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Russia claims nuclear plant targeted during massive Ukrainian drone attack

Russia and Ukraine continue to swap daily barrages, with the prospects of ceasefire talks appearing slim.

Aljazeera, 29 Jan 2025

A nuclear power plant was among targets during a massive Ukrainian drone attack, Russian officials have said.

Moscow said on Wednesday that the country’s energy infrastructure had come under attack by at least 100 drones overnight. Ukraine also reported strikes. The continuing barrages were accompanied by barbs from the two countries’ presidents, suggesting little prospect of peace talks.

The Russian Ministry of Defence said on Telegram that 104 drones were involved in raids across western Russia, many targeting power and oil facilities.

Local officials claimed that air defence systems had destroyed one drone that had attempted to strike the nuclear power plant in the western region of Smolensk.

“According to preliminary information, one of the drones was shot down during an attempt to attack a nuclear power facility,” Governor Vasily Anokhin said on the Telegram messaging app. “There were no casualties or damage.”

The Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant, the largest power generating plant in Russia’s northwest, was working normally on Wednesday morning, RIA state news agency reported, citing the plant’s press service.

Russia’s air defences reportedly destroyed drones over nine regions, including 11 over Smolensk, which sits on the border with Belarus. Nearly half were hit over Kursk, where Ukrainian troops have occupied several villages for months following an incursion.

Ukraine and Russia have been swapping drone and missile strikes on an almost daily basis, with energy infrastructure a particular target amid winter.

Warnings that the fighting could spark a nuclear disaster have been sounded since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of its neighbour in February 2022. However, most of the concern has focused on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant, which sits on the frontlines in the east of the country…………………………………………………………………….https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/29/russia-claims-nuclear-plant-targeted-during-massive-ukrainian-drone-attack

January 30, 2025 Posted by | incidents, Russia, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Nuclear icebreaker sustained hull damage after collision in the Kara Sea 

A video published by the pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Mash shows how the 50 Let Pobedy sails straight into the cargo vessel Yamal Krechet

Thomas Nilsen, 28 January 2025 ,  https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/nuclear-icebreaker-sustained-hull-damage-after-collision-in-the-kara-seanbsp/423819

The dramatic collision happened at 03.51 am on the night to January 26 but did not become known to the public before the press service of Rosatomflot confirmed the facts to several Russian media in the evening of January 28.

Murmansk-based Arctic Observer said in its Telegram channel that the collision happened as the powerful icebreaker was assisting a cargo ship sailing through the ice-covered waters.  

According to Rosatomflot, the nuclear powered icebreaker continues to operate in normal mode along the Northern Sea Route, despite the damage to the hull. 

Rosatomflot says in the press statement that “seaworthiness has not been lost” and “there were no casualties.” 

The state owned operator of Russia’s icebreaker fleet underlines that the two onboard reactors were not harmed in the collision. The information has not been confirmed by independent sources. 

Rosatomflot does not provide any information about what caused the navigation mistake leading to the huge icebreaker smashing into the smaller cargo ship. 

The 50 Let Pobedy is the newest of the older Arktika-class nuclear-powered icebreakers. Construction of the vessel started in the late Soviet era (1989), but she was not commissioned before 2007. 

The icebreaker has Murmansk as homeport, but can operate independently for months at a time during the icy navigation season along the Northern Sea Route.

The cargo vessel Yamal Krechet was according to MarineTraffic.com on her way from Arkhangelsk towards Sabetta, the port where Novatek’s Yamal LNG production facilitates are located.  

There are no public reports about the possible damages to the cargo vessel. Several tens of containers can be seen on deck of the Yamal Krechet at the time of the collision, but it is not known immediately known what content the cargo includes. 

January 30, 2025 Posted by | incidents, Russia | Leave a comment

Here comes Yakutia, Russia’s newest nuclear icebreaker

Rosatomflot now has eight nuclear-powered icebreakers in operation, the highest number since Soviet times.  

Thomas Nilsen, Barents Observer 30 December 2024

The flag-raising ceremony happened at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on December 28. It took four and a half years to build the Yakutia and the icebreaker is the first made with mostly Russian-made components. 

Testing took place in the Gulf of Finland earlier in December and the powerful vessel is now delivered to Rosatomflot, the state-owned company in charge of sailings and infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route. 

The three previous icebreakers of the same class had both Western and Ukrainian made parts. With sanctions implemented and the engine factory in Ukraine bombed, the shipyard had to look for import substitutes domestically.

“The sanctions restrictions that we faced did not prevent us from ensuring high-quality and timely construction of the order,” said Deputy General Director Andrei Buzinov with the Baltic Shipyard at the ceremony.

The Yakutia is powered by two RITM-200 reactors and will join the fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers sailing out of Rosatomflot’s base in Murmansk. 

The three sister vessels of the same class, the ArktikaSibir and Ural are already crushing the ice along the Northern Sea Route, mainly for Russia’s LNG export to reach the markets. 

The fleet also includes four older nuclear-powered icebreakers, the Yamal and 50 Let Poedy, and the two Finnish built Taymyr and Vaygash. They have all got their service life prolonged

Not since the late 1980s have more nuclear-powered icebreakers been in operation. Out at sea, the winter season 2024/2025 will be a record as several of the icebreakers in the late Soviet times stayed at port in Murmansk although they officially were on active duty. ……………..

The flag raising ceremony took place 65 years after the Soviet Union’s first nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Lenin, was launched from the yard in Severodvinsk. Lenin became the world’s first civilian nuclear-powered vessel and is today moored in Murmansk as a museum open to the public. 

The two last icebreakers of the new class will also be named after past dictators. The Leningrad and Stalingrad are expected to be put in service in 2028 and 2030. Before that, the Chukotka will come in 2026. 

If no unforeseen delays happen.

Last week, the Defense Ministry’s cargo ship Ursa Major sank in the Mediterranean with two 45-tons hatches to cover the reactors on the Rossiya icebreaker currently under construction at the yard in Bolshoi Kamen near Vladivostok. 

The giant icebreaker is already many years behind schedule and is unlikely to be start sailing the Northern Sea Route’s East Arctic waters in 2027 as stipulated.   https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/here-comes-yakutia-russias-newest-nuclear-icebreaker/422559

January 1, 2025 Posted by | Russia, technology | Leave a comment

Putin’s huge, rusting nuclear battlecruisers symbolise Russian naval decline.

In losing nearly as much tonnage as it built in 2023, the Russian navy joins an exclusive and embarrassing club of stagnating navies that, startlingly, also includes the 886,000-ton – and shrinking – Royal Navy. In recent years, the British fleet has been decommissioning more and bigger vessels than it builds.

Apart from its submarines, the Kremlin will soon have only a coastal navy

David Axe, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/12/02/putin-naval-decline-kirov-class-nuclear-battlecruisers/

The hulking Kirov-class nuclear powered battlecruisers were symbols of Moscow’s naval strength during the later Soviet era. A generation later, they’re symbols of Moscow’s slow naval collapse.

The Soviets built four of the 28,000-ton, missile-armed vessels to lead far-ranging battle groups meant to confront Nato warships on the high seas. Three were commissioned in time to see service with the Soviet navy before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991; the final vessel joined the Russian fleet in 1998 following years of construction delays.

That youngest Kirov, the Northern Fleet’s Pyotr Velikiy, is the only battlecruiser still in active service. She’s one of a dwindling number of big Soviet-vintage warships – including the rusty Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s sole aircraft carrier – that sustain Russia’s fading capacity for projecting maritime power across oceans. 

A second old battlecruiser, Admiral Nakhimov, has been pierside at Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, in northern Russia, since 1999. The farcical story of her planned return to service is indicative of Russia’s wider naval decline.

The Kremlin decided to return Admiral Nakhimov to service way back in 2008. Refurbishment got underway in 2013. Planned upgrades include the fitting of Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles plus new sensors and communications. As recently as this fall, photos circulated online showing modest but visible progress with the installations.

But the work has been missing deadlines – for years. In 2014, the plan was for Admiral Nakhimov to return to service in 2020. She didn’t. As of 2018, the battlecruiser was supposed to recommission in 2021. A year later, the recommissioning slipped to 2022. That deadline came and went, as did the next deadline for a 2024 return to service. Now the plan is for Admiral Nakhimov to rejoin the fleet in 2026.

Don’t hold your breath. The costs of Russia’s 33-month wider war on Ukraine have driven up inflation and driven down investment in Russia. The economy is teetering. The costly effort to squeeze a few more years of front-line use from a 38-year-old warship may soon seem like an extravagance.

If and when the effort to reactivate Admiral Nakhimov finally fails, it could signal a new – and humbler – era for the Russian fleet. 

In 2023, the Russian navy added just 6,300 tons to its total tonnage, ending the year with warships totalling 2,152,000 tons. The Russians would have added 17,700 tons last year through the new construction of a new frigate, corvettes, a minesweeper and a few submarines, but Ukrainian missiles and drones destroyed vessels together weighing 11,400 tons.

In losing nearly as much tonnage as it built in 2023, the Russian navy joins an exclusive and embarrassing club of stagnating navies that, startlingly, also includes the 886,000-ton – and shrinking – Royal Navy. In recent years, the British fleet has been decommissioning more and bigger vessels than it builds.

For the Russians, it mostly comes down to strategy, money … and engines. Big ships are expensive – and unnecessary for a country whose main strategic ambitions lie along its land border. The Russians still build plenty of modern nuclear-powered submarines and can deploy them to deter direct conflict with a major foe. Given that safeguard, a globally-deploying surface fleet is a luxury.

Which is fortunate for Russia’s leaders, as it’s not clear Russian industry could build big new warships even if it had the money to do so and a clear reason to try. Prior to 2014, Russian shipbuilders imported most of their large maritime engines from Ukraine. It should go without saying they no longer do so.

Lacking a source of new engines, it’s much easier for Russia to restore an old battlecruiser than to build a new one from scratch. It actually helps that Admiral Nakhimov has a nuclear powerplant, as Russian industry still manages to build and maintain those on its own.

When the last big Soviet ships finally sail for the last time, the Russian navy will become a mostly coastal navy – albeit one with a powerful undersea deterrent. Even if Admiral Nakhimov does rejoin the fleet and deploys a few more times, she’ll only delay that inevitability.

December 6, 2024 Posted by | Russia, wastes | Leave a comment

Ironic Dependency: Russian Uranium and the US Energy Market

November 27, 2024, by: Dr Binoy Kampmark,  https://theaimn.com/ironic-dependency-russian-uranium-and-the-us-energy-market/

Be careful who you condemn and ostracise. They just might be supplying you with a special need. While the United States security establishment deems Russia the devil incarnate helped along by aspiring, mischief–making China, that devil continues supplying the US energy market with enriched uranium.

This dependency has irked the self-sufficiency patriots in Washington, especially those keen to break Russia’s firm hold in this field. That, more than any bleeding-heart sentimentality for Ukrainian suffering at the hands of the Russian Army, has taken precedence. For that reason, US lawmakers sought a ban on Russian uranium that would come into effect by January 1, 2028, by which time domestic uranium enrichment and conversion is meant to have reached sustainable levels.

The May 2024 Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, signed by President Joe Biden as law H.R.1042, specifically bans unirradiated low-enriched uranium produced in Russia or by any Russian entity from being imported into the US. It also bars the importation of unirradiated low-enriched uranium that has been swapped for the banned uranium or otherwise obtained in circumstances designed to bypass the restrictions.

At the time, Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm struck a note of hollering triumphalism. “Our nation’s clean energy future will not rely on Russian imports,” she declared. “We are making investments to build out a secure nuclear fuel supply chain here in the United States. That means American jobs supporting the Biden-Harris Administration’s commitment to a clean, safe, and secure energy economy.”

This does not get away from current circumstances, which see Russia’s provision of some 27% of enrichment service purchases for US utilities. The Russian state-owned company Rosatom is alone responsible for arranging imports of low-enriched uranium into the US market at some 3 million SWU (Separative Work Units) annually. Alexander Uranov, who heads the Russian analytical service Atominfo Center, puts this figure into perspective: that amount would be the equivalent of the annual uranium consumption rate of 20 large reactors.

Given this reliance, some legroom has been given to those in the industry by means of import waivers. H.R.1042 grants the Department of Energy the power to waive the ban in cases where there is no alternative viable source of low-enriched uranium available to enable the continued operation of a nuclear reactor or US nuclear energy company and in cases where importing the uranium would be in the national interest.

The utility Constellation, which is the largest operator of US nuclear reactors, along with the US enrichment trader, Centrus, have received waivers. The latter also has on its book of supply, the Russian state-owned company Tenex, its largest provider of low-enriched uranium as part of a 2011 contract.

No doubt knowing such a state of play, Moscow announced this month that it would temporarily ban the export of low-enriched uranium to the US as an amendment to Government Decree No 313 (March 9, 2022). The decree covers imports “to the United States or under foreign trade contracts concluded with persons registered in the jurisdiction of the United States.”

According to the Russian government, such a decision was made “on the instructions of the President in response to the restriction imposed by the United States for 2024-2027, and from 2028 – a ban on the import of Russian uranium products.” Vladimir Putin had accordingly given instructions in September “to analyse the possibility of restricting supplies to foreign markets of strategic raw materials.” The Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom confirmed that the ban was a “tit-for-tat response to actions of the US authorities” and would not affect the delivery of Russian uranium to other countries.

In a Russian government post on Telegram, the ban is qualified. To make matters less severe, there will be, for instance, one-time licenses issued by the Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control. This is of cold comfort to the likes of Centrus, given that most of its revenue is derived from importing the enriched uranium before then reselling it. On being notified by Tenex that its general license to export the uranium to the US had been rescinded, the scramble was on to seek a specific export license for remaining shipments in 2024 and those scheduled to take place in 2025.

In a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Centrus warned that any failure by Tenex “to secure export licences for our pending or future orders […] would affect our ability to meet our delivery obligations to our customers and would have a material adverse effect on our business, results in operations, and competitive position.” While Tenex had contacted Centrus of its plans to secure the required export licenses in a timely manner, a sense of pessimism was hard to dispel as “there is no certainty whether such licenses will be issued by the Russian authorities and if issued, whether they will be issued in a timely manner.” The sheer, sweet irony of it all.

November 29, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Uranium, USA | Leave a comment

Russia Prepares to Respond to the Armageddon Wanted by the Biden Administration

by Thierry Meyssan, Voltaire Network | Paris (France) | 26 November 2024

Russia has deployed thousands of North Korean soldiers to defend its Kursk region, attacked in August by Ukrainian integral nationalists.

Washington considers this fact as a development of the war it has been waging since 1950, despite a ceasefire, against the Korean and Chinese communists, even more than as a development of the one it has been waging through Ukrainian proxy against Russia since 2022. It therefore responded on November 19 by guiding six ATACMS (Army TACtical Missile System) missiles that it had given to kyiv against Russia [1]. They were directed not only against the Kursk Oblast, but also against the Bryansk Oblast, where they failed to hit an ammunition depot. London, for its part, decided on November 21 to guide the Storm Shadow missiles it gave to kyiv in the same way. All of the allied missiles were destroyed in flight by Russian anti-aircraft defense.

On the contrary, Moscow considers the Kursk attack as a continuation of the CIA’s secret war in Ukraine and as the one organized in the 1950s against the USSR, both with the support of Stepan Bandera’s Ukrainian integral nationalists.

The West does not understand these events because it has forgotten Beijing’s support for Pyongyang, wrongly thinks that Kursk and Bryansk are in Ukraine and ignores the secret war during which the Anglo-Saxons allied themselves with the last Nazis (which means that it also did not understand the objective of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine).

ATACMS missiles can be fired from HIMARS mobile launchers. The latest models have a range of 300 kilometers and fly at an altitude of 50,000 meters. The latest versions of the Storm Shadow missiles, on the other hand, have a range of about 400 kilometers. None can therefore reach deep into Russia.

Russia has a wide range of responses to allied attacks……………………………… On November 19, it modified its nuclear doctrine, leaving open the option of a nuclear response. Finally, it can make use of its military dominance. Ukraine announced that, on November 20, Moscow had fired a long-range ballistic missile (i.e. capable of reaching the United States from Russia), RS-26 Rubezh. We now know that it was something else.

Unbeknownst to us, the battlefields of Ukraine and the Middle East have already come together, as the US neoconservatives (the Straussians), the Israeli “revisionist Zionists” [3]; and the Ukrainian “integral nationalists” [4] have allied themselves once again, as in the Second World War. These three groups, historically linked to the Tripatite Axis, are in favor of a final confrontation. The only ones missing are the Japanese militarists of the new Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba.

Immediately after the launch of the US ATACMS missiles and even before that of the British Storm Shadows, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree promulgating his country’s new nuclear doctrine that he had announced on September 24 [5]. It authorizes the use of nuclear weapons in five new cases:
1) if reliable information is received about the launch of ballistic missiles targeting the territory of Russia or its allies.

2) if nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction strike the territory of Russia or its allies, or are used to strike Russian military units or installations abroad.
3) if the impact of an enemy on the Russian government or military installations is of critical importance that could undermine the capability of a retaliatory nuclear strike.
4) if aggression against Russia or Belarus with conventional weapons poses a serious threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
5) if reliable information is received about the takeoff or launch of strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic vehicles or other flying vehicles and their crossing of the Russian border……………………………………………………………………………………..more https://www.voltairenet.org/article221540.html

November 29, 2024 Posted by | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

White House finally confirms greenlight for deep Russia strikes

 https://www.rt.com/news/608194-us-admits-russia-strikes/ 25 Nov 24

Ukraine can use ATACMS to strike in the vicinity of Kursk Region, John Kirby has said

Washington on Monday officially confirmed a well-flagged policy change allowing Ukraine to strike inside Russia using US-supplied ATACMS missiles.

Numerous international officials have spoken about the change in stance over the past week. While US President Joe Biden and his administration remained silent, Kiev fired a volley of ATACMS projectiles at Russia’s Bryansk Region last Monday.

“They are able to use ATACMS to defend themselves in an immediate-need basis,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters at a White House briefing on Monday.

“We did change the guidance and gave them guidance that they can use them to strike these particular types of targets,” Kirby said, referring to the Ukrainian attacks “in and around Kursk.”

The US and its allies have provided increasingly powerful weapons systems to Kiev since 2022, while maintaining that it does not make them a party to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons would change the character of the hostilities and make NATO a direct participant. He explained that weapons such as the ATACMS or the UK-supplied Storm Shadow cannot be deployed by Kiev’s forces without the participation of NATO military personnel.

Moscow’s response came last Thursday, when a brand-new hypersonic ballistic missile, the Oreshnik, was used against the Yuzhmash military-industrial complex in Dnepropetrovsk. Putin called it a “combat test” of the new weapon and said such tests would continue depending on circumstances.

November 27, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Russia’s Revised Nuclear Doctrine and the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War

RUSSIAN and EURASIAN POLITICS, by Gordonhahn, November 21, 2024

In response to the escalating NATO-Ukrainian threat to Russia’s national security, embodied most recently and intensively by the U.S., British, and French use of their own missiles on pre-2022 Russian territory (outside Crimea, annexed in 2014), Moscow adopted and activated into law a revised Nuclear Doctrine (ND) on November 19th.

The original decision to revise Russia’s ND and, indeed, lower the threshold for use came in September when NATO countries first began discussing the use of ATACMs, Storm Shadows, Scalp, etc., which can only be fired with the participation of U.S., British, and/or French officers, making them and their countries direct combatants in a war against Russia, as Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the time and quite logically so.

This and the timing in which the September discussion was revived in November at the same time completion of the ND revisions was expected gives evidence to the fact that this Western course and escalations in the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War is the driver of the ND revisions.

Similarly, NATO-Ukraine’s use on November 18-19 of ATACMs and Storm Shadows by NATO against targets on Russian territory proper (Bryansk and Kursk) internationally recognized demonstrate how several stipulations in the new doctrine are intended by the Kremlin to address the escalation by NATO to direct involvement by its officers’ control over the launch and attack process of such missiles. Moreover, there are indications that conditions are now such that, according to the new doctrine, Russia’s use of nuclear weapons against Ukrainian, American, British, and French targets is justifiable and thus, regretfully, feasible.

Much of the discussion around the ND revisions centers around Articles 9-12. They address the security problem posed to Russia by the NATO-Ukraine alliance and the war it sparked with Russia. Articles 9-10 note: “9. Nuclear deterrence is also carried out against States that provide their controlled territory, air and/or sea space and resources for the preparation and implementation of aggression against the Russian Federation. 10. Aggression of any state from the military coalition (bloc, union) against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies is considered as aggression of this coalition (bloc, union) as a whole” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, pp. 2-3).

These new articles are a result of, and a response to NATO countries various forms of support for Ukraine, particularly its invasion into Kursk as well as drome and missile attacks on numerous Russian regions, aside from Crimea and the four Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia.

Several subsequent Articles in Russia’s revised ND reduce the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate just how close we are approaching said threshold, as far as the Kremlin is concerned. In many ways, these specific Articles constitute the core of the warning that Putin’s decision to revise the ND is; the revision of the ND is an exercise of nuclear deterrence in and of itself.

Much attention has been focused on Article 11 and properly so. It stipulates: “Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear State with the participation or support of a nuclear State is considered as their joint attack” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, p. 3). This is indeed crucial because it attributes joint responsibility to NATO’s non-nuclear states and Ukraine along with NATO’s nuclear powers – the U.S., UK, and France.

Thus, Ukraine is tied to the potential nuclear threat to Russia or Belarus posed by the three leading NATO states. Kiev is placed on the nuclear escalatory ladder and targeted for nuclear deterrence, given the implied nuclear threat it poses by putting Russia into conflict and ever greater conflict with NATO and its nuclear powers. 

The November 21st Russian attack on Dnipro, Kiev using a new intermediate range ballistic conventional not nuclear missile among others, was an exercise in deterrence if implied, if you will. This attack was in accordance with Article 11’s attribution of joint responsibility for Ukraine and NATO and its nuclear powers. Article 12 states: “Nuclear deterrence is aimed at ensuring that a potential adversary understands the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75598, p. 3). The invocation of inevitable retaliation is particularly chilling in light of the Russian ND’s Article 11 and the November 21st Russian attack on Dnipro—already a nuclear deterrence attack sans the nuclear warhead.

In response to the use of six ATACMs, the Russians deployed a new hypersonic, intermediate-range missile with a conventional but still unclear explosive charge, as noted above. In seeming proportion to the six ATACMs, the new Russian missile attacked in 6 waves each with 6 missiles, suggesting a multiple conventional warhead. There is speculation that there was no explosive, the attack having been a test, or detonation occurred deep underground (www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVrLEcxI7Wc&t=933s, at the 1:30 mark). Putin addressed the nation and the world after the Dnipro attack to explain Russia’s deterrence goal while again offering negotiations to end the war. He noted: ……………………………………………………………………………………………..

The upshot of all this, again, is that we are moving closer to scenarios in which Putin or a less cautious successor might choose to use a tactical nuclear weapon in order to end such threats as enumerated above or deter their further posing. 

 I do not think that Putin, who is an extremely rational and cautious actor, will opt to use even a single tactical nuclear weapon, unless a situation, say, like the one in Kursk should drastically deteriorate from the Russian point of view: for example, if by some miracle Ukraine’s forces in Kursk were somehow to regroup and be approaching the Kursk nuclear power plant and/or nuclear weapons storage facility. 

But the actual situation on the ground is quite the reverse. Ukrainian forces are being or have been surrounded, depending on which one is talking about, and are likely to be fully destroyed or mostly destroyed during a hasty retreat. Thus, the ATACMs may be a way to ensure an open extraction corridor, and little more when it comes to Kursk. 

But the attack on Bryansk suggests a more expansive NATO-Ukraine agenda for the missiles. Since NATO has consistently escalated its involvement in terms of weapons deployments to Kiev, we can expect a similar escalation regarding the use of the ATACMs and other missiles. Putin will match them every step up the way. He may be forced to rise up the escalatory ladder more rapidly, given mounting public and elite pressure to get tough and fight a war instead of his ‘special military operation.’ https://gordonhahn.com/2024/11/21/russias-revised-nuclear-doctrine-and-the-nato-russia-ukrainian-war/

November 24, 2024 Posted by | politics, Russia | Leave a comment

The enriched uranium market is all at sea, with USA the largest importer of Russian material

 Five days after Russia imposed tit-for-tat restrictions on exports of
enriched uranium to the US, a 14-year old vessel remains anchored outside
the port of Saint Petersburg, its crew presumably unsure whether the
radioactive cargo they were due to collect for a US-based client can still
be shipped.

Moscow’s new measures, announced on Friday, come with
caveats. Just as US import restrictions introduced in May still allow
companies to seek waivers allowing uranium shipments when they can’t
obtain supplies elsewhere, so the Russians “didn’t say they’re
outright ending all deliveries to the US,” says Jonathan Hinze, president
of UxC, a consultancy specialising in the nuclear industry.

Russia’s cash requirements and control of almost half of global enrichment capacity,
coupled with the energy needs of the world’s biggest economy, mean “the
US stands out conspicuously as the largest importer of Russian material,
both prior to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and since,” writes Darya
Dolzikova, a research fellow at Royal United Services Institute.

 FT 20th Nov 2024,
https://www.ft.com/content/ec09bcff-3771-4679-b0d0-4ec7062b7072

November 24, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, Russia, Uranium | Leave a comment

Biden Authorizes Ukrainian Long-Range Strikes Into Russia Using ATACMS Missiles – Reports

Ilya Tsukanov, 17 Nov 24,  https://sputnikglobe.com/20241117/biden-authorizes-ukrainian-long-range-strikes-into-russia-using-atacms-missiles—reports-1120914282.html

The US and its allies spent months debating whether or not to give Ukraine the go-ahead to use its NATO-provided long-range strike systems to target Russia. In September, President Putin warned that allowing Kiev to use its Western long-range missiles on Russia would mean NATO’s direct participation in a war against the Russian Federation.

President Biden has signed off on the Ukrainian military’s use of US-made ATACMS missiles to try to help defend its faltering positions in Ukrainian-occupied areas of Russia’s Kursk region, the New York Times reported on Sunday, citing US officials apprized of the situation.

The US and its allies spent months debating whether or not to give Ukraine the go-ahead to use its NATO-provided long-range strike systems to target Russia. In September, President Putin warned that allowing Kiev to use its Western long-range missiles on Russia would mean NATO’s direct participation in a war against the Russian Federation.

President Biden has signed off on the Ukrainian military’s use of US-made ATACMS missiles to try to help defend its faltering positions in Ukrainian-occupied areas of Russia’s Kursk region, the New York Times reported on Sunday, citing US officials apprized of the situation.

Officials told the newspaper that they “do not expect the shift” in policy “to fundamentally alter the course of the war” (NYT’s phrasing), and indicated that Biden could further authorize Kiev to use the weapons in directions besides Kursk in the future.

Washington reportedly expects the ATACMS to be used to strike troop concentrations, military equipment, logistics, ammunition depots and supply lines, all with the goal of “blunt[ing] the effectiveness” of the ongoing Russian military operation to clear Kursk of Ukrainian forces.

According to NYT’s information, some Pentagon officials opposed delivering the missile systems to Ukraine in the first place due to the US Army’s limited supply. Others reportedly expressed fears that their delivery and use could escalate the conflict and even prompt direct Russian retaliation against US and NATO forces – something President Putin has explicitly warned about.

The ATACMS go-ahead also appears to be connected to to the increasingly dire situation for Ukrainian forces across the front, with US officials said to have become “increasingly concerned” about the Ukrainian army being “stretched thin by simultaneous Russian assaults in the east, Kharkov and now Kursk.”

President-elect Trump’s statements about seeking to quickly end the conflict have also reportedly weighed in the outgoing administration’s decision, NYT said.

November 18, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Putin Tells German Leader That Ukraine Peace Deal Possible

Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz for the first time in two years on Friday

by Kyle Anzalone November 15, 2024  https://news.antiwar.com/2024/11/15/putin-tells-german-leader-that-ukraine-peace-deal-possible/

Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and offered to end the war in Ukraine. The Russian leader offered a deal similar to one proposed by Moscow in June.

On Friday, Scholz spoke with Putin for the first time in nearly two years. According to the Kremlin, “The Russian president noted that the Russian side has never refused and remains open to the resumption of the negotiations that were interrupted by the Kiev regime.” Adding, “Russia’s proposals are well known and outlined, in particular, in a June speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry.”

In that speech, Putin said that if Ukrainian forces withdrew from all Russian annexed territory, adopted a position of neutrality between NATO and Russia, agreed to denazification and demilitarization of the country, and the lifting of all Western sanctions on Moscow, then Russia would bring the war to an end.

Scholz’s spokesman said that the German and Russian leaders agreed to remain in contact. The official added that Scholz “condemned the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and called on President Putin to end it and withdraw his troops.” He also told Putin, Berlin maintains “steadfast determination” to support Ukraine for “as long as is necessary.”

Throughout the Joe Biden administration, the West has refused to talk with Moscow about core national security issues. The refusal to negotiate throughout 2021, led Putin to invade Ukraine in the beginning of 2022. After the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine, a deal was nearly reached, but Kiev has been pushed away from negotiations by its Western backers.

After over two and a half years of war, Kiev is struggling to find the manpower to continue the fight while losing territory to the Russian military. Though NATO countries pledged to give Ukraine everything it needed to win the war, Washington has refused to provide Ukraine with advanced weapons and long-range missiles Kiev says it needs to achieve a victory.

November 18, 2024 Posted by | politics international, Russia, Ukraine | Leave a comment

‘Russia doesn’t want to use nuclear weapons’: The view from wartime Moscow

Putin is revising Russia’s nuclear doctrine at a critical juncture in Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Aljazeera, By Niko Vorobyov, 7 Oct 2024

Russia, which holds the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear warheads, has unveiled its new nuclear doctrine, lowering its threshold for nuclear engagement while continuing its invasion of Ukraine.

The revised rules, outlined by President Vladimir Putin, say that an attack on Russia with “participation or support of a nuclear power” will be seen as their “joint attack on the Russian Federation”, seemingly responding to the possibility that Ukraine could strike targets deep within Russian territory using long-range weapons supplied by Western allies.

The United States, Ukraine’s most important ally, is the world’s second-largest nuclear power, with 5,224 warheads compared to Russia’s 5,889.

Alexey Malinin, the Moscow-based founder of the Center for International Interaction and Cooperation, told Al Jazeera that from the Russian perspective, a reassessment of nuclear capabilities was necessary in the face of encirclement by hostile powers.

But as panic sets in across some Western nations, Russian experts say Moscow does not want to tap into its arsenal.

“Russia does not want to use nuclear weapons, understanding the seriousness of the consequences of a conflict with the use of such weapons,” he said.

“However, at present, our country is forced to respond to the growing threats directed against us. The West continues to pump Ukraine with weapons, including F-16 fighters and long-range missiles like [US-made] ATACMS. Moreover, NATO is developing its infrastructure around the borders of Russia: new units are being created in Finland.”

He claimed that although Russia is trying to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, Moscow is “forced to demonstrate” that it is ready to defend “integrity and sovereignty” by any possible means”.

However, Kremlin critics worry that Putin is pushing closer towards, if not a nuclear apocalypse, then at least a regional humanitarian disaster.

“The USSR said that it would never strike first … Now Putin says that he will strike whenever he wants,” exiled politician Leonid Gozman wrote in the Novaya Gazeta newspaper…………………………..

During the Cold War, both Washington and Moscow operated on the principle of mutually assured destruction, the understanding that a nuclear strike from one side would prompt a response in kind, leading to an all-out atomic altercation and mass devastation on a global scale.

However, Putin is warning that Russia would use nuclear weapons in response to a “critical threat to our sovereignty” – referring to not necessarily a nuclear assault, but also a conventional one.

Alexandra, an everyday Russian in Moscow who works as an architect, told Al Jazeera: “I’m scared, but I don’t understand much of what’s going on.”

The Russian government and its supporters believe they are sending a strong signal to Ukraine’s Western allies, warning against interfering in the conflict.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has warned the UN that should the West allow Ukraine to strike further into Russia, it will be dragging itself into a “suicidal escapade”.

“Whether or not they will provide the permission for Ukraine for long-range weapons, then we will see what their understanding was of what they heard,” he said recently.

Washington has recently greenlit additional aid for Ukraine, but permission to use US-supplied weapons does not yet go beyond what was previously agreed.

Writing on Telegram, the hawkish former President Dmitry Medvedev stated the new doctrine “could cool the passions of those opponents who have not yet lost their sense of self-preservation.”…………
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/7/russia-doesnt-want-to-use-nuclear-weapons-the-view-from-wartime-moscow

October 9, 2024 Posted by | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Russia intercepts drone near Kursk, no damage to nuclear plant, governor says

By Reuters, October 4, 2024

MOSCOW, Oct 3 (Reuters) – Russian forces intercepted a Ukrainian drone on Thursday near the Russian town of Kurchatov but there was no damage to the nearby Kursk nuclear power plant, the regional governor said.

Governor Alexei Smirnov said debris from the drone caused explosions in a building unrelated to the plant.

Several Russian Telegram channels earlier reported the alleged Ukrainian attack, which they said had been thwarted by air defences but had resulted in a fire several miles from the nuclear plant…………………………

Rafael Grossi, head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, visited the nuclear plant on Aug. 27 and said it was especially vulnerable to a serious accident because it lacks a protective dome that could shield it from missiles, drones or artillery. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-intercepts-drone-near-kursk-no-damage-nuclear-plant-governor-says-2024-10-03/

October 5, 2024 Posted by | Russia, safety | Leave a comment

Russia revisits nuclear doctrine to allow attacks on non-nuclear states in response to Western weapons in Ukraine.

By Heloise Vyas,  https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-26/russia-revises-nuclear-weapons-laws-warning-united-states/104398414

In short:

Vladimir Putin has unveiled changes to conditions surrounding Russia’s use of nuclear weapons which he says will be put into effect if there was “reliable information” about a large-scale enemy attack.

The updated doctrine includes a widening of the threats under which Russia would consider a nuclear strike, including retaliating against conventional weapons.

What’s next?

Russian President Vladimir Putin has broadened the remit of his nuclear doctrine to fend off Western-supported attacks in the Ukraine war, threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed nations even if not attacked by them.

During a meeting with Russia’s Security Council on Wednesday, local time, he outlined three key changes to the Kremlin’s official nuclear doctrine — signed in 2020 — as a response to ongoing deliberations in the United States and Britain about permitting Ukraine to fire long-range missiles into Russian territory.

Mr Putin said under the lowered threshold, Russia could deploy nuclear bombs even if it was struck with conventional weapons, and that Moscow would consider any assault on it supported by a nuclear power to be a “joint attack”. 

Russia reserved the right to also use nuclear weapons if it or ally Belarus were the subject of aggression, including by conventional weapons, he added.

The 71-year-old, who is the primary decision-maker on Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, said he wanted to underscore one key change in particular.

“It is proposed that aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear state, be considered as their joint attack on the Russian Federation,” Mr Putin said in his opening remarks to the council.

He said the new rules would be effectuated if Russia detected a large-scale launch of enemy missiles, aircraft or drones was coming its way: “The conditions for Russia’s transition to the use of nuclear weapons are also clearly fixed.”

Mr Putin said the clarifications were carefully calibrated and commensurate with the modern military threats facing Russia — confirmation that the nuclear doctrine was changing.

The implications

Russia’s warning to the West comes amid Ukrainian pleas to fire long-range weapons (many already in its possession) into Russia, including British Storm Shadows and American ATACMS ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy argues these will help hit vital military depots with precision, but the US has trodden carefully, fearing such a move would escalate the war and pit NATO in direct conflict with Russia. 

Russia has previously provoked war with NATO, accusing the US and European nations of de facto participation in the conflict, but has not come as far as spelling out changes to the use of its nuclear arsenal. Earlier this month it said it was considering updating the doctrine.

With Ukraine losing key towns to gradually advancing Russian forces in the country’s east, the war is entering what Russian officials say is the most dangerous phase to date.

Western aid for Kyiv has remained steady, with the US pledging a further $375 million in aid on Thursday, although it is unclear what bearing Mr Putin’s nuclear threat will have on considerations of long-range weapon restrictions. 

Many view Russia brandishing its nuclear sabre as little more than a bluff, but some analysts say it is “because of and not in spite of” the fact that Moscow has repeatedly held its nuclear arsenals over Western heads that leaders should take these threats seriously.

Russia’s current published nuclear doctrine, set out in a 2020 decree by Mr Putin, says it may use nuclear weapons in case of a nuclear attack by an enemy or a conventional attack that threatens the existence of the state.

The innovations outlined include a widening of the threats under which Russia would consider a nuclear strike, the inclusion of ally Belarus under the nuclear umbrella, and the idea that a rival nuclear power supporting a conventional strike on Russia would also be considered to be attacking it.

Nuclear-armed states that could be drawn into this include France, the United Kingdom, Israel and most crucially the US, which along with Russia controls 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear warheads. 

China, Pakistan, India, and North Korea possess the remainder, but neither has actively been involved in the Ukraine war. A further 32 states also either host nuclear weapons or endorse their use.

Ukraine is neither a nuclear state, nor a part of NATO, but is backed by the alliance.

How has Russia’s threat been received?

Mr Zelenskyy has urged the West to disregard Russia’s so-called “red lines”, and some Western allies have also urged the US to do just that.

“Russia no longer has any instruments to intimidate the world apart from nuclear blackmail,” Andrey Yermak, Mr Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, said in response to the Russian president’s Wednesday remarks. 

“These instruments will not work.”

Mr Putin, who casts the West as a decadent aggressor, and US President Joe Biden, who casts Russia as a corrupt autocracy and Mr Putin as a killer, have both warned that a direct Russia-NATO confrontation could escalate into World War III. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has also warned of the risk of nuclear war.

In his comments to Russia’s Security Council, a type of modern-day politburo of Mr Putin’s most powerful officials including influential hawks, he said work on amendments to changing the doctrine had been going on for the past year.

“The nuclear triad remains the most important guarantee of ensuring the security of our state and citizens, an instrument for maintaining strategic parity and balance of power in the world,” he said.

Russia, he said, would consider using nuclear weapons “upon receiving reliable information about the massive launch of aerospace attack vehicles and their crossing of our state border, meaning strategic or tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft”.

No explicit laws restraining nuclear weapons use

Casualties from a nuclear war between Russia and the US could reach tens of millions, with even a single bomb having the capacity to wipe out about 580,000 people, according to estimates from the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. 

US-Russian arms control agreements also classify “tactical” nuclear weapons, which are presented as having smaller yield, and are intended for battlefield use as opposed to strategic weapons fired across vast distances.

But even these smaller warheads are hugely destructive and comparable in strength with the two atomic bombs dropped by the US in Japan during World War Two which killed about 210,000 people.

In 2022, Washington was so concerned about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia that it warned Mr Putin about the consequences of using them, according to Central Intelligence Agency director Bill Burns.

The two-and-a-half-year Ukraine war has triggered the gravest confrontation between Russia and the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis — considered to be the closest the two Cold War superpowers came to intentional nuclear war.

Internationally, little power exists to prevent nuclear powers invoking the use of their arsenals.

The UN’s Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons does formally push for nuclear disarmament and outlaws the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons but neither Russia nor the US is a part of it.

The Netherlands is also the only NATO member participating in the treaty.

October 2, 2024 Posted by | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine Change Is More Cautious Than It May Appear

What’s new in the proposed update is the suggestion that a non-nuclear state could be the primary aggressor without being formally allied with a nuclear-armed state. ……………….

This shift in the doctrine seems to be crafted with the current geopolitical situation in mind, particularly Russia’s framing of the Ukraine conflict and its relationship with the United States and its allies.….

Long-Range Strikes May Not Be a Silver Bullet…………

By Maxim Trudolyubov on September 27, 2024,  https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-nuclear-doctrine-change-more-cautious-it-may-appear

In a recent discussion on Russia’s nuclear doctrine, President Vladimir Putin announced an expansion of the categories of states and military alliances that would fall under Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy. “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, with the participation or support of a nuclear state, will be treated as a joint attack on the Russian Federation,” Putin stated during the public segment of a recent meeting of Russia’s Security Council.

While the official document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” has yet to be updated, experts suggest that the timing of this announcement serves as a clear warning to Ukraine. Currently, Ukraine is seeking approval from the United States to use Western long-range missiles against targets deeper within Russian territory.

Putin’s wording is explicit: the “non-nuclear state” in question is Ukraine, while the “nuclear state” providing support or participating in an attack is primarily the United States, though this could also extend to the United Kingdom and France.

U.S. officials believe such strikes could lead to a significant escalation, potentially drawing NATO into direct confrontation with Russia. Moscow has consistently warned Western countries that any attacks on its territory would be seen as acts of war. This cautious stance by the United States has led to public frustration among some American allies in Europe. 

Both France and Britain have indicated a willingness to approve such strikes for Ukraine, but they are waiting for Washington’s decision as a benchmark. The UK and France produce and supply their own missiles, but they use guiding technology developed by the United States. “It would be really good to stop the delays. And I think that the restrictions on the use of weapons should be lifted,” said Mette Frederiksen, prime minister of Denmark, in an interview with Bloomberg. 

What the New Language Actually Means

Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher on weapons of mass destruction at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, notes that Russia’s current nuclear doctrine does not clearly distinguish between aggression from nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states. Instead, any aggression that “threatens the existence of the state” could potentially provoke a nuclear response.

At first glance, the proposed change does not sound like a tectonic shift. Since 1995, Russia has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states unless they act “in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.” The Russian authorities at the time operated on an assumption that any such situation would involve a nuclear-armed state as the primary aggressor, with non-nuclear states in a supporting role.

What’s new in the proposed update is the suggestion that a non-nuclear state could be the primary aggressor without being formally allied with a nuclear-armed state. The language implies that a non-nuclear state’s aggression could be seen as part of a broader campaign involving a nuclear-armed state, thereby justifying a nuclear response. This shift in the doctrine seems to be crafted with the current geopolitical situation in mind, particularly Russia’s framing of the Ukraine conflict and its relationship with the United States and its allies.

“The new language suggests that a non-nuclear weapon state might be an aggressor,” Podvig says. “Apparently, the idea behind the change is to say that this ‘association’ would make the nuclear weapons state that provides this support an aggressor too. It’s the ‘joint attack’ language.”

During the Security Council meeting Putin also said that Russia could resort to nuclear weapons on receiving “reliable information” indicating a large-scale aerial attack involving aircraft, missiles, and drones. Additionally, Moscow would treat an attack on its ally Belarus as an attack on Russia itself, potentially responding with nuclear force to defend Belarus.

On closer examination, Putin’s remarks reflect a more cautious approach than may initially seem. While the rhetoric implies a potential broadening of scenarios in which Russia might consider nuclear deterrence, it does not represent a fundamental departure from the country’s long-standing policies. However, the language remains vague: it fails to define what constitutes an “association” or clarify precisely against whom a nuclear strike might be directed. 

Long-Range Strikes May Not Be a Silver Bullet

There are doubts within the policy and expert communities about whether long-range strikes on Russian territory would be a decisive factor in the war. To achieve a significant breakthrough, Ukraine would need to coordinate large-scale ground maneuvers in tandem with these strikes—something its forces have yet to demonstrate. “In its summer 2023 offensive, the Ukrainian military showed no ability to coordinate forces on anything like the scale needed for a decisive breakthrough. Longer-range weapons would make this coordination even more complicated,” writes Stephen Biddle, professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University, in a piece for Foreign Affairs

Biddle highlights the limitations and challenges of deep strikes in the current context. Such strikes are costly and require precision guidance, which can quickly lose effectiveness as the opposing side adapts.

The historical record on longer-range strikes is not encouraging, notes Biddle. Historically, even large-scale strategic bombing campaigns, including strikes aimed at German and Japanese cities during World War II and North-Korean cities during the Korean War, have not succeeded in breaking the resolve of the targeted country. Additionally, the military benefits of diverting Russian efforts into air defense or disrupting weapons production would require an extensive, sustained campaign that Ukraine is not currently equipped to carry out.

All Eyes on U.S. Voters

The wait for a decision on allowing Ukraine to carry out long-range strikes on Russian territory is closely tied to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. The two candidates have contrasting views on the Russo-Ukrainian war, which makes the future U.S. stance uncertain. One candidate may push for greater support for Ukraine, potentially approving the use of advanced Western missiles for strikes deeper into Russia, while the other could advocate a more cautious approach, prioritizing de-escalation or negotiations.

This political uncertainty leaves European allies, Ukrainian policymakers, and even Moscow in a holding pattern. For now, decision-makers are watching the United States closely, understanding that the future of support for Ukraine’s military capabilities—and the overall direction of the war—will largely hinge on the results of the upcoming election.

October 2, 2024 Posted by | politics international, Russia | Leave a comment