Trump may soon inform Congress that Iran is not complying with its end of the nuclear deal, despite numerous IAEA reports to the contrary and his own two previous certifications. The president is reportedly annoyed by the process, which requires him to certify every 90 days that Iran is in compliance with the terms of the agreement, and he appears to be keen to adopt a more confrontational approach toward Tehran.
While Trump’s refusal to re-certify is not the same as completely withdrawing from the deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—refusing to certify could have a significant impact, kicking the issue over to Congress, which would then have to decide within 60 days whether to re-impose nuclear-related economic sanctions on Iran. While this action is by no means guaranteed, given thediscord between the White House and mainstream Republicans on Capitol Hill on a number of issues, the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran is still a distinct possibility, given previous opposition to the deal by dedicated congressional Iran hawks.
And from the Iranian point of view, if sanctions are re-imposed by the US Congress, the United States would be in material breach of the deal, which would give a pretext for its unravelling—unless the deal can in some way survive without the United States.
What are the chances of this happening? Can Washington withdraw from the deal without facts on the ground to back up this action? Can the dispute resolution mechanism contained in the deal save it? What about the role of the other five countries that negotiated with Iran alongside the United States: France, Germany, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom? (And the European Union, which coordinates the JCPOA.)
Can the deal survive?
Immediate signals from Iran and Europe. Recent statements by Iran seem to indicate that it wishes to try to keep the deal going, despite a putative US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said in some of his strongest public language yet that Iran would remain in the deal if Europe and others did too. And that seems to be a strong possibility; in an interview with Politico, Zarif said: “The Europeans have made it very clear to us and to the United States that they intend to do their utmost to ensure survival of the deal.” This interview also illuminated what a striking gap Trump has opened up between the Americans and their closest allies.
With this in mind, it is clear that a United States withdrawal from the deal would isolate Washington, significantly damage its credibility to negotiate future agreements in good faith, and harm its relationship with allies.
And it might potentially expose it to economic and even legal risks. Can Washington even withdraw from the deal? It is unclear whether the Trump administration can simply withdraw from the deal without cause, or as the deal defines it, an issue of non-performance. The deal does not explicitly describe the procedures involved for a party to leave the agreement—likely by design. The United States may consider the deal to be a non-binding political commitment, but the Europeans believe that the JCPOA is binding because it has been codified through a UN Security Council resolution. When viewed through this lens, US re-imposition of unilateral sanctions (including withdrawal from the agreement) could be interpreted as contravening international law and place Washington in legal jeopardy. This course of action would certainly qualify as non-performance under the deal.
To dance around this problem, the Trump administration has repeatedly accused Iran of violating the spirit of the agreement. For example, administration officials have been making references to the JCPOA’s Preamble and its Article 28, both of which state that the parties commit to implement the deal in good faith and refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit, and intent of the JCPOA. By interpreting these provisions beyond the scope they were originally intended, the Trump Administrations apparently hopes to prop up its possible withdrawal from the deal.
What about the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism? The JCPOA and the corresponding UN Security Council Resolution detail the necessary steps needed to resolve issues of legitimate non-performance. (And it should be noted that this mechanism was developed with the presumption that no party would deliberately sabotage the deal, which seems to be the intent of the Trump Administration’s words and deeds.)
Under this mechanism, both the United States and Iran could raise the issue of non-performance before the Joint Commission, which is charged with overseeing implementation of the deal. The Joint Commission would then have the opportunity to resolve the problem, at both the foreign minister-level and through a three-member advisory panel, each of which could issue a non-binding opinion. In this situation, the three-member panel would consist of Iran, the United States, and a third JCPOA member. (And remember that the Joint Commission consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran.) Seeing as how all the remaining members of the Joint Commission resolutely back continued implementation of the nuclear deal, it’s safe to assume that their judgment would be in favor of Iran and rule that the US was in non-performance—a decision that Washington would disagree with.
But the decision would be a hollow victory for Iran, because the Joint Commission requires full consensus when it comes to the issue of non-performance—effectively meaning unanimous approval—so just the one dissenting vote from the United States would be enough to stop the dispute resolution mechanism from going into effect, and so leave Iran with few options for redress.
But US non-performance might give Iran grounds to cease performing its own commitments in whole or in part. This would see Iran expand its nuclear program to pre-agreement levels and potentially beyond, and remove the transparency and inspection measures that Iran has found so intrusive but which it had agreed to under the deal. As a result, US non-performance could needlessly re-introduce a crisis that had previously been resolved, and increase the risk of military conflict between Iran and the United States (or Israel). Much of the world would likely blame the Trump administration and this would have far-reaching effects; for example, any credible approach to peacefully resolving the situation on the Korean peninsula would be met with skepticism. Or, as EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini put it: “We already have one potential nuclear crisis. We definitely [do] not need to go into another one.”
The United States could go even further, by abusing the terms of the JCPOA to re-impose—or “snap back”—UN Security Council sanctions on Iran. The United States would merely have to notify the Security Council of its assessment that Iran is in non-performance, regardless of the facts. The Security Council would then have to vote on a resolution to continue sanctions relief. The Trump administration would likely veto the resolution and the pre-JCPOA UN sanctions against Iran would be back in place.
Ironically, this mechanism was intended to keep Tehran, and not Washington, in check.
To mitigate against a US threat of snapping UN sanctions back, an arcane and mostly symbolic tactic to bypass a veto could be invoked through the so-called “Uniting for Peace” resolutionof the UN General Assembly, which allows it to vote on a matter that lacks unanimity in the UN Security Council with a simple majority. Although this may seem far-fetched, it could be a legitimate option in countering President Trump’s unpredictability.
Blowback from US withdrawal? Should Washington contravene the nuclear deal, the remaining members of the Joint Commission could work to salvage what is left of the JCPOA, which, along with the UN Security Council Resolution, allows it to “adopt or modify, as necessary, procedures to govern its activities” and “consult and provide guidance on other implementation matters that may arise under the JCPOA.” In this vein, the Joint Commission could adopt an approach that would include accepting US non-performance and withdrawal as a fait accompli, and encourage its members to simply ignore UN sanctions—effectively preventing any snap back, and working against any unilateral US nuclear-related sanctions on Iran.
The EU has already indicated that it is considering employing a “Blocking Statute” which would make it illegal for EU companies to comply with US sanctions done in this manner. (And there is a precedent for this action; the EU had previously used a Blocking Statute in the 1990s in response to the Clinton administration’s sanctions against Iran.) At a recent panel discussion, the EU ambassador to the United States notedthat the “European Union will act to protect the legitimate interests of our companies with all the means at our disposal.”
Seeking remedial action against US secondary sanctions through the World Trade Organization could be another option by the EU. (Secondary sanctions are penalties applied to third-parties, such as foreign banks not directly linked to Iranian entities.) Presumably, Russia, China and others could adopt similar hedges against US measures.
Consequently, it can be seen that maintaining the deal in some form, without the United States, could indeed be a real possibility.
But by far, the best path forward would be for Washington to continue to comply with the JCPOA—which, after all, was a deal laboriously negotiated in good faith over several years to peacefully resolve a longstanding security concern. Simply put, the alternative to the JCPOA would be escalating tensions and inevitable conflict. Other US grievances against Iran—such as addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program, or countering Iranian influence in the region, or dealing with the sunset clauses of the JCPOA (which see time limits of varying lengths, including 10 and 15 years, on restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program)—should be discussed through engagement and diplomacy.
Should the president fail to re-certify Iranian compliance by the October 15 deadline called for by the agreement, it will be up to members of Congress to act in the best interests of the United States, by refraining to re-impose sanctions.
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