Ask the locals: NFLA Chair says it is ‘prudent and proper’ for Nuclear Waste Services to consult residents over South Copeland flooding risk
The UK/Ireland Nuclear Free Local Authorities have urged Nuclear Waste
Services and the South Copeland GDF Community Partnership to ask the
residents of Millom and Haverigg for help in identifying local sites which
have been flooded.
As part of its ongoing effort to locate a potential site
for a Geological Disposal Facility, a repository into which Britain’s
legacy and future high-level radioactive waste will be dumped, NWS intends
to identity ‘Areas of Focus’ in the South Copeland Search Area which
incorporates the communities of Drigg, Haverigg, Kirksanton, and Millom.
These ‘Areas of Focus’ will be subject to more intensive geological
investigations and in the guidance published by NWS those sites ‘with
known flood risks’ will be excluded.
Report: Israel and Hamas Agree ‘in Principle’ to Ceasefire and Hostage Deal

According to media reports, the deal on the table doesn’t commit Israel to a permanent ceasefire
by Dave DeCamp January 14, 2025, https://news.antiwar.com/2025/01/14/report-israel-and-hamas-agree-in-principle-to-ceasefire-and-hostage-deal/
CBS News reported Tuesday that both Israel and Hamas have agreed “in principle” to a draft hostage and ceasefire deal that could be finalized this week.
The report, which cited US, Arab, and Israeli officials, said if the final details are worked out and the Israeli government approves it, the deal could be implemented as soon as this weekend, before the January 20 inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump.
The Associated Press had a similar report that said Hamas had accepted a draft deal and that details were still being finalized before Israeli approval. The deal is largely based on a proposal President Biden put forward in May 2024, which Hamas accepted months ago.
According to Israeli media reports, pressure on Netanyahu from Trump’s incoming Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, is the reason why there’s been progress in recent days.
The deal involves three phases, but according to AP, it would not commit Israel to a permanent ceasefire or full withdrawal from Gaza.
The AP report reads: “Details of the second phase still must be negotiated during the first. Those details remain difficult to resolve — and the deal does not include written guarantees that the ceasefire will continue until a deal is reached. That means Israel could resume its military campaign after the first phase ends.”
According to media reports, the first phase involves a 42-day ceasefire, and during that time, Hamas would release 33 Israeli hostages, including women, children, the elderly, and five female IDF soldiers. Some of the hostages released in the first phase may be dead, but Israeli officials said they believe most are still alive. In exchange, Israel is expected to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.
During the first phase, Israeli troops will withdraw from population centers in Gaza, and Palestinians will be able to return to north Gaza, although there is nothing for them to return to since IDF has destroyed nearly every building in sight. Aid deliveries will also be surged, with 600 trucks per day expected to enter the Strip.
The second phase of the deal would involve the release of all male Israeli hostages from Gaza and a full IDF withdrawal, with many details still needing to be worked out. The third phase would involve the exchange of bodies and the start of the reconstruction of Gaza.
French auditor recommends EDF delays UK Sizewell investment decision.

French State body says nuclear energy group should ensure international projects do not
delay domestic programme. France’s state auditor has said that French
nuclear company EDF should not make a final investment decision in the UK’s
Sizewell C reactor project until it has reduced its exposure to its other
British development, Hinkley Point C.
The Cour des comptes also said state-owned EDF must ensure that any international projects are profitable, and must not delay the programme of new nuclear projects in France. The auditors’ comments on Tuesday came just hours after the Financial Times
reported that the construction cost of the Sizewell C project in Suffolk
was likely to reach £40bn, double the estimate in 2020.
FT 14th Jan 2025 https://www.ft.com/content/9a6f1e55-91e2-4173-8c17-f67da0962201
NUKES AND FIRE – California Wildfires and Nuclear Dangers
Libbe’s Story: January 14, 2025
I live in Los Angeles in the foothills less than a mile away from what became the Eaton (Altadena/Pasadena) fire Evacuation Warning zone.
There was no new Nuclear Hotseat last week because after the Eaton fire broke out on Tuesday, I lost power and internet for more than 32 hours – as well as being under the stress of possibly needing to evacuate at a moment’s notice (and in the middle of the worst toothache of my life!). The winds were gusting up to 100 MPH, and only a few miles away from where I live, embers were being blown sideways, simultaneously setting whole neighborhoods afire. I packed my car, made arrangements with friends who had space for Munchkin and me to evacuate, and tried to stay in the moment instead of catastrophizing the worst.
After a very intense several days, the danger receded, as did the border of the evacuation zone, and it seemed that I had escaped with my home and life intact. Only the shadows of PTSD – which everyone in Los Angeles is suffering from, whether they lost their homes or not – remained, motivating me to check disaster maps and evacuation updates multiple times every day and throughout the night, sleeping with my clothes on… and not unpacking the car.
Many of you reached out to me, and I’m deeply grateful for your concern and support. As you might imagine, during this time I received numerous email, texts, and Facebook questions on whether any nukes have been at risk. San Onofre is 70 miles from where I live and Diablo Canyon a good 160 miles away, so there didn’t seem to be any immediate danger to them. But what are the dangers in general of fire and nukes? What are we up against?
To find out, I spoke with several experts to gain their insights. Our topics ranged more widely than I had anticipated, including:
the difference between a line fire and a mass fire- why reporters must NEVER evoke Hiroshima or Nagasaki as a comparison to the fire devastation here
- fire hazards posed by exposed spent fuel pools and fuel storage canisters
- how Southern California Edison retains a flawed power transmission tower system that may have contributed to the start of the Altadena/Pasadena Eaton fire
- radiation releases from fire in a radioactive materials dump zone such as the Santa Susana Field Lab (only 30 miles away)
…and other nuclear dangers created by wildfires at nuclear sites.
I learned more than I expected, information I’d not encountered before and that you probably haven’t, either. I will try to get this program into the hands and ears of reporters who can do a more thorough, focused job of following up. There are important aspects to nuclear’s vulnerability to fire, and given the nature of this current wildfire catastrophe – with maybe worse to come – we can’t assume safety when it’s clear that no one can.
In the meantime… I’m not unpacking the car.
Featured Interviews:………………………………………………..
Virginia, we have a problem

14 Jan 2025, |Peter Briggs, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/virginia-we-have-a-problem/
Australia’s plan to acquire Virginia-class submarines from the United State is looking increasingly improbable. The US building program is slipping too badly.
This heightens the need for Australia to begin looking at other options, including acquiring Suffren-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) from France.
The Covid-19 pandemic dramatically disrupted work at the two shipyards that build Virginias, General Dynamics Electric Boat at Groton, Connecticut, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ yard at Newport News, Virginia. It badly hindered output at many companies in the supply chain, too. With too few workers, the industry has built up a backlog, and yards are filling with incomplete submarines.
Within six years, the US must decide whether to proceed with sale of the first of at least three and possibly five Virginias to Australia, a boat that will be transferred from the US Navy’s fleet.
Nine months before the transfer goes ahead, the president of the day must certify that it will not diminish USN undersea capability. This certification is unlikely if the industry has not by then cleared its backlog and achieved a production rate of 2.3 a year—the long-term building rate of two a year for the USN plus about one every three years to cover Australia’s requirement.
The chance of meeting that condition is vanishingly small.
The situation in the shipyards is stark. The industry laid down only one SSN in 2021. It delivered none from April 2020 to May 2022. The USN has requested funding for only one Virginia in fiscal year 2025, breaking the two-a-year drumbeat, ‘due to limits on Navy’s budget topline and the growing Virginia class production backlog’.
As of January 2025, five of 10 Block IV Virginias ordered are in the yards, as are five of 12 Block Vs for which acquisition has been announced. (Work has not begun on the other seven Block Vs.)
The building time from laying down until delivery has increased from between 3 and 3.5 years before the pandemic to more than 5 years. The tempo is still slowing: the next Virginia, USS Iowa, is due to be delivered on 5 April 2025, 5.8 years after it was laid down.
On the original, pre-pandemic schedule, all the Block IVs could probably have been delivered to the USN by now. This is a gap that cannot be recovered in a few years, despite all the expensive manpower training and retention programs in hand.
Exacerbating the problem for the yards, the Block V submarines are 30 percent larger, and more complex to build, making a return to shorter build times unlikely. Speaking to their shareholders in October, the chief executives of Huntington Ingalls and General Dynamics blamed their slowing delivery tempo on supply chain and workforce issues. HII says it is renegotiating contracts for 17 Block IV and Block V Virginias.
Furthermore, Electric Boat has diverted its most experienced workers to avoid further slippage in building the first two ballistic missile submarines of the Columbia class, the USN’s highest priority shipbuilding program, in which the Newport News yard also participates.
It gets worse. Many USN SSNs that have joined the US fleet over the past few decades are unavailable for service, awaiting maintenance. The pandemic similarly disrupted shipyards that maintain the SSNs of the Los Angeles and Virginia classes. In September 2022, 18 of the 50 SSNs in commission were awaiting maintenance. The Congressional Budget Office reports lack of spending on spare parts is also forcing cannibalisation and impacting the availability of Virginia class SSNs.
Australia’s SSN plan must worsen the US’s challenge in recovering from this situation, adding to the congestion in shipyards and further over loading supply chains already struggling to deliver SSNs to the USN.
A US decision not to sell SSNs to Australia is inevitable, and on current planning we will have no stopgap to cover withdrawal of our six diesel submarines of the Collins class, the oldest of which has already served for 28 years.
In the end, Australia’s unwise reliance on the US will have weakened the combined capability of the alliance. And Australia’s independent capacity for deterrence will be weakened, too.
As I wrote in December, it is time to look for another solution. One is ordering SSNs of the French Suffren class. The design is in production, with three of six planned boats delivered. It is optimised for anti-submarine warfare, with good anti-surface, land-strike, special-forces and mining capability. It is a smaller design, less capable than the Virginia, but should be cheaper and is a better fit for Australia’s requirements.
Importantly, it requires only half the crew of a Virginia, and we should be able to afford and crew the minimum viable force of 12 SSNs.
Let’s build on the good progress in training, industry and facility preparations for supporting US and British SSNs in Australia, all of which should continue, and find a way to add to the alliance’s overall submarine capability, not reduce it.
Sizewell C’s future in doubt as EDF told to prioritise French nuclear power

Auditor warns against costly foreign projects as energy giant considers investment decision into the plant
The future of Sizewell C has been thrown into doubt after EDF, the company
behind the project, was told to prioritise supporting nuclear power in
France. In a rare intervention, the French state auditor warned the
state-owned energy giant against backing risky new projects abroad, which
include plans to build a new nuclear power station in Suffolk.
Instead, the Cour de Comptes said EDF should focus on making a success of
multibillion-euro projects at home, ensuring they were profitable and built
on time. It comes as EDF prepares to make a final investment decision on
Sizewell C, which will increase its exposure in the UK given it is already
building Hinkley Point C in Somerset.
However, that project has been hit by
surging costs and delays, with the most recent forecasts saying it will
open after 2030 and cost around £45bn. Industry sources are also predicting
Sizewell C will cost £40bn to build, double EDF’s initial estimates in
2020.
EDF is working alongside the Government on Sizewell C, with £4bn of
taxpayer cash already spent on the project. However, the French auditor has
released a report saying EDF should not make a final investment decision on
the Sizewell project before cutting its financial exposure to Hinkley.
Telegraph 14th Jan 2025,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/01/14/sizewell-c-future-doubt-edf-told-prioritise-french-nuclear/
Outgoing CIA director says ‘no sign’ Iran developing nuclear weapons
William Burns stated that the Islamic Republic made a decision in 2003 not to pursure nuclear weapons and has not changed its policy
The Cradle, News Desk, JAN 12, 2025
Outgoing CIA director William Burns stated in an interview on 10 January that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program, following a decision it made in 2003, and that the US is concerned about the revival of ISIS.
In an interview with state broadcaster National Public Radio (NPR) to discuss his time as director of the notorious spy agency under President Joe Biden, Burns was asked whether Iran may accelerate its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons given the setbacks the Islamic Republic and its allies in the regional Axis of Resistance have sustained over the past year.
Burns answered that “the Iranian regime could decide in the face of that weakness that it needs to restore its deterrence as it sees it and, you know, reverse the decision made at the end of 2003 (an oral fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) to suspend their weaponization program.”
However, Burns clarified, “We do not see any sign today that any such decision has been made, but we obviously watch it intently. “
He added that Iran’s weakness could instead lead to negotiations for a nuclear deal similar to the one signed by Iran and the United States under President Obama in 2014. President Trump later withdrew from the deal following intense lobbying by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“You know that that sense of weakness could also theoretically create a possibility for serious negotiations, too. And, you know, that’s something the new administration is going to have to sort through. I mean, it’s something I have a lot of experience in with the secret talks a decade ago, a little more than a decade ago with the Iranians. So, you know, that’s that’s also a possibility,” Burns stated.
Regarding the negotiations for a possible ceasefire and prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, Burns said he believes there is a chance for an agreement.
“I think the gaps between the parties have narrowed. There’s an Israeli delegation in Doha right now working through proximity talks managed by the Qataris, with the support of the Egyptians and with our support. So, I think there’s a chance.”……………………………………………………. https://thecradle.co/articles/outgoing-cia-director-says-no-sign-iran-developing-nuclear-weapons
France ‘far from ready’ to build six new nuclear reactors, audit body says

France is “far from ready” to build six nuclear reactors, the state’s top
audit body said on Tuesday, underlining the challenges the country faces in
rejuvenating its ageing fleet of nuclear power plants.
French President Emmanuel Macron announced a plan in 2022 for state-owned utility EDF to
build six European pressurised reactors (EPRs). The cost was estimated at
51.7 billion euros ($52.73 billion), but revised up to 67.4 billion in 2023
on higher raw material and engineering costs.
EDF planned to update that estimate by the end of last year but has not done so publicly. Construction is expected to get underway in 2027 but with financing for the project
still uncertain, the supply chain has not been able to prepare for such a
large construction programme, raising the risk of failure, the Court of
Auditors said in its report. It added that EDF is also facing “a
considerable increase” in costs at the UK’s Hinkley Point nuclear plant,
which it is now shouldering alone after the withdrawal of Chinese partner
CGN in 2023.
It should secure new investors in the project, before
committing financing for Britain’s Sizewell C plant, it said. EDF
reiterated that its contribution to the financing of Sizewell C was subject
to the fulfilment of certain conditions, including its stake capping at
20%.
France24 14th Jan 2024, www.france24.com/en/europe/20250114-france-far-from-ready-to-build-six-new-nuclear-reactors-audit-body-says
The EPR nuclear sector: new dynamics show persistent risks -La cour des comptes .

As recommended by the Court, the use of feedback and risk analysis has been
developed.
In addition to the excesses of the Flamanville 3 construction
site, the EPR reactors in operation in China (Taishan 1 and 2) and in
Finland (Olkiluoto 3) have experienced technical malfunctions in recent
years, with significant financial impacts, the consequences of which have
been damaging to the credibility of the EPR 2 programme.
In Great Britain, on the Hinkley Point construction site, EDF is facing a sharp increase in
costs accompanied by a further two-year delay, as well as a heavy
additional financing constraint caused by the withdrawal of the Chinese
co-shareholder.
As regards the new EPR project at Sizewell, delays are
already accumulating, with initial negative consequences in organisational
and financial terms. The Court recommends that a final investment decision
on this project should not be approved until a significant reduction in
EDF’s financial exposure to the Hinkley Point project has been achieved.
The Court also recommends ensuring that any new international nuclear
project generates quantified gains and does not delay the timetable for the
EPR 2 programme in France.
Cour des Comptes 14th Jan 2025, https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/la-filiere-epr-une-dynamique-nouvelle-des-risques-persistants
Cost of Sizewell C nuclear project expected to reach close to £40bn

“Nuclear is too expensive, too slow — and very expensive to contain at the end of its life.”
Final price tag for building new power plant is likely to be double 2020 estimate
Jim Pickard, Rachel Millard and Gill Plimmer , January 14 2025
The final price tag for building the planned Sizewell C nuclear power station in Suffolk is likely to reach close to £40bn, according to people close to the negotiations over the flagship energy scheme.
The sum is double the £20bn estimate given by developer EDF and the UK government for the project in 2020, reflecting surging construction costs as well as the implications of delays and cost overruns at sister site Hinkley Point C.
The higher estimate is likely to raise questions over the government’s strategy for a nuclear power revival, at a time of stretched government finances and cost of living concerns.
EDF says that once up and running, Sizewell C should be able to supply low carbon electricity to the equivalent of about 6mn homes for 60 years.
The Treasury is due to decide whether to go ahead with the project in this year’s multiyear spending review, according to officials.
The UK government and French energy group EDF were the initial backers of Sizewell C, but they are trying to raise billions of pounds from new investors, a process that is dragging on longer than planned.
Earlier this month the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Desnz) said it could not reveal the current cost estimate for the project as it was “commercially sensitive”. …………………
Alison Downes, executive director of campaign group Stop Sizewell C, urged the government to “come clean” on the “massive true cost” of the project given that households would be paying upfront for its construction via a levy on energy bills. “This secrecy around Sizewell C is inexcusable.”
Dale Vince, a big Labour party donor and founder of green energy company Ecotricity, has written to the government’s new Office for Value for Money warning that the construction of Sizewell “will saddle consumers with higher bills long before it delivers a single unit of electricity”.
But one senior government figure and two well-placed industry sources said a reasonable assumption for the cost of building Sizewell C would be about £40bn in 2025 prices.
The government has already awarded £3.7bn of state funding to the project. Ministers had planned to reach a final investment decision by the end of 2024 but were forced to delay this until spring 2025. Now there is industry speculation that any deal could slip beyond the autumn.
Speaking to the Financial Times, he added: “Nuclear is too expensive, too slow — and very expensive to contain at the end of its life”…………………………….
all but one of Britain’s current ageing fleet of plants is due to close by March 2030, potentially sooner if planned life extensions cannot go ahead.
Only one new nuclear power station, Hinkley Point C in Somerset, is at present being built in the UK but it is delayed and over budget.
The project is due to start generating in 2029 at the earliest, and cost up to £46bn. That compares with initial expectations from 2016 that it would start at the end of 2025 and cost £18bn. …………………….
there is scepticism inside government about how much lower Sizewell C’s price tag would be compared with Hinkley Point C………………………………
Saudi Arabia plans to enrich and sell uranium as Iran commences nuclear talks with E3

Jan 13, 2025,
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501135824
audi Arabia plans to monetize all its mineral resources, including uranium, by enriching and selling it, while Iran begins nuclear talks with the E3 in Geneva.
Speaking at a conference in Dhahran, Saudi energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said on Monday, “We will enrich it and we will sell it and we will do a ‘yellowcake,'” referring to the powdered concentrate used to prepare uranium fuel for nuclear reactors.
According to Iranian media, Iran’s two-day discussions with the E3 (Britain, France, and Germany), along with a European Union representative, will focus on negotiations for a nuclear deal and regional issues.
The talks follow November meetings amid tensions following the UN nuclear watchdog’s Board of Governors’ resolution censuring Iran, demanding that Tehran resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA over its advancing nuclear program.
Last Energy, Texas, Utah allege NRC overstepping in SMR regulation

Nuclear Newswire 13th Jan 2025
Advanced nuclear reactor company Last Energy joined with two Republican state attorneys general in a lawsuit against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, arguing that some microreactors should not require the commission’s approval.
Utah and Texas are the states involved in the lawsuit, which was filed December 30 in federal court in Texas. The parties’ goal is to accelerate the pace of micro- and small modular reactor deployment in the United States by exempting some new technologies from the traditional licensing process.
According to a Last Energy spokesperson, “This case will determine the threshold at which a nuclear reactor is so safe that it is below concern for federal licensing. There’s no doubt that robust shielding can eliminate exposure to, and the hazards from, nuclear radiation. Congress and former NRC executive director Victor Stello Jr. have both argued for a de minimus standard, and our intent is for the courts to enforce that recommendation.”
An NRC spokesperson said the agency will respond through its filings with the district court.
Background: The nuclear power industry is experiencing a surge of support as Americans are using more energy through the electrification of the economy. The biggest customers in the playing field are large tech companies trying to build additional data centers and support artificial intelligence growth, both power-hungry endeavors…………………………………………………… https://www.ans.org/news/2025-01-13/article-6680/last-energy-texas-utah-allege-nrc-overstepping-in-smr-regulation/
Destroyed Assange Files: Why Judge’s Rebuke Against Crown Prosecution Service Was So Significant.

“This is a significant victory in a long battle to get the truth out on the involvement of CPS in keeping Julian in arbitrary detention that later turned into political imprisonment, according to UN bodies and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.”
An unknown number of emails were apparently deleted after one of the U.K.’s lead prosecutor in the case, Paul Close, retired from the CPS. The deletions occurred despite the fact that the case against the award-winning journalist and publisher of the news and transparency website WikiLeaks was still active.
the dissenter, Mohamed Elmaazi, 14 Jan 2025,
A British judge issued an unusually critical rebuke against the Crown Prosecution Service of England and Wales.
A British judge issued an unusually critical rebuke against the Crown Prosecution Service of England and Wales (CPS) for its handling of freedom of information requests related to Sweden’s failed attempt to extradite WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange.
The decision by the United Kingdom’s information rights tribunal was made public on January 10. It followed an appeal by Italian investigative journalist Stefania Maurizi, who argued that the CPS failed in its duty to properly explain why a senior prosecutor’s emails were allegedly deleted or destroyed.
In writing the decision for the three-member tribunal, First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) Judge Penrose Foss pierced the veil of deference that is often shown to governmental bodies in England and Wales by the U.K.’s data protection regulator, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Foss was quite blunt in her criticism of the CPS’s handling of multiple Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that Maurizi had submitted as early as 2015.
It is uncommon for the CPS to be a respondent in FOIA appeals. A review of FTT decisions regarding information rights cases since 2009 shows the CPS as a respondent in 16 out of 3,167 cases (0.5 percent). This includes two appeals filed by Maurizi.
The decision establishes a precedent that may make it easier for future FOIA requests to be successful in the long run, according to Estelle Dehon KC of London’s Cornerstone Barristers, who represented Maurizi.
When the information rights tribunal comes across instances of a public authority’s failure to comply with FOIA obligations it “has been known to be quite trenchant in its criticism,” Dehon, told The Dissenter. But it is “unusual in the run of cases that are specific to Stefania’s FOIA requests” for the tribunal to be as critical as it was last week, she added.
“What we can do now is say to the ICO, look at the quality of the search process [conducted by a public body when a FOIA request is made]. If the search process was poor, then that is an indication that the information is being, or might be, held despite the public authority’s claims to the contrary,” Dehon said.
Kristinn Hrafnsson, WikiLeaks’ editor-in-chief, told The Dissenter, “This is a significant victory in a long battle to get the truth out on the involvement of CPS in keeping Julian in arbitrary detention that later turned into political imprisonment, according to UN bodies and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.”
The tribunal ordered the CPS to confirm whether it holds information as to “when, how and why” it destroyed or deleted any “hard or electronic copies of emails” with the Swedish Prosecution Authority by February 21 at 4 p.m. If they have any such information they must provide it to Maurizi or otherwise explain why they are exempt from doing so.
‘Unfounded’ Assumptions Prevented Adequate Search For Records
“Overall, based on the evidence before us, our concern is that over a number of years the CPS has not properly addressed itself at least to recording, if not undertaking, adequate searches in relation to the CPS lawyer’s emails, with the result that, in 2023, when it has purported to answer [Maurizi’s] 2019 [FOIA] Request, it has not been able to give a clear and complete account,” the Tribunal stated in its decision.
The tribunal noted that the CPS’s approach “appears to have been informed by a combination of unfounded and incorrect assumptions or speculation, flawed corporate memory, and unreliable anecdotal instruction, much, but not all, of that resting inevitably in the natural succession of employees through the organisation over time.”
“The cumulative effect of those things, taken together with what we find to be (1) imprecisely worded questions and a failure to drill down into answers, and (2) the absence of any clear and complete audit trail of enquiries and responses at each stage, has very likely prevented adequate searches and has certainly prevented a full and satisfactory account of matters.”
An unknown number of emails were apparently deleted after one of the U.K.’s lead prosecutor in the case, Paul Close, retired from the CPS. The deletions occurred despite the fact that the case against the award-winning journalist and publisher of the news and transparency website WikiLeaks was still active.
…………………………………………………………………….. Taking Aim At the UK’s Data Protection Regulator
The tribunal was quite critical of the ICO for its willingness to accept that every reasonable step had been taken by the prosecution to search for the information Maurizi requested.
…………………………………………………………………. The tribunal found that claims made by the government were contradictory and lacking in evidence to support them and even found “no evidence as to what searches were undertaken” in relation to Maurizi’s earlier FOIA requests.
……………………………………….The tribunal’s decision represents the latest victory for Maurizi who has filed multiple FOIA requests and appeals over the U.K. and Swedish governments’ handling of Assange’s extradition case. Dehon summarized the decision succinctly, “The tribunal concluded the CPS likely still holds some information explaining what took place. Hopefully that will finally be disclosed.”
“So far we have learned that the CPS overstepped and dictated how the Swedish prosecutor’s office handled the case with the obvious intent to keep Julian in limbo and maintain for years his unlawful detention,” Hrafnsson said. “The world needs to know who dictated CPS staff to handle the case in this manner both inside the U.K. establishment at its initiative and with input from other governments. It is unacceptable that government files in the U.K. are disappeared in an effort to hide the truth from the public.”
Hrafnsson believes that the missing files, or “at least their fate,” will ultimately “shed light on the real story behind the political persecution of Julian Assange.”
………………………………………………………………………………………. more https://thedissenter.org/destroyed-assange-files-why-judges-rebuke-against-crown-prosecution-service-was-so-significant/
Becoming a responsible ancestor – about America’s nuclear wastes.

This country, with the world’s largest inventory of high-activity radioactive waste, has not fashioned even a shadow of a strategy for the material’s permanent disposition.
in any case, the burdens would fall on future generations.
Bulletin, By Daniel Metlay | January 13, 2025
After more than four decades of intense struggle, the United States found itself in an unenviable and awkward position by 2015: It no longer had even the barest blueprint of how to dispose of its growing inventory of high-activity radioactive waste.[1] Under the leadership of Rodney Ewing, former chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and Allison MacFarlane, former chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a steering committee composed of a dozen specialists set out to prepare the so-called “reset” report on how to reconstruct that enterprise.[2] In the study’s words: “Reset is an effort to untangle the technical, administrative, and public concerns in such a way that important issues can be identified, understood, and addressed (Steering Committee 2018, 2).”
One of its key recommendations was that a non-profit, single-purpose organization should be established by the owners of the country’s nuclear powerplants to replace the Department of Energy as the implementor of a fresh waste-disposal undertaking.[3]
To appreciate these suggestions, one must first understand how the United States found itself in its current predicament.
How did the United States get here
The roots of the United States’ waste-disposition program can be found in a study prepared by a panel working under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council 1957). The group’s principal advice was that high-activity waste should be entombed in conventionally mined, deep-geologic repositories such as salt mines.
Early attempts to find a site for the facility met with unanticipated technical difficulties and unflinching opposition from state officials (Carter 1989). President Jimmy Carter appointed an Interagency Review Group to suggest a pathway to unsnarl the Gordian Knot (IRG 1978). Among other things, it counseled the president that a new waste-management program should be established within the Department of Energy. It should investigate multiple potential locations in a variety of geologic formations and choose the one bearing the soundest technical characteristics for development of a repository.
President Ronald Reagan signed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in January, 1983 (NWPA 1982). The legislation captured the consensus that had emerged around the lion’s share of the Interagency Review Group’s ideas. In particular, the law contained four strategic bargains that were requisite to its passage:
Two repositories would be built, the first in the west and a second in the east, to ensure geographic equity and geologic diversity.- Site-selection would be a technically driven process in which several different hydrogeologic formations would be evaluated against pre-established guidelines.
- States would be given a substantial voice in the choice of sites.
- Upon payment of a fee, the Department of Energy would contract with the owners of nuclear powerplants to accept their waste for disposal starting in January 1998.
By the time Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act a mere five years later, all the bargains had been breached in one way or another (NWPAA 1987; Colglazier and Langum 1988).
Derisively labeled the “Screw Nevada” bill, the new law confined site-selection to Yucca Mountain, located both on and adjacent to the weapons-testing area. Hardly surprisingly, the state mounted an implacable and sustained challenge to the actions of the Department of Energy, including investigations to evaluate the technical suitability of Yucca Mountain and opposition to the license application that the department submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Adams 2010).
…………………………………………………………………………………… President Obama directed the new secretary of the Energy Department, Steven Chu, to empanel the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC 2012). Ostensibly not a “siting commission,” it nonetheless proposed a “consent-based” process that was dramatically at odds with the method used to choose the Yucca Mountain site. In addition, the new leadership sought, unsuccessfully as it turns out, to withdraw the license application before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Ultimately, funding for the project ran out even during President Donald Trump’s administration, and the Yucca Mountain Project faded into history.
Left in its wake is the current state of affairs. This country, with the world’s largest inventory of high-activity radioactive waste, has not fashioned even a shadow of a strategy for the material’s permanent disposition.
The Department of Energy detailed the consequences of the absence of a policy with its analysis of the No-Action Alternative in the Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain (DOE 2002, S-79).[4] Under this scenario, the adverse outcomes are seemingly modest—but the calculations exclude effects due to human intrusion as well as sabotage, precisely the rationales for the disposal imperative.
At best, the nation has been left with the regulator’s vague assurance that the owners of the waste can safely extend its storage on the surface for roughly 100 years (NRC 2014). This abdication of accountability—kicking the burden down the road—transforms our generation into irresponsible ancestors.
Why has the United States gotten there
Many independent and reinforcing factors have led to this nation’s precarious moral circumstances. Five of them are worthy of note.
First, striking a balance between protecting the national interest in the disposition of the waste versus state and local interest in warding off a possible calculated risk has proven to be a constant struggle. The Interagency Review Group proposed the nebulous notion of “consultation and concurrence” to suggest that a host state must provide its consent before the repository-development process could proceed to the next step.
Congress morphed that idea into the much weaker “consultation and cooperation” when it passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act. But it did authorize the host-state to raise an objection to the president’s selection of the site. That dissent could, however, be overridden by a majority vote in each chamber. As the Yucca Mountain case illustrated, once intensive investigations at a proposed repository location gained momentum and the prospect of restarting site selection lurked in the future, sustaining a protest was only an abstract possibility.
Second, the regulatory regime for approving a repository system was plagued by controversy. In the mid-1980s, the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated radionuclide release standards, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued licensing rules for a generic repository. Directed by Congress in 1992, both agencies later released Yucca Mountain-specific regulations. These protocols proved to be methodologically contested and subject to criticism for changing the “rules of the game.”
Third, the Department of Energy has failed to merit public trust and confidence. A survey conducted by the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board at the height of the Yucca Mountain controversy conclusively demonstrated this reality: None of the interested and affected parties believe that the Department of Energy is very trustworthy. See Figure 1.[on original]
Nor did that deficit of trust and confidence shrink in the coming years. The Blue Ribbon Commission’s and Reset reports underscored this endemic problem. The Department of Energy’s recent initiative to craft a consent-based procedure for siting a federal consolidated interim storage facility positioned restoring public trust at the core of its activities.
Fourth, the Department of Energy’s execution of a stepwise approach to constructing a disposal facility was practically and conceptually flawed. Its license application composed a narrative about how it would meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s regulation mandating that the material be able to be retrieved from an open repository once it was emplaced. That account did not detail the conditions under which the waste might be removed; it did not suggest where it might go; nor did it indicate what might be done if the repository proved to be unworkable. Like extended storage, retrievability of the waste would somehow take place if and when necessary. But, in any case, the burdens would fall on future generations.
Fifth, the Department of Energy encountered difficulties persuasively resolving technical uncertainties. Its license application rested on the premise that the corrosion-resistant Alloy-22 waste packages and the titanium alloy drip shields, which might divert water from the packages, would function to limit the release of radionuclides into the environment. Whether those engineered structures would perform as anticipated in a hot and humid repository may still be an open question. ………………………………….
What should be done
It would be unfair to reproach the Department of Energy alone for all the difficulties that the US waste-disposition program has confronted over the years; sometimes it just was dealt a poor hand by others. Nonetheless, in this writer’s view, reviving that effort demands, among other transformations, a modification in the organization that will execute it in the future.
Indeed, institutional design in the United States is hardly a novel concern. Included in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was a provision directing the secretary of the Department of Energy to “undertake a study with respect to alternative approaches to managing the construction and operation of all civilian radioactive waste management facilities, including the feasibility of establishing a private corporation for such purposes (NWPA 1992).” That analysis advocated a Tennessee Valley Authority-like corporation, which was labeled “FEDCORP,” to take on the responsibility of constructing and operating a repository (AMFM 1995).
The Blue Ribbon Commission also concluded that:
A new [single-purpose] organization will be in a better position to develop a strong culture of safety, transparency, consultation, and collaboration. And by signaling a clear break with the often troubled history of the U.S. waste management program it can begin repairing the legacy of distrust left by decades of missed deadlines and failed commitments (BRC 2012, 61).
It, too, advised that a FEDCORP should replace the Department of Energy.
An examination of national waste-disposal undertakings indicates that countries do have several options for structuring their missions. See Figure 2 below [on original].
That multiplicity of alternatives led the majority of the Reset Steering Committee, after intense discussion and consideration, to decide that a more radical approach ought to be adopted. As the group observed: “The track record of nuclear utility-owned implementors abroad…makes at least a prima facie case for considering the creation of a not-for-profit, nuclear utility-owned implementing organization (NUCO) (Steering Committee 2018, 35).”
Of the four nations relying on nuclear utility-owned implementing organizations, three—including Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland—have selected repository sites, and another, Canada, may be on the cusp of doing so. In pointed contrast, only one of the nine countries employing other organizational designs have launched a determined set of site investigations, let along definitely and unequivocally chosen a location to build a repository.

Removing disposal authority from the Department of Energy and passing it on to a nuclear utility-owned implementing organization also permits the full integration of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the exception of disposition, every element is the responsibility of some industrial firm: uranium exploration and conversion, fuel manufacture and configuration, enrichment, reactor design and construction, spent fuel reprocessing (if permitted by law or regulation and if deemed economical), and temporary storage of spent fuel on and off reactor sites.
……………………………………………By creating a nuclear utility-owned implementing organizations, reactor owners can more easily negotiate adjustments with their industrial partners.
But transitioning from the Department of Energy to a nuclear utility-owned implementing organization is unlikely to be a frictionless process. Policymakers in government and industry will have to resolve many particulars. For instance, of central importance is the question of who should pay for the reconstructed program. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act’s passage four decades ago, utilities have paid a fee of $0.001 (one mil) per kilowatt of electricity produced. In addition, Congress has periodically appropriated funds to dispose of weapons-origin high-activity waste. Those resources have all been deposited in the Nuclear Waste Fund with the expectation they would pay the full life-cycle costs of the disposition effort.
At the end of Fiscal Year 2024, the Nuclear Waste Fund balance was $52.2 billion dollars (DOE 2024).[5] f a nuclear utility-owned implementing organization were established, one possibility would be to transfer the body of the fund to the new organization. However, the nuclear utility-owned implementing organization might be limited to spending for disposition only the amount of interest that the waste fund generates. In Fiscal Year 2024, that amount was roughly $1.9 billion a year. Notably that income was approximately four times what the Department of Energy spent during the last full year of the Yucca Mountain Project (Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008). Consequently, the new implementor should have sufficient resources to sustain a robust effort. (Under this approach, nuclear utilities would continue to be responsible for storing their spent fuel.)
Another question that would have to be determined is the fate of weapons-origin high-activity radioactive waste. Conceivably the Federal Government might resurrect its own repository effort, perhaps at Yucca Mountain or through a contemporary siting project. Alternatively, the most cost-effective option might be to pay the nuclear utility-owned implementing organizations a disposition fee through congressional appropriations.
Finally, given the weight to its additional responsibilities, the nuclear utility-owned implementing organization must demonstrate that it will be a trustworthy implementor……………………………………………………………….
But for this arrangement to be most effective, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself must be viewed more widely as trustworthy…………………………………………………………………………………
Other reforms beyond switching the implementor will urgently be necessary, such as improving the technical credibility of studies to determine the suitability of a potential repository site and structuring a sound step-by-step developmental process. Without the full slate of improvements, this generation will be stuck in the role of irresponsible ancestors. So, the reader should consider this essay as a broader call to action, if only for our children and grandchildren’s sake. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-01/becoming-a-responsible-ancestor/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Radioactive%20fallout%20in%20Tokyo%20after%20Fukushima&utm_campaign=20250113%20Monday%20Newsletter
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