The Real Story Behind the Russia–Ukraine War—and What Happens Next
local Ukrainian nationalists joined Hitler’s Wehrmacht in its depredations against Jews, Poles, Roma and Russians when it first swept through the country from the west on its way to Stalingrad; and then, in turn, the Russian populations from the Donbas and south campaigned with the Red Army during its vengeance-wreaking return from the east after winning the bloody 1943 battle of Stalingrad that turned the course of WWII.
As Washington sleepwalks deeper into conflicts that have nothing to do with genuine US security, the stakes for ordinary Americans grow higher by the day.
by David Stockman, Doug Casey’s International Man , 27 Dec 25
Notwithstanding the historic fluidity of borders, there is no case whatsoever that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was “unprovoked” and unrelated to NATO’s own transparent provocations in the region.
The details are arrayed below, but the larger issue needs be addressed first.
Namely, is there any reason to believe that Russia is an expansionist power looking to gobble up neighbors which were not integral parts of its own historic evolution, as is the case with Ukraine?
After all, if despite Rubio’s treachery President Trump does manage to strike a Ukraine peace and partition deal with Putin you can be sure that the neocons will come charging in with a false Munich appeasement analogy.
The answer, however, is a resounding no!
Our firm rebuke of the hoary Munich analogy as it has been falsely applied to Putin is based on what might be called the double-digit rule. To wit, the true expansionary hegemons of modern history have spent huge parts of their GDP on defense because that’s what it takes to support the military infrastructure and logistics required for invasion and occupation of foreign lands.
For instance, here are the figures for military spending by Nazi Germany from 1935–1944 expressed as a percent of GDP. This is what an aggressive hegemon looks like in the ramp-up to war: German military spending had already reach 23% of GDP, even before its invasion of Poland in September 1939 and its subsequent commencement of actual military campaigns of invasion and occupation.
Not surprisingly, the same kind of claim on resources occurred when the United States took it upon itself to counter the aggression of Germany and Japan on a global basis. By 1944 defense spending was equal to 40% of America’s GDP, and would have totaled more than $2 trillion per year in present day dollars of purchasing power.
Military Spending As A Percent Of GDP In Nazi Germany
- 1935: 8%.
- 1936: 13%.
- 1937: 13%.
- 1938: 17%.
- 1939: 23%.
- 1940: 38%.
- 1941: 47%.
- 1942: 55%.
- 1943: 61%.
- 1944: 75%
By contrast, during the final year before Washington/NATO triggered the Ukraine proxy war in February 2022, the Russian military budget was $65 billion, which amounted to just 3.5% of its GDP.
Moreover, the prior years showed no build-up of the kind that has always accompanied historic aggressors. For the period 1992 to 2022, for instance, the average military spending by Russia was 3.8% of GDP– with a minimum of 2.7% in 1998 and a maximum of 5.4% in 2016.
Needless to say, you don’t invade the Baltics or Poland—to say nothing of Germany, France, the Benelux and crossing the English Channel—on 3.5% of GDP! Not even remotely.
Since full scale war broke out in 2022 Russian military spending has increased significantly to 6% of GDP, but all of that is being consumed by the Demolition Derby in Ukraine—barely 100 miles from its own border.
That is, even at 6% of GDP Russia has not yet been able to subdue its own historic borderlands. So if Russia self-evidently does not have the economic and military capacity to conquer its non-Ukrainian neighbors in its own region, let alone Europe proper, what is the war really about?
Continue readingThe first Zionist targeted assassination – 1924

Eli Ku, Aug 25, 2025, https://lenabloch.medium.com/the-first-zionist-targeted-assassination-was-of-the-orthodox-jewish-peace-negotiator-jaacob-israel-de5b0eb7844b
The first Zionist targeted assassination was of the Orthodox Jewish peace negotiator, Jaacob Israel De Haan, in 1924. Jewish terrorists unleashed a brutal terror campaign on Palestinians and the British, with bombings, assassinations, pogroms of Arab businesses and villages, destruction of civilian places of commonality, sabotaging railroads.
“By the time the Balfour Declaration was finalised, thirty-plus years of Zionist settlement had made clear that the Zionists intended to ethnically cleanse the land for a settler state based on racial superiority; and it was the behind-the-scenes demands of the principal Zionist leaders, notably Chaim Weizmann and Baron Rothschild.
First-hand accounts of Zionist settlement in Palestine had already painted a picture of violent racial displacement. I will cite one of the lesser known reports, by Dr. Paul Nathan, a prominent Jewish leader in Berlin, who went to Palestine on behalf of the German Jewish National Relief Association. He was so horrified by what he found that he published a pamphlet in January, 1914, in which he described the Zionist settlers as carrying on
“a campaign of terror modelled almost on Russian pogrom models [against settlers refusing to adopt Hebrew].”
A few years later, the Balfour Declaration’s deliberately ambiguous wording was being finalized. Sceptics—and the British Cabinet—were assured that it did not mean a Zionist state. Yet simultaneously, Weizmann was pushing to create that very state immediately. He demanded that his state extend all the way to the Jordan River within three or four years of the Declaration—that is, by 1921—and then expand beyond it.
In their behind-the-scenes meetings, Weizmann and Rothschild treated the ethnic cleansing of non-Jewish Palestinians as indispensable to their plans, and they repeatedly complained to the British that the settlers were not being treated preferentially enough over the Palestinians. And they insisted that the British must lie about the scheme until it is too late for anyone to do anything about it.
In correspondence with Balfour, Weizmann justified his lies by slandering the Palestinians and Jews—that is, the Middle East’s indigenous Jews, who were overwhelmingly opposed to Zionism and whom Weizmann smeared with classic anti-Semitic stereotypes. The Palestinians he dismissed as, in so many words, a lower type of human, and this was among the reasons he and other Zionist leaders used for refusing democracy in Palestine—if the “Arabs” had the vote, he said, it would lower the Jew down to the level of a “native”.
With the establishment of the British Mandate, four decades of peaceful Palestinian resistance had proved futile, and armed Palestinian resistance—which included terrorism—began. Zionist terror became the domain of formal organizations that attacked anyone in the way of its messianic goals—Palestinian, Jew, or British. These terror organizations operated from within the Zionist settlements and were actively empowered and shielded by the settlements and the Jewish Agency, the recognized semi-autonomous government of the Zionist settlements, what would become the Israeli government.
There was no substantive difference between the acknowledged terror organizations—most famously, the Irgun, and Lehi, the so-called Stern Gang—and the Jewish Agency, and its terror gang, the Hagana. The Agency cooperated, collaborated, and even helped finance the Irgun.
The relationship between the Jewish Agency, and the Irgun and Lehi, was symbiotic. The Irgun in particular would act on behalf of the Hagana so that the Jewish Agency could feign innocence. The Agency would then tell the British that they condemn the terror, while steadfastly refusing any cooperation against it, indeed doing what they could to shield it.
The fascist nature of the Zionist enterprise was apparent both to US and British intelligence. The Jewish Agency tolerated no dissent and sought to dictate the fates of all Jews. Children were radicalised as part of the methodology of all three major organizations, and by extension, the Jewish Agency.”
Thomas Suarez, London House of Lords, December 2016.
Fire at Windscale piles

Does Britain Really Ned Nuclear Power? by Ian Fairlea, beyondnuclearinternational
“…………………………………………………………….In 1957, a major fire occurred at Windscale nuclear site (what is now known as Sellafield). The effects of the Windscale fire were hushed up at the time but it is now recognised as one of the world’s worst nuclear accidents. An official statement in 1957 said: ‘There was not a large amount of radiation released. The amount was not hazardous and in fact it was carried out to sea by the wind.’ The truth, kept hidden for over thirty years, was that a large quantity of hazardous radioactivity was blown east and south east, across most of England.
After years of accidents and leaks, several of them serious, and regular cover-up attempts by both the management and government, it was decided to change the plant’s name in 1981 to Sellafield, presumably in the hope that the public would forget about Windscale and the accident.
When, in 1983, Greenpeace divers discovered highly radioactive waste being discharged into the sea through a pipeline at Sellafield and tried to block it, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), who then operated the site, repeatedly took Greenpeace to the High Court to try to stop them and to sequestrate its assets. The first generation of British Magnox nuclear power stations were all secretly designed with the dual purpose of plutonium and electricity production in mind.
Some people think that because plutonium is no longer needed by the UK to make weapons as it already has huge stocks of weapons grade plutonium, there no longer is any connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. This is incorrect: they remain inextricably linked. For example:
- All the processes at the front of the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. uranium ore mining, uranium ore milling, uranium ore refining, and U-235 enrichment are still used for both power and military purposes.
- The UK factory at Capenhurst that makes nuclear fuel for reactors also makes nuclear fuel for nuclear (Trident and hunter-killer) submarines.
- Nuclear reactors are used to create tritium (the radioactive isotope of hydrogen) necessary for nuclear weapons.
………………………………………………………………………………………………… https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2025/12/14/does-britain-really-need-nuclear-power/
Radioactive fertilizer and the nuclear industry

Gordon Edwards. 14 Dec 25
CORRECTION
I wrote that
“…selling raffinate as fertilizer goes on all the time from the world’s largest uranium refinery owned by Cameco, situated at Blind River on the north shore of Georgian Bay.”
This sentence is incorrect. Raffinate from Blind River is not used as fertilizer. I apologize for the error.
Radioactive fertilizer from the Canadian uranium industry does not come from the Cameco Blind River refinery but from two other sources – the Cameco Key Lake uranium mill in Northern Saskatchewan, and the Cameo uranium dioxide conversion facility at Port Hope Ontario.
Moreover, the material that is being used in radioactive fertilizer is not raffinate (i.e. refinery waste). It is ammonium sulphate that is recovered from the Key Lake uranium processing circuits and sold as fertilizer, together with a liquid by-product of Cameco’s Port Hope uranium dioxide conversion plant – an ammonium nitrate solution – that is sold to a local agricultural supply company for use in fertilizer production.
The use of similar waste solutions from nuclear fuel facilities as fertilizer has been a concern in other jurisdictions as well. So at the present time, it is not raffinate but ammonium compounds that have been used in uranium processing that ends up in fertilizer. I apologize for not checking the facts much more carefully..
About radioactive fertilizer and the nuclear industry.
A lot of the phosphate used for fertilizer comes from Florida where the phosphate ore is mined. That ore is contaminated with uranium and its decay products, especially radium. Radium disintegrates to produce radon gas Radon-222) and this builds up in an enclosed space, without adequate ventiliation, reaching an “equilibrium” in about one month.
That’s why Florida was the first “hot spot” that alerted the US government to the major public health hazard posed by radon, which is estimated to kill about 20-30 thousand Americans every year. Every atom of radon comes from the disintegration of a radium atom, and in turn, every atom of radium started out as an atom of uranium.
Radioactive quilibrium means #becquerels of radium = #becquerels of radon. One becquerel being one disintegration per second. In a simiar way, if pure radon gas is in an enclosed container, it will reach equilibrium with its four short-lived decay products in a couple of hours – so the radioactivity in the container is about five times greater than it was originally, as all the short-lived decay products have attained roughly the same level of radioactivity as the radon.
When this radioactive fertilizer is used on tobacco crops, the radon from the soil and the fertilizer builds up under the thick canopy of tobacco leaves and hangs there for a time (radon being 7-8 times heavier than air). The radon atoms disintegrate to produce four airborne solid short lived decay products – polonium-218, bismuth-214, lead-214, polonium-214, all of which decay into lead-210 and polonium-210. [Note: the last two nuclides never reach equilibrium, unlike the first four.]
These radon decay products stick to the resinous (sticky) hairs on the undersides of the tobacco leaves and when the tobacco is harvested these radioactive materials are harvested along with the tobacco. By the time the tobacco is cured, rolled, and packaged, small quantities of lead-210 (22-year half-life) and its immediate successor polonium-210 are left in the tobacco/cigarettes for the unwitting smoker (or second-hand-smoke inhaler) to encounter.
When the cigarette is lit and the smoker draws on it, the temperature at the tip increases dramatically and it vaporizes the lead-210 and polonium-210 which is inhaled deep into the lungs, where polonium-210 sticks to and attacks the sensitive lung tissue with its very energetic alpha particles.
Polonium-210 is a very damaging radionuclide which Los Alamos Labs reckons is about 250 billion time more toxic than hydrogen cyanide. (It’s what was used to murder Alexander Litvenenko in London at the “request” of Putin who was openly criticized by Litvenenko).
Polonium-210 adds greatly to the cancer-causing characteristic of the tobacco residues lodged in the lung, making cigarettes smoke significantly more carcinogenic than it would otherwise be. (When the smoker is not inhaling, the lead-210/polonium-210 is wafted into the second-hand cigarette smoke as a respirable aerosol to endanger the health of those within sniffing distance,)
Inside the lung, some of the inhaled polonium-210 crosses the blood-air barrier end enters the bloodstream. Being solid, it attaches to pre-existing plaque build-up in the arteries of the smoker, usually near the arterial valves, where the alpha particle bombardment causes fibrosis of the arterial wall and valve, thus exacerbating the plaque build-up and increasing the restriction of blood flow, thereby contributing substantially to the incidence of heart attacks and strokes among smokers because of the alpha emitting polonium-210 in the plaque.
What you may not have heard is that voluminous sand-like radioactive waste from the uranium industry, called “raffinate” (leftovers from uranium refining), is also sold as fertilizer on the open market without any warnings about the radioactive content. The justification for this nefarious practice seems to be, that since “natural” phosphate from Florids is used to make fertilizer, and it is clearly radioactive (due to the radium-radon chain), and since raffinate from a uranium refinery is not much higher in radioactive content, then what the heck, we (the uranium industry) may as well turn this sow’s ear into a silk purse by selling the radioactive raffinate waste as fertilizer.
Extensive radioactive contamination – involving uranium raffinate – of the homes, schools, roadways, ravines, and the public beach in the town of Port Hope (prior to 1985) – has led to a $2.6 billion radioactive environmental cleanup of the town (by the federal government) resulting in over a million cubic metres (about a million tonnes) of radioactibve waste to be stored for 500 years in a gigantic earthen mound just north of the town. The subsequent fate of the still-radioactive waste will be decided at that time.
This practice of selling raddinate as fertilizer goes on all the time from the world’s largest uranium refinery owned by Cameco, situated at Blind River on the north shore of Georgian Bay. The Blind RIver plant turns uranium mill concentrates from Saskatchewan, Australia and South Africa, called “yellowcake” (mostly U3O8), into a product called “uranium trioxide” UO3. At that point the raffinate is the waste product, contaminated with radium. That’s what’s sold for fertilizer.
The trioxide then goes to Port Hope Ontario, where it is chemically converted into UO2 (uranium dioxide) for domestic use, about 15% of the total, and into UF6 (uranium hexafluoride or “hex”) for export to enrichment plants outside of Canada where the concentration of U-235 is increased to the level required by the customer.
At the enrichment plant, the “hex” is turned into a gas at a fairly low temperature so that the heavier U-238 atoms can be separated from the lighter U-235 atoms, resulting in an enriched uranium product that goes out the front door while the voluminous discarded U-238 (called depleted uranium or “DU”) goes out the back door.
For low enrichment in light water nuclear power plants, about 85% of the refined uranium is discarded as depleted uranium. The DU has important military uses, and a few civilian uses, but for the most part DU is part of the radioactive legacy of the nuclear age wth a half-life of 4.5 billion years.
Besides using DU in conventional bullets, shells, missiles, tanks, et cetera, used in the former Yugoslavia and in other conflicts, resulting in a battlefield litters with radioactive waste, the military also uses DU as “target rods” in plutonium production reactors to breed plutonium for nuclear warheads. In addition, the military uses DU metal in almost all nuclear warheads as a way of significantly multiplying the explosive power of the warhead by a sizable factor. These weapons are called “fission-fusion-fission” weapons,
The first fission is from a small ball of plutonium (usually with a tritium “spark-plug” inside) whose sole purpose is to ignite the fusion reaction by raising it to a temperature of about 100 million degrees. When fusion occurs, extremely energetic neutrons are goven off which fission the U-238 that has been used for that exact purpose in the construction of the warhead. That third stage, the fission of U-238, provides the bulk of the explosive power and the lion’s share of the radioactive fallout.
It is a sad story from beginning to end.
And, to add to this tale of woe, Canada currently has about 220 million tonnes of radioactive waste (tailings) stored at or near the surface from uranium milling (the operation that produces yellowcake) along with about 167 million tonnes of radioactive “waste rock”. Yet the Canadian authorities and others routinely and unabashedly declare that nuclear power is a “clean” source of energy and for the most part, Canadian academic scientists and sientific bodies say not a peep to the contrary.
What to do with Britain’s radioactive waste?

by Ian Fairlea, beyondnuclearinternational .
“………………………………………………………………………………… Radioactive nuclear waste is produced by all nuclear activities. For example, uranium mining produces a great deal of waste in the form of ore spoil like all mining. Since uranium is radioactive, so are its ore wastes. So also are all the processes of refining the ore, enriching the uranium, turning it into fuel for reactors, transportation, burning it in nuclear power stations, processing the used fuel, and its handling and storage. They all create more nuclear waste.
The reason is that everything that comes into contact with radioactive materials, including the containers in which they are stored or moved and even the buildings in which they are handled, become contaminated with radioactivity or are activated by radiation
All radioactive waste is dangerous to human life as exposure to it can cause leukaemia and other cancers. It is usually categorised as low, intermediate or high-level waste. As the radioactivity level increases, so does the danger. Extremely high levels of radioactivity can kill anyone coming into contact with it – or just getting too close to it – within a matter of days or weeks.
Radioactive materials slowly lose their radioactivity and so can become in theory safe to handle but in most cases this is a very slow process. Plutonium-239, for instance, has a half-life of over 24,000 years which means it will remain lethal for over 240,000 years. Other radio-isotopes remain radioactive for millions or even billions of years.
The safe, long-term storage of nuclear waste is a problem that is reaching crisis point for both the civil nuclear industry and for the military.
During the Cold War years of the 1950s and 1960s, the development of the British atomic bomb was seen as a matter of urgency. Dealing with the mess caused by the production, operating and even testing of nuclear weapons was something to be worried about later, if at all.
For example, the Ministry of Defence does not really have a proper solution for dealing with the highly radioactive hulls of decommissioned nuclear submarines, apart from storing them for many decades. As a result, 19 nuclear-powered retired submarines are still waiting to be dismantled, with more expected each year. Yet Britain goes on building these submarines.
This callous disregard for the future has spilled over to the nuclear power industry. For example, at Dounreay, in the north of Scotland, nuclear waste and scrap from the experimental reactor and reprocessing plants were simply tipped down a disused shaft for over 20 years. No proper records of what was dumped were kept and eventually, in 1977, an explosion showered the area with radioactive debris. In April 1998, it was finally announced that excavation and safe removal of the debris had cost £355 million.
The problems of long term, secure storage of nuclear waste are unsolved and growing more acute year by year. Earlier attempts by the nuclear industry to get rid of it by dumping it in the sea were stopped by environmental direct action, trades union protests and now by law.
All details concerning military nuclear waste are regarded as official secrets. However, large and growing quantities of radioactive waste exist at the Rosyth and Devonport dockyards and in particular at the Aldermaston and Burghfield Atomic Weapons Establishments.
One feature of Aldermaston and Sellafield in particular is that they are old sites, and have grown up in an unplanned, haphazard way. New buildings are fitted in between old, sometimes abandoned, buildings. Some areas and buildings are sealed off and polluted by radioactivity. Local streams, and in the case of Sellafield the sea shore, are polluted. The demolition of old radioactive buildings is a delicate, slow and dangerous process. In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the amount of nuclear waste can only be estimated.
Civil intermediate level solid waste is mainly stored at Sellafield awaiting a decision on a national storage facility.
Military intermediate level solid waste is stored where it is created: dockyards, AWE plants etc. Both civil and military high level solid waste is generally moved to Sellafield for temporary storage.
The major problems are with the long-term storage of intermediate and in particular high-level wastes. Since these are very dangerous and very long-lived, any storage facility has to be very secure (i.e. well-guarded) and safer over a longer period – some tens of thousands of years – than anything yet designed and built by humanity.
Because of this very long time scale, it can never be sealed up and forgotten. Containers corrode with time. There are earth movements. Water seeps through rocks. The waste will have to be stored in such a form that it cannot be stolen and misused and in such a way that it can be inspected and if necessary retrieved and moved.
Plans to dig a trial deep storage facility under the Sellafield site were thrown out in 1997. Geological evidence suggested that the local rock is too fissured and liable to be affected by water seepage.
This threw all the nuclear industry’s plans into confusion. Instead of having a storage site ready by 2010, the date has been put back more or less indefinitely. No alternative site has even been identified.
Apart from the technical, geological problems, few communities seek a huge, long-term nuclear waste storage site in their neighbourhood. Indeed the original choice of Sellafield was as much political as technical. With most local jobs depending on nuclear industry already, there would have been less local opposition than elsewhere.
Nuclear waste is a problem that the nuclear industry has failed to consider seriously for over sixty years but one that can no longer be put off for future generations to cope with.
The effects of any nuclear accidents, such as those at Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011, are also very long-lasting and will affect future generations. The problems of nuclear waste are nowhere near solution. The history of the nuclear industry does not inspire confidence………………………………………………………. https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2025/12/14/does-britain-really-need-nuclear-power/
Manufactured Narratives: A Century of Distortion and Dispossession in Palestine
9 December 2025 Andrew Klein, https://theaimn.net/manufactured-narratives-a-century-of-distortion-and-dispossession-in-palestine/
A recent report criticising Palestinian schoolbooks has revived a persistent narrative: that Palestinian culture inherently teaches hatred. This framing is not merely inaccurate; it is the latest tool in a century-long campaign to obscure a foundational truth – the establishment of Israel was predicated on the deliberate, violent dispossession of the Palestinian people, known as the Nakba (Catastrophe)¹. To understand the present conflict, one must confront the history of broken promises, calculated ethnic cleansing, and the sustained narrative warfare that has enabled ongoing oppression.
The Foundational Act: The Nakba and Systematic Dispossession
The Nakba (1947-1949) was not a tragic byproduct of war but a deliberate political project of demographic engineering. Following the UN partition plan granting 55% of Palestine to a Jewish state despite Jewish land ownership of only ~7%², Zionist militias executed a coordinated plan.
Mass Expulsion: Approximately 750,000 Palestinians – over half the indigenous population – were expelled from their homes or fled massacres³.
Destruction of Society: Over 500 Palestinian villages and urban neighbourhoods were systematically depopulated and often razed to prevent return⁴.
Massacres as Policy: Dozens of massacres terrorised the population into flight. Key examples include:
- Deir Yassin (April 1948): Over 110 Palestinians were killed by Irgun and Lehi militias⁵.
- Lydda (July 1948): Israeli forces killed an estimated 200 people and expelled 60,000-70,000 in a “death march”⁶.
- Tantura (May 1948): Dozens to hundreds of civilians were killed by the Alexandroni Brigade⁷.
Israeli historian Ilan Pappé terms this process “ethnic cleansing”⁸. By 1949, Israel controlled 78% of historic Palestine, creating a refugee population denied their legal right of return – a direct consequence of foundational violence that continues today³.
The Colonial Blueprint: Broken Promises and Zionist Ambition
The Nakba’s roots lie in colonial politics and political Zionism. As noted in the prompt, critical betrayals set the stage:
- The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence (1915-16): Britain promised Arab independence in exchange for revolt against the Ottomans – a promise later broken⁹.
- The Balfour Declaration (1917): In a colonial act, Britain promised “a national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine, dismissing the indigenous Arab majority as “existing non-Jewish communities”¹⁰.
- The British Mandate (1922-1948): Britain facilitated Zionist immigration and land acquisition, suppressing Arab resistance and fostering a “dual society” that marginalised Palestinians¹¹.
This period established the core dynamic: a colonial-backed settler movement facing indigenous resistance, falsely framed as a clash between two equal national movements.
Weaponising Narrative: From Greenhouses to Textbooks
Distorting history shapes perception and shifts blame. A prime example is the Gaza greenhouses narrative after Israel’s 2005 disengagement.
The propagated story was that Palestinians looted and destroyed valuable greenhouses left for them¹². The documented reality is different:
- Israeli settlers destroyed roughly half the greenhouses before departing¹³.
- The remaining greenhouses were purchased for $14 million by international donors for Palestinian use¹³.
- Palestinian entrepreneurs successfully revived the project, exporting produce by late 2005¹³.
- The project was then strangled by Israeli border closures. The critical Karni crossing was shut for months, preventing export and collapsing the enterprise¹³.
This lie – painting Palestinians as inherently self-destructive – serves to absolve Israel of responsibility for its siege’s economic devastation and to dehumanise Palestinians as incapable of peace¹².
This context is essential for the current textbook debate. While groups like IMPACT-se document concerning content, such analysis is often decontextualised¹⁴. It ignores the living curriculum of military occupation, home demolitions, and trauma that Palestinian children endure daily. Framing the teaching of historical resistance as “incitement” deflects from the occupation’s role as the primary teacher of resentment, misleadingly treating a symptom as the root cause¹⁴.
Gaza: The Continuation of the Nakba
The current assault on Gaza is widely seen as a continuation and intensification of the Nakba¹⁵.
- Scale of Destruction: With over 64,000 killed, widespread displacement, and systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, the assault aligns with acts prohibited under the Genocide Convention¹⁶.
- Evidence of Intent: Statements by Israeli officials dehumanising Palestinians and invoking genocidal biblical rhetoric have been cited by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as “plausible” evidence of genocidal intent¹⁷.
- Manufactured Consent: Media hesitancy to accurately describe the violence functions to sanitise the reality for international audiences. As Gaza-based journalist Rami Abou Jamous notes, the intent is clear: “They are not hiding it.”¹⁸
The propaganda that once blamed Palestinians for losing their land now blames them for their own societal destruction, all while displacement continues.
Conclusion: Confronting the Core to Break the Cycle
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a land conflict resolved through demographic engineering and sustained by narrative control. From “a land without a people” to blaming Palestinian curricula, the pattern is the denial of Palestinian sovereignty, identity, and victimhood.
Palestinian resistance to erasure is criminalised, and their history of trauma is reframed as incitement. Until the international community confronts the original and ongoing sin of the Nakba and advances a justice-based solution acknowledging Palestinian rights, this cycle will persist. The debate over textbooks is a distraction from the real-time erasure it seeks to obscure..
References…………………………………………………………………….
How Holtec International became an expanding (and controversial) nuclear power.

In Ukraine, Holtec’s principal state partner, Energoatom, has become the focus of a sweeping corruption inquiry
Holtec now controls the fate of multiple nuclear power plants across the United States………. even though Holtec had never operated a nuclear power plant.
One week after acquiring Palisades for decommissioning, Holtec submitted plans to the Energy Department for restarting the plant. Those plans only came to public light through a Freedom of Information Act request by the activist group Beyond Nuclear, published on its website in October 2023. In March 2024, Holtec secured a $1.52 billion US government loan guarantee and moved forward with an attempt to restart the nuclear reactor, despite expert assessments that the plant was no longer viable.
Following its start as a producer of nuclear waste storage canisters, Holtec International has built an empire around mothballed nuclear power plants and as-yet incomplete nuclear initiatives. The firm’s history of overpromising and underdelivery raises a question: Is this who we should trust with the future of nuclear energy?
Bulletin, By Matt Smith, November 20, 2025
On a 90-degree afternoon in July 2014, the governor, the mayor, and the local state senator gathered before 200 people at Camden, New Jersey’s Broadway Terminal along the Delaware River to celebrate an impending economic miracle. A planned technology center would bring pioneering nuclear technology and hundreds of new jobs to a dismal waterfront known for its unemployment and poverty.
State Sen. Donald Norcross, among those on a stage decorated with an eight-foot-tall banner bearing the red and black logo of Holtec International, said the company behind the deal was “a titan of energy.”
Holtec CEO Krishna Singh could locate his company’s nuclear technology center anywhere, not just in the United States but in the world, Norcross said, “And he chose Camden.”
The 47-acre campus would be used to develop a new kind of nuclear reactor that “cannot under any condition go out of control,” Singh said.
Now, the promised local miracle of economic progress seems, at most, incremental. There is no nuclear power plant assembly line as initially envisioned by Singh. His promised next-generation nuclear reactors remain conceptual a decade later, so far not progressing beyond the drawing board.
Singh made public pronouncements about providing a “path out of hereditary poverty” and a “pathway to the middle class” for Camden residents. The Camden facility would employ some 2,000 laborers and 1,000 professional staff in its first five years, the company said in promotional materials. But it ultimately hired far fewer locals than initially suggested.
In a statement in response to questions for this article, Holtec said that it has exceeded every obligation outlined in its contractual agreement with the state related to its Camden site. Also, the company noted that a court had rejected the state of New Jersey’s view that Holtec had fallen short of commitments, restoring funds that had been withheld based on claims of noncompliance.
New Jersey officials did, however, abandon a partnership with Holtec to build a job training center. Holtec said the state’s move “turned its back on the people of one of America’s poorest cities. The company has continued to invest in workforce development initiatives and to create meaningful opportunities for residents, advancing its mission to contribute to the city’s long-term economic revitalization.”
Documents filed in state and federal courts, records from regulatory agencies, and interviews with officials, activists, ex-employees, and industry analysts show that the Camden project was not a Holtec anomaly. Across its ventures, announcements of grand undertakings have been followed by under-delivery and controversy, as Holtec, a company primarily known for making concrete nuclear waste containers, succeeded in promoting itself as a high-tech leader in nuclear power generation and the decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
Since launching the Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus in Camden, Holtec has expanded aggressively into the decommissioning of shuttered nuclear power plants and a government-backed attempt to revive the largely dormant US nuclear energy sector. Holtec’s business strategy has relied in part on acquiring old nuclear plants and tapping into trust funds that plant operators had paid to the government for the eventual decommissioning of those plants. In some cases, Holtec has then reversed course and tried to restart aging reactors. Internationally, Holtec has positioned itself as spearheading US efforts to expand nuclear power generation in Ukraine and South Korea.
The stakes of that claim are higher now. In Ukraine, Holtec’s principal state partner, Energoatom, has become the focus of a sweeping corruption inquiry alleging years of inflated contracts, illicit payments and political interference in the very projects Holtec helped build at Chernobyl — prompting new scrutiny of the environment in which those projects took shape.
Although many of its projects are either unfinished or less than initially portrayed, Holtec now controls the fate of multiple nuclear power plants across the United States. The company that didn’t fully deliver on initial promises about a technology center in Camden (see sidebar) has been entrusted with billions of dollars from ratepayer-funded decommissioning trust funds, responsibility for some of the nation’s most hazardous nuclear sites, and permission to re-start a closed nuclear reactor—even though Holtec had never operated a nuclear power plant.
Now, Holtec plans to go public in a planned stock offering that Singh told Barron’s could value his company at $10 billion. Singh hopes to sell shares worth 20 percent of the company’s total value in a stock offering that aims to raise capital for an expansion of its oft-stated plans to build small modular reactors (SMRs), a next-generation technology that, for Holtec, remains in the design stage and has not yet been licensed.
The move to go public entrusts yet more financial and public faith in a company whose grand undertakings have often been followed by controversy and under-delivery.
Capitalizing on the failure of Yucca Mountain
………………………………………………………………………………….. Today, Singh oversees a company that has expanded far beyond building nuclear fuel storage casks. Holtec has won contracts to control nuclear plants and manage billions of dollars in federally mandated decommissioning trust funds. However, this aggressive expansion has been overshadowed by serious concerns: 24-year-old bribery allegations (see sidebar) and regulatory violations related to employee radiation exposure risk, quality control in spent fuel transportation and storage systems, and inadequate security. Activists, public officials, and nuclear experts question whether a company with no prior experience in building, operating, or maintaining nuclear power plants—one that has attracted sustained controversy—should be positioned to lead a significant part of America’s nuclear future
………………………………………………………………………….In 2018, Holtec formed a subsidiary called Holtec Decommissioning International and began acquiring shuttered nuclear plants outright. Rather than simply selling storage systems to utilities, Holtec would now buy entire reactor sites, take control of their decommissioning trust funds, and assume responsibility for dismantling the facilities and managing the radioactive waste stored there.
Each closed nuclear plant came with a substantial decommissioning trust fund—money collected from ratepayers over decades to pay for eventual cleanup.
Holtec claimed it could complete the decommissioning work much faster than utilities had planned, promising 10- to 12-year timelines instead of the 60 years allowed by regulators. Also, there was a glittering prospect: Holtec could potentially keep whatever remained in the trust funds after decommissioning was complete………………………………….
For former Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) chairman Gregory Jaczko and other observers skeptical of Holtec’s plans, one important question centers on whether Holtec has been set up in a way that will allow it to be held accountable should things go wrong.
Singh has set up his business via a web of subsidiaries spanning 17 countries across four continents. The company has created dozens of separate entities, from Holtec Orrvilon in Hong Kong to operations in Britain and Ukraine, plus numerous limited liability companies (LLCs) clustered in New Jersey, Delaware, and Florida. These are set up in complex structures, whereby entities often own each other in nested arrangements, with one LLC either a shareholder or a subsidiary of the other.
This structure is perhaps most clearly seen in Holtec’s nuclear decommissioning business. Each closed plant—the Palisades Nuclear Plant in Michigan, the Indian Point plant in New York, and the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Massachusetts—exists within its own special-purpose LLC. These subsidiaries control billions of dollars in decommissioning trust funds while maintaining limited legal liability, according to state attorneys general from Massachusetts and New York.
………………………………………Jaczko noted that there was no corporate entity positioned to provide a financial backstop if something went wrong.
………………………….“This structure is far less transparent and accountable than what we typically see for power plant ownership,” he said. “It appears that there is no corporate entity with sufficient resources to provide capital and cover operating expenses in the event of revenue losses, whether due to accidents or plant problems requiring extended shutdowns.”………………………………………………………….
A tangled tale: Holtec in Ukraine
…………………………………….. Anti-corruption officials in Ukraine in early November announced a $100 million corruption scandal that forced out the senior leadership of Energoatom, the principal state partner with Holtec at Chernobyl. The officials describe corruption and a lack of oversight at the agency—during periods that overlapped Holtec’s work. As of press time, allegations had not included Holtec itself.
……………………………Holtec’s promotional materials continue to present its Ukraine record as evidence of competence and reliability. Ukrainian authorities, meanwhile, continue collecting evidence to support allegations that agencies overseeing the U.S. company were compromised.
Publicly available information does not indicate that Holtec has been formally accused of wrongdoing in the Ukrainian corruption cases.
…………………….According to Holtec’s and the Ukrainian government’s project documents, the company served as the prime contractor for what is known as the Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Facility, or ISF-2, which is designed to hold spent fuel from undamaged reactors at Chernobyl, which had remained in operation until 2000. Holtec hired YUTEM-Engineering as its principal subcontractor. That is, Holtec had a direct, if unwitting, role in hiring and managing a key local company whose owner had financial ties to what official Ukrainian investigations said was a notorious corruption network.
Holtec’s Ukrainian venture began in the mid-2000s, when the country confronted a growing crisis over its nuclear waste. Each year, Ukraine paid Russia approximately $200 million to dispose of the spent fuel from its 15 reactors. American officials grew increasingly worried about this dependency, diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show. In leaked cables, those officials touted Holtec as a means to pry Ukraine from Russia’s nuclear embrace. The geopolitical urgency also had a practical side: Holtec might help secure waste in the still-hazardous Chernobyl Exclusion Zone.
Ukraine decided to make the depopulated land around the old plant into a general-purpose nuclear waste storage site serving both the old plant and its spent fuel, as well as spent fuel from power plants elsewhere in the country.
The most visually prominent of the three separate projects is a massive arch-shaped sarcophagus that contains the old, damaged portion of the Chernobyl complex. But there are two lesser-known facilities, and that’s where Holtec supplied management, technical know-how, and equipment. Holtec was the main contractor for what was called the Interim Storage Facility-2 for spent fuel from Chernobyl reactors. And it supplied equipment and engineering support for the Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility, built to store nuclear waste from elsewhere.
In its prime contractor role, Holtec was to hire, manage, and pay subcontractors doing on-the-ground civil engineering work, according to records from the Chernobyl management agency, Ukraine’s public spending audit agency (hyperlined document in Ukrainian), and other documents.
Holtec’s work was supported by international heavyweights: the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The company nonetheless found itself in the company of controversial figures.
Holtec’s main local partner for the ISF-2 project was the firm YUTEM-Engineering, whose owner had ties to Maksym Mykytas, the head of a construction empire. According to official records, Holtec hired, managed, and paid YUTEM on that project.
Anti-corruption agencies have accused Mykytas of masterminding multimillion-dollar collusion and bribery schemes related to, among other things, the repository for waste from outside Chernobyl. On that centralized fuel storage project, Holtec was not responsible for hiring or managing YUTEM, which became mired in bid-rigging and bribery scandals.
Evidence connects YUTEM to a wider alleged criminal enterprise that’s been the subject of multiple high-profile investigations of alleged embezzlement, fraud, bribery, and bid-rigging. The Bulletin traced these ties via multiple records, including Mykyta’s asset declaration from 2017, when he was a member of Ukraine’s parliament, showing he received money or equity worth approximately $75,000 in a transaction with YUTEM’s owner.
Mykytas was not just any politician. According to Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau, he was the alleged mastermind of a sprawling network of companies used to embezzle state funds.
……………………………..Eventually, investigations into Mykytas caused progress on the nationwide storage facility to stall, though all the sites at Chernobyl eventually passed testing and licensing phases. By then, Holtec and Ukrainian officials were announcing another ambitious nuclear effort: a commitment to build 20 small modular reactors across the war-torn country. The announcement came despite Holtec having no US-approved reactor design and no experience building or running nuclear plants, and despite Russia’s ongoing campaign of bombing energy infrastructure, once again pitting a grand vision against a complex and hazardous reality.
……………………………….In December, Energoatom, Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear company, announced it was discussing with Holtec the idea of building a factory for SMR components to make Ukraine a regional center for the production and export of nuclear technologies.
In January, Energoatom announced its officials had held a video conference with Singh to discuss ideas such as a new factory for producing parts for SMRs, a joint Energoatom-Holtec engineering and training center, and “implementation of SMR-300 technology in Ukraine,” according to an agency announcement.……………………………
Holtec’s unusual strategy in Michigan. And elsewhere.
…………………………………….. unlike some competitors who have made at least incremental progress toward deployment, Holtec’s SMR vision has remained mostly notional. It wasn’t until July, when Holtec obtained an operating license for Palisades, that the company had ever obtained regulatory approval to operate a reactor.
Holtec, in a statement, said its announced plans to install SMR reactors in Michigan five years from now show that it is ahead of its competitors.
At its Camden facility, Holtec has announced plans to install a simulator to mimic the reactor conditions of its SMR. The company describes the facility as an innovation center for SMR design, employing over 600 highly skilled workers and says it will be “where the US’s first SMRs will be constructed and shipped for commercial deployment in this decade.” But no reactor manufacturing has begun as the company awaits regulatory approvals for its designs.
Even so, these paper reactors have yielded concrete returns.
In September 2024, the US Department of Energy granted Holtec a $1.52 billion loan guarantee to restart the mothballed Palisades nuclear power plant in Michigan. The re-commissioning of Palisades is controversial in its own right, but Holtec has also woven its still-unproven SMR program into the Palisades narrative. Though the loan formally supports the restart of an existing unit at the plant, Holtec has presented the site as a dual project: a place to both reboot old infrastructure and a site for new SMRs, making Palisades “ground zero for America’s nuclear renaissance,” according to company marketing materials.
This renaissance story seems to be absent from federal records, however. The SMR-300 design does not yet have an NRC license application on file. Holtec suspended the SMR-160’s licensing process in 2023 and has begun only informal pre-application discussions for the new design, according to the NRC. The target date for filing formal applications from scratch is sometime in 2026, according to a Holtec presentation to the NRC.
The idea of SMRs continues to deliver. Singh now describes Palisades as the birthplace of a nuclear revival, promising to deploy Holtec’s SMR-300 design on the Michigan lakeshore by 2030……………
……………………………Although it lacks US certification for its SMR designs, Singh has pursued this SMR strategy internationally. In India, it envisions hundreds of reactors.
………………………………………How decommissioning became re-commissioning
Holtec bought the Palisades nuclear plant in 2018, gaining access to a $592 million fund set aside for decommissioning.
But Holtec’s stewardship of the Palisades plant soon took a swift course change. …………………………….
One week after acquiring Palisades for decommissioning, Holtec submitted plans to the Energy Department for restarting the plant. Those plans only came to public light through a Freedom of Information Act request by the activist group Beyond Nuclear, published on its website in October 2023. In March 2024, Holtec secured a $1.52 billion US government loan guarantee and moved forward with an attempt to restart the nuclear reactor, despite expert assessments that the plant was no longer viable.
…………………………………………….“They lied about what they were going to do at Palisades. They said they were taking over ownership to decommission the plant. Little did we know, they weren’t even intending to decommission,” said Kevin Kamps with Beyond Nuclear, an anti-nuclear advocacy group. “This was a trick to get their hands on the plant.”
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….The questions about Indian Point
……………………………………………………………………………………Community fears intensified in 2021 when Holtec announced plans to discharge radioactive wastewater from Indian Point into the Hudson River. State lawmakers swiftly passed legislation blocking such discharges. Holtec sued the state in April 2024, arguing the law unlawfully infringed on federal authority over nuclear safety. A federal judge ruled in favor of Holtec in September 2025, but New York is appealing the decision.
…………………………Holtec’s financial disclosures raise additional concerns. In meetings with state officials, company executives admitted that project delays or unexpected costs could undermine their business model…………………………………………………………….
Vision vs. reality
The story of Holtec often comes down to moments when soaring vision collides with terrestrial problems……………………………………..
……………………………………Holtec International capitalized on the federal government’s failure to create a national nuclear waste repository, creating a captive market for concrete casks now on-site at power plants across America. From this foundation, CEO Krishna Singh launched a more audacious expansion into decommissioning, acquiring shuttered nuclear plants outright. The company took control of billions in ratepayer-funded decommissioning trust funds, promising to clean up sites in a fraction of the time planned by utilities, with the glittering prospect of keeping any leftover money.
This aggressive growth, however, relies on financial and operational strategies that have drawn unflattering scrutiny. . Holtec structures its decommissioning projects through a web of special-purpose corporations (LLCs), which own the plants and control their trust funds, potentially leaving no backstop if a project encounters costly problems. Instead of legal guarantees, Singh has offered his word and his company’s reputation.
Now, Holtec is asking the public and investors for even greater faith as it plans a multibillion-dollar initial public stock offering. The capital raised is intended to fund another expansive promise. Yet, like the future of high-tech jobs once promised for Camden, these SMRs remain in the concept stage. The company has built an empire on mothballed plants and sidelined projects while selling a vision of a nuclear renaissance. Its history leaves a question for regulators and potential investors: Is this who the world should trust with a large portion of the future of nuclear energy?
Matt Smith is a freelance reporter with 30 years of experience covering business, the environment, and other topics. https://thebulletin.org/2025/11/how-holtec-international-became-an-expanding-and-controversial-nuclear-power/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Disasters%20in%20a%20post-truth%20world&utm_campaign=20251117%20Monday%20Newsletter%20%28Copy%29
Trump’s new radiation exposure limits could be ‘catastrophic’ for women and girls.

it has since been widely documented that women and young girls are significantly more vulnerable to radiation harm than men—in some cases by as much as a ten-fold difference………… Those most impacted by weaker exposure standards will be young girls under five years old
By Lesley M. M. Blume, Chloe Shrager | November 14, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/2025/11/trumps-new-radiation-exposure-limits-could-be-catastrophic-for-women-and-girls/
In a May executive order, aimed at ushering in what he described as an “American nuclear renaissance,” President Donald Trump declared moot the science underpinning decades-old radiation exposure standards set by the federal government. Executive Order 14300 directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct a “wholesale revision” of half-a-century of guidance and regulations. In doing so, it considers throwing out the foundational model used by the government to determine exposure limits, and investigates the possibility of loosening the standard on what is considered a “safe” level of radiation exposure for the general public. In a statement to the Bulletin, NRC spokesperson Scott Burnell confirmed that the NRC is reconsidering the standards long relied upon to guide exposure limits.
Now, some radiology and policy experts are sounding alarm bells, calling the directive a dangerous departure from a respected framework that has been followed and consistently reinforced by scientific review for generations. They warn that under some circumstances, the effects of the possible new limits could range from “undeniably homicidal” to “catastrophic” for those living close to nuclear operations and beyond.
“It’s an attack on the science and the policy behind radiation protection of people and the environment that has been in place for decades,” says radiologist Kimberly Applegate, a former chair of the radiological protection in medicine committee of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and a current council and scientific committee member of the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP)—two regulatory bodies that make radiation safety recommendations to the NRC. According to Applegate, current government sources have told her and other experts that the most conservative proposed change would raise the current limit on the amount of radiation that a member of the general public can be exposed to by five times. That would be a standard “far out of the international norms,” she says, and could significantly raise cancer rates among those living nearby. The NRC spokesperson did not respond to a question from the Bulletin about specific new exposure limits being considered.
Kathryn Higley, president of the NCRP, warns that a five-fold increase in radiation dose exposure would look like “potentially causing cancers in populations that you might not expect to see within a couple of decades.”
“There are many things that Executive Order does, but one thing that’s really important is that it reduces the amount of public input that will be allowed,” says Diane D’Arrigo, the Radioactive Waste Project Director at the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, a nonprofit group critical of the nuclear energy industry. In a statement to the Bulletin, the NRC said that once its standards reassessment process is completed, the NRC will publish its proposed rules in the Federal Register for public comment.* The NRC spokesperson did not respond to questions about when the proposed new standards would be made public and whether or how the general public would be further alerted to the changes.
Once the proposed policy change hits the Federal Register, the final decision will likely follow in a few days without advertising a period for public input, Applegate adds.
“I’m not sure I know why the loosening is needed,” says Peter Crane, who served as the NRC’s Counsel for Special Projects for nearly 25 years, starting in 1975. “I think it’s ideologically driven.” He points out that the probable loosening of the standards is set to coincide with increased pressure to greenlight new nuclear plants and could weaken emergency preparedness in case of leaks or other accidents: “I think it’s playing with fire.” (The NRC’s Office of Public Affairs did not respond to questions about the rationale for loosening the standards and the timing of the reconsideration.)
Possible shorter timelines for building nuclear power plants, coinciding with weakened radiation exposure standards, could spell disaster, warn other experts. It would be “undeniably homicidal” of the NRC to loosen current US exposure standards even slightly, adds Mary Olson, a biologist who has researched the effects of radiation for over 40 years and published a peer-reviewed study titled “Disproportionate impact of radiation and radiation regulation” in 2019. Olson cites NRC equations that found that the current exposure standards result in 3.5 fatal cancers per 1,000 people exposed for their lifetimes by living near a nuclear facility; a five-fold rate increase in allowable radiation exposure could therefore result in a little over 17.5 cancers per 1,000 people. Expressed another way, that means “one in 57 people getting fatal cancer from year in, year out exposure to an NRC facility,” she says.
The NRC’s Office of Public Affairs did not respond to questions about whether the NRC could guarantee the current level of safety for the general public or nuclear workers if adopting looser radiation exposure standards, and about whether new protections would be put into place.
Are women and children more vulnerable? According to Olson, increased radiation exposure could be even more “catastrophic” for women and children. Exposure standards have long been determined by studies on how radiation affects the “reference man,” defined by the ICRP as a white male “between 20-30 years of age, weighing around 70 kilograms [155 pounds].”
But Applegate, Olson, and other experts say that it has since been widely documented that women and young girls are significantly more vulnerable to radiation harm than men—in some cases by as much as a ten-fold difference, according to Olson’s 2019 study. Olson and Applegate cite another 2006 review assessing and summarizing 60 years of health data on the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings; the study showed that women are one-and-a-half to two times as likely to develop cancer from the same one-time radiation dose as men.
Young girls are seven times more at risk, they say. Those most impacted by weaker exposure standards will be young girls under five years old, Olson says. Her 2024 study of the A-bomb bomb survivor data for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, titled “Gender and Ionizing Radiation,” found that they face twice the risk as boys of the same age, and have four to five times the risk of developing cancer later in life than a woman exposed in adulthood.
“Protections of the public from environmental poisons and dangerous materials have to be focused on those who will be most harmed, not average harmed,” Olson says. “That’s where the protection should be.”
Infants are especially vulnerable to radiation harm, says Rebecca Smith-Bindman, a radiologist and epidemiologist who is the lead author of a just-released major study in the New England Journal of Medicine documenting the relationship between medical imaging (such as X-rays and CT scans) and cancer risk for children and adolescents; more than 3.7 million children born between 1996 and 2016 participated and have been tracked. Smith-Bindman contests the idea that women are overall more vulnerable to cancer than men, saying that “in general, maybe women are a little bit more sensitive, …[but] women and men have different susceptibilities to different cancer types,” with women being more vulnerable to lung and breast cancers, among other types. But it is “absolutely true that children are more susceptible,” she adds. With children under the age of one, “the risks are markedly elevated.” While these findings are sobering, she points out that with medical imaging, “there’s a trade-off…it helps you make diagnoses; it might save your life. It’s very different from nuclear power or other sources of radiation where there’s no benefit to the patient or the population. It’s just a harm.”
“We’ve known for decades that pregnancy is [also] more impacted” by radiation exposure, says Cindy Folkers, radiation and health hazard specialist at Beyond Nuclear, a nonprofit anti-nuclear power and weapons organization. “Radiation does its damage to cells, and so when you have a pregnancy, you have very few cells that will be developing into various parts of the human body: the skeleton, the organs, the brain,” and exposing those cells to radiation during pregnancy can impact the embryo’s health, she says. Smith-Bindman and her team are also studying the impact of radiation exposure on pregnancy, and while their results are not yet in, “we do know that exposures during pregnancy are harmful,” she says, “and that they result in elevated cancer risks in the offspring of those patients.”
For children, lifetime cancer risk will be increased not only because of the “sensitivity and vulnerability of developing tissues, but also partly [because] they would be living longer under a different radiation protection framework,” adds David Richardson, a UC Irvine professor who studies occupational safety hazards.
Several experts noted the irony that these changes are being mandated by the same administration that is also overseeing a policy of “Make America Healthy Again” (MAHA), an effort being spearheaded by Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy Jr. “In terms of general [public] knowledge, I think there has not been very large coverage or acceptance of the idea that radiation affects different people differently on the basis of both age and biological sex,” says Olson. “But we now have enough reviews, enough literature to say that the biological sex difference is there. I don’t think MAHA mothers know this because it’s been underreported, [and] they would be concerned if they knew it.”
The NRC’s Office of Public Affairs did not respond to questions about concerns being raised by radiologists and epidemiologists about possible health consequences—especially for children—as a result of increased radiation exposure.
Continue readingThe remnants of Chernobyl are still present in the Black Sea

Forty years have passed since Chernobyl, but Chernobyl-related radioactive contamination in the Black Sea has not ended. TENMAK’s research has revealed that the concentration of caesium-137 in the Black Sea is seven times higher than in the Mediterranean Sea.
BirGün Daily, Giriş: 07.11.2025 , https://www.birgun.net/haber/the-remnants-of-chernobyl-are-still-present-in-the-black-sea-667018
Nearly 40 years have passed since the Chernobyl disaster, considered one of the world’s three largest nuclear accidents, but the radioactive contamination caused by the accident continues to affect the Black Sea. At the IVth National Symposium on Monitoring and Assessment in the Seas, Dr Aysun Kılınçarslan, presenting on behalf of the Turkish Energy, Nuclear and Mining Research Institute (TENMAK), announced the results of monitoring studies on radioactive contamination in Turkey’s coastal waters and sediments.
Analyses conducted in coastal sediments between 2015 and 2023 detected high levels of caesium-137 and strontium-90. While an average of 21 becquerels of caesium-137 isotope per kilogram was observed in the Black Sea, this rate was recorded as only 3.2 becquerels in the Mediterranean Sea. Values that are relatively high in the Sea of Marmara decrease as one moves towards the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The highest value found in the analyses exceeds 82 becquerels. This figure is 10 times higher than the highest value observed in the Mediterranean Sea. When viewed on a regional basis, the highest caesium-137 value in sediments, 50 becquerels, was found in Hopa. Hopa is followed by Trabzon and Sinop.
HIGH FIGURES IN TRABZON AND HOPA
In measurements taken in coastal surface waters between 2014 and 2023, the caesium-137 concentration averaged 9 millibecquerels per litre in the Black Sea, while this figure dropped to 1.6 millibecquerels in the Mediterranean Sea. Rates in the Bosphorus, Marmara and Çanakkale ranged between 8.4 and 6.9 millibecquerels, while the amount of caesium-137 in the water decreased in the Aegean Sea, falling to 1.8 millibecquerels. The highest figures were found in Trabzon and Hopa, which have been affected by Chernobyl for years and where cancer rates have increased. Tekirdağ, Ordu, Karasu and İğneada stand out as other regions with high measurements. Although the study’s findings indicate that these levels do not pose a risk to human health or environmental pollution, the significant difference between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean clearly demonstrates the consequences of Chernobyl-related contamination.
CHERNOBYL FLOWS
Another noteworthy finding of the study was the detection of plutonium-239, which does not occur naturally and is produced by nuclear reactions, alongside caesium-137. While average values do not differ between seas, the locations most affected by this contamination include Erdek, the Bosphorus Strait, Hopa, and Sinop. Experts point out that the sources of contamination linked to these isotopes are nuclear power plant accidents, nuclear weapons tests, and operational nuclear reactors. Chernobyl is also cited as a source of contamination in the Black Sea. Radioactive pollution from the out-of-control melted reactor and the surrounding area reaches the Black Sea via groundwater and the Dnieper River.
MARINE ASSESSMENT IS NECESSARY
Prof. Dr. İnci Gökmen, who revealed high levels of radiation in tea after Chernobyl, points out that the radiation level detected at 21 becquerels per kilogram is quite high. Gökmen states that data collected from the seas and coasts also highlights the need to measure radiation levels in the soil, adding, “It is surprising to see plutonium in the seas, even at low levels. Strontium is not surprising. However, since strontium does not emit gamma radiation and must be measured by chemical separation, measurements were rarely taken despite the presence of strontium in the environment and food after Chernobyl. However, the strontium values immediately after the accident can be estimated from the current results. By looking at the caesium levels in coastal surface water in some areas, it would be good to calculate the doses that swimmers or those working at sea, such as fishermen, would receive. It would be appropriate to take measurements in fish, mussels and other seafood. Thirty-nine years have passed since Chernobyl. Caesium has only undergone one half-life. This means that radioactive elements will remain in the seas for a long time to come,” he said. WHAT IS CAESIUM (CS-137)?
The most common radioactive form of caesium is Cs-137. Caesium-137 is produced by nuclear reactions. External exposure to Cs-137 can cause burns, acute radiation sickness and even death. Exposure to large amounts of Cs-137 can result from the misuse of a powerful industrial Cs-137 source, a nuclear explosion, or a major nuclear accident. Under normal conditions, large amounts of Cs-137 are not found in the environment. Exposure to Cs-137 can increase the risk of cancer due to the presence of high-energy gamma radiation. Ingestion or inhalation of Cs-137 increases the risk of cancer by causing the radioactive material to spread to soft tissues, particularly muscle tissue. Vascular plants do not accumulate high levels of caesium through root uptake because caesium is strongly adsorbed to the soil. However, the accumulation of radioactive residues on flora with large surface areas, such as lichens or mosses, is significant. Animals that feed on these plants can consume large amounts of radiocaesium (and other radionuclides present in radioactive fallout). Human consumption of the meat of such animals leads to the uptake of these radionuclides into the body.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Çernobil’in izleri hâlâ Karadeniz’de, published in BirGün newspaper on November 7, 2025.
Who is paying for Britain’s nuclear revival?

Ultimately, the UK taxpayer is paying for both power stations……………..If Sizewell’s total costs rise above around £47 billion, private investors are not obliged to inject additional equity, leaving the taxpayer exposed to cost overruns.
15th October 2025 by Sol Woodroffe, https://www.if.org.uk/2025/10/15/who-is-paying-for-britains-nuclear-revival/
In this article, IF volunteer Sol Woodroffe, considers the intergenerational fairness of the government’s financing models for Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C.
Building a nuclear power station: an intergenerational decision
Building a nuclear reactor is very expensive. In fact, the financing costs are the most expensive part. According to the World Nuclear Association, capital costs for new nuclear power stations account for at least 60% of their Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE). The LCOE is the total cost to build and operate a power plant over its lifetime divided by the total electricity output dispatched from the plant over that period. This means that when we talk about the price of nuclear, we are really talking about the price of borrowing to cover the upfront costs.

Specifically, when determining whether a government should invest in nuclear power, the cost depends on how much the government values cheap electricity for future generations. The decision to build a nuclear power station is a truly intergenerational one. This graph from the World Nuclear Association highlights how different discount rates affect the value for money of nuclear energy compared with other energy sources:

This shows that the relative capital intensity of building a nuclear power station means that the more we discount future generations, the less worth it nuclear energy seems from today’s standpoint.
The discount rate the government chooses to use on public infrastructure projects is, to some extent, determined by interest rates. But it is also an ethical choice about how much the government cares about future generations. The lower the value placed on future generations, the higher the discount rate used, and so the more expensive nuclear energy seems.
On the face of it, the UK government’s decision to build two enormous nuclear reactors should be a source of optimism for young people. Nuclear energy is one of the safest and cleanest forms of energy. In many parts of the world, it is also one of the cheapest. Decarbonisation, energy security and industrial strategy are all part of the motivation for building these reactors. Many of the UK’s current reactors were built in the 70s and 80s and will retire by the early 2030s. Without new capacity, the UK will lose a major source of low carbon power. Arguably, it’s a sign of the UK government daring to invest for future generations. And yet, a closer look at the financing of the two reactors tells a different story…
What are Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C

Hinkley Point C is the first new UK nuclear station in a generation. It uses the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) design and, when complete, will be one of the largest nuclear power stations in Europe. According to EDF Energy, each of its two reactors will produce enough electricity to supply roughly 7% of the UK’s electricity demand. Construction was authorised by Theresa May’s government in September 2016. The original target was to have it running by 2025, but EDF now forecasts first power no earlier than 2029–2031.

Sizewell C is a close imitation of Hinkley planned for the Suffolk coast. The UK government approved the development in July 2022 and committed public equity financing in November 2022. Because the Hinkley supply chain and licensing work already existed, ministers argued that a second EPR project would reduce design and regulatory costs. Sizewell C will have enough capacity to power around six million homes when operating.
What went wrong and why?
Both projects are running well behind their initial projected timelines, and both have run worryingly over budget. These two things are interrelated. Long construction periods push up financing costs. Again, the cost of finance here is all-important. Over a long construction period, during which there are no revenue streams from the project, the interest on funds borrowed can compound into very significant amounts (World Nuclear Association, 2023).
HPC’s original cost estimate was about £18 billion but now is projected to a whopping £31–£35 billion. Moreover, our research on the “nuclear premium” estimated the additional cost of power from Hinkley Point C for its 35-year initial contract period, compared to onshore wind and solar power, would be £31.2 billion and £39.9 billion respectively. Sizewell C’s projected cost has ballooned from an initial estimate of around £20 billion to £38 billion (in 2025 pricing), nearly doubling the original figure.
The cause of these cost overruns is clear. EDF has complained that the UK lacks the building infrastructure and productive capacity for such a massive project. This kind of capacity is built up over time and requires beginning with smaller projects and then gradually scaling up. To some extent, the government has acknowledged this mistake and so began to invest in the small modular reactor programme in the UK, but from the perspective of the taxpayer, it all seems too little too late.
Who is paying for these power station?
Ultimately, the UK taxpayer is paying for both power stations. But from an intergenerational fairness perspective, the key questions are which taxpayers and when. The government has an option to borrow and shield the current taxpaying generation from footing the bill, but rising UK borrowing costs and increasingly jittery bond markets mean this would come at a serious cost.
Hinkley Point: paid for by Gen Z and Gen Alpha
The financing model for each power station is very different. For Hinkley point, the government has agreed on a Contract for Difference. This means that private companies must cover the upfront costs, with the knowledge that they receive a guaranteed price for their energy when the costs are finished.
EDF, the French national energy company, and CGN, the Chinese national energy company, shouldered much of the initial capital cost. In return, the government guarantees a price of £92.50/MWh (in 2012 £) for 35 years of output.
There were serious advantages to this model from a public financing perspective. The main advantage was that the investors took on the construction-cost risk: the UK taxpayer has arguably not been punished because Hinkley Point’s financial costs have so enormously overrun.
Nonetheless, this model ultimately kicks the financial burden down the road. Ultimately, today’s Gen-Z and Gen Alpha will be made to pay for this deal.
This is because the guaranteed price will likely be a rip-off. The average price of energy today in terms of 2012 pounds is £50–55/MWh. The falling price of clean energy alternatives means that we should expect the real price of energy to fall over the next few decades. Therefore, it seems highly likely that the fixed price will be a seriously uncompetitive rate for future UK consumers.
Sizewell C: a fairer distribution of costs
The financing of Sizewell distributes the financing costs more fairly between generations. To pay for the reactor, the government switched to a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model. This means that consumers begin contributing to the project’s financing through small charges on their energy bills while the plant is still under construction, rather than waiting until it generates electricity. The model provides investors with a regulated return during construction, reducing their exposure to financing risk.
The RAB model allows investors to share construction and operational risks with consumers, which in theory lowers the cost of capital. Since capital costs make up the majority of nuclear project expenses, this could make Sizewell C substantially cheaper overall, if delivered as planned.
The key drawback is that taxpayers and consumers shoulder significant risk. If total costs rise above around £47 billion, private investors are not obliged to inject additional equity, leaving the taxpayer exposed to cost overruns.
From an intergenerational fairness perspective, the financing model is somewhat fairer as it smooths the cost of construction between generations. Nonetheless, the future taxpayers are the ones most exposed to the risk of cost overruns.
The cost of decommissioning

Historically, the cost of decommissioning nuclear power stations has been gravely underestimated in the UK. Decommissioning costs will be faced by generations well into the future, and so whether the state considers them massively depends on the chosen discount rate. Ultimately, the more the government values future consumers, the more seriously they must take these massive costs.
Sizewell and Hinkley both have operating lives of 60 years. However, with Sizewell, future taxpayers are exposed to the risk of ballooning decommissioning costs, whereas with Hinkley the operator must fully cover these costs.
Think of the children
When these large public infrastructure projects are discussed, the focus is often on whether government has negotiated value for money for UK taxpayers. But if the government wants to claim nuclear is a forward-looking investment, it must prove future generations won’t be the ones footing the bill.
New Radiation Protection Standards in 2026?

Tony Webb – November 2025.
In May 2025 US President Donald Trump ordered the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to review US radiation protection standards for workers and the public. The order claims that these and other NRC regulatory processes hinder development of US nuclear power generation and need to be revised – in line with another set of his ‘alternative facts’ that overturn almost all the established principles that provide the basis of national and international protection standards.

This latest diktat will result in a significant weakening of current protection at a time when we have mounting scientific evidence that the existing standards need to be significantly improved/tightened. Permissible radiation exposures to workers will likely increase five-fold. Exposures to the public could be 100 times greater than currently permitted. Changes in the USA will lead to pressure for similar changes to standards in other countries, including Australia. Whether we end up with better or worse protection will require a sustained awareness and advocacy campaign. This will need to involve exposed workers, trade unions, environment and public health
interests arguing: first that our government and radiation protection agencies should reject the US approach, and second that new and improved national standards in line with the latest evidence should be adopted.

Health effects of radiation exposure
It has long been recognised that all radiation exposures present a risk to human health. Put simply there is no safe level of radiation – whether naturally occurring or artificially generated. Some we cannot avoid. Some like diagnostic medical x-rays we accept as having other countervailing benefits. High doses, like those received
by Japanese residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from nuclear bombs in 1945, or some of the first responders to the Ukrainian Chernobyl nuclear reactor meltdown in 1986, cause ‘radiation sickness’ where whole organs are damaged often with fatal
effects.
The results from high-dose exposures are what are known as ‘determinate’ effects.
Above a threshold dose these effects occur with severity determined by the dose. Radiation standards are set to keep exposures below the threshold, so these do not occur.
Lower doses cause a different kind of damage. Particularly concerning are increased rates of a wide range of cancers and genetic damage being passed on to future generations. These are referred to as ‘stochastic’ effects. The damage is not ‘determinate’ with a threshold below which they do not occur. Stochastic damage is a ‘hit and miss’ affair. You either get this type of health damage or you don’t. And if you do the scale of the damage isn’t related to the radiation dose you received.
The initial damage occurs at the cellular level where a radiation strike can have one of three outcomes. (i) It may simply pass through causing no damage. Alternatively, (ii) the radiation may kill the cell which isn’t a problem, unless too many cells are killed at once affecting functioning of whole organs. Our bodies are eliminating and replacing dead and dying cells all the time. Problems arise however when (iii) the cell is merely damaged and goes on to replicate in this damaged form.
Our bodies do have well developed repair mechanisms that often result in adequate repair of the damage. There is even some evidence suggesting that some such radiation damage and repair may assist the body’s capacity for repair in the future.
But where radiation leaves the damaged cell to survive and replicate uncontrollably in this damaged form the result is what we call a cancer – sometimes detectable only decades after the initial radiation damage. The process can be complicated further as growth of some cancers involves a two-stage process – initiation, where damage (from radiation or other environmental pollutants) leaves the cell susceptible,
followed by promotion (again from radiation or other sources) which drives the cell-cancer process forward.
Stochastic radiation damage is real. it doesn’t involve a threshold dose. Any exposure can be the one that causes the initial and/or subsequent damage leading to the health effects. We are in the world of ‘probability’ – far from certainty at the individual level but with fairly predictable outcomes at the population level which allow us to assess the risk (i.e., probability of an adverse outcome) individuals face from receiving small, sometimes repeated, doses of radiation.
Radiation protection principles.
In light of these established mechanisms for harm from radiation, standard setting bodies have long adopted three principles – that any exposure needs to be: (i) justified as necessary against some social benefits; (ii) kept as low as reasonably achievable (the ALARA principle); and (iii) kept below specified limits set in regulations.
The last of these has been the subject of much controversy over the years.
Standards have been set for workers’ occupational exposures and for public exposures. These, first, ensure exposures are below the threshold levels where deterministic effects might occur. Below these high levels, they have been set such that the risk of stochastic effects – particularly cancers and genetic damage are at levels deemed ‘acceptable’. There have been arguments over both what is ‘acceptable’ and how the probable level of risk from any given low dose is estimated.
Estimates of risk
A number of early studies of patients exposed as part of medical procedures indicated a problem with radiation exposure and some early estimates of the stochastic risk. Since then, the bulk of the data for the estimates of risk has come from studies of survivors of the Japanese nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. These Life Span Studies (LSS) have consistently shown
increases in cancer rates among survivors higher than those in the non-exposed population. There are a number of problems with this data – not least that survivors were not wearing film badges when the bombs went off, so all doses have had to be estimated later. They were also the ‘hardy’ survivors of wide-ranging traumatic
events, perhaps less vulnerable to damage from radiation Most of these survivors received relatively high doses as a single exposure or within a relatively short time period. More accurate measures of small exposures repeated over longer time periods to a general population, might be expected to yield different results.
However, these were the best data to be had. The risks at lower doses are estimated using the assumption that, if there is no safe level of exposure, no threshold below which stochastic effects do not occur, we can estimate lower dose risks on a straight line from these higher LSS doses. This Linear No Threshold (LNT) assumption, though adopted by all stands setting bodies, has at times been contested. Some have suggested a sub-linear relationship with a threshold for any effects. Others have made the case for a super-linear or marginally higher effect at lower doses where these are spread over longer time periods or result from radiative material that gets inside the body.
For now all the significant agencies agree that radiation protection for workers and the public should be based on LNT and the three radiation protection principles: justification, ALARA, and Specific Exposure Limits. These agencies include: the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) the US National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionising Radiation (known as the BEIR Committee) and national agencies like the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA). The cancer risk from low
dose radiation is estimated to be in the range of 4-6% per Sievert (1000 mSv) of exposure. The risk of genetic damage (first two generations only) is estimated to be around 1.5% per Sievert.
These estimates have resulted in national protection bodies setting standards that limit annual exposures. For workers the annual limit is 20 mSv as a target – but with 50 mSv allowed in any year provided the average over five years does not exceed 20 mSv. The annual limit for public exposures is 1 mSv. All of these are for
exposures in addition to what might be received from natural background radiation or exposures due to medical procedures such as diagnostic x-rays and nuclear medicine.
Change is coming – one way or another.
It is these protection principles and the exposure standards for workers and the public that the Presidential directive to the US NRC seeks to overturn. It calls on the NRC to reconsider reliance on LNT (and ALARA) as the basis for standard setting at low doses, where there is a need to protect against probable stochastic effects and
directs that instead the NRC set standards based on deterministic effects.
This will likely result in a significant weakening of the current standards at a time when the evidence strongly suggests that they are in need of further tightening. The current standards have been in place since 1991. Revisions at that time were the result of a sustained campaign throughout the 1980s led by trade unions in the UK, Europe, USA and Canada for reduction of the then 50 mSv occupational and 5 mSv public limits -justified in large part by emerging evidence from the Japanese lifespan studies. As previously noted, estimates of risk from these was based on one-off
short-term exposure to relatively high doses (at and above 100 mSv). Since then, studies in Europe and North America of workers exposed over years of work in nuclear industries to doses below the current occupational limits, indicate the risks are around 2 to 3 times greater than those used for setting the current standards.
They also show a doubling of expected rates of cardio-vascular diseases: strokes, arthro-sclerosis, and heart damage. In addition, studies of populations living close to nuclear facilities in Europe and the USA show childhood cancer rates significantly higher than expected. This evidence is cause for concern, suggesting that the
current standards provide inadequate protection and need to be tightened.
A new campaign for improved protection?
Past experience suggests that persuading national and international bodies to improve radiation protection standards is far from easy but not impossible. In the short term, a campaign would be seeking clear and unequivocal statements from national protection agencies that reject the US president’s directive that the NRC abandon the fundamental principles which have formed the basis for regulating worker and public exposures. If implemented Trump’s proposals would likely result in occupational exposure limits five times higher than presently allowed, and public exposure limits could be 100 times greater.
The campaign should seek assurances that there will be no change to the established principles underpinning radiation protection: that there is no safe level of radiation, that all exposures should be kept as low as can be reasonably achievable; and that occupational and public limits need to be based on the best scientific evidence of risk to human populations.
Raising the concern about, and seeking rejection of, the likely US NRC changes will require building an informed coalition of trade union, environment and public health interests. Occupational and public radiation exposures are more widespread that commonly appreciated. Workers are routinely exposed in mining, industry and medicine as well as those associated with the nuclear power industry. The. campaign could involve local initiatives that focus concerns of workers in , and people living close to sites of: proposed nuclear power plants; existing uranium, mineral sands, and hard rock mines; proposed ‘rare earth’ mines; medical and other
radioactive waste storage sites; and other activities that routinely release radiative materials.
Opposing Trump’s latest proposals to weaken standards is fairly straightforward. If implemented by the NRC they would dismantle the whole edifice on which radiation protection has been built over the past 80 years – a framework that many concerned about radiation protection within the affected industries have invested time and energy to establish and maintain.
Pressing the claim for improvements is harder but not impossible given the evidence for greater harm that is emerging. The case can already be made for at least halving the permissible occupational and public exposure limits. If we are successful in pressing for improved protection standards, the nuclear industry is unlikely to thank President Trump for opening this can of worms with his NRC directive. Once opened it will be hard to close without increasing worker and public awareness of how any, and all radiation exposures increase health risks to workers the public and to future generations.
Tony Webb has worked as a researcher, consultant and advisor on radiation and health issues to politicians, trade unions, environment and public health groups in the UK, Europe, USA , Canada and Australasia since the late1970s. He can be contacted for information on how to assist the latest evolving international campaign via tonyrwebb@gmail.com.
Generation IV Nuclear Reactor Designs

The Next Nuclear Renaissance?
CATO Institute, Steve Thomas, Fall 2025 • Regulation,
……………………………………………………………………………..Around the time of the previous nuclear renaissance, there was talk of the designs that would succeed Gen III+, so-called Gen IV designs. Gen III+ designs were seen as transitional technologies filling the gap until their long-term successors were developed. The Gen IV International Forum (GIF), an international intergovernmental organization funded by the governments of nearly all the nuclear-using countries, was set up in 2001 to promote development of these designs.
The GIF has stated, “The objectives set for Generation IV designs encompass enhanced fuel efficiency, minimized waste generation, economic competitiveness, and adherence to rigorous safety and proliferation resistance measures.” It identified six designs as the most promising, and these remain its focus. Some are designs that have been pursued since the 1950s and built as prototypes and demonstration plants but never offered as commercial designs. Among these are sodium-cooled fast reactors and high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs). Some, such as the lead-cooled fast reactor and the molten salt reactor, have been talked about for 50 or more years but never actually built. Others, such as the supercritical-water-cooled reactor and the gas-cooled fast reactor, do not appear to be under serious commercial development. When GIF was created, it expected some of the designs to be commercially available by 2025, but it now does not expect this to happen before 2050.
When the Gen IV initiative began, there was no expectation they would be small or modular. Gen IV designs are now sometimes known as Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs) in an apparent attempt to profit from the positive press that LWR SMRs are receiving. However, they are very different from LWRs, with different designs and safety requirements, so the claims made for LWR SMRs compared to the large LWR designs are not relevant to AMRs.
There is particular interest in HTGRs because of the hope that they can operate at high temperatures (above 800°C /1,500°F). This would allow a plant to also produce hydrogen more efficiently than conventional electrolysis, providing the plant an additional revenue stream. However, existing HTGRs have only operated at 750°C /1,380°F, much higher than the 375°C /700°F of PWRs but not ideal for producing hydrogen. Increasing the temperature to the levels GIF anticipated originally, 950°C–1,000°C/1,750°F–1,850°F, would require new, expensive materials and would raise significant safety issues. The British government is concentrating its efforts on HTGRs, but it has said, “It is not currently aware of any viable fully commercial proposals for HTGRs that could be deployed in time to make an impact on Net Zero by 2050.” Nevertheless, the UK is still subsidizing development of HTGRs.
Overall, there are high-profile promoters of these Gen IV designs. For example, Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates is investing in sodium-cooled fast reactors through his nuclear innovation firm Terrapower. However, given the 50+ year history of these efforts, it is hard to see why these new companies would succeed now. Few of the more prominent Gen IV designs are being developed by firms with any history of supplying nuclear reactors. At most, Gen IV designs are a long-term hope……………………………. https://www.cato.org/regulation/fall-2025/next-nuclear-renaissance
Generation IV Nuclear Reactor Designs

The Next Nuclear Renaissance?
The CATO Institute, Fall 2025 • Regulation………………………………………………………..Around the time of the previous nuclear renaissance, there was talk of the designs that would succeed Gen III+, so-called Gen IV designs. Gen III+ designs were seen as transitional technologies filling the gap until their long-term successors were developed. The Gen IV International Forum (GIF), an international intergovernmental organization funded by the governments of nearly all the nuclear-using countries, was set up in 2001 to promote development of these designs.
The GIF has stated, “The objectives set for Generation IV designs encompass enhanced fuel efficiency, minimized waste generation, economic competitiveness, and adherence to rigorous safety and proliferation resistance measures.” It identified six designs as the most promising, and these remain its focus. Some are designs that have been pursued since the 1950s and built as prototypes and demonstration plants but never offered as commercial designs. Among these are sodium-cooled fast reactors and high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs). Some, such as the lead-cooled fast reactor and the molten salt reactor, have been talked about for 50 or more years but never actually built. Others, such as the supercritical-water-cooled reactor and the gas-cooled fast reactor, do not appear to be under serious commercial development. When GIF was created, it expected some of the designs to be commercially available by 2025, but it now does not expect this to happen before 2050.
When the Gen IV initiative began, there was no expectation they would be small or modular. Gen IV designs are now sometimes known as Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs) in an apparent attempt to profit from the positive press that LWR SMRs are receiving. However, they are very different from LWRs, with different designs and safety requirements, so the claims made for LWR SMRs compared to the large LWR designs are not relevant to AMRs.
There is particular interest in HTGRs because of the hope that they can operate at high temperatures (above 800°C /1,500°F). This would allow a plant to also produce hydrogen more efficiently than conventional electrolysis, providing the plant an additional revenue stream. However, existing HTGRs have only operated at 750°C /1,380°F, much higher than the 375°C /700°F of PWRs but not ideal for producing hydrogen. Increasing the temperature to the levels GIF anticipated originally, 950°C–1,000°C/1,750°F–1,850°F, would require new, expensive materials and would raise significant safety issues. The British government is concentrating its efforts on HTGRs, but it has said, “It is not currently aware of any viable fully commercial proposals for HTGRs that could be deployed in time to make an impact on Net Zero by 2050.” Nevertheless, the UK is still subsidizing development of HTGRs.
Overall, there are high-profile promoters of these Gen IV designs. For example, Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates is investing in sodium-cooled fast reactors through his nuclear innovation firm Terrapower. However, given the 50+ year history of these efforts, it is hard to see why these new companies would succeed now. Few of the more prominent Gen IV designs are being developed by firms with any history of supplying nuclear reactors. At most, Gen IV designs are a long-term hope.
Large Reactors
If we exclude Russia and China (see below), three large reactor designs are currently available, at least in theory: the Westinghouse AP1000, Framatome (formerly known as Areva NP) EPR, and the South Korean KHNPC APR1400. These were all also available at the time of the previous nuclear renaissance, along with the GE–Hitachi ESBWR, but it won no orders and appears to no longer be marketed.
The only work in recent decades on a new design for a large reactor is for a modified version of the EPR, the EPR2. Despite this work starting in 2010, it had not entered detailed design phase as of the start of 2025, and the first reactor using this design is not expected online before about 2038. A new version, Monark, of the Canadian heavy water reactor CANDU has been publicized, but it seems to be at an early stage of development and the only interest in it appears to be from Canada.
The lack of new designs may reflect in part the very high cost of developing a nuclear reactor coupled with the uncertainty whether such research and development will lead to sufficient (if any) sales to recover those costs. For example, in 2023 NuScale stated that work developing its SMR design had cost $1.8 billion. In 2014, Westinghouse estimated it would have to sell 30–50 SMRs to get a return on its R&D investment. The GE–Hitachi ESBWR was carried through to detailed design and successfully completed the US NRC’s design evaluation, but commercial sales failed to materialize, and the vendor appears to no longer offer it. Another factor may be that vendors have exhausted their ideas for improving the economics of large reactors. During the previous renaissance, concepts such as passive safety, modularization, and use of production-line-made components were unable to solve the financial problems associated with large reactor designs (Thomas 2019).
Despite these setbacks, there is growing interest in Europe in large reactors, not just in the well-established markets of France and the UK, but also in countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Below is a more careful look at these units.
Westinghouse AP1000 / The AP1000 (Advanced Passive) 1,100MW PWR won eight orders, four for the United States (two for the Summer plant in South Carolina and two for Vogtle in Georgia) and four for China. The Summer orders were abandoned after four years’ construction, but the others have been completed. The most recent orders were placed in 2010, and all six completed reactors were late and over budget. The Vogtle project took 11 years and cost more than double the forecasted cost. Similarly, the four reactors in China each took about 10 years to complete.
The AP1000 has been chosen by Poland for its first nuclear orders, with construction supposed to begin in 2028 and first power slated for 2036. The design was excluded from the bidding process in the Czech Republic because it “did not meet the necessary conditions.” Westinghouse is competing to win orders in Sweden and the Netherlands, neither of which has made a design choice.
Framatome EPR / The French EPR design is in a sort of limbo at the moment. In 2010, Areva NP acknowledged that the EPR design needed significant modification because of construction problems faced at Olkiluoto 3 (Finland) and Flamanville 3 (France). A modified design has been under development since then, and for the last decade Framatome has claimed it will be ready to order in two or three years. The new EPR2 design has long been expected to be used for follow-on orders from Flamanville 3, leaving only the UK as a customer for the original EPR design, for Hinkley Point C (under construction since 2018) and Sizewell C (ordered this year). In 2021, the French government required EDF to build six EPR2s, one every 18 months, with the first one expected to begin construction in 2026 and be operational in 2035. This timeline cannot be met, and the earliest first power is likely is 2038. Given the record of EPR projects, export customers likely want to see an EPR2 built and in operation before they order one. That would mean the EPR2 design is not an option for new export orders before 2040.
Despite the obvious uncertainties and risks, EDF/Framatome offered a scaled-down version of the EPR2, the EPR1200, to the Czech Republic and Poland. In both cases, Framatome’s bids were unsuccessful. Ordering an EPR1200 ahead of completion of the first EPR2 would have been an extraordinary gamble given that the reactor is an untested, scaled-down version of an untested design.
KHNPC APR 1400 / Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power Company (KHNPC) is a subsidiary of the state-owned monopoly electric utility KEPCO. The design is derived from the American engineering firm Combustion Engineering’s System 80+ design that completed a full safety review by the US NRC in 1997 but has received no orders. Combustion Engineering was absorbed into Westinghouse, and KHNPC purchased a technology license for the design.
In South Korea, six reactors of this design have been completed, the first in 2016, with two under construction as of July 2025. All except one of the completed reactors took more than 10 years to build, and the two under construction are far behind schedule. South Korea’s only reactor export has been four units, all using this design and built in the United Arab Emirates. All four took nine years to build.
KHNPC has acknowledged the design that has been built in South Korea and the UAE lacks features that would be essential for it to be licensed in Europe. Besides, under a recent change to its licensing agreement with Westinghouse, KHNPC is prohibited from marketing the unit in EU countries other than the Czech Republic, and also prohibited in Britain, Ukraine, Japan, and North America. Nevertheless, KHNPC appears confident that a scaled-down version of the APR1400, the APR1000, will be ordered by the Czech Republic. As with the EPR1200, ordering this untested design would be a gamble.
Prospects for large reactors / While the large reactor options look dated and their record is poor, in Europe they appear to have better prospects for orders in the next few years than SMRs. All will depend on a national government risking large amounts of public money to make these projects happen. France and the UK seem determined to follow this path, but other countries, which do not have as much financial strength, may waver when they find the scale of the financial commitment needed……………………………. https://www.cato.org/regulation/fall-2025/next-nuclear-renaissance#
Dounreay waste particle ‘most radioactive’ find for three years

Steven McKenzie, Highlands and Islands reporter and Rachel Grant, BBC Scotland. 23 Oct 25
A fragment of waste found near the decommissioned experimental nuclear power facility in Dounreay in April was the most radioactive to be detected in the past three years, the Highland site’s operator has said.
The fragment, categorised as “significant”, was discovered during monitoring work around the nuclear power plant near Thurso. It is the latest in a long line of particle discoveries in the area.
Dounreay was built in the 1950s as the UK’s centre of fast reactor research, but during the 1960s and 1970s sand-sized particles of irradiated nuclear fuel got into the drainage system.
Work to clear the pollution began in the 1980s, after particles were found washed up on the nearby foreshore.
The facility closed in 1994. The multi-billion pound decommissioning process involves hundreds of workers and is expected to last into the 2070s.
The full decontamination of the site is expected to take more than 300 years.
A Dounreay spokesperson said: “Particles are a legacy of industrial practices dating back to the early 1960s and our commitment today to environmental protection includes their monitoring and removal from the marine environment and transparent reporting of our activities.”
A group of independent experts, who advise the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Sepa) and Dounreay, classify particles by the radioactivity of their caesium-137 content.
The categories are minor, relevant and significant.
Significant means a reading greater than one million becquerels of CS-137.
A becquerel is the standard unit of radioactivity.
The particle was found on the western part of Dounreay’s foreshore on 7 April. Eight other finds reported since then have been categorised as “minor” or “relevant”.
A significant-category particle was last discovered in March 2022.
Thousands of particles of different categories have been removed from beaches, foreshore and seabed at Dounreay.
The site’s operator said monitoring on the site on the north Caithness coast continued to be done on a fortnightly basis.
On occasions it said the scheduled work could be interrupted by bad weather or the presence of protected species of ground-nesting birds……………………………………………………..
What risk is there to the public?
According to official reports, risk to people on local beaches is very low.
Guidance issued by the UK government’s Nuclear Restoration Services says the most at-risk area is not accessible to the public.
The particles found along the coast vary in size and radioactivity with smaller and less active particles generally found on beaches used by the public.
Larger particles have only been found only on the foreshore at Dounreay, which is not used by the public.
The particles found on beaches are believed to come from the disintegration of larger fragments in the seabed near Dounreay. The area is continuously monitored for traces of radioactive materials.
Harvesting of seafood is prohibited within a 2km (1.2 mile) radius of a point near Dounreay. This is where the largest and most hazardous fragments have been detected.
Dounreay’s radioactive history
- 1954 – A remote site on the north coast of Scotland is chosen as the site of a new type of nuclear reactor. Modern homes were built in Caithness to attract workers to the sparsely populated area.
- 1957 – A chain reaction which provided sustained and controlled nuclear energy is achieved for the first time.
- 1959 – A new disposal site for radioactive waste called the Shaft opens. It drops 65.4m (214.5ft) below ground.
- 1962 – The fast reactor inside the dome is the first in the world to provide electricity to a national grid.
- 1977 – The original “golf ball” reactor is shut down and waste disposal in the Shaft ends after an explosion.
- 1994 – Dounreay nuclear power generating facility closes.
- 1998 – Decommissioning programme is announced.
- 2008 – Operation to scour the seabed for hazardous material begins and the Shaft shaft is encircled in a boot-shaped ring of grout to prevent contamination.
- 2020 – Clean-up begins of the highly contaminated Shaft – a three decades-long project.
- 2333 – Decontamination expected to be complete, making the 148-acre site available for other uses. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz91nx0lv59o
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