Russia is deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus. NATO shouldn’t take the bait

By Nikolai N. Sokov Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Nikolai N. Sokov, a senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, previously worked at the Soviet and Russian Ministry. April 24, 2023

In June 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a new policy of Russia deploying some of its nuclear weapons in Belarus. The nuclear sharing arrangements between Russia and Belarus represent a fundamental change in Russian nuclear policy and the European security landscape. But as is usual with changes in Russian defense policy, the story developed slowly and has been full of unnecessary intrigue with important information revealed in small portions.

More than nine months after the initial announcement, the Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing is still very much incomplete; further developments may depend on the still uncertain evolution of the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine as well as any future changes in the scope and scale of Western assistance to Ukraine. But despite the many uncertainties, some key implications of Russia’s new policy of nuclear sharing can already be anticipated—especially as regard to its consequences for strategic stability.

Slow developments, false intrigue………………………………………………………………………….

Uncertainties. Unlike NATO’s nuclear sharing, which is built around nearly 100 B-61 gravity bombs, the Russia-Belarus one will involve a mix of gravity bombs and ground-launched missiles……………………………………………………………………………………………………….

The location of the storage site(s) for the nuclear warheads is perhaps the greatest of all uncertainties surrounding the Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing……………………………

Strategic consequences. The impact of Russia’s decision to institute nuclear sharing with Belarus will have wide-ranging consequences.

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, short-range, tactical nuclear weapons have acquired a distinct military mission…………………………………………………………………………..

the Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing—which involves preparation for deployment of nuclear weapons and may eventually entail the actual transfer of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus—is by far the boldest move by Russia because it comes supported with new capability. Moreover, if the delivery systems and warheads under these arrangements are deployed near the western border of Belarus where they are highly vulnerable, the only conceivable mode for them is to strike first. The number of nuclear weapons involved may be relatively small—perhaps only about one-third of the entire inventory of B-61 bombs—but ready to use

The message is undoubtedly addressed to the West; nuclear use against Ukraine has never even indirectly featured in any Russian statements.

……………………………………………. The seriousness of the new signal does not mean that nuclear use in Europe is an immediate threat. First, it is reserved for extreme circumstances, such as a major defeat of Russia, which would put the regime at risk. Second, it would only result from a relatively lengthy process of escalation. ………………………….

Do not respond in kind. Recent nuclear signaling and actions by Russia are clearly a step on the escalation ladder. ………………………………. The wisdom of a symmetrical, tit-for-tat response to Russia’s escalatory steps is questionable

……………………….. NATO would be better off to continue the current policy and rally international opinion against Russia’s possible nuclear use. As Allies’ defense production continues to ramp up, assistance to Ukraine will become more efficient and consequential. Escalation may be tempting, but it is both unnecessary and potentially dangerous. https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/russia-is-deploying-nuclear-weapons-in-belarus-nato-shouldnt-take-the-bait/