Arms control, risk reduction, and the art of the possible

Bulletin, By Jack Kennedy | May 13, 2026

The arms control community is facing a difficult moment. With the expiration of New START in February, there are no longer any treaty limits on the sizes of the major nuclear arsenals. Much ink has already been spilled on the question of what comes next (Diaz-Maurin 2026); many analysts are worried that without any legal check on vertical proliferation, there is a serious risk of a new arms race. These worries are likely well-founded; there are already prominent, influential voices calling for the United States to deploy more weapons out of a perceived need to shore up deterrence in the face of general geopolitical uncertainty, particularly as related to China’s nuclear buildup (Narang and Vaddi 2025; Kroenig 2022).

The prudent and responsible approach for the nuclear-armed states—particularly the United States, Russia, and China—to take now would be to embark on nuclear arms control talks immediately. Even in the absence of obvious political will from the others, the right course of action for any one of them would be to strongly broadcast their readiness to start such talks at any time, without imposing preconditions on the outcome.

However, there is little political will to do the prudent and responsible thing right now. Both the US and Russian governments have claimed to be open to some kind of new deal but have taken no actual steps in that direction (Pifer 2026). China has long declined to participate in talks with Washington and/or Moscow, pointing to its smaller arsenal—buildup notwithstanding—and no-first-use policy to justify not accepting reductions in or even limitations on its nuclear capabilities (Rust 2025).

While disappointing, this lack of political will should not come as a surprise. A look at the historical record indicates that arms control has only ever been achieved under specific conditions, namely either to restrain ongoing competition in armament or as a continuation of an existing framework of arms control.

With this in mind, the arms control community should be realistic about the dim prospects of any major achievement in that domain in the short term and focus on other policy areas that require more urgent attention, particularly risk-reduction measures.

The right time for arms control

Many voices are now calling for arms control to prevent a potential nuclear arms race. Normatively, this is a valuable goal. Descriptively, however, it misunderstands arms control’s historical function: Arms control does not prevent arms races, it brings them to a halt. To date, essentially all major arms control agreements came about either in response to an arms race already underway or as a continuation of existing arms control frameworks, often in the context of generally improving relations between the participating states………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Looking ahead

Over the past four to five decades, the world has become used to having nuclear arms control treaties and the limitations they impose on countries’ arsenals. By limiting vertical proliferation and its destabilizing effects, these tools have made everyone safer. However, in the process, it has been forgotten that the nuclear arms control regime—like the interwar naval arms control regime before it—was created as a reaction to a costly arms race, not because the United States and the Soviet Union simply had admirable foresight.

It would also be good if the governments of today had such foresight, and the project of convincing them to do so should not be abandoned totally. But it is likely to be a tall order. Arms control advocates could better spend their time on two other projects. One is forestalling an arms race by highlighting the danger and futility of arms competition. Those calling for a US nuclear buildup, for example, need to be challenged to provide a better answer to the arms racing eventuality than merely crossed fingers.

The other is risk reduction. There are various reasons to believe the world has entered a nuclear age more dangerous than those which have come before. There are smaller, more achievable forms of cooperation that nuclear-armed states can work on now to reduce that danger. Governments should initiate dialogue with their rivals as soon as possible.

Even below the level of government, scholars, analysts, policymakers, and citizens should prioritize risk reduction intellectually and politically. Figuring out ways to reduce risk in the new strategic environment—and gaining a better understanding of the nature of that strategic environment, which remains under-theorized—is, for now, likely a better use of time and effort than trying to reinvent arms control. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2026-05/arms-control-risk-reduction-and-the-art-of-the-possible/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=The%20church%20steps%20into%20the%20AI%20debate&utm_campaign=20260604%20Thursday%20Newsletter