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Will Trump’s ceasefire plan really lead to lasting peace in the Middle East? There’s still a long way to go

Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University October 12, 2025, https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-ceasefire-plan-really-lead-to-lasting-peace-in-the-middle-east-theres-still-a-long-way-to-go-267112?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%2013%202025%20-%203547436165&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%2013%202025%20-%203547436165+CID_bcade8c9c4dad1f5a754fd2f23566c83&utm_source=campaign_monitor&utm_term=Will%20Trumps%20ceasefire%20plan%20really%20lead%20to%20lasting%20peace%20in%20the%20Middle%20East%20Theres%20still%20a%20long%20way%20to%20go

The first steps of the peace plan for Gaza are underway. Now both parties have agreed to terms, Hamas is obligated to release all hostages within 72 hours and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will withdraw to an agreed-upon line within the strip.

Hopes are high, particularly on the ground in Gaza and in Israel after two years of brutal conflict. Some argue the parties are now closer than ever to an end to hostilities, and US President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan may be an effective road-map.

But the truth is we have been here before. Hamas and Israel have now agreed to a road-map to peace in principle, but what is in place today is very similar to ceasefire deals in the past, and a ceasefire is not the same as a peace deal or an armistice.

The plan is also very light on specifics, and the devil is definitely in the detail. Will the IDF completely withdraw from Gaza and rule out annexation? Who will take on governance of the strip? Is Hamas going to be involved in this governance? There were signs of disagreement on these issues even before the fighting stopped.

So if the ceasefire steps hold in the short term – then what? What would it take for the peace plan to be successful?

First, the political pressures to refrain from resuming hostilities will need to hold. Once all the hostages are returned, which is expected to take place by Tuesday Australian time, Hamas effectively loses any remaining leverage for future negotiations if hostilities were to resume.

Once the hostage exchange is complete, it’s likely Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will see some pressure from his right to resume hostilities.

With Hamas relinquishing this leverage, it will be essential for the Israeli government to see these negotiations and the end of the war as fundamental to its long term interests and security for peace to hold. There must be a sincere desire to return to dialogue and compromise, not the pre-October 7 2023 complacency.

Second, Hamas will likely have to relinquish its arms and any political power in Gaza. Previously, Hamas has said it would only do this on the condition of recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state. As recently as October 10, factions in Gaza have said they would not accept foreign guardianship, a key part of the peace plan, with governance to be determined “by the national component of our people directly”.

Related to this, any interim governance or authority that takes shape in Gaza must reflect local needs. The proposed “body of peace” headed by Trump and former UK prime minister Tony Blair, could risk repeating previous mistakes of cutting Palestinians out of discussions over their own future.

Part of the peace deal is the resumption of humanitarian aid flows, but the fate of the Gaza blockade that has been effectively in place since 2007 is unclear. The land, sea and air blockade, which was imposed by Egypt and Israel following Hamas’ political takeover of Gaza, heavily restricts imports and the movement of Gazans.

Prior to October 2023, unemployment in the strip sat at 46%, and 62% of Gazans required food assistance as a result of the limits placed on imports, including basic food and agricultural items such as fertiliser.

Should the blockade continue, at best Israel will create the same humanitarian conditions in Gaza of food, medical and financial insecurity that existed prior to the October 7 attacks. While conditions and restrictions are orders of magnitude worse in Gaza today, NGOs called early incarnations of the blockade “collective punishment”. For peace to hold in the strip, security policy needs to be in line with global humanitarian principles and international law.

Most importantly, however, all parties involved must see peace in Gaza as fundamentally connected to broader peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Seeing the Gaza conflict as discrete and separate from the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict would be a mistake. Discussions of Palestinian national self-determination in Gaza and the West Bank must be taken seriously and be a central part of the plan for peace to last.

While the 20-point plan mentions a “credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”“, history tells us these pathways struggle to get past the rhetoric stage.

Many challenges stand in the way, including Israeli settlement and annexation, the status of Jerusalem and the question of demilitarisation.

A meaningful step would be for the US to refrain from using its veto power at the UN Security Council (UNSC) against votes supporting Palestinian statehood. While several states recognised a Palestinian state at the recent UN General Assembly, the US has blocked formal status at the UNSC every time.

Despite all these concerns, any pause in hostilities is undeniably a good thing. Deaths from October 7 2023 number nearly 70,000 in total, with 11% of Gaza’s population killed or injured and 465 Israeli soldiers killed. The resumption of aid delivery alone will go far in addressing the growing famine in the strip.

However, peace deals are incredibly difficult to negotiate at the best of times, requiring good faith, sustained commitment and trust. The roots of this conflict reach back decades, and mutual mistrust has been institutionalised and weaponised. Difficulties in negotiating the Oslo Accords in the 1990s showed just how deep the roots of the conflict are. The situation is now much worse.

It is not clear if any party involved in negotiation possesses the political will needed to reach an accord. However, an opportunity exists to reach one, and it should not be taken for granted.

October 14, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

The Nobel that wasn’t Trump’s: Why Oslo chose a Venezuelan rebel over a peacemaker.

What Oslo calls a “peaceful transition” others might see as a strategy of regime change.

Machado in many ways stands on the same side as Trump. She’s seen positively by figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and all of them share a goal of opposing Nicolás Maduro’s regime. So this may not have been a snub to Trump – it’s more of a balancing act.”

Rt.com 10 Oct 25

By honoring an opposition leader wanted in Caracas, the Nobel Committee reignited a debate over who gets to define “peace”.

The 2025 Nobel Peace Prize has gone to María Corina Machado, one of the most prominent faces of Venezuela’s opposition. The committee’s language is familiar – ”rights,” “peaceful transition” – but the story behind it isn’t. Machado’s record blends volunteer election networks with long-running fights over foreign funding; her name has appeared in cases tied to efforts to unseat the government – charges she rejects; and a country remains split over where legitimate politics ends and regime change begins.

The award lifts a domestic struggle onto a global stage and drops it into a fresh context: for much of the year, chatter about a “Nobel for Trump” hung in the air, and the very idea of what counts as peacemaking is once again up for debate far beyond Caracas.

From steel dynasty to political underground

María Corina Machado is an engineer by training and one of the most recognizable figures in Venezuela’s opposition over the past two decades. Born in Caracas to a family linked to the industrial group SIVENSA, she studied at the Andrés Bello Catholic University and later at IESA, Venezuela’s leading management school. Early exposure to the family business and an affinity for market-friendly ideas shaped her public profile: an emphasis on entrepreneurship, privatization, and integration with global markets

In 2002, Machado co-founded Súmate, a civic platform that built volunteer networks to train election observers and run parallel vote counts. That is when the first major controversy took hold: authorities alleged the group received funding from US-based organizations; her supporters countered that the money supported legitimate civic initiatives. From then on, every move she made in politics was viewed through the lens of where to draw the line on outside assistance.

That same year brought Venezuela’s most dramatic recent upheaval – the brief ouster of President Hugo Chávez and the “Carmona decree,” which proclaimed a provisional government. Machado’s name surfaced in debates over who backed the decree; she denied participating. The legal and historical arguments never fully settled, but the episode fixed an image of Machado as a politician whom opponents associate with the idea of “regime change.”

A long stretch of investigations and restrictions followed. Between 2003 and 2005, prosecutors examined alleged “illegal foreign funding” for NGOs; travel bans appeared periodically. In 2014, amid street protests, Machado became one of the most prominent voices criticizing the government and, in official rhetoric, was linked to cases alleging a plot and even an attempt on President Nicolás Maduro’s life. Machado rejected the accusations as politically motivated. The upshot was a prolonged ban on holding public office…………………………………………………….

After the 2024 vote, Machado largely disappeared from public events. Her statements came via video, with her whereabouts undisclosed. The phrase “underground network” took hold in media shorthand: supporters saw a movement operating under pressure; opponents argued it was a continuation of street-level tactics and external lobbying against the authorities. Against that backdrop, the Nobel Peace Prize elevates Machado’s biography to the international stage – and carries a long-running national argument over the limits of political struggle to a much wider audience.

Why Oslo chose her

In announcing its decision, the Nobel Committee said it was honoring María Corina Machado “for her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.”

The language was familiar — rights, democracy, peaceful transition — but the context was not. Machado’s record blends civic mobilization and volunteer networks with long-running controversies over foreign funding. Her name has appeared in cases tied to efforts to unseat the government — allegations she has consistently rejected — and Venezuela remains deeply divided over what counts as legitimate political struggle.

Those contradictions make the award particularly charged. Within Venezuela, the same actions that Oslo calls “peaceful resistance” have been framed by officials as destabilization efforts supported from abroad. For Machado and her allies, the prize validates years of activism under pressure; for the government, it confirms a long-held view that Western institutions reward political opposition disguised as democracy promotion.

The decision also fits a larger pattern. By awarding Machado, the Nobel Committee effectively reintroduced Venezuela into the global political conversation – not as an energy supplier or a sanctions case, but as a test of how the world now interprets democracy itself. What Oslo calls a “peaceful transition” others might see as a strategy of regime change. That tension is what makes this year’s prize less about peace – and more about the politics of defining it.

The Nobel announcement also landed amid one of the most charged moments in US–Venezuela relations in years. Since early 2025, Washington has tightened its posture toward Caracas – reviving energy sanctions that had been partially lifted after the 2023 Barbados agreements and signaling a renewed focus on “transnational crime networks” in the Caribbean. In practice, that meant more joint naval patrols, renewed intelligence activity, and a sharper tone linking Venezuela to the regional drug trade – an accusation Caracas dismissed as a pretext for pressure.

At the same time, the Biden-era approach of limited engagement had given way to a more assertive line under Trump’s second administration. The new White House framed its strategy as a “war on narcotics” and a push to restore regional stability; in Venezuela and across Latin America, many viewed it as an attempt to reassert US influence in a region increasingly connected to Russia, China, and Iran.

Notably, María Corina Machado publicly voiced support for Washington’s decision to combat Venezuelan drug cartels through military means. Her statement drew wide attention, as it aligned her stance with the US administration’s tougher regional policy and blurred the boundary between domestic opposition and foreign strategy………..

The Nobel that got away

For much of the year, Washington buzzed with talk of a “Nobel for Trump.” The president himself didn’t hide his ambition: he wanted to go down in history as a peacemaker. After returning to the White House, he made foreign policy the centerpiece of his second term – launching a flurry of initiatives aimed at cooling global flashpoints and projecting a renewed American presence abroad.

Supporters pointed to a record few modern leaders could match. The Abraham Accords, signed during his first term, had already redefined Israel’s ties with its neighbors – and served as the basis for his 2024 nomination by congresswoman Claudia Tenney.

By late 2025, Trump’s team listed seven cases where US diplomacy had helped halt or de-escalate conflicts:………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Anastasia Gafarova, deputy director of the Center for Political Information, described the Nobel Committee’s choice as “an attempt at compromise rather than confrontation.”

“Despite tensions between Washington and Caracas, Machado in many ways stands on the same side as Trump. She’s seen positively by figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and all of them share a goal of opposing Nicolás Maduro’s regime. So this may not have been a snub to Trump – it’s more of a balancing act.”……………………………………………

What ‘peace’ means now

For the Nobel Committee, María Corina Machado’s name will likely stand beside those of activists and reformers who defied authoritarian systems. For Washington and Caracas, however, the meaning of her award reaches far beyond that frame………………….

To her critics, it is yet another example of Western institutions rewarding political alignment under the banner of human rights……………

Trump’s shadow still looms over the story. His claim to the title of “peacemaker” has turned the Peace Prize itself into a political mirror: a reflection of who gets to define peace, and on whose terms.

According to Fyodor Lukyanov, Trump’s prospects may not be gone for good:

“The door isn’t completely closed. For his achievements – real or perceived – he could very well be nominated again next year, and the Nobel Committee will have a chance to weigh everything once more.”…………..

October 13, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

The Gaza ceasefire deal could be a ‘strangle contract’, with Israel holding all the cards

Marika Sosnowski, Senior research fellow, The University of Melbourne: October 10, 2025 , https://theconversation.com/the-gaza-ceasefire-deal-could-be-a-strangle-contract-with-israel-holding-all-the-cards-267208?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The%20Weekender%20-%203545436146&utm_content=The%20Weekender%20-%203545436146+CID_9b06daa16329ec78ac380b964d55ad0a&utm_source=campaign_monitor&utm_term=The%20Gaza%20ceasefire%20deal%20could%20be%20a%20strangle%20contract%20with%20Israel%20holding%20all%20the%20cards

There are jubilant scenes in both Gaza and Israel after both sides in the war have agreed to another ceasefire. If all goes well, this will be only the third ceasefire to be implemented by Israel and Hamas, despite there being numerous other agreements to try to stop the violence.

There is a lot to be happy about here. Most notably, this ceasefire will bring a halt to what has now been established as a genocidal campaign of violence against Palestinians in Gaza, the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and the resumption of aid into Gaza to alleviate the famine conditions there.

However, a lot of unknowns remain. While the terms of the “first phase” of this ceasefire have been rehearsed in previous ceasefires in November 2023 and January 2025, many other terms remain vague. This makes their implementation difficult and likely contested.

After this phase is complete, a lot will depend on domestic Israeli politics and the Trump administration’s willingness to follow through on its guarantor responsibilities.

Immediate positives for both sides

The ceasefire agreement appears to be based on the 20-point plan US President Donald Trump unveiled in the White House alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29.

What will be implemented in what is being called the “first phase” are the practical, more detailed and immediate terms of the ceasefire.

In the text of the peace plan released to the public, these terms are stipulated in:

• 
  Point 3 – an “immediate” end to the war and Israeli troop withdrawal to an “agreed upon line”.
• Points 4 and 5 – the release of all living and deceased hostages by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.
• Point 7 – full aid to flow into the strip, consistent with the January ceasefire agreement terms.

While these steps are positive, they are the bare minimum you would expect both sides to acquiesce to as part of a ceasefire deal.

Over the past two years, Gaza has been virtually demolished by Israel’s military and the population of the strip is starving. There is also great domestic pressure on the Israeli government to bring the hostages home, while Hamas has no cards left to play besides their release.

The text of these particular terms has been drafted in a way that means both Israel and Hamas know what to do and when. This makes it more likely they will abide by the terms.

Both sides also have a vested interest in these terms happening. Further, both parties have taken these exact steps before during the November 2023 and January 2025 Gaza ceasefires.

Given this, I expect these terms will be implemented in the coming days. It is less clear what will happen after that.

What comes next: the great unknown

After the first phase of the ceasefire has been implemented, Hamas will find itself in a situation very similar to ceasefire agreements that occurred during the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 and only recently ended with the downfall of the Assad regime in late 2024. I call these strangle contracts.

These type of ceasefire agreements are not like bargains or contracts negotiated between two equal parties. Instead, they are highly coercive agreements that enable the more powerful party to force the weaker party into agreeing to anything in order for them to survive.

Once the hostages are released, Hamas will go back to having negligible bargaining power of its own. And the group, along with the people of Gaza themselves, will once again be at the mercy of Israeli military might and domestic and international politics.

Other terms of the Trump peace plan relating to Hamas’ demilitarisation (Points 1 and 13), the future governance of Gaza (Points 9 and 13) and Gaza’s redevelopment (Points 2, 10 and 11) are also extremely vague and offer little guidance on what exactly should occur, when or how.

Under such a strangle contract, Hamas will have no leverage after it releases the hostages. This, together with the vague terms of the ceasefire agreement, will offer Israel a great deal of manoeuvrability and political cover.

For example, the Israeli government could claim Hamas is not abiding by the terms of the agreement and then recommence bombardment, curtail aid or further displace the Palestinians in Gaza.

While Point 12 rightly stipulates that “no one will be forced to leave Gaza”, Israel could make conditions there so inhospitable and offer enough incentives to Gazans, they might have little choice other than to leave if they want to survive.

Points 15 and 16 stipulate that the United States (along with Arab and other international partners) will develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force to deploy to Gaza to act as guarantors for the agreement. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) will also withdraw “based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization”.

But these “standards, milestones and timeframes” have been left unspecified and will be hard for the parties to agree on.

It is also possible Israel could use the vagueness of these terms to its advantage by arguing Hamas has failed to meet certain conditions in order to justify restarting the war.

Knowing it has no leverage after the first phase, Hamas has explicitly said it is expecting the US to fulfil its guarantor role. It is certainly a good sign the US has pledged 200 troops to help support and monitor the ceasefire, but at this stage, Hamas has little choice other than to pray the US’ deeds reflect its words.

While the ceasefire has now been passed by a majority of the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), five far-right ministers voted against the deal. These include Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who said the ceasefire is akin to “a deal with Adolf Hitler”.

This opposition bloc will no doubt be making more threats – and could potentially act – to bring down Netanyahu’s government after the first phase is implemented.

The problem with ceasefires

The first phase of this ceasefire will offer Hamas and Israel key items – a hostage-prisoner swap, a halt to violence and humanitarian aid.

After that, rather than a bargaining process with trade-offs between negotiating partners operating on a relatively even playing field, without US opprobrium, the ceasefire could easily devolve into an excuse for further Israeli domination of Gaza.

A ceasefire was always going to be a very small step forward in a long road towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Without meaningful engagement with Palestinians in their self-determination, we can only hope the future for Gazans will not get any worse.

As a Palestinian leader from Yarmouk camp in Syria told me back in 2018: “If there is a ceasefire, people know the devil is coming.”

October 12, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

Beware Trump’s Ceasefire Deal Absent Meaningful UN Action to Halt Israel’s Genocide.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has said publicly that Israel will not withdraw its forces from Gaza until Hamas and other Palestinian forces have been removed from power and disarmed, while Hamas insists it will not disarm until the occupation of Palestine ends and its fighters can hand over their weapons to the new armed forces of the sovereign nation of Palestine.

Without concrete global efforts to hold Israel to account, Trump’s new occupation plan for Gaza offers little hope for the future to the besieged, starved, bombed people of Gaza.

Nicolas J.S. Davies, Oct 09, 2025

As President Donald Trump surely intended, his “20-point Gaza plan” succeeded in upstaging calls by many other world leaders at the UN General Assembly for concrete, coordinated UN-led measures to force Israel to end its criminal genocide in Gaza and the illegal occupation of Palestine.

Trump’s White House meeting with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29th coincided with the last day of the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York, where Trump had met with eight Arab and Muslim leaders at the UN and won their support for a proposed plan for Gaza. In a textbook bait-and-switch, Trump then allowed the Israelis to significantly alter his plan before he unveiled it to the world at his meeting with Netanyahu, but pretended it was the same plan that the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and other countries had endorsed.

Trump’s plan was based on cornering Hamas into a series of steps it hadn’t agreed to: freeing all the Israeli prisoners in Gaza without a full Israeli withdrawal; surrendering its weapons and its role in Palestinian politics; and handing Gaza over to a new phase of Israeli occupation. Gaza would be governed by a “board” headed by Trump and former UK prime minister Tony Blair, who not only invaded Iraq alongside the US in 2003, but at the same time masterminded a dirty war against Hamas that led to the isolation and blockade of Gaza, and ultimately to the current crisis.

On October 8th, after unprecedented pressure from Arab and Islamic mediators, Hamas dropped its insistence on a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a precondition for the prisoner exchange. Other details remained to be worked out, but all sides seemed to believe they were close to an agreement. A source close to the negotiators told Drop Site News that Hamas was willing to gamble on Trump’s promise to prevent the Israelis from resuming the genocide once Israel had its prisoners back.

Trump’s plan is still rife with unresolved disagreements, but it may at least lead to a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange, and the ceasefire could possibly become permanent.

Under Trump’s plan, Israel would agree to end its genocidal assault on Gaza and partially withdraw its forces, but only his word would prevent it relaunching the genocide once it had the Israeli prisoners in Gaza safely back. Israel reportedly agreed to begin allowing 600 truckloads of aid to enter each day, but it would retain control of Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt, and could again restrict the entry of food, medicine, and rebuilding materials at any point.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has said publicly that Israel will not withdraw its forces from Gaza until Hamas and other Palestinian forces have been removed from power and disarmed, while Hamas insists it will not disarm until the occupation of Palestine ends and its fighters can hand over their weapons to the new armed forces of the sovereign nation of Palestine.

“Far from paving a path to peace, it offers a blueprint for the further colonisation and subjugation of the Palestinian people — the culmination of decades of dispossession and destruction that reached its dark zenith in the ongoing genocide in Gaza.”

Whatever the result of these negotiations, the UN and the world’s governments should not sit idly by as passive observers. The UN should urgently prepare to take the concrete steps that leaders from around the world called for at the General Assembly in September, to give force to UN General Assembly resolutions calling for an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the unrestricted restoration of life-saving humanitarian aid, and a final end to the brutal Israeli occupation of Palestine.

In July 2025, the UN General Assembly organized a “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution.” The conference was chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, and its goal was “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-State solution.”

The conference produced a lengthy “New York Declaration,” which was endorsed by the General Assembly in a resolution on September 12th, by a vote of 142 to 10, with 12 abstentions.

But this was a plan for the “day after,” which, by itself, failed to bring that day any closer, because it deliberately avoided taking the “concrete, timebound and coordinated international action” that the conference’s mandate had explicitly called for.

The declaration was based on the deliberations of 8 working groups, co-chaired by representatives of 15 different countries, the Arab League and the European Union, which each drew up plans for the aftermath of a hypothetical permanent ceasefire in Gaza, with topics like “Humanitarian Action and Reconstruction” and “Security for Israelis and Palestinians.”

Three roundtables at the July conference, chaired by former Irish president Mary Robinson, former Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid bin Ra’ad of Jordan, agreed that the General Assembly’s first step should be the international recognition of the state of Palestine.

UN recognition requires the approval of both the General Assembly and the UN Security Council. However, with such a large majority of countries supporting recognition, and the United States abusing its veto to sideline the Security Council, the General Assembly can call an Emergency Special Session (ESS) to act alone under the “Uniting for Peace” principle, to officially recognize Palestine and welcome it as a full UN member.

Instead, while several Western countries finally recognized Palestine, bringing the total number who have recognized its independent statehood to 157, the declaration was endorsed in a regular session of the General Assembly that lacked the power to grant formal UN recognition.

But the most serious omission from the July 2025 conference and the September 12th resolution was that they failed to take concrete, coordinated UN action to impose a ceasefire in Gaza, the vital first step to get to the “day after” that the working groups at the conference were tasked with planning for. Trump took advantage of that omission to propose an end to the genocide in Gaza on terms that would perpetuate the Israeli occupation instead of ending it.

It was entirely predictable that Israel would reject and ignore the New York Declaration, and Netanyahu did just that in his General Assembly speech on September 26th. But after most of the delegates walked out and left Netanyahu ranting to a nearly empty hall, the Hague Group of countries led by Colombia and South Africa hosted a meeting with representatives of 34 countries to plan the coordinated, concrete action the UN must now take to end the genocide and the occupation.

As Cuban foreign minister Bruno Rodriguez Parilla told the General Assembly in his speech the next day, it should convene an Emergency Special Session “without further delay” to take concrete measures for Palestine, including a binding resolution on full UN membership.

If the large majority of countries that voted for the New York Declaration are ready to back their words and their votes with coordinated action, a UN-led trade boycott, divestment campaign and arms embargo can put enormous pressure on Israel to end its genocide in Gaza and its illegal occupation of Palestine.

If the General Assembly is serious about ending the genocide and the occupation, the Emergency Special Session must also debate and vote on a UN-led arms embargo, economic boycott and other concrete measures designed to force Israel to comply withinternational law, international court rulings and UN resolutions on Palestine.

The UN Human Rights Office in Geneva already has a database of 158 Israeli and multinational corporations that are complicit in Israel’s illegal occupation, so an international boycott of those companies could take effect immediately.

Israel is a small country, dependent on trade and economic relations with countries all over the world. If the large majority of countries that voted for the New York Declaration are ready to back their words and their votes with coordinated action, a UN-led trade boycott, divestment campaign and arms embargo can put enormous pressure on Israel to end its genocide in Gaza and its illegal occupation of Palestine. With full participation by enough countries, these steps could quickly make Israel’s position very difficult.

Many speakers at the 2025 General Assembly called passionately for this kind of decisive action to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza and end the occupation. King Abdullah of Jordan asked, “How long will we be satisfied with condemnation after condemnation without concrete actiion.

President Lula said that Brazil already has an arms embargo against Israel and has cut off all trade with its illegal settlements; Turkiye severed all trade links with Israel in August; Dutch prime minister Dick Schoof called for an arms embargo and the suspension of the EU’s trade agreement with Israel; and Chadian prime minister Allah-Maye Halina declared, “Our duty from this moment on is to transform this strong declaration into concrete acts and make the Palestinian people’s hope a reality.”

The Hague Group of countries was formed by the Progressive International to support South Africa’s genocide case at the International Court of Justice and war crimes cases against Israeli officials at the International Criminal Court. In a meeting at Bogota in Colombia in July, twelve of those countries committed to an arms embargo and other concrete measures against the Israeli occupation. In his speech to the General Assembly on September 23rd, Colombian president Gustavo Petro called for an Emergency Special Session on Palestine and for a UN peacekeeping force to “defend Palestine.”

A previous Emergency Special Session in September 2024 demanded that Israel must end its post-1967 occupation of Palestine within a year. Israel’s refusal to even begin to do so, and its defiant escalation of its genocide in Gaza, increasing repression in the other occupied territories and attacks on other countries provide all the grounds the General Assembly should need to take the concrete, coordinated measures that many countries are calling for.

Tragically, instead of applying the diplomatic and economic pressure it will take to secure a ceasefire and end the occupation, France, Saudi Arabia and their partners instead relied on dangling carrots in front of Israel, such as regional economic integration and recognition by Arab and Muslim countries, to try to seduce or bribe Israel into complying with international law and UN resolutions.

Across the world, ordinary people are rising up to demand that their governments take action, while flotillas of activists set sail to breach the blockade of Gaza that their governments have failed to challenge.

This was never going to work. The toothless New York Declaration, and now Trump’s new occupation plan for Gaza, offer little hope for the future to the besieged, starved, bombed people of Gaza. The UN General Assembly must follow up on these flawed initiatives with decisive UN-led action to ensure a real, permanent end to the genocide and the occupation, by imposing economic sanctions, an arms embargo and other measures to diplomatically and economically isolate Israel.

There is nothing to prevent the UN General Assembly from quickly convening a new meeting of its Emergency Special Session on Palestine. The ESS can finally take the “concrete, time-bound, coordinated international action” that the French- and Saudi-led initiative promised but failed to deliver—what Malaysian foreign minister Mohamad Hasan described to the General Assembly as “concrete action against the occupying force.”

Across the world, ordinary people are rising up to demand that their governments take action, while flotillas of activists set sail to breach the blockade of Gaza that their governments have failed to challenge.

The Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, meeting under the Uniting for Peace principle, can debate and pass binding resolutions on UN recognition of Palestine, a UN-led international arms embargo, economic boycott and disinvestment campaign, war crimes prosecutions, and other measures to diplomatically isolate Israel.

By responding to calls of conscience from their own people, voting for these measures at the UN and acting quickly to enforce them, the governments of the world have the collective power to end this genocide and the brutal, illegal occupation of Palestine that it is part of. Now they must use it.

Nicolas J.S. Davies

Nicolas J. S. Davies is an independent journalist and a researcher with CODEPINK. He is the co-author, with Medea Benjamin, of War in Ukraine: Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict, available from OR Books in November 2022, and the author of Blood On Our Hands: the American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq.

October 11, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

Nobel Peace Prize’s hypocrisy

URGENT: The Nobel Peace Prize and Israel’s Influence

madison_morrisonil , 11 Oct 25 https://www.instagram.com/reel/DPojAqrEY5i/

The 2025 Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to María Corina Machado, the Venezuelan opposition leader but what’s being left out of the headlines is her deep alignment with the Israeli state, a government the international community has repeatedly condemned for ongoing genocide in Gaza.

This isn’t just symbolic it’s political.
Machado’s party has a formal cooperation agreement with Israel’s Likud Party, led by Netanyahu. She’s pledged to restore full diplomatic ties with Israel and has consistently echoed their military and security rhetoric while Palestinians are being starved, displaced, and executed.

When a Nobel Peace Prize honors a figure tied to an apartheid regime, it sends a dangerous message: that “peace” is defined by the same powers funding war.

The Nobel Committee isn’t celebrating peace it’s legitimizing oppression.
It’s up to the global community to call out hypocrisy, demand accountability, and stand with the people of Gaza , not with those aligned with their oppressors.

October 11, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment