March 7, 2015 5:44 am
According to Matthew Bunn, a nuclear-security expert and a professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, during the nineteen-fifties and sixties “the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) literally imposed no rules at all concerning how private companies with weapons-usable nuclear material had to secure such stocks.” The A.E.C. assumed that the financial value of the fissile material would encourage companies to safeguard it carefully. That wasn’t the case. For decades, plutonium was shipped across the United States without armed guards. In 1972, the terrorist attack on the Munich Olympics prompted much tougher federal oversight of fissile materials. The subsequent rise of international terrorism and the 9/11 attacks tightened the security even further. And yet, until the opening of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, in 2010, tons of weapons-grade uranium were still being stored at Y-12 in a wooden building constructed during the Manhattan Project.
The traditional reliance on “guns, gates, and guards” for nuclear security may overlook a serious vulnerability at nuclear sites: the insider threat…….
Kirby had asked, “What do you think about what they do at Y-12?”
“I think with sadness that they are making a huge amount of money,” Sister Megan said.
Walli, Boertje-Obed, and Sister Megan were convicted by the jury on all counts. The three were now classified as violent offenders, because of the conviction for attacking government property. They were handcuffed, shackled, and led from the courtroom to jail…….
the walls of the penitentiary guarding this pacifist were taller and more impenetrable than any of the fences at Y-12. ♦http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/09/break-in-at-y-12?mbid=social_twitter.http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/09/break-in-at-y-12?mbid=social_twitter
Posted by Christina Macpherson
Categories: USA, weapons and war
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