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Trump, or Violence as Diplomacy

By C.A.R. Turner / August 1, 2025, https://www.thepostil.com/trump-violence-as-diplomacy/

Violence is diplomacy—that is the essence of the Trumpian encounter with the world: do as I say, or else. Versions of this approach are easily noted in most of President Trump’s public pronouncements. The most recent iteration, in response to Trump’s bombing of Iran, was given by Vice President JD Vance at the Ohio Republican Party dinner in Lima, Ohio, on Tuesday, June 24, 2025. He later summarized it on X also.

Here is what he said: “What I call the Trump Doctrine is quite simple: Number one, you articulate a clear American interest and that’s, in this case, that Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon. Number two, you try to aggressively, diplomatically solve that problem. And number three, when you can’t solve it diplomatically, you use overwhelming military power to solve it and then you get the hell out of there before it ever becomes a protracted conflict.”

The contradictions from one through to three are obvious: how can there be a clarity of “American interest” when the policy is “Israel First?” America has long given up being clear about what it wants, since it wants so many different things which negate one another. It wants to be the hegemon, but also the beacon of “liberty.” Number two: suddenly “American interest” is now a “problem” that needs to “solved” by diplomacy, because other countries do not agree with the “American interest.” Was it not Zelinsky, sitting in the White House, who asked Vance, “What do you mean by diplomacy?” In other words, that “American interest” mentioned in Number one is actually an American demand.

And then we quickly move on to Number three—when America fails at diplomacy, it loves to drop bombs. Bombing, it would appear is the last resort of the scoundrel, to update a famous phrase. What is the point of doing any diplomacy when the people you are trying to diplomatize already know that you are going to bomb them in the end? Iran found that out pretty darned quick—for they thought they were actually involved in diplomacy with Washington when Trump suddenly decided to drop some bombs all over Iran, thinking that this would be persuasive. So, how quickly does Washington move from the diplomatic table to the cockpit of a B2 bomber? In other words, how do bombs become diplomacy?

Vance then throws in the caveat that “you get the hell out of there before it ever becomes a protracted conflict.” So, we are supposed to believe that bombing a country flat and flying back home magically avoids a “protracted conflict?” A recent example—how long has America been bombing Yemen—and what has it accomplished? America just bombed Iran—and what has that accomplished? And, is there any need to mention the fact that Trump, in his first five months of his second term, has carried out 529 airstrikes against Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Somalia, and bombed 240 locations in these places—it is not known yet how many total civilians he has killed in the process. And whatever happened to Number two in all these cases? How did Trump move past diplomacy and get right to Number three with Iraq, Somalia and Yemen?

In other words, the world is viewed through simplistic Trumpian narratives and bombed accordingly.

It would seem that Vance is trying to lend coherence to a “foreign policy” that is no more than Trump’s feelings. How such feelings, which are erratic at best, become a doctrine is beyond comprehension.

Despite claims of aggressively pursuing diplomacy, what everyone has witnessed is an utter lack of diplomacy—there are only threats; or worse, bomb first and then pretend to talk.

The “overwhelming military force” part has translated into significant civilian casualties, nearly matching the total from many years prior in specific conflicts such as Yemen. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have labeled some strikes as potential war crimes. This “bomb first, ask questions later” approach contrasts starkly with the so-called doctrine’s promise to avoid prolonged entanglements, raising ethical and legal questions.

Trump promised rapid resolutions to major conflicts like Ukraine and Gaza and a definitive end to Iran’s nuclear program but has largely failed to achieve any of these objectives. Instead, what the world sees again and again is an overestimation of his own personal influence upon world leaders, and an utter lack of comprehension of the complexity of diplomacy and the ensuing buildup of a deep resentment among nations. In other, there is hardly a doctrine, let alone clarity.

What is clear to see is that all of foreign policy is reduced to a some sort of a transaction, “a deal,” which is spun as prioritizing narrowly defined American interests and sovereignty. However, what ends up happening is confrontation, backed up by a lot of threats of sanctions, tariffs, or bombs.

Despite talk of restraint and rapid exits, Trump’s administration embraces a willingness to wage sustained aerial campaigns and intense military operations, sometimes lacking clarity on long-term goals. What is deployed therefore is intimidation tactics.

This so-called “doctrine” causes unease within political factions and the public who fear prolonged conflicts despite the promise of quick disengagement. It is a strategy that will fail to prevent entanglements, because the world is seen as “ripping American off” and therefore needs to be put in its place. This completely undermines real-world expectations of other nation-states.

In essence, while Vance’s presentation of the “Trump Doctrine” attempts to offer a clear and structured foreign policy, there is a wide gap between rhetoric and reality, made worse by diplomatic incompetence, problematic military consequences, and fundamental inconsistencies that collectively render this “doctrine” not only deeply flawed, but utterly reprehensible as any sort of a guiding principle.

Thus, in June 2025, in the so-called “12 Day War,” the Trump administration conducted airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear sites, aiming to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, consistent with the Trump Doctrine’s three-step approach (clear interests, aggressive diplomacy, military force, if necessary). However, the strikes were launched just two days after a supposed diplomatic ultimatum, raising suspicions that diplomacy was not genuinely exhausted beforehand.

Plus, the strikes risked escalating into a broader regional war and limited future diplomatic options because of Trump’s prior withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement, which Iran rightly saw as a betrayal. This undercut trust and prospects for peaceful resolution.

Although Vance and administration proponents called the strikes “wildly successful” with no American casualties, initial intelligence suggested damage to Iran’s program was limited. Moreover, Iran’s leadership remained cautious, avoiding direct war with the U.S. despite harsh rhetoric, complicating claims of decisive military resolution.

Humanitarian consequences and the risk of civilian casualties added ethical and legal criticisms, undermining the promise to exit before prolonged conflict.

Proponents of the Trump Doctrine also contrast it with the 2015 Obama nuclear deal, which they argue was lenient and compromised American moral clarity by allowing Iran’s nuclear enrichment program to continue.

The Trump Doctrine calls for denying Iran all paths to nuclear weapons through strength and clarity, but this maximalist stance (zero enrichment demanded) is unrealistic and purely ideological, offering no practical diplomatic off-ramp and increasing risk of sustained conflict.

The doctrine’s combination of maximum pressure without clear enforcement capability resulted in constrained U.S. options and increased involvement in the conflict, contradicting the promise of quick exits.

Then, there are the broader regional implications. The doctrine’s application in Yemen, with intense bombing campaigns against the Houthis, parallels its Iran approach, marked by high civilian casualties and unclear long-term strategic gains, raising concerns about ethical implications and strategic coherence.

Fear of prolonged entanglement in the Middle East and tensions within political factions about the feasibility of rapid withdrawal reveal internal contradictions within the doctrine.

Thus, what happened in Iran and Yemen entirely contradicts what Vance says. In other words, there is a chasm between what is done and what is said.

The rapid shift from diplomacy to military action fully undermines claims of aggressive diplomacy first.

Then, military strikes have yet to yield definitive success and have caused legal, ethical controversies and humanitarian catastrophes.

Overly maximalist demands and the lack of feasible diplomatic pathways constrain U.S. options and risk protracted conflicts.

Contradictions between partisan expectations of quick exits and the reality of prolonged military engagement create strategic incoherence.

Thus, the doctrine abandons traditional moral leadership and multilateral cooperation in favor of a deal that tries to find ways to “protect” America rather than build or lead alliances. This results in a posture of strategic disengagement and economic self-interest rather than any sort of global leadership.

In conflicts like Ukraine, the U.S. under Trump criticizes Russia but also avoids deep involvement, leaving resolution largely to the affected parties (e.g., Kyiv and Moscow). This causes concern among long-term defense partners about the reliability and clarity of American commitments, weakening traditional alliance cohesion.

Trump treats NATO more as a “protection racket,” demanding more financial contributions from allies and showing willingness to reduce U.S. support if unmet. European leaders, uncertain about the U.S. guarantee, are exploring independent defense measures, including shared nuclear capabilities. This unsettles longstanding alliance structures and undermines trust, and points to a West that engage in a new arms race.

The Trump administration has withdrawn from major international agreements (e.g., Paris Climate Accord, WHO), signaling skepticism toward multilateral institutions. This has led to diplomatic isolation and further strains relationships with traditional global partners.

The doctrine involves recalibrated signaling to allies based on geopolitical alignment and interests rather than comprehensive coalition-building, emphasizing sovereignty and economic independence sometimes at the expense of traditional alliance solidarity.

In effect, the Trump Doctrine as articulated essentially reshapes U.S. alliances by emphasizing American sovereignty and international relations as “dealmaking,” coupled with reluctance for enduring involvement, which collectively causes alliance uncertainty, strain on NATO and Western partnerships, and challenges to traditional multilateralism and global leadership that the U.S. once upheld.

So, when Trump repeats the slogan of making America “great,” what does he mean? Great economically, or great in leading the world? He does not know how to do both. On the one hand, he piles on tariffs on the world and threatens it, and on the other he wants the world to look up to America.

Vance’s “Trump Doctrine” is clear in one thing—the Trump administration has no clue how to reconcile what they say with what they do, because their actions and words are always contradictory.

August 3, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, USA | Leave a comment