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Outsized and Eccentric: The Farce Behind the Nobel Peace Prize

12 October 2025 Dr Binoy Kampmark, https://theaimn.net/outsized-and-eccentric-the-farce-behind-the-nobel-peace-prize/

The fuss about the Nobel Peace Prize has always been excessively outsized to its relevance. Like most prizes, the panel is bound to have its treasure trove of prejudices and eccentricities in reaching any decision. Thin resumes have swayed the Norwegian committee to acts of dottiness. Surprising moments of dark humour have made an appearance in the award of the prize to warmongers and those antithetical to peace. And those on the Nobel Prize peace panel would barely cause a murmur of acknowledgement outside the spine-like length of that country of only 5.6 million inhabitants. (The current membership of five features, for instance, three politicians: Anne Enger, former leader of the country’s Centre Party; former Conservative Party education minister Kristin Clement, and former state secretary of the Labour Party, Gry Larsen.)

Rather feebly, Asle Toje, another member of the five, uses a gastronomic metaphor in describing the selection process: “We do it pretty much the same way you make a good sauce – you reduce and reduce and reduce.” The reduction formula leads to surprising, rancid results. In 1973, the ruthless, toadying poseur Henry Kissinger was overcome with joy in receiving the prize. The National Security Adviser and US Secretary of State had supposedly done much to advance the cause of peace in the Indochina conflict by “spearheading cease-fire negotiations” that led to an armistice in January 1973. His co-awardee, the North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho, was far more sensible, refusing to accept a peace award where there was no peace to be had.  

The choice of Kissinger was almost mockingly ghoulish. This was the same man who left his marks all over secret and illegal bombing campaigns in Laos and Cambodia during the Nixon administration, oversaw the extinction of democratically elected governments in Latin America in favour of murderous, authoritarian regimes, and spent his early academic career arguing that small-scale nuclear might be feasibly pursued by the United States as a psychological lever.  

The selection for 2025 was always going to be shadowed by the theatre known as the Donald Trump show. In claiming not to want it, the US President has done much to pad out his credentials to make himself eligible. He has put on an incomplete, disputable show of halting conflicts while indulging in spells of violence (strikes on Venezuelan shipping, ostensibly carrying drugs to the US; the illegal bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities).

What the committee has done is the next best (or worse) thing. In opting for María Corina Machado, seen as the main figure of the Venezuelan opposition to the current government of Nicolás Maduro, they have offered the prize to a Trump medium. “I dedicate this prize to the suffering people of Venezuela and to President Trump for his decisive support in our cause,” she cooed on X.  

Almost hinting at something in the works – that is to say, the ongoing regime change agenda so enthusiastically sought by Washington – Machado was convinced of being “on the threshold of victory and today, more than ever, we count on President Trump, the people of the United States, the peoples of Latin America, and the democratic nations of the world as our principal allies to achieve freedom and democracy.” Given Latin America’s record on peaceful transitions from coups, this was fine humour indeed.

The award to Machado was, according to the Nordic wiseacres, based on her “tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.” They go on to be didactic, talking about democracy being in global retreat, with Machado being its illuminating defender. (On being barred from running, she installed the surrogate opposition leader Edmundo Gonzálezwho allegedly won the July 2024 election.)  

This is the bromide of binary thought. Machado’s record, befitting most political records, is untidy. David Smilde, a student of Venezuelan politics, sees her as “a controversial pick, less a peace activist than a political operator willing to use some of the trade’s dark arts for the greater democratic good.”  Even that might be generous.

For one thing, she is clearly biding her time, shunning local and regional elections, treating the honouring of the 2024 presidential election results as absolute. She has openly argued for the necessity of foreign intervention in removing Maduro and endorsed Trump’s military buildup in the Caribbean, calling the recent bombing of suspected drug boats a matter of“saving lives”. To remove Maduro was essential, she argues, because of his alleged credentials as “the head of a narco-terrorist structure of cooperation.”  

Disingenuously, she has swallowed the dubious theory that Maduro is the true figure running the Tren de Aragua gang, which Trump accuses of directing operations against the United States. Her Vente Venezuela party has enthusiastically shared the threats by US officials against supposed Venezuelan drug traffickers on X. “If you’re in the Caribbean,” states one recent post, “if you’re north of Venezuela and you’re trying to traffic drugs to the US, you’re a legitimate target for the US.”

Machado is undoubtedly readying herself to step into any presidential vacancy, forced or otherwise. She claims to have a plan for the first 100 hours and the first 100 days of a transition process, promising the generation of wealth for the country to the value of $1.7 trillion over 15 years. Her advisor on international affairs, Pedro Urruchurtu, has been open about communicating with the Trump administration over Maduro’s removal.  

Again, this says much about the eccentric reading of peace embraced by the insular Norwegian grandees. If Tom Lehrer was right to call political satire obsolete after Kissinger’s award, it would also be accurate to say that instances of rich farce have come in its wake.

October 17, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

Israeli Historian Ilan Pappé: Despite Ceasefire, Palestinians Still Face “Elimination, Genocide”

October 13, 2025, Democracy Now – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VBDIaaryG8

Renowned Israeli historian, author and professor Ilan Pappé discusses the postwar prospects of Palestinian statehood and of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is under investigation for corruption in Israel and subject to an international arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. Despite the newly implemented Gaza ceasefire, says Pappé, Israeli political leaders have not changed their policy aim to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from their remaining territory. “Nothing has changed in the dehumanization and the attitude of this particular Israeli government and its belief that it has the power to wipe out Palestine as a nation, as a people and as a country,” he explains. Pappé’s latest book is titled Israel on the Brink: And the Eight Revolutions That Could Lead to Decolonization and Coexistence.

Transcript……………………………..

ILAN PAPPÉ:………………………………………….. I don’t think we are in such an historical moment as President Trump claimed in his speech in the Knesset and beforehand. We are not at the end of the terrible chapter that we have been in it for the last two years. And that chapter is an Israeli attempt by a particularly fanatic, extremely right-wing Israeli government to try and use ethnic cleansing in the West Bank and genocide in Gaza to downsize the number of Palestinians in Palestine and impose Israel’s will in a way that they hope would be at least endorsed by some Arab governments and the world. And so far, they have an alliance of Trump and some extreme right-wing parties in Europe.

And now I hope that the world will not be misled that Israel is now ready to open a different kind of page in its relationship with the Palestinians………………nothing has changed in the dehumanization and the attitude of this particular Israeli government and its belief that it has the power to wipe out Palestine as a nation, as a people and as a country. And I hope the world will not stand by, because up to now it did stand by when the genocide occurred in Palestine………..

…………………………………………….. it is the nature of the Israeli government that was elected in November 2022, this alliance between a very opportunistic politician, who’s only interested in surviving and keeping his position as a prime minister, alongside messianic, neo-Zionist politicians who really believe that God has given them the opportunity to create the Greater Israel, maybe even beyond the borders of Palestine, and, in the process, eliminate Palestinians. I think that his [Netanyahu’s] consideration should all — are always about his chances of survival. …..

………… My greatest worry is that he does believe that his only chance of being reelected is still to have a war going on, either in Gaza or in the West Bank or against Iran or in the north with Lebanon. We are dealing here with a reckless, irresponsible politician, who is even willing to drown his own state in the process of saving his skin and his neck. And the victims will always be, from this adventurous policy, the Palestinians…….

…………………. I do hope that political elites will understand their — especially in the West, their role now is not to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians. Their role now is to protect the Palestinians from destruction, elimination, genocide and ethnic cleansing. ……………………………………………………https://www.democracynow.org/2025/10/13/ilan_pappe_israel_on_the_brink

October 17, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

Will Trump’s ceasefire plan really lead to lasting peace in the Middle East? There’s still a long way to go

Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University October 12, 2025, https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-ceasefire-plan-really-lead-to-lasting-peace-in-the-middle-east-theres-still-a-long-way-to-go-267112?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%2013%202025%20-%203547436165&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%2013%202025%20-%203547436165+CID_bcade8c9c4dad1f5a754fd2f23566c83&utm_source=campaign_monitor&utm_term=Will%20Trumps%20ceasefire%20plan%20really%20lead%20to%20lasting%20peace%20in%20the%20Middle%20East%20Theres%20still%20a%20long%20way%20to%20go

The first steps of the peace plan for Gaza are underway. Now both parties have agreed to terms, Hamas is obligated to release all hostages within 72 hours and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will withdraw to an agreed-upon line within the strip.

Hopes are high, particularly on the ground in Gaza and in Israel after two years of brutal conflict. Some argue the parties are now closer than ever to an end to hostilities, and US President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan may be an effective road-map.

But the truth is we have been here before. Hamas and Israel have now agreed to a road-map to peace in principle, but what is in place today is very similar to ceasefire deals in the past, and a ceasefire is not the same as a peace deal or an armistice.

The plan is also very light on specifics, and the devil is definitely in the detail. Will the IDF completely withdraw from Gaza and rule out annexation? Who will take on governance of the strip? Is Hamas going to be involved in this governance? There were signs of disagreement on these issues even before the fighting stopped.

So if the ceasefire steps hold in the short term – then what? What would it take for the peace plan to be successful?

First, the political pressures to refrain from resuming hostilities will need to hold. Once all the hostages are returned, which is expected to take place by Tuesday Australian time, Hamas effectively loses any remaining leverage for future negotiations if hostilities were to resume.

Once the hostage exchange is complete, it’s likely Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will see some pressure from his right to resume hostilities.

With Hamas relinquishing this leverage, it will be essential for the Israeli government to see these negotiations and the end of the war as fundamental to its long term interests and security for peace to hold. There must be a sincere desire to return to dialogue and compromise, not the pre-October 7 2023 complacency.

Second, Hamas will likely have to relinquish its arms and any political power in Gaza. Previously, Hamas has said it would only do this on the condition of recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state. As recently as October 10, factions in Gaza have said they would not accept foreign guardianship, a key part of the peace plan, with governance to be determined “by the national component of our people directly”.

Related to this, any interim governance or authority that takes shape in Gaza must reflect local needs. The proposed “body of peace” headed by Trump and former UK prime minister Tony Blair, could risk repeating previous mistakes of cutting Palestinians out of discussions over their own future.

Part of the peace deal is the resumption of humanitarian aid flows, but the fate of the Gaza blockade that has been effectively in place since 2007 is unclear. The land, sea and air blockade, which was imposed by Egypt and Israel following Hamas’ political takeover of Gaza, heavily restricts imports and the movement of Gazans.

Prior to October 2023, unemployment in the strip sat at 46%, and 62% of Gazans required food assistance as a result of the limits placed on imports, including basic food and agricultural items such as fertiliser.

Should the blockade continue, at best Israel will create the same humanitarian conditions in Gaza of food, medical and financial insecurity that existed prior to the October 7 attacks. While conditions and restrictions are orders of magnitude worse in Gaza today, NGOs called early incarnations of the blockade “collective punishment”. For peace to hold in the strip, security policy needs to be in line with global humanitarian principles and international law.

Most importantly, however, all parties involved must see peace in Gaza as fundamentally connected to broader peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Seeing the Gaza conflict as discrete and separate from the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict would be a mistake. Discussions of Palestinian national self-determination in Gaza and the West Bank must be taken seriously and be a central part of the plan for peace to last.

While the 20-point plan mentions a “credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”“, history tells us these pathways struggle to get past the rhetoric stage.

Many challenges stand in the way, including Israeli settlement and annexation, the status of Jerusalem and the question of demilitarisation.

A meaningful step would be for the US to refrain from using its veto power at the UN Security Council (UNSC) against votes supporting Palestinian statehood. While several states recognised a Palestinian state at the recent UN General Assembly, the US has blocked formal status at the UNSC every time.

Despite all these concerns, any pause in hostilities is undeniably a good thing. Deaths from October 7 2023 number nearly 70,000 in total, with 11% of Gaza’s population killed or injured and 465 Israeli soldiers killed. The resumption of aid delivery alone will go far in addressing the growing famine in the strip.

However, peace deals are incredibly difficult to negotiate at the best of times, requiring good faith, sustained commitment and trust. The roots of this conflict reach back decades, and mutual mistrust has been institutionalised and weaponised. Difficulties in negotiating the Oslo Accords in the 1990s showed just how deep the roots of the conflict are. The situation is now much worse.

It is not clear if any party involved in negotiation possesses the political will needed to reach an accord. However, an opportunity exists to reach one, and it should not be taken for granted.

October 14, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

The Nobel that wasn’t Trump’s: Why Oslo chose a Venezuelan rebel over a peacemaker.

What Oslo calls a “peaceful transition” others might see as a strategy of regime change.

Machado in many ways stands on the same side as Trump. She’s seen positively by figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and all of them share a goal of opposing Nicolás Maduro’s regime. So this may not have been a snub to Trump – it’s more of a balancing act.”

Rt.com 10 Oct 25

By honoring an opposition leader wanted in Caracas, the Nobel Committee reignited a debate over who gets to define “peace”.

The 2025 Nobel Peace Prize has gone to María Corina Machado, one of the most prominent faces of Venezuela’s opposition. The committee’s language is familiar – ”rights,” “peaceful transition” – but the story behind it isn’t. Machado’s record blends volunteer election networks with long-running fights over foreign funding; her name has appeared in cases tied to efforts to unseat the government – charges she rejects; and a country remains split over where legitimate politics ends and regime change begins.

The award lifts a domestic struggle onto a global stage and drops it into a fresh context: for much of the year, chatter about a “Nobel for Trump” hung in the air, and the very idea of what counts as peacemaking is once again up for debate far beyond Caracas.

From steel dynasty to political underground

María Corina Machado is an engineer by training and one of the most recognizable figures in Venezuela’s opposition over the past two decades. Born in Caracas to a family linked to the industrial group SIVENSA, she studied at the Andrés Bello Catholic University and later at IESA, Venezuela’s leading management school. Early exposure to the family business and an affinity for market-friendly ideas shaped her public profile: an emphasis on entrepreneurship, privatization, and integration with global markets

In 2002, Machado co-founded Súmate, a civic platform that built volunteer networks to train election observers and run parallel vote counts. That is when the first major controversy took hold: authorities alleged the group received funding from US-based organizations; her supporters countered that the money supported legitimate civic initiatives. From then on, every move she made in politics was viewed through the lens of where to draw the line on outside assistance.

That same year brought Venezuela’s most dramatic recent upheaval – the brief ouster of President Hugo Chávez and the “Carmona decree,” which proclaimed a provisional government. Machado’s name surfaced in debates over who backed the decree; she denied participating. The legal and historical arguments never fully settled, but the episode fixed an image of Machado as a politician whom opponents associate with the idea of “regime change.”

A long stretch of investigations and restrictions followed. Between 2003 and 2005, prosecutors examined alleged “illegal foreign funding” for NGOs; travel bans appeared periodically. In 2014, amid street protests, Machado became one of the most prominent voices criticizing the government and, in official rhetoric, was linked to cases alleging a plot and even an attempt on President Nicolás Maduro’s life. Machado rejected the accusations as politically motivated. The upshot was a prolonged ban on holding public office…………………………………………………….

After the 2024 vote, Machado largely disappeared from public events. Her statements came via video, with her whereabouts undisclosed. The phrase “underground network” took hold in media shorthand: supporters saw a movement operating under pressure; opponents argued it was a continuation of street-level tactics and external lobbying against the authorities. Against that backdrop, the Nobel Peace Prize elevates Machado’s biography to the international stage – and carries a long-running national argument over the limits of political struggle to a much wider audience.

Why Oslo chose her

In announcing its decision, the Nobel Committee said it was honoring María Corina Machado “for her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.”

The language was familiar — rights, democracy, peaceful transition — but the context was not. Machado’s record blends civic mobilization and volunteer networks with long-running controversies over foreign funding. Her name has appeared in cases tied to efforts to unseat the government — allegations she has consistently rejected — and Venezuela remains deeply divided over what counts as legitimate political struggle.

Those contradictions make the award particularly charged. Within Venezuela, the same actions that Oslo calls “peaceful resistance” have been framed by officials as destabilization efforts supported from abroad. For Machado and her allies, the prize validates years of activism under pressure; for the government, it confirms a long-held view that Western institutions reward political opposition disguised as democracy promotion.

The decision also fits a larger pattern. By awarding Machado, the Nobel Committee effectively reintroduced Venezuela into the global political conversation – not as an energy supplier or a sanctions case, but as a test of how the world now interprets democracy itself. What Oslo calls a “peaceful transition” others might see as a strategy of regime change. That tension is what makes this year’s prize less about peace – and more about the politics of defining it.

The Nobel announcement also landed amid one of the most charged moments in US–Venezuela relations in years. Since early 2025, Washington has tightened its posture toward Caracas – reviving energy sanctions that had been partially lifted after the 2023 Barbados agreements and signaling a renewed focus on “transnational crime networks” in the Caribbean. In practice, that meant more joint naval patrols, renewed intelligence activity, and a sharper tone linking Venezuela to the regional drug trade – an accusation Caracas dismissed as a pretext for pressure.

At the same time, the Biden-era approach of limited engagement had given way to a more assertive line under Trump’s second administration. The new White House framed its strategy as a “war on narcotics” and a push to restore regional stability; in Venezuela and across Latin America, many viewed it as an attempt to reassert US influence in a region increasingly connected to Russia, China, and Iran.

Notably, María Corina Machado publicly voiced support for Washington’s decision to combat Venezuelan drug cartels through military means. Her statement drew wide attention, as it aligned her stance with the US administration’s tougher regional policy and blurred the boundary between domestic opposition and foreign strategy………..

The Nobel that got away

For much of the year, Washington buzzed with talk of a “Nobel for Trump.” The president himself didn’t hide his ambition: he wanted to go down in history as a peacemaker. After returning to the White House, he made foreign policy the centerpiece of his second term – launching a flurry of initiatives aimed at cooling global flashpoints and projecting a renewed American presence abroad.

Supporters pointed to a record few modern leaders could match. The Abraham Accords, signed during his first term, had already redefined Israel’s ties with its neighbors – and served as the basis for his 2024 nomination by congresswoman Claudia Tenney.

By late 2025, Trump’s team listed seven cases where US diplomacy had helped halt or de-escalate conflicts:………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Anastasia Gafarova, deputy director of the Center for Political Information, described the Nobel Committee’s choice as “an attempt at compromise rather than confrontation.”

“Despite tensions between Washington and Caracas, Machado in many ways stands on the same side as Trump. She’s seen positively by figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and all of them share a goal of opposing Nicolás Maduro’s regime. So this may not have been a snub to Trump – it’s more of a balancing act.”……………………………………………

What ‘peace’ means now

For the Nobel Committee, María Corina Machado’s name will likely stand beside those of activists and reformers who defied authoritarian systems. For Washington and Caracas, however, the meaning of her award reaches far beyond that frame………………….

To her critics, it is yet another example of Western institutions rewarding political alignment under the banner of human rights……………

Trump’s shadow still looms over the story. His claim to the title of “peacemaker” has turned the Peace Prize itself into a political mirror: a reflection of who gets to define peace, and on whose terms.

According to Fyodor Lukyanov, Trump’s prospects may not be gone for good:

“The door isn’t completely closed. For his achievements – real or perceived – he could very well be nominated again next year, and the Nobel Committee will have a chance to weigh everything once more.”…………..

October 13, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

The Gaza ceasefire deal could be a ‘strangle contract’, with Israel holding all the cards

Marika Sosnowski, Senior research fellow, The University of Melbourne: October 10, 2025 , https://theconversation.com/the-gaza-ceasefire-deal-could-be-a-strangle-contract-with-israel-holding-all-the-cards-267208?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The%20Weekender%20-%203545436146&utm_content=The%20Weekender%20-%203545436146+CID_9b06daa16329ec78ac380b964d55ad0a&utm_source=campaign_monitor&utm_term=The%20Gaza%20ceasefire%20deal%20could%20be%20a%20strangle%20contract%20with%20Israel%20holding%20all%20the%20cards

There are jubilant scenes in both Gaza and Israel after both sides in the war have agreed to another ceasefire. If all goes well, this will be only the third ceasefire to be implemented by Israel and Hamas, despite there being numerous other agreements to try to stop the violence.

There is a lot to be happy about here. Most notably, this ceasefire will bring a halt to what has now been established as a genocidal campaign of violence against Palestinians in Gaza, the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and the resumption of aid into Gaza to alleviate the famine conditions there.

However, a lot of unknowns remain. While the terms of the “first phase” of this ceasefire have been rehearsed in previous ceasefires in November 2023 and January 2025, many other terms remain vague. This makes their implementation difficult and likely contested.

After this phase is complete, a lot will depend on domestic Israeli politics and the Trump administration’s willingness to follow through on its guarantor responsibilities.

Immediate positives for both sides

The ceasefire agreement appears to be based on the 20-point plan US President Donald Trump unveiled in the White House alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29.

What will be implemented in what is being called the “first phase” are the practical, more detailed and immediate terms of the ceasefire.

In the text of the peace plan released to the public, these terms are stipulated in:

• 
  Point 3 – an “immediate” end to the war and Israeli troop withdrawal to an “agreed upon line”.
• Points 4 and 5 – the release of all living and deceased hostages by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.
• Point 7 – full aid to flow into the strip, consistent with the January ceasefire agreement terms.

While these steps are positive, they are the bare minimum you would expect both sides to acquiesce to as part of a ceasefire deal.

Over the past two years, Gaza has been virtually demolished by Israel’s military and the population of the strip is starving. There is also great domestic pressure on the Israeli government to bring the hostages home, while Hamas has no cards left to play besides their release.

The text of these particular terms has been drafted in a way that means both Israel and Hamas know what to do and when. This makes it more likely they will abide by the terms.

Both sides also have a vested interest in these terms happening. Further, both parties have taken these exact steps before during the November 2023 and January 2025 Gaza ceasefires.

Given this, I expect these terms will be implemented in the coming days. It is less clear what will happen after that.

What comes next: the great unknown

After the first phase of the ceasefire has been implemented, Hamas will find itself in a situation very similar to ceasefire agreements that occurred during the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 and only recently ended with the downfall of the Assad regime in late 2024. I call these strangle contracts.

These type of ceasefire agreements are not like bargains or contracts negotiated between two equal parties. Instead, they are highly coercive agreements that enable the more powerful party to force the weaker party into agreeing to anything in order for them to survive.

Once the hostages are released, Hamas will go back to having negligible bargaining power of its own. And the group, along with the people of Gaza themselves, will once again be at the mercy of Israeli military might and domestic and international politics.

Other terms of the Trump peace plan relating to Hamas’ demilitarisation (Points 1 and 13), the future governance of Gaza (Points 9 and 13) and Gaza’s redevelopment (Points 2, 10 and 11) are also extremely vague and offer little guidance on what exactly should occur, when or how.

Under such a strangle contract, Hamas will have no leverage after it releases the hostages. This, together with the vague terms of the ceasefire agreement, will offer Israel a great deal of manoeuvrability and political cover.

For example, the Israeli government could claim Hamas is not abiding by the terms of the agreement and then recommence bombardment, curtail aid or further displace the Palestinians in Gaza.

While Point 12 rightly stipulates that “no one will be forced to leave Gaza”, Israel could make conditions there so inhospitable and offer enough incentives to Gazans, they might have little choice other than to leave if they want to survive.

Points 15 and 16 stipulate that the United States (along with Arab and other international partners) will develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force to deploy to Gaza to act as guarantors for the agreement. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) will also withdraw “based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization”.

But these “standards, milestones and timeframes” have been left unspecified and will be hard for the parties to agree on.

It is also possible Israel could use the vagueness of these terms to its advantage by arguing Hamas has failed to meet certain conditions in order to justify restarting the war.

Knowing it has no leverage after the first phase, Hamas has explicitly said it is expecting the US to fulfil its guarantor role. It is certainly a good sign the US has pledged 200 troops to help support and monitor the ceasefire, but at this stage, Hamas has little choice other than to pray the US’ deeds reflect its words.

While the ceasefire has now been passed by a majority of the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), five far-right ministers voted against the deal. These include Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who said the ceasefire is akin to “a deal with Adolf Hitler”.

This opposition bloc will no doubt be making more threats – and could potentially act – to bring down Netanyahu’s government after the first phase is implemented.

The problem with ceasefires

The first phase of this ceasefire will offer Hamas and Israel key items – a hostage-prisoner swap, a halt to violence and humanitarian aid.

After that, rather than a bargaining process with trade-offs between negotiating partners operating on a relatively even playing field, without US opprobrium, the ceasefire could easily devolve into an excuse for further Israeli domination of Gaza.

A ceasefire was always going to be a very small step forward in a long road towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Without meaningful engagement with Palestinians in their self-determination, we can only hope the future for Gazans will not get any worse.

As a Palestinian leader from Yarmouk camp in Syria told me back in 2018: “If there is a ceasefire, people know the devil is coming.”

October 12, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment