Mini-Nukes, Big Bucks: The Interests Behind the SMR Push
The “billionaires’ nuclear club”
The 2015 Paris climate talks featured what cleantechnica.com called a “splashy press conference” by Bill Gates to announce the launch of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition (BEC) – a group of (originally) 28 high net-worth investors, aiming “to provide early-stage capital for technologies that offer promise in bringing affordable clean energy to billions.”
Though BEC no longer makes its membership public, the original coalition included such familiar names as Jeff Bezos (Amazon), Marc Benioff (Salesforce), Michael Bloomberg, Richard Branson, Jack Ma (Alibaba), David Rubenstein (Carlyle Group), Tom Steyer, George Soros, and Mark Zuckerberg. Many of those names (and others) can now be found on the “Board and Investors” page of Breakthrough Energy’s website.
Why Canada is now poised to pour billions of tax dollars into developing Small Modular Reactors as a “clean energy” climate solution
by Joyce Nelson, January 14, 2021, story. Mini-Nukes, Big Bucks: The Interests Behind the SMR Push | Watershed Sentinel
Back in 2018, the Watershed Sentinel ran an article warning that “unless Canadians speak out,” a huge amount of taxpayer dollars would be spent on small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs), which author D. S. Geary called “risky, retro, uncompetitive, expensive, and completely unnecessary.” Now here we are in 2021 with the Trudeau government and four provinces (Saskatchewan, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Alberta) poised to pour billions of dollars into SMRs as a supposed “clean energy” solution to climate change.
It’s remarkable that only five years ago, the National Energy Board predicted: “No new nuclear units are anticipated to be built in any province” by 2040.
So what happened?
The answer involves looking at some of the key influencers at work behind the scenes, lobbying for government funding for SMRs.
The Carney factor
When the first three provinces jumped on the SMR bandwagon in 2019 at an estimated price tag of $27 billion, the Green Party called the plan “absurd” – especially noting that SMRs don’t even exist yet as viable technologies but only as designs on paper.
According to the BBC (March 9, 2020), some of the biggest names in the nuclear industry gave up on SMRs for various reasons: Babcock & Wilcox in 2017, Transatomic Power in 2018, and Westinghouse (after a decade of work on its project) in 2014.
But in 2018, the private equity arm of Canada’s Brookfield Asset Management Inc. announced that it was buying Westinghouse’s global nuclear business (Westinghouse Electric Co.) for $4.6 billion.
“If Wall Street and the banks will not finance this, why should it be the role of the government to engage in venture capitalism of this kind?”
Two years later, in August 2020, Brookfield announced that Mark Carney, former Bank of England and Bank of Canada governor, would be joining the company as its vice-chair and head of ESG (environmental, social, and governance) and impact fund investing, while remaining as UN Special Envoy for Climate Action and Finance.
“We are not going to solve climate change without the private sector,” Carney told the press, calling the climate crisis “one of the greatest commercial opportunities of our time.” He considers Canada “an energy superpower,” with nuclear a key asset.
Carney is an informal advisor to PM Trudeau and to British PM Boris Johnson. In November, Johnson announced £525 million (CAD$909.6 million) for “large and small-scale nuclear plants.”
SNC-Lavalin
Scandal-ridden SNC-Lavalin is playing a major role in the push for SMRs. In her mid-December 2020 newsletter, Elizabeth May, the Parliamentary Leader of the Green Party, focused on SNC-Lavalin, reminding readers that in 2015, then-PM Stephen Harper sold the commercial reactor division of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) “to SNC-Lavalin for the sweetheart deal price of $15 million.”
May explained, “SNC-Lavalin formed a consortium called the Canadian National Energy Alliance (CNEA) to run some of the broken-apart bits of AECL. CNEA has been the big booster of what sounds like some sort of warm and cuddly version of nuclear energy – Small Modular Reactors. Do not be fooled. Not only do we not need new nuclear, not only does it have the same risks as previous nuclear reactors and creates long-lived nuclear wastes, it is more tied to the U.S. military-industrial complex than ever before. That’s because SNC-Lavalin’s partners in the CNEA are US companies Fluor and Jacobs,” who both have contracts with US Department of Energy nuclear-weapons facilities.”
But, states May, “Natural Resources Minister Seamus O’Regan has been sucked into the latest nuclear propaganda – that ‘there is no pathway to Net Zero [carbon emissions] without nuclear’.”
Terrestrial Energy
Then there’s Terrestrial Energy, which in mid-October 2020 received a $20 million grant for SMR development from NRCan’s O’Regan and Navdeep Bains (Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry). The announcement prompted more than 30 Canadian NGOs to call SMRs “dirty, dangerous, and distracting” from real, available solutions to climate change.
The Connecticut-based company has a subsidiary in Oakville, Ontario. Its advisory board includes Stephen Harper; Michael Binder, the former president and CEO of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; and (as of October) Dr. Ian Duncan, the former UK Minister of Climate Change in the Dept. of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS).
Perhaps more important, Terrestrial Energy’s advisory board includes Dr. Ernest Moniz, the former US Secretary of the Dept. of Energy (2013-2017) who provided more than $12 billion in loan guarantees to the nuclear industry. Moniz has been a key advisor to the Biden-Harris transition team, which has come out in favour of SMRs, calling them “game-changing technologies” at “half the construction cost of today’s reactors.”
In 2015, while the COP 21 Paris Climate Agreement was being finalized, Moniz told reporters that SMRs could lead to “better financing terms” than traditional nuclear plants because they would change the scale of capital at risk. For years, banks and financial institutions have been reluctant to invest in money-losing nuclear projects, so now the goal is to get governments to invest, especially in SMRs.
That has been the agenda of a powerful lobby group that has been working closely with NRCan for several years.
The “billionaires’ nuclear club”
The 2015 Paris climate talks featured what cleantechnica.com called a “splashy press conference” by Bill Gates to announce the launch of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition (BEC) – a group of (originally) 28 high net-worth investors, aiming “to provide early-stage capital for technologies that offer promise in bringing affordable clean energy to billions.”
Though BEC no longer makes its membership public, the original coalition included such familiar names as Jeff Bezos (Amazon), Marc Benioff (Salesforce), Michael Bloomberg, Richard Branson, Jack Ma (Alibaba), David Rubenstein (Carlyle Group), Tom Steyer, George Soros, and Mark Zuckerberg. Many of those names (and others) can now be found on the “Board and Investors” page of Breakthrough Energy’s website.
“As long as Bill Gates is wasting his own money or that of other billionaires, it is not so much of an issue. The problem is that he is lobbying hard for government investment.”
Writing in Counterpunch (Dec. 4, 2015) shortly after BEC’s launch, Linda Pentz Gunter noted that many of those 28 BEC billionaires (collectively worth some $350 billion at the time) are pro-nuclear and Gates himself “is already squandering part of his wealth on Terra Power LLC, a nuclear design and engineering company seeking an elusive, expensive and futile so-called Generation IV traveling wave reactor” for SMRs. (In 2016, Terra Power, based in Bellevue, Washington, received a $40 million grant from Ernest Moniz’s Department of Energy.)
According to cleantechnica.com, the Breakthrough Energy Coalition “does have a particular focus on nuclear energy.” Think of BEC as the billionaires’ nuclear club.
By 2017, BEC was launching Breakthrough Energy Ventures (BEV), a $1 billion fund to provide start-up capital to clean-tech companies in several countries.
Going after the public purse
Bill Gates was apparently very busy during the 2015 Paris climate talks. He also went on stage during the talks to announce a collaboration among 24 countries and the EU on something called Mission Innovation – an attempt to “accelerate global clean energy innovation” and “increase government support” for the technologies. Mission Innovation’s key private sector partners include the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, the World Economic Forum, the International Energy Agency, and the World Bank.
An employee at Natural Resources Canada, Amanda Wilson, was appointed as one of the 12 international members of the Mission Innovation Steering Committee.
In December 2017, Bill Gates announced that the Breakthrough Energy Coalition was partnering with Mission Innovation members Canada, UK, France, Mexico, and the European Commission in a “public-private collaboration” to “double public investment in clean energy innovation.”
Canada’s Minister of Natural Resources at the time, Jim Carr, said the partnership with BEC “will greatly benefit the environment and the economy. Working side by side with innovators like Bill Gates can only serve to enhance our purpose and inspire others.”
Dr. M.V. Ramana, an expert on nuclear energy and a professor at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at UBC, told me by email: “As long as Bill Gates is wasting his own money or that of other billionaires, it is not so much of an issue. The problem is that he is lobbying hard for government investment.”
Dr. Ramana explained that because SMRs only exist on paper, “the scale of investment needed to move these paper designs to a level of detail that would satisfy any reasonable nuclear safety regulator that the design is safe” would be in the billions of dollars. “I don’t see Gates and others being willing to invest anything of that scale. Instead, they invest a relatively small amount of money (compared to what they are worth financially) and then ask for government handouts for the vast majority of the investment that is needed.”
Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist at Beyond Nuclear, told me by email that the companies involved in SMRs “don’t care” if the technology is actually workable, “so long as they get paid more subsidies from the unsuspecting public. It’s not a question of it working, necessarily,” he noted.
Gordon Edwards, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, says governments “are being suckers. Because if Wall Street and the banks will not finance this, why should it be the role of the government to engage in venture capitalism of this kind?”
“Roadmap” to a NICE future
By 2018, NRCan was pouring money into a 10-month, pan-Canadian “conversation” about SMRs that brought together some 180 individuals from First Nations and northern communities, provincial and territorial governments, industry, utilities, and “stakeholders.” The resulting November 2018 report, A Call to Action: A Canadian Roadmap for Small Modular Reactors, enthusiastically noted that “Canada’s nuclear industry is poised to be a leader in an emerging global market estimated at $150 billion a year by 2040.”
At the same time, Bill Gates announced the launch of Breakthrough Energy Europe, a collaboration with the European Commission (one of BEC’s five Mission Innovation partners) in the amount of 100 million euros for clean-tech innovation.
Gates’ PR tactic is effective: provide a bit of capital to create an SMR “bandwagon,” with governments fearing their economies would be left behind unless they massively fund such innovations.
NRCan’s SMR Roadmap was just in time for Canada’s hosting of the Clean Energy Ministerial/Mission Innovation summit in Vancouver in May 2019 to “accelerate progress toward a clean energy future.” Canada invested $30 million in Breakthrough Energy Solutions Canada to fund start-up companies.
A particular focus of the CEM/MI summit was a CEM initiative called “Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy (NICE) Future,” with all participants receiving a book highlighting SMRs. As Tanya Glafanheim and M.V. Ramana warned in thetyee.ca (May 27, 2019) in advance of the summit, “Note to Ministers from 25 countries: Prepare to be dangerously greenwashed.”
Greenwash vs public backlash
While releasing the federal SMR Action Plan on December 18, O’Regan called it “the next great opportunity for Canada.”
Bizarrely, the Action Plan states that by developing SMRs, our governments would be “supporting reconciliation with Indigenous peoples” – but a Special Chiefs Assembly of the Assembly of First Nations passed a unanimous 2018 resolution demanding that “the Government of Canada cease funding and support” of SMRs. And in June 2019, the Anishinabek Chiefs-in-Assembly (representing 40 First Nations across Ontario) unanimously opposed “any effort to situate SMRs within our territory.”
Some 70 NGOs across Canada are opposed to SMRs, which are being pushed as a replacement for diesel in remote communities, for use in off-grid mining, tar-sands development, and heavy industry, and as exportable expertise in a global market.
Whether SMRs work or not, Mission Innovation members will be throwing tax-dollars at them like there is no tomorrow.
On December 7, the Hill Times published an open letter to the Treasury Board of Canada from more than 100 women leaders across Canada, stating: “We urge you to say ‘no’ to the nuclear industry that is asking for billions of dollars in taxpayer funds to subsidize a dangerous, highly-polluting and expensive technology that we don’t need. Instead, put more money into renewables, energy efficiency and energy conservation.”
No new money for SMRs was announced in the Action Plan, but in her Fall Economic Statement, Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland touted SMRs and noted that “targeted action by the government to mobilize private capital will better position Canadian firms to bring their technologies to market.” That suggests the Canada Infrastructure Bank will use its $35 billion for such projects.
It will take a Herculean effort from the public to defeat this NICE Future, but along with the Assembly of First Nations, three political parties – the NDP, the Bloc Quebecois, and the Green Party – have now come out against SMRs.
Award-winning author Joyce Nelson’s latest book, Bypassing Dystopia, is published by Watershed Sentinel Books. She can be reached via www.joycenelson.ca.
Ontario town starts voting today on willingness to host ‘forever’ nuclear waste storage site
$418 million in subsidies from Canada’s nuclear industry
“When you look at the money, I don’t think it’s really significant when you look at the scope of this project,“
Teeswater, north of London, and northern Ontario site being considered for massive facility
Andrew Lupton · CBC News · Posted: Oct 21, 2024
The small farming community of Teeswater, Ont., faces a massive decision. Starting today, its 6,000 residents will vote in a referendum on whether or not they’re willing to host Canada’s largest underground storage facility of spent nuclear fuel.
For Anja Vandervlies, who operates a 1,300-goat dairy farm nearby, it’s a monumental decision for her town in the municipality of South Bruce, and an easy choice for her.
“If we vote yes, we’re stuck with this nuclear waste in the ground forever,” said Vandervlies, a member of the opposition group Protecting Our Waterways – No Nuclear Waste. “This is the only time that we, as residents, are going to get a say in this whole process.”
A two-hour drive from London but less than 45 minutes from the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station on Lake Huron, Teeswater is one of two locations being considered to host Canada’s largest permanent underground storage facility for spent nuclear fuel.
Also under consideration is Ignace, a community of about 1,200, located 245 kilometres northwest of Thunder Bay. Voters there have already said they’re willing hosts; now it’s Teeswater’s turn to have its say.
Voting will be conducted online and by phone over seven days. To be binding, a yes vote of 50 per cent plus one is required. If Teeswater votes yes, the board of the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) will make a final decision between Teeswater and Ignace, likely before the end of this year.
Once the site is decided, the $26-billion storage facility would be built in stages, with plans to begin accepting waste in the 2040s and continue storing it away underground for the next 175 years.
The process also requires consultation from First Nations groups in both communities. Neither has officially made a decision. The Wabigoon Lake Ojibway First Nation will vote in November. Opposition from Indigenous groups to the northern Ontario site is growing.
Wherever it’s located, the facility, which the NWMO calls a “deep geological repository” that would be located 600 metres underground, will take spent nuclear fuel from Canadian Candu reactors located as far away as Winnipeg.
Running counter to the safety concerns is the significant windfall awaiting whichever of the two communities winds up hosting the storage facility.
The host town would not only benefit from high-paying jobs, but also $418 million in subsidies from Canada’s nuclear industry over the the course of the project.
South Bruce Coun. Ron Schnurr didn’t want to say how he’s voting, opting instead to give the community its say this week.
However, he said the money would be a massive boost to a rural community with big infrastructure needs and a small tax base to pay for them. ……………………….
To Vandervlies and others in the group opposing the facility, the risk far outweighs the potential reward of hosting the site.
“When you look at the money, I don’t think it’s really significant when you look at the scope of this project,” she said.
The question
Voters will decide yes or no to the following question:
- Are you in favour of the Municipality of South Bruce declaring South Bruce to be a willing host for the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s proposed Deep Geological Repository (DGR)?
Information about how to vote, how to get on the voters list and where to find a voter assistance centre is posted here. Voting closes on Oct. 28 at 8 p.m. ET.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/teeswater-nuclear-waste-storage-site-vote-1.7356267
Video. Gordon Edwards on Nuclear Fuel Waste Abandonment (South Bruce)
Canada’s nuclear waste producers want to bury and eventually abandon all of their high-level radioactive waste (used nuclear fuel) in a Deep Geological Repository (DGR). For this purpose they need to find a “willing host community” that will accept the waste. Accordingly, in 2005 the waste producers created a Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) that has given many millions of dollars to a small number of “candidate communities” over the last 14 years, in addition to meeting on a monthly basis with the members of a Citizens’ Liaison Committee (CLC) chosen for each candidate community, in a program called “Learn More”.
The idea is that each community would learn about how safe the management, transport, packaging and burial of this intensely radioactive material will be, so that they are “fully informed” about the proposed project. Now NWMO has narrowed down the original list of 22 candidate communities to just two: one near Revell Lake north of Lake Superior, between the Ontario towns of Ignace and Dryden, and the other near Teeswater, South Bruce, a small farming community a few kilometres west of Lake Huron.
Unfortunately, NWMO withheld information about the individual radioactive constituents of used nuclear fuel (like radioactive iodine, radioactive caesium, radioactive strontium, and plutonium) and the biomedical dangers they pose. NWMO also erroneously affirmed that the used fuel pellets are solid ceramics that can not leak, which is untrue. Until recently, NWMO neglected to tell the communities that the used fuel will have to be “repackaged” before burial, an elaborate and potentially dangerous operation. In addition NWMO withheld information about the specific risks associated with “reprocessing” – the option of extraction of plutonium from the used fuel before burial, which requires the destruction of the nuclear fuel matrix, thereby releasing a very large quantity of radioactive solids, vapours and gases that are difficult to contain.
The Ignace town council has already signed an agreement with NWMO to proceed, and we are awaiting the decision of Wabigoon Lake First Nation – one of the closest indigenous communities to the Revell Lake site. The citizens of South Bruce will be voting in a referendum near the end of October whether or not to give their approval, after which the nearby Saugeen Ojibway First Nation will render its decision whether or not to support the project. In both cases, the decision of the indigenous peoples will be of great importance. Canada has accepted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as a fundamental component of federal decision-making. UNDRIP asserts that no toxic waste shall be stored or disposed of o indigenous lands without the Free, Prior, Informed Consent of those indigenous rights-holders.
Canada’s nuclear watchdog green-lights operation of aging Pickering reactors to 2026
Pressure tubes, which are six-metre-long rods that contain fuel bundles of uranium, are regarded as the major life-limiting component in CANDUs. They deteriorate as they age, gradually increasing their propensity to fracture, an event which could lead to a serious accident.
Matthew McClearn, October 11, 2024 https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadas-nuclear-watchdog-green-lights-operation-of-aging-pickering/
Canada’s nuclear safety regulator again extended a crucial permit for the country’s oldest nuclear power plant on Friday, allowing it to continue operating beyond its original design life.
On Friday the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission authorized its owner, Ontario Power Generation, to operate the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station for an additional two years, to Dec. 31, 2026. The extended permit applies only to its newest four reactors, Units 5 through 8, which are collectively known as Pickering B. Those reactors entered service between 1983 and 1986.
The licence extension was granted by commissioners Timothy Berube, Marcel Lacroix and Andrea Hardie, who decided OPG would make adequate provisions for protecting the environment and public safety.
Canada’s homegrown reactor, the CANDU, was originally assigned a design life of 30 years, which had been incorporated into CNSC licensing requirements. If followed, they would have dictated that all four reactors shut down for major overhauls or decommissioning years ago. The CNSC, though, amended those rules and extended the station’s licence three times, while imposing more thorough inspection requirements on key components. The Pickering B reactors are now around 40 years old.
Pickering Station, located roughly 30 kilometres northeast of downtown Toronto, employs about 3,000 people and until recently supplied about 11 per cent of Ontario’s electricity. Nuclear power plants play a crucial role in the province’s grid, but their output has declined: Pickering Unit 1 shut down permanently last month, and Unit 4 is scheduled to follow in December. (The other two Pickering A units were idled permanently decades ago.)
OPG said Pickering B’s continued operation is needed because reactors at other stations are offline for overhauls.
Pressure tubes, which are six-metre-long rods that contain fuel bundles of uranium, are regarded as the major life-limiting component in CANDUs. They deteriorate as they age, gradually increasing their propensity to fracture, an event which could lead to a serious accident. Pressure tubes and related components are collectively known as fuel channels.
The main cause of that deterioration is called deuterium ingress, which is measured in parts per million (ppm) of hydrogen equivalent concentration. Previously, Pickering’s licence contained a condition that effectively capped hydrogen concentrations at 120 parts per million.
But in recent years a small number of pressure tubes in Canada have been found to have greatly exceeded that limit. The CNSC removed the 120 ppm limit from Pickering Station’s licence on Friday, and introduced a new requirement that OPG “implement and maintain an enhanced fitness for service program” for its fuel channels.
Familiar patterns of support and opposition emerged during public hearings held by the CNSC in June, with host municipalities emphasizing the plant’s economic importance. A deluge of submissions from nuclear industry contractors, lobbyists and unions also supported the plant’s continued operation, including the Society of United Professionals and the Canadian Nuclear Association.
The CANDU Operators Group, which represents utilities that use those reactors, wrote in a statement that experimental work had confirmed that the station’s fuel channels could operate safely until 2026, and that OPG “will continue with its exemplary safety record in every aspect of its operations.”
Environmental activists such as the Canadian Environmental Law Association recommended the CNSC reject the permit, partly owing to risks associated with the plant’s aging equipment.
“Old nuclear plants are particularly susceptible to accidents,” it wrote in its submission, adding that the dangers of allowing the plant to continue operating are “high and increasing.”
Sunil Nijhawan, a nuclear safety consultant and frequent intervenor before the CNSC, said that OPG’s own estimates showed “that the degradation of fuel channels is widespread; a number of component and system failure mechanisms are fast converging to put the reactor into unsafe operation territory.”
Several First Nations asserted that the plant’s continued operations required their consent, and some also raised concerns about aging pressure tubes. The Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation declared in a written statement that it was “not comfortable with the risk management methods being employed by the CNSC and OPG.”
The CNSC found that the licence extension “does not present any novel adverse impact on any potential or established Aboriginal claim or right.”
A second life is planned for the Pickering B reactors following the planned 2026 shutdown: In January, the Ontario government authorized OPG to begin a refurbishment that would return them to service in the mid-2030s.
Canada’s false ‘solution’ for used nuclear fuel waste
Potentially trucking waste to a deep geological repository could be a recipe for disaster.
BY WILLIAM LEISS | October 7, 2024, William Leiss is an author, and emeritus professor at Queen’s University
The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) is a curious hybrid body created out of whole cloth by the federal government in its 2002 Nuclear Fuel Waste Act to find a permanent solution for that waste. Governments tried and failed to find that solution for the previous quarter-century. Now, NWMO is weeks away from identifying the “final resting place” in a deep geological repository (DGR) in Ontario, either far into the province’s northwest at Ignace near Dryden/Wabigoon Lake First Nation, or South Bruce close to Lake Huron near Teeswater and the Bruce Peninsula. One of two small municipalities and one of two groups of treaty-rights holding First Nations will need to agree, but millions of Canadians potentially affected won’t get a say.
Last month, The Globe and Mail described the organization’s DGR solution: “For 40 or so years … big trucks carrying specially designed waste containers would trundle from the reactor sites to the DGR facility, where the fuel canisters would be lowered.”
More than 90 per cent of that waste is currently at the Pickering, Darlington, and Bruce nuclear generating stations. The rest is at far-off Point Lepreau, N.B., and in Quebec, Manitoba, and Ottawa. If NWMO chooses the Ignace site and an all-road transportation method, it estimates that those trucks will travel 84 million kilometres on Canadian roads.
Each truckload will hold exactly 192 used fuel bundles, packed into a special steel container weighing 35 tonnes. The current array of operating reactors will ultimately produce a total of six million bundles. But that figure doesn’t include the announced “Bruce C” development of new reactors, or other new ones yet to be unveiled, adding at least two million more bundles. Eight million bundles will require 40,000 truckloads over at least a 40-year period.
And there will be a further 20,000 dry-cask containers in which those bundles had previously been stored which will also require transportation to a DGR. Empty, they each weigh 60 tonnes and will be radioactive. They will need to be cut in half due to their weight, adding up to another 40,000 truckloads. If they go to a DGR in Ignace, that will add another 84 million kilometres of truck travel on Canadian roads. (The NWMO has not done this estimate.)
Is everybody OK with all this? Are most Canadians even aware of these scenarios? The NWMO says that the containers on the trucks will survive any imaginable road accident, and no radioactivity will escape. But trucks travelling 168 million kilometres are—quite obviously—going to be involved in a fair number of road accidents, some serious, across those four or more decades. In those cases, folks likely will be told, “Don’t worry, it may look awful, but you and your kids won’t be irradiated.”
The two small communities designated as potential “hosts” for the DGR do not, apparently, care too much about the transportation issue. However, others are starting to become alarmed, especially in and around the city of Thunder Bay, which is on the road route for those 80,000 trucks if the DGR is sited in Ignace. If the choice is South Bruce, well, who knows? The NWMO has not published any kind of transportation plan for that choice. Just looking at a map, however, a lot of those trucks will have to go through or near the already grid-locked GTA.
And what about the First Nations? Here’s where things get interesting. The designated First Nation treaty rights holders for the Ignace site are the 28 First Nation communities of Grand Council Treaty 3, the governing body of the Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty 3, which maintains rights to all lands and water in the territory. Development in the Treaty 3 territory requires the consent, agreement, and participation of the Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty 3. To date, that consent hasn’t been granted.
The designated First Nation treaty rights holder for the South Bruce site is Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON): the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation–Neyaashiinigmiing Anishinaabek, and the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation. CBC News recently quoted Greg Nadjiwon, one of SON’s two chiefs, that “if you think about how many [other] treaty territories that waste would have to go through, I don’t think it will happen.” The CBC then paraphrased the chief: “Nadjiwon says even if Ignace and nearby Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation say yes to the proposed nuclear dump, he doubts the spent nuclear fuel from the Bruce station, which is currently in temporary storage, would ever leave his nation’s traditional territory.” Mere weeks from a site selection announcement, there clearly isn’t agreement.
NWMO’s approach isn’t going to work. Canadians do not have an acceptable solution to the problem of long-term storage or disposal of used nuclear fuel. It’s past time to consider some alternative options.
Fulsome bribery to communities – from Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO)
Frank Greening, 7 Oct 24
Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) is using offers of money – and I’m talking about a lot of money in the millions of dollars range – to “persuade” local individuals or groups to vote in favor of constructing a DGR on their land. For example, consider the announcement by the township of Ignace after it agreed to allow NWMO to construct a used fuel DGR on its land:
There are of course many benefits to hosting the DGR in the area and these benefits will exceed the $170 Million monitory value of this agreement plus the cost of the Centre of Expertise, and thousands of dollars in housing, infrastructure, and capacity building studies to build the Township over the course of many years.
As we all know, NWMO is fond of saying that it will only proceed with the construction of a DGR at a particular location if there is a “willing host”. Now the dictionary definition of “willing” implies a readiness and eagerness to accede to or anticipate the wishes of another person or group. However, I’m sure if you asked the people of Ignace if they were ready and eager to host a DGR in their town, without any compensation or inducement, the answer would be a resounding NO! However, throw $170 million into the pot and everything changes! So, it’s obvious that the notion of “willingness” really means “a willingness to be bribed”.
Now some might argue that my use of the word bribe is too strong – dare I say offensive – but consider the dictionary definition of bribe: To give someone money or something else of value, to persuade that person to do something you want. In this case “you” means the NWMO, and what NWMO “wants” is a township’s approval of a DGR. I would argue, however, that the true meaning of willingness is acceptance without inducement!
I believe that NWMO know full well that, as the saying goes, “money talks”, and NWMO appears to have plenty of money to talk unwilling hosts into becoming willing hosts. In this regard, consider the opinion of a certain James Kimberly as expressed in his letter to the Fort Francis Times, dated December 6th, 2023:
The NWMOs proposed budget for 2023 is $162 million dollars. Projections to 2026 increase their budget to $299.8 million dollars increasing on average $40 million dollars per year. Their budget is broken into eight categories; engineering, site assessment, safety, regulatory decisions, engagement, transportation, communications, staffing and administration. All of the money the NWMO spends in their budget is derived from the public – people who pay the electricity bills. The interesting thing about their budget projection is the amount of money dedicated to the different activities.
Second to staffing and administration the next major expenditure is what they call “engagement”. There are no specific details on what “engagement” entails but I think one could safely state it is getting the public on side for their proposed dump. The engagement portion of their budget in 2023 is $47.8 million rising to $81.9 million by 2026. Other parts of their budget such as engineering, site assessment and safety come in at much lower costs literally a fraction of the staffing and engagement dollars.
According to NWMO’s projections over the next five years they will spend $359.3 million dollars of public money in trying to convince people their plan will work and that is just a part of their bottomless pit of money…..
So, I’m sure we can continue to present endless technical arguments against NWMOs plans to build a DGR, and I believe we are doing the right thing because we have the moral high-ground, but how can such arguments compete with NWMO’s bottomless pit of money?
and ……. it looks like Ignace is being short-changed!
Check out the South Bruce Hosting Agreement:
South Bruce stands to receive a stunning $418 million if it signs NWMO’s Hosting Agreement, (tabled in May of this year), and due to be voted on October 28th.
I would say, to quote a famous Mafia line, NWMO is making an offer South Bruce residents can’t refuse…
Construction of Ontario nuclear reactor should move forward despite incomplete design, ! regulator says
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-though-its-design-is-incomplete-nuclear-safety-regulator-says-the/ Matthew McClearn, 4 Oct 24
Canada’s nuclear safety regulator has recommended that the country’s first new power reactor in decades should receive the go-ahead to begin construction, even though its design is not yet complete.
At a hearing Wednesday, staff from Ontario Power Generation argued that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission should grant a licence to construct a 327-megawatt nuclear reactor known as the BWRX-300 at OPG’s Darlington Nuclear Generating Station in Clarington, Ont., about 70 kilometres east of Toronto.
he application received unequivocal support from the CNSC’s staff, despite the fact that several safety questions remain unresolved.
“The level of design information needed for CNSC staff to recommend a licence to construct is not the final design, but the information must be sufficient to ensure that the regulations have been met,” Sarah Eaton, the CNSC’s director-general ofits Directorate of Advanced Reactor Technologies, said before the commission.
It would be the first small modular reactor built in a G7 country and among the first globally – although its output would exceedthe informal 300-megawatt cutoff for SMRs.
The BWRX-300 is currently being developed by U.S. vendor GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy. Someaspects of its design are based on the Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR), which was licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014 but never built. The CNSC said the 1,600-megawattESBWR underwent significant testing that is “mostly applicable” to its smaller cousin.
OPG, which submitted its application two years ago, is seeking a 10-year licence andplans to build three additional BWRX-300s at Darlington.
A second part of the CNSC hearing, scheduled for January, will hear interventions from the public, including Indigenous communities. OPG has already partly prepared the site – building roads and moving earth – under an earlier licence granted by the CNSC.
David Tyndall, OPG’s vice-president of new nuclear engineering, said the reactor’s design had advanced sufficiently to meet Canada’s regulatory requirements.
One significant unresolved issue, though, is its emergency shutdown systems.
Typically, reactors are required to have two independent shutdown systems. The BWRX-300would have 57 control rods that could be inserted rapidly into its coreby high-pressure water in an emergency to halt reactivity. Should that hydraulic method fail, electric motors would drive them in instead.
Mr. Tyndall assured the commission that the BWRX-300 was designedin such a way that all safety systems “are guaranteed to be fully independent and redundant, which ensureshigh reliability and fail-safe operation.”
CNSC staff, however, questioned whether the shut-off systems were truly independent because both systems rely on the same control rods. That remained unresolved at Wednesday’s hearing.
To address unresolved issues, CNSC staff proposed that the commission impose three “regulatory hold points” during the reactor’s construction at which work would halt until OPG provided sufficient information to satisfy CNSC staff. Ramzi Jammal, the commission’s executive vice-president and chief regulatory operations officer, would administer the hold points.
Throughout an assessmentrunning more than 1,000 pages, published by the CNSC this summer, staff repeatedly noted missing information in OPG’s submission that they vowed to review once it becomes available.
“In many cases, there is a discussion about a topic, and it’s noted that the design is not complete,” commissioner Jerry Hopwood observed at the hearing.
“It’s not entirely clear to what extent the design has been completed in such a way that the conclusions that support a licence to construct are then justified.”
M.V. Ramana, a professor at the University of British Columbia’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs who specializes in nuclear power, said the CNSC doesn’t have enough information to answer key safety questions necessary to grant a construction licence. He added that, as the first of its kind, the Darlington SMR’s design is likely to require further significant changes during construction.
“What it does tell me is that OPG really has rushed through this,” he said. “It may be that they don’t feel they know enough about the design and are waiting for information from GE Hitachi, or that OPG is under its own self-imposed deadline to submit this application by a certain date.”
Prof. Ramana said the CNSC’s role as a safety regulatoris in conflict with statements its leadership has made in recent years promoting SMRs.
“The CNSC has acted as a cheerleader for small modular reactors,” he said. “This is completely at odds with what a good regulator ought to be doing.”
Hey Australia, Ontario is no model for energy and climate policy
Energy and climate strategy should prioritize options with lowest economic, environmental, technological and safety risks. Ontario’s does the opposite.
by Mark Winfield October 4, 2024, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2024/ontario-energy/
Over the past few weeks, word has begun to reach Ontario of a series of stories in the Australian media in which the province is being held up as a model for climate and energy policy Down Under.
It seems that Peter Dutton, the leader of the federal opposition Liberal (the conservative party in Australian politics), has been promoting Ontario’s nuclear heavy energy plans as a pathway for Australia.
For those in the province familiar with the ongoing saga of its energy and electricity policies, the reactions to the notion of Ontario being an example of energy and electricity policymaking have ranged from “bizarre” to “you couldn’t make this up.”
Poor maintenance and operating practices led to the near-overnight shutdown of the province’s seven oldest reactors in 1997, leading to a dramatic rise in the role of coal-fired generation and its associated emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and smog precursors. The refurbishment of the “laid-up” reactors themselves went badly. Two ended in write-offs, and the others ran billions over budget and years behind schedule, accounting for a large portion of the near doubling of electricity rates in the province between the mid-2000s and 2020.
Towards a $100-billion nuclear binge?
Only two other provinces followed Ontario’s lead on nuclear. Quebec built two reactors and New Brunswick one, each of them completed in the 1970s or the early 1980s. The Gentilly-1 facility in Quebec was barely ever operational and closed in 1977. The Gentilly-2 facility was shut down in 2012, and assessed as uneconomic, particularly in light of Ontario’s experiences in attempting to refurbish its own. The construction and then refurbishment of the Point Lepreau facility has repeatedly pushed New Brunswick Power to the brink of bankruptcy.
The current government of Ontario, led by Conservative Premier Doug Ford, has seemed determined to ignore the nuclear experiences of these provinces, and its own history of failed nuclear megaprojects. The government’s July 2023 energy plan includes the refurbishment of six reactors at the Bruce nuclear power facility (owned by OPG), and four reactors at the OPG’s Darlington facility. It subsequently added the refurbishment of four more reactors at OPG’s Pickering B facility, an option that had previously been assessed as unnecessary and uneconomic. The plant had originally been scheduled to close in 2018. There are also proposals for four new reactors totaling 4,800 MW in capacity at Bruce and four new 300MW reactors at Darlington. (The current capacity is 6,550 MW at Bruce, and 3,512 MW at Darlington.)
The total costs of these plans are unknown at this point, but an overall estimate in excess of $100 billion would not be unrealistic:
- $13 billion for the refurbishment at Darlington;
- approximately $20 billion for the refurbishment at Bruce;
- $15 billion for Pickering B (based on Darlington costs and plant age for both this case and Bruce);
- about $50 billion for the new build at Bruce, based on previous new build proposals;
- and the Darlington new build (unknown, but likely $10 billion or more).
Even this 100$-billion figure would assume that things go according to plan, which rarely happens with nuclear construction and refurbishment projects.
The government’s ambitious nuclear plans have not been subject to any form of external review or regulatory oversight in terms of costs, economic and environmental rationality, or the availability of lower-cost and lower-risk pathways for meeting the province’s electricity needs. Rather, the system now runs entirely on the basis of ministerial directives that agencies in the sector, including the putative regulator, the Ontario Energy Board, are mandated to implement.
The province’s politically driven policy environment is very advantageous to nuclear proponents. When previous nuclear expansion proposals had been subject to meaningful public review, the plans collapsed in the face of soaring cost estimates and unrealistic demand projections. This was the case in the early 1980s with the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning – aka the Porter commission, at the turn of the 1990s with the Ontario Hydro demand and supply plan environmental assessment, and in the late 2000s, with the Ontario Power Authority’s integrated power system plan review.
A halt to renewable energy
There is a second dimension to Ontario’s electricity plans that also should not be overlooked. Upon arriving in office the Ford government promptly terminated all efforts at renewable energy development, including having completed wind turbine projects quite literally ripped out of the ground at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. It then scrapped the province’s energy efficiency strategy for being too effective at reducing demand. Repeated offers of low-cost electricity from the hydropower-rich neighbouring province of Quebec were ignored. The results of studies by the province’s own electricity system operator on energy efficiency potential and the possible contributions of distributed generation, like building and facility-level solar photovoltaics (PV) and storage, have been largely disregarded.
These choices have left the province with no apparent option but to rely on natural gas-fired generation to replace nuclear facilities that are being refurbished or retired. With existing facilities dramatically ramping up their output, and new facilities being added, GHG and other emissions from gas-fired generation have more than tripled since 2017, and are projected to continue to increase dramatically over the next years. On its current trajectory, gas-fired generation will constitute a quarter of the province’s electricity supply, the same portion provided by coal-fired plants before their phase-out, completed in 2013. The province has recently announced a re-engagement around renewable energy, but the seriousness of this interest has been subject to considerable doubt.
Given all of this, it would be difficult to see Ontario as a model for Australia or any other jurisdiction to follow in designing its energy and climate strategy. The province has no meaningful energy planning and review process. Its current nuclear and gas-focussed pathway seems destined to embed high energy costs and high emissions for decades to come. And it will leave a growing legacy of radioactive wastes that will require management of timescales hundreds of millennia.
A rational and transparent process would prioritize the options with the lowest economic, environmental, technological and safety risks. Higher-risk options, like new nuclear, should only be considered where it can be demonstrated that the lower-risk options have been fully optimized and developed in the planning process. Ontario’s current path goes in the opposite direction. To follow its example would be a serious mistake.
The Anishinaabe community fighting nuclear waste dumping, one step at a time‘
‘There’s more fresh water in this part of the country than there is in the Great Lakes, and they want to destroy that’
Ricochet, Crystal Greene, September 23 2024
Every September long weekend for the past five years, Indigenous and non-Indigenous allies have walked together along the TransCanada Highway 17 to peacefully protest the proposed dumping of nuclear waste on Treaty 3 lands in northwestern Ontario.
Among the walkers at the annual Walk Against Nuclear Waste was an Anishinaabe grandmother, who started the walk in hopes that more people will “wake up” to what’s at stake with the possibility of a deep geological repository (DGR) that would contain all of Canada’s high-level nuclear waste within their watershed.
“This is my last year and I feel like I’m gonna miss it, but it was a good awareness. I’m okay with that,” Darlene Necan, told Ricochet Media as vehicles zoomed by on TransCanada Highway 17, many beeping their horns in support throughout the roadside interview.
On September 1, two groups left from Ignace and Wabigoon at the same time. Over two days the group of about 30 participants walked about 40 kilometres from each direction.
They all met up at a rest stop near Revell Lake, the site where the Nuclear Waste Management Organization has done exploration drilling for the potential $26-billion DGR, which would sit at headwaters of the Wabigoon River and Turtle River watersheds. The underground facility would be used to bury and abandon millions of bundles of spent fuel from Canadian nuclear power plants.
“We cannot foresee the future, but what if it does happen? What if there’s a leak?” Necan said. “The creator gifted us this beautiful land for all of us to live, but who are these people to come here and economically destroy it? Money is never going to last.”
Necan, 65, is also known for asserting Anishinaabe title by building a cabin on her traditional territory at Savant Lake, Ontario, without permits, after she grew tired of waiting for housing from her band, Ojibway Nation of Saugeen #258. She was charged under the Public Lands Act with construction on so-called Crown land.
It’s no surprise that she took on the responsibility to alert others about the NWMO’s plan to transport, bury and abandon the waste.
There is a strong sense of urgency as the NWMO is set to finalize its chosen waste site, narrowed down from a list of 22 locations in Canada, a process that began in 2010.
By the end of the year, NWMO will choose either the Revell Lake site, near where the walk ended, or a Bruce County site in southwestern Ontario.
Rather than having the radioactive waste shipped by truck or train for the next 50 plus years —which they foresee is an accident waiting to happen — walkers say they want to see the waste all kept where it originated from, and for Canada to stop producing nuclear energy altogether.
The NWMO is an industry-funded organization made up of representatives from Canada’s nuclear power industry who’ve been looking for a way to deal with the approximately 100,000 tonnes of waste they’ve produced that will be radioactive for tens of thousands of years.
In a report to the Standing Committee on Environmental and Sustainable Development, a northwestern Ontario coalition “We the Nuclear Free North” describes the flaws and weaknesses of the DGR project along with the serious risks expressed by experts.
“Numerous experts in the fields of geology, chemistry and physics warn of the insufficiency of current scientific knowledge to guide a project of the nature and magnitude of the NWMO’s proposed plan,” the coalition wrote .
Their report broke down NWMO’s “conceptual” plan.
The waste would be transported by truck and received at a fuel packaging plant where it would be placed into containers.
The water used during the process to decontaminate the devices used for the waste in-transit would become contaminated with radionuclides and moved into a tailings pond, and be contained as a low-to-medium level radioactive liquid waste.
The waste in containers would be lowered to the DGR underground storage facility, made up of rooms blasted out of precambrian rock, 500 to 1000 metres below the Earth’s surface.
Since there is no way for the high-level radioactive nuclear fuel to deactivate, except for time, it would continue to generate heat, years after being stored. It could lead to pressure build-up, causing fractures in the DGR walls, where the groundwater would seep in and mix with water-soluble radionuclides.
Eventually, the free-moving contaminated water would reach the two watersheds, through cracks in the DGR, and a sump pump would need to be used to bring liquid to a surface tailings pond.
Another risk to hosting a DGR in the Revell Lake area are low magnitude earthquakes that have been documented by Environment Canada. A quake could fracture the DGR and increase flow of water into the facility and send contaminated water into the watersheds…………………………………………………………. more https://ricochet.media/indigenous/the-anishinaabe-community-fighting-nuclear-waste-dumping-one-step-at-a-time/
The challenge of long-lived alpha emitters in the Chalk River legacy wastes
Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, January 22, 2024 (revised September 17, 2024)
Why is so little Chalk River waste suitable for near surface disposal?
Extensive research work at the Chalk River Laboratories on nuclear reactor fuels, and in the early days, on materials for nuclear weapons, produced waste with large quantities of long-lived alpha emitters. This waste is difficult to manage and can even become increasingly radioactive over time.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, because of the presence of long-lived alpha emitters, waste from nuclear research facilities is generally classified as intermediate level, and even in some cases, as high level. This waste cannot be put in a near surface disposal facility because its radioactivity will not decay to harmless levels during the period that the facility remains under institutional control.
Alpha emitters decay by throwing off an alpha particle, the equivalent of a helium nucleus, with two protons and two neutrons. The external penetrating power of an alpha particle is low, but alpha emitters have extremely serious health effects if ingested or inhaled. They can lodge in your lungs and cause cancer.
Research at Chalk River and all other nuclear laboratories is ultimately based on three long-lived alpha emitters — thorium-232, uranium-235, and uranium-238. These are the “naturally occurring” or “primordial” radionuclides. They were created by large stars and then incorporated into the Earth and the solar system when they formed some 4.5 billion years ago. The waste inventory proposed by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories for the Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) includes over six tons each of thorium-232 and uranium-238……………………………………………………..
Hazards increase when uranium and thorium are mined and concentrated from ores and used in their pure form. Marie Curie, who spent much of her career isolating radium and polonium from uranium, died of radiation-induced leukemia at age 66. She was buried in a lead-lined tomb because her corpse emitted so much radiation.
When thorium-232, uranium-235, and uranium-238 are irradiated in a reactor, as at Chalk River, they absorb neutrons and produce significant quantities of new, man-made, long-lived alpha-emitters. Irradiated uranium-238 absorbs a neutron and temporarily forms uranium-239. Uranium-239 transmutes to neptunium-239, which quickly transmutes to long-lived plutonium-239, with a half-life of 24,000 years.
Plutonium-239 is “fissile” – it can readily support a chain reaction. It is what the early Chalk River researchers produced for the manufacture of U.S. nuclear weapons, by separating the plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. They also used the separated plutonium to make “mixed oxide” (MOX) reactor fuel, mixing it with fresh uranium………………………………………….
Detecting alpha emitters in mixed waste is expensive and challenging. Putting inadequately characterized waste in the NSDF would invalidate its safety case.
Unfortunately, the NSDF Project lacks adequate waste characterization procedures. If the project is allowed to proceed, workers and future Ottawa valley residents could be exposed to unknown quantities of long-lived alpha emitters and suffer the serious health effects associated with them. https://concernedcitizens.net/2024/09/17/the-challenge-of-long-lived-alpha-emitters-in-the-chalk-river-legacy-wastes/
Federal Conflict Rules Would Have Barred New Brunswick, Ontario Cabinet Ministers from New Corporate Posts, Expert Says
The ENERGY MIX, Mitchell Beer September 12, 2024
Two former provincial cabinet ministers would have been barred by conflict of interest legislation from the senior positions they’ve taken with engineering services and nuclear energy giant AtkinsRéalis if they’d been in federal politics, an expert in government and corporate ethics has concluded.
Former New Brunswick natural resources minister Mike Holland and Ontario energy minister Todd Smith both left their positions over the summer and signed on with Montreal-based AtkinsRéalis within a couple of weeks of quitting politics. Holland resigned from cabinet in late June and was appointed as Atkins’ director of business development for North America in early July. Smith quit in mid-August and was hired as vice-president, marketing and business development for Atkins subsidiary Candu Energy two weeks later……………………………………………………
Holland’s and Smith’s career moves are permitted by New Brunswick’s and Ontario’s conflict of interest rules, respectively. Both provinces set 12-month bans on activities like direct lobbying after a former official leaves office, but do not bar other employment with a company that does business with the official’s former government.
……………………………………………… Democracy Watch co-founder Duff Conacher said neither official would have been allowed to make the move if they’d been serving in the federal cabinet. And Smith would have been barred by Ontario rules if he had been working as minister’s staff, rather than as minister.
A Preceding Transaction
“At the federal level you wouldn’t be allowed to do what they did,” Conacher told The Energy Mix.
“There’s a preceding transaction, a negotiation they provided advice on. They were both quoted in AtkinsRéalis’ news release.”
That was a reference to an April 13, 2022 release in which Candu Energy and Saint John, New Brunswick-based Moltex Energy announced a “strategic partnership to advance the development and deployment of next-generation Small Modular Reactor (SMR) nuclear technology in Canada,” including a “first of a kind” installation in New Brunswick. In that release, Holland and Smith both showed up as early boosters for the partnership.
“New Brunswick welcomes investment in clean energy, especially as it builds on the province’s established core of expertise in nuclear technology,” Holland said. “This agreement contributes not only to the growth of long-term, high-quality jobs in New Brunswick’s energy sector; it also recognizes the leadership role of both Moltex and the province in advancing the next generation of nuclear technology.”
“I’m thrilled to welcome this new partnership between Moltex and SNC-Lavalin that builds our provincial energy industry, one renowned for its talented work force and strong nuclear supply chain,” Smith added. “This partnership enhances our clean energy advantage and reputation as a global hub for SMR expertise, making Ontario an even more attractive place to do business and create jobs.”
The release cited Candu Energy as a subsidiary of SNC-Lavalin, the politically connected but often deeply troubled global firm that eventually rebranded as AtkinsRéalis in September, 2023. But not before it set up Candu Energy by acquiring key commercial nuclear contracts, intellectual property, and personnel from federally-owned Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. in 2011.
‘You’re Never Allowed’
Neither Holland nor Smith would have been allowed to join AtkinsRéalis if they were bound by the federal Conflict of Interest Act, Conacher told The Mix.
“You’re never allowed to act on behalf of any person or organization connected with something you were involved with in government. It’s not 12 months. It’s never. You’re never allowed,” Conacher said.
“And then secondly, you’re not allowed to give advice to anyone using confidential information,” he added. That amounts to a blanket restriction because “they learn things every day that are not disclosed,” which means all the advice a former cabinet official gives is based on confidential information.
“How do you unknow what you know and then give advice pretending you don’t know what you know? It’s impossible.”
That concern doesn’t apply in New Brunswick or Ontario, and Conacher said New Brunswick’s conflict of interest rules are the weaker of the two. In mid-August, Holland was listed in the federal lobbying registry as an AtkinsRéalis senior officer whose lobbying activities represented more than 20% of his duties.
Other Ways to Be Useful
But direct lobbying isn’t the only way, or even the most useful way, a former cabinet minister can help out a new corporate employer.
If a provincial ban applies only to lobbying, “you just don’t make the representation,” Conacher explained. “You give strategic advice to the company’s lobbyists on who they should be talking to, who’s the real decision-maker in cabinet, and what you should be saying to make something go through smoothly or get some extra benefit, like a subsidy or a [deadline] extension without any penalty. And that’s why they’re hired—because they have that inside knowledge.”………………………… https://www.theenergymix.com/exclusive-federal-conflict-rules-would-have-barred-new-brunswick-ontario-cabinet-ministers-from-new-corporate-posts-expert-says-old/
‘Unacceptable’: Is this Ontario nuclear waste dump a risk to Quebec’s water supply?
The Bloc Québécois is calling for work to immediately stop on an already-approved nuclear waste facility at the Chalk River research site in eastern Ontario, arguing its current placement unnecessarily risks Quebecers’ water supply — a claim that the company behind the project denies.
Sept. 10, 2024, By Alex Ballingall, Ottawa Bureau, Toronto Star
OTTAWA — The Bloc Québécois is calling for work to immediately stop on an already-approved nuclear waste facility at the Chalk River research site in eastern Ontario, arguing its current placement unnecessarily risks Quebecers’ water supply — a claim the company behind the project denies.
Bloc Leader Yves-François Blanchet held a news conference on Parliament Hill Monday with First Nations from Ontario and Quebec who also oppose the project. Trumpeting his solidarity with the leaders, who claim the project’s approval early this year violated their rights as Indigenous Peoples, Blanchet said the waste facility is too close to the Ottawa River that separates Quebec from Ontario and flows into the St. Lawrence River.
Speaking in French, Blanchet described the plan as a way to take the “dangerous” waste from Ontario’s nuclear industry and place it in a spot that he claimed could put the water supply of Quebecers at risk.
“This is unacceptable to us,” Blanchet said. He added that the planned facility “should be placed elsewhere.”
Chief Lance Haymond of the Kebaowek First Nation, who attended the news conference with Blanchet, accused the company building the facility — Canadian Nuclear Laboratories, which is contracted to run the Chalk River facility by an arms-length federal Crown corporation — of dismissing his community’s concerns, which include worries about disruption to local bears and other wildlife.
Haymond said the company is presenting a “façade of reconciliation” over its failure to seek his nation’s consent for the project, which is on unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg near Deep River, Ont., almost 200 kilometres northwest of Ottawa.
The Kebaowek First Nation has also launched a legal process in Federal Court that seeks to overturn the January decision by Canada’s federal nuclear regulator to green-light the project.
“We will not stand by while our rights are trampled, our lands desecrated and our future put at risk,” Haymond said. ……………………………………………………………..
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission approved the project in January, more than eight years after Canadian Nuclear Laboratories first raised the idea.
A spokesperson for the commission declined to comment Monday, citing the Federal Court challenge………………………………………………………………………….
According to the safety commission, most of the waste slated for disposal there will come from the company’s existing Chalk River Laboratories operation at the site, with about 10 per cent coming from other sites, including commercial sources like hospitals and universities.
The waste site is planned as an “engineered containment mound” that covers 37 hectares, alongside other facilities like a wastewater treatment plant.
The project has been controversial for months, with several municipalities in the region and environmental groups stating their opposition alongside First Nations. Bloc MPs and Green Leader Elizabeth May have also denounced the project. https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/unacceptable-is-this-ontario-nuclear-waste-dump-a-risk-to-quebecs-water-supply/article_27adb27e-6ec2-11ef-985e-9345e7a9932d.html?source=newsletter&utm_source=ts_nl&utm_medium=email&utm_email=C574FBD817092BE3920DD70067C080F0&utm_campaign=frst_1906
Bloc Québécois backs First Nation fighting nuclear waste site.
By Natasha Bulowski , Ottawa Insider, September 10th 2024
Bloc Québécois leader Yves-François Blanchet is throwing his weight behind a First Nation fighting a nuclear waste disposal site near the Ottawa River.
Flanked by three BQ MPs — Sébastien Lemire, Mario Simard and Monique Pauzé — Blanchet reaffirmed the BQ’s support for Kebaowek First Nation’s sustained opposition to the radioactive waste disposal site, located about 190 kilometres northwest of Ottawa at Chalk River Laboratories.
Blanchet called on the federal government to immediately suspend the project. …………………………………………………………………………………..more https://www.nationalobserver.com/2024/09/10/news/bloc-quebecois-radioactive-waste-facility
Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs) in Canada
While civil society opposition to SMRs is broad and substantial in Canada, ultimately the exorbitant cost of SMRs will be their undoing. Conclusive analysis shows that SMRs cannot compete economically with wind, solar and storage systems.
SMRs will last as long as governments are willing to pour public funds into them, and SMRs will start to disappear after the money tap is turned off. Already the nuclear hype in Canada is turning back to big reactors.
WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor, August 29, 2024 | Issue #918, By Brennain Lloyd and Susan O’Donnell
Introduction: CANDUs versus SMRs
Canada developed the CANDU reactor, fueled with natural uranium mined in Canada and cooled and moderated with heavy water. All 19 operating power reactors in Canada – 18 in Ontario on the Great Lakes and one in New Brunswick on the Bay of Fundy – are CANDU designs with outputs ranging from about 500 to 900 MWe.
It’s been more than 30 years since the last CANDU was completed and connected to the grid in Canada. Attempts to build new ones were halted over high projected costs, and CANDU exports have dried up. To keep itself alive, in 2018 the nuclear industry launched a “roadmap” to develop smaller reactors and kick-start new nuclear export opportunities.
From 2020 to 2023, the Canadian government funded six so-called “Small Modular Nuclear Reactor” (SMR) designs. Only one – Terrestrial Energy’s Integral Molten Salt Reactor (IMSR) design – is Canadian.
The six designs are not only unlike the CANDU but also different from each other. The fuels range from low-enriched uranium, TRISO particles and HALEU (High-Assay, Low-Enriched Uranium) to plutonium-based fuel, and the different cooling systems include high-temperature gas, molten salt, liquid sodium metal and heat pipes. One design – Moltex – requires a separate reprocessing unit to extract plutonium from used CANDU fuel to make fuel for its proposed SMR.
Only one of the grid-scale SMR designs seems plausible to be built – the GE Hitachi 300 MWe boiling water reactor (BWRX-300) being developed at the Darlington nuclear site on Lake Ontario. This design uses low-enriched uranium fuel and is cooled by ordinary water. The Darlington site owner, the public utility Ontario Power Generation (OPG), is planning to build four of them.
Canada gave OPG a $970 million “low-interest” loan to help develop the BWRX-300 design. The other five SMR designs received considerably less federal funding, from $7 million to $50.5 million each, and most SMR proponents have been struggling to source matching funds. One design, Westinghouse’s off-grid eVinci micro-reactor, had early development costs funded by the U.S. military and now seems to have independent funding.
The Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) at Chalk River received more than $1.2 billion in 2023. CNL is operated by a private-sector consortium with two U.S. companies involved in the nuclear weapons industry and the Canadian firm Atkins-Réalis (formerly SNC Lavalin) which is also involved in almost every SMR project in Canada. CNL and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited are building an “Advanced Nuclear Materials Research Centre” at Chalk River, one of the largest nuclear facilities ever built in Canada, that will conduct research on SMRs.
Canada recently released a report suggesting that SMRs will be in almost all provinces by 2035, although most provincial electrical utilities have expressed no interest, and only Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and Alberta are promoting SMRs. Alberta says it wants SMRs to reduce the GHG emissions generated in tar sands extraction.
SMR “project creep”
Proponents of most of the SMR designs keep changing the description of their projects. This is not unique to Canada, but is certainly apparent in Canada, and the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), aids and abets that practise for those SMRs in the review stream.
In the case of the BWRX-300 proposed for the Darlington site, the CNSC not only accepted a 2009 environmental assessment for very different reactors as a stand-in for the BWRX-300 but also is carrying out the current review as if for a single reactor. The nuclear regulator made this decision despite Ontario Power Generation very publicly stating its intent to construct four reactors in rapid succession at the Darlington site.
The proposed “Micro Modular Reactor” (MMR) for the Chalk River site in Ontario is another example of “project creep” and demonstrates just how flexible “scope of project” is in the domain of the CNSC.
Earlier this year, CNSC staff released a document outlining communications from the MMR proponent, Global First Power, describing significant project changes. The proponent wants to triple power output, and to operate with fuel enrichment levels from 9.75% (LEU+) up to 19.75%.
Global First Power also wants a shift from no need to refuel in a 20-year operating life to provision for on-site refueling and defueling with periods varying from three to 13.5 years. They also want to double their facility design life from 20 years to 40 years.
Despite all these significant changes to key elements of the design, the CNSC staff concluded that the Global First Power MMR project remained within scope of its initial (very different) description.
Another example of SMR project creep is in New Brunswick. In June 2023, the provincial utility NB Power applied to the CNSC for a licence to clear a site for the ARC-100 design at the Point Lepreau nuclear site on the Bay of Fundy. The design for the sodium-cooled reactor requires HALEU fuel, which is scarce because of sanctions imposed on Russia, the sole supplier.
News reports have suggested the ARC-100 design might need to change because changing the fuel means changing the design. Meanwhile the ARC company CEO left suddenly, and staff received layoff notices. Despite these obvious problems, the application under CNSC review and a provincial environmental assessment underway with the CNSC are continuing with the original design.
SMRs complicate radioactive waste management
One of the (many) false promises floated about SMRs is that they will alleviate the significant challenges of managing radioactive wastes. This is patently false. Some of this misleading rhetoric stems from the notion of “recycling” and claims by some SMR promoters that their particular design of reactor will use high-level radioactive wastes as “fuel” for their reactor.
But the reality is that the introduction of so-called “next generation” designs of reactors in Canada will only complicate the already complex set of problems related to the caretaking of these extremely hazardous materials.
……………………………………………..The shift from natural uranium to enriched uranium in commercial power reactors in Canada will fundamentally change the nature and characteristics of the spent fuel waste and will take away one of the nuclear industry’s favourite pitch points for the CANDU design: that there is no potential for criticality after the fuel is removed from the reactor.
The new potential for the irradiated enriched fuel wastes to “go critical” is only one of the many problems being overlooked by both government and industry.
Another very obvious shift is in the dimensions of the fuel, from the relatively uniform dimensions of CANDU fuel to the widely divergent shapes and sizes of fuel being depicted for the various small modular reactor designs.
The CANDU fuel bundles are approximately 50 cm long and 10 cm in diameter. In contrast, the fuel waste dimensions are significantly different for SMRs. For example, the BWRX-300 fuel bundles are much larger, the casks much heavier, and the reactor will generate higher level activity wastes. These differences will require different approaches and designs for interim and long-term dry storage of used fuel.
SMR wastes not considered in Canada’s repository design
As a fleet, small modular reactors will generate more waste per energy unit than the larger conventional reactors that preceded them. But in Canada they will also require redesign of the “concept” plan currently being promoted for the long-term dispositioning of the used fuel to a deep geological repository (DGR).
Since 2002 an association of the nuclear power companies, operating as the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), have been pursuing a single site to bury and then abandon all of Canada’s high-level nuclear waste.
Their siting process, launched in 2010, caught the interest of 22 municipalities that allowed themselves to be studied for the “$16-24 billion national infrastructure project.” Hundreds of millions of dollars later – with tens of millions going directly into the coffers of the participating municipalities – the NWMO is now down to two candidate sites in Ontario.
The NWMO say they will make their final selection by the end of 2024. But even at this late date they have produced only “conceptual” descriptions of their repository project, including for key components such as the packaging plant where the fuel waste would be transferred into that final container, and the DGR itself. But all of the conceptual work is premised on the characteristics and dimensions of the CANDU fuel bundle.
The process lines of the used fuel packaging plant, the final container, and the spacing requirements for the repository will all need to be redone for different SMR wastes with their very different dimensions and characteristics.
While it could be said that the NWMO design progress has been surprisingly slow given their target of selecting a site this year and beginning the regulatory and licensing process next year, it will be back to square one if their proposed DGR is to accommodate SMR wastes.
There is, however, a strong possibility that the regulator, the CNSC, will allow the NWMO to skate through at least the first license phase with large information gaps, as the CNSC is doing with the plan to construct four BWRX-300s at the Darlington site.
As mentioned in the example of “project creep,” earlier this year the CNSC announced it would accept an environmental assessment approval of a generic 2009 reactor proposal instead of requiring that the BWRX-300 be subject to an impact assessment. This was despite the marked differences between the technologies assessed in 2009 and the BWRX-300 technology.
These differences will impact the management of the project’s radioactive waste. For example, the BWRX-300 public dose rates are estimated to be 10 x higher for one accident scenario (pool fire) and 54% higher in a dry storage container accident, the waste contains different proportions of radionuclides than the waste that was assessed in 2009, radio-iodine and carbon-14 emissions will be higher, alpha and beta-gamma activity per cubic metre of waste will be higher and the BWRX-300 will generate higher activity spent fuel.
Despite the NWMO having successfully wooed two small municipalities, there is broad opposition to the transportation, burial and abandonment of all of Canada’s high-level radioactive wastes in a single location, either in the headwaters of two major watersheds in northern Ontario or the rich farm lands of southwestern Ontario.
This opposition is amplified by concerns about SMR wastes and the NWMO’s open ticket to add other operations to their DGR site. Of particular concern are the potential for the NWMO to add an SMR to power their repository site or even to add a reprocessing plant at the site to extract plutonium from the used fuel. The Canadian government’s refusal to include an explicit ban on commercial reprocessing in the 2022 review of the national radioactive waste policy heightened the latter concern.
Who/what is behind the SMR push in Canada?
Although proponents claim that SMRs will contribute to climate action, critics are sceptical. It is doubtful that any SMR will be built in time to contribute to Canada’s target to decarbonize the electricity grid by 2035, and independent research found that SMRs will cost substantially more than alternative sources of grid energy.
The high cost and lengthy development timelines of SMRs, the questionable claims of climate action, as well as the significant challenges related to SMR wastes, raises an obvious question: who is pushing SMRs and why?
A central reason is a political imperative to keep the Canadian nuclear industry alive. The industry is small in Canada, but nuclear power looms large in the political imagination. Canada sees itself as a global leader in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Without a nuclear weapons industry, Canada needs nuclear exports to keep its domestic industry alive and ensure Canada’s membership in the international nuclear club. Earlier this year, Canada released an action plan to get nuclear projects built faster and ensure that “’nuclear energy remains a strategic asset to Canada now and into the future.”
Since the start of the nuclear age, Canada has spent a disproportionate amount of research funding on nuclear reactor development. Politicians see the CANDU design as a success, despite its costly legacy and lackluster exports. The CANDU reactors in Canada have all required significant public subsidies, and the CANDUs sold for export have been heavily subsidized by Canada as well.
Selling more CANDUs outside Canada is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But Canada wants a nuclear industry, and that requires choosing and aggressively marketing at least one nuclear reactor design. Despite being a U.S. design, the G.E. Hitachi BWRX-300 is the chosen favourite in Canada. The reactor, in early development at the Darlington site, is being promoted globally by Ontario Power Generation as part of an international collaboration with GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and Synthos Green Energy.
What’s the future for SMRs in Canada?
Since the nuclear industry and its government partner Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) launched their SMR roadmap in 2018, the political and business hype for SMRs has been intense. The SMR buzz is meant to attract private sector investment, but so far that strategy is failing.
Almost everyone understands now that SMRs, like the CANDUs, are expensive projects that will need continuous massive public subsidies. To date, taxpayers have provided just over $1.2 billion in direct subsidies to SMR proponents in Canada, not nearly as much as the industry will need to develop an SMR fleet in the country.
A broad coalition of groups – from climate activists to Indigenous organizations and other groups protecting lands and waters from radioactive waste – have been pushing back against public funding for SMRs. A 2020 statement signed by 130 groups called SMRs “dirty, dangerous distractions” from real climate action. In March this year, 130 groups in Canada also signed the international declaration against new nuclear energy development launched in Brussels at the Nuclear Summit organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
While civil society opposition to SMRs is broad and substantial in Canada, ultimately the exorbitant cost of SMRs will be their undoing. Conclusive analysis shows that SMRs cannot compete economically with wind, solar and storage systems.
SMRs will last as long as governments are willing to pour public funds into them, and SMRs will start to disappear after the money tap is turned off. Already the nuclear hype in Canada is turning back to big reactors.
The Bruce Nuclear Generating Station on Lake Huron in Ontario, with eight CANDU reactors, is already the largest operating nuclear plant in the world. Bruce Power recently began the formal process to develop four new big reactors at the site, to generate another 4,800 megawatts of electricity. It remains to be seen if the sticker shock for the proposed big nuclear reactors will, like it has for SMRs, scare off investors.
Although more than six years of SMR promotion in Canada has produced almost no private investor interest, the SMR buzz remains strong. The SMR star may be fading but the SMR story is far from over.
Brennain Lloyd is the coordinator of Northwatch in Ontario. Susan O’Donnell is the lead researcher for the CEDAR project at St. Thomas University in New Brunswick and a spokesperson for CRED-NB. https://crednb.ca/small-modular-nuclear-reactors-smrs-in-canada/
That time when Canada cancelled its nuclear submarine order
The decision to cut the Australian community out altogether — except where we will be called upon to service the US military as it builds its base in WA — puts us in the relationship of a vassal state, existing only to do the bidding of our powerful friend.
By Julie Macken and Michael Walker, Aug 30, 2024, https://johnmenadue.com/that-time-when-canada-cancelled-its-nuclear-submarine-order/
Back in 1987, when no one knew that the Cold War was just about to end, the Canadian Government signed up to build 10 nuclear-powered submarines. That submarine program lasted for all of two years before being cancelled in 1989. No nuclear Canadian sub ever even began construction, let alone getting put in the water.
There is a very real sense of déjà vu when we look at the Canadian experience and the current Australian experience of AUKUS. The good news is that it is not too late to learn the lessons the Canadians learnt for us.
One of the reasons for the Canadian cancellation was the $8 billion price tag, or about $19 billion in today’s money. Two billion dollars per submarine now sounds like a bargain compared to the astronomical $45 billion per submarine under AUKUS. Canada decided it had other priorities where that money could be put to better use.
But before the contract was cancelled in Canada, the ministries involved in its construction became embroiled in conflict, the Government itself was in a cost-of-living-crisis with immediate, real-world needs pressing and the hasty and secretive choice of vessel design came under withering criticism from the Treasury department for poor procurement with the cost expected to blow out to $30 billion ($70 billion today). And finally, media support eroded, with 71% of the population opposed to the project.
Déjà vu much?
On 12 June, the US Congressional Research Document service produced a research and advice document called the Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress.
The document points out the AUKUS deal was a three-step process. The first was to establish a US-UK rotational submarine force in Western Australia. The second was that the US would sell us three or five Virginia nuclear powered submarines and the third would be that the UK assists us in building our own AUKUS class nuclear submarines.
But the Congressional report outlines when comparing the “potential benefits, costs, and risks” of the three stage plan, it might just be better for the US to operate more of its own boats out of WA. That is, “procuring up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs that would be retained in US Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the US and UK SSNs”.
That’s right, why bother with the whole step two and three when the US is best served by simply operating its nuclear-powered attack submarines out of WA?
This is an extraordinary development and one that demands more attention than has been given previously because a number of issues flow from this kind of thinking.
First, this potentially frees up $400 billion that could be put to far better use on a national housing construction program or high-speed rail network running the entire east coast of Australia or other large and much-needed nation-building projects. But not so fast.
The US Congressional Research Document suggests that “those funds (the $400 billion) could be invested in other military capabilities”, such as long-range missiles and bombers, “so as to create an Australian capacity for performing non-SSN military missions for both Australia and the United States”.
The decision to cut the Australian community out altogether — except where we will be called upon to service the US military as it builds its base in WA — puts us in the relationship of a vassal state, existing only to do the bidding of our powerful friend.
The fact that the document only referenced the “potential benefits, costs, and risks” from the US perspective, without any attempt to imagine how Australia may view becoming a life support for a US submarine base, makes the nature of our relationship pretty clear.
Australia’s Government may not consider it necessary to have done its due diligence on AUKUS but the Americans are happy to do that for us and, you guessed it, even though they quietly have doubts about the SSN project, they’ve already thought of plenty of other ways to spend our money on their own defence objectives. Spending it on the well-being and prosperity of our own people didn’t even rate a mention.
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