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German nuclear plant to be replaced by Europe’s biggest battery.

PreussenElektra, operator of the decommissioned Brokdorf nuclear power
plant in northern German state Schleswig-Holstein, which was taken offline
at the end of 2021, wants to transform the site into a power storage
facility, reports NDR.

Initial plans could see a 100-megawatts (MW) battery
plant operating on a site close to the nuclear power station in 2026. A
second phase would add 700-megawatts of capacity, hosted on the 12-hectare
site of the nuclear power plant itself. (No storage duration was cited).
The company hopes to have the entire project online in 2036, but is waiting
for authorisation to begin dismantling the decommissioned reactor.

 Renew Economy 15th Dec 2023

German nuclear plant to be replaced by Europe’s biggest battery

December 16, 2023 Posted by | Germany, renewable | Leave a comment

The German Environment Agency shows that a global tripling of nuclear capacity by 2050 is neither realistic nor needed to achieve climate goals

This factsheet analyzes the role of nuclear energy in global climate
scenarios. It shows that a global tripling of nuclear capacity until 2050
is neither realistic nor is it needed to achieve climate targets according
to the Paris agreement.

The factsheet presents an analysis of nine global
climate scenarios that achieve climate targets according to the Paris
agreement as well as two non-target scenarios with an emphasis on the role
of nuclear energy.

In order to assess how realistic these top-down
scenarios are, it compares these figures with the plans and programs of
governments for the expansion (or phase out) of nuclear power.

A tripling of today’s nuclear capacity of 370 GW would require 1.110 GW net
electrical capacity to be operational in 2050. If we assume a very high
sixty year lifetime for all nuclear reactors in operation and under
construction today, roughly 210 GW of the current nuclear fleet would still
be online in 2050.

Thus, a total of nearly 900 GW would have to be
constructed additionally between 2024 and 2050. Assuming a linear increase
in the rate of new construction up to 2050, starting with the amount of new
nuclear connected to the grid in 2023, in 2050 more than 60 GW would need
to be connected to the grid to meet the tripling nuclear target, compare
Figure 10.

This would be approximately twice the maximum historic capacity
connected to the grid in a single year. On average, more new capacity would
have to be added every year over 25 years as was the case at the historical
maximum in 1985. From these numbers, it is evident, that a tripling of
nuclear capacity until 2050 is neither realistic nor is it needed to
achieve climate targets according to the Paris agreement.

 German Environment 30th Nov 2023

Click to access factsheet_nuclear_in_international_energy_scenarios.pdf


8 Dec 23 https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/11850/publikationen/factsheet_nuclear_in_international_energy_scenarios.pdf>

December 10, 2023 Posted by | climate change, Germany | Leave a comment

Disproportionately High Contributions of 60 Year Old Weapons-137Cs Explain the Persistence of Radioactive Contamination in Bavarian Wild Boars

Environmental Science and Technology, Felix Stäger, Dorian Zok, Anna-Katharina Schiller,    American Chemical Society, ACS Publications 30th Aug 2023

Abstract

Radionuclides released from nuclear accidents or explosions pose long-term threats to ecosystem health. A prominent example is wild boar contamination in central Europe, which is notorious for its persistently high 137Cs levels. However, without reliable source identification, the origin of this decades old problem has been uncertain. Here, we target radiocesium contamination in wild boars from Bavaria. Our samples (2019–2021) range from 370 to 15,000 Bq·kg–1 137Cs, thus exceeding the regulatory limits (600 Bq·kg–1) by a factor of up to 25. Using an emerging nuclear forensic fingerprint, 135Cs/137Cs, we distinguished various radiocesium source legacies in their source composition. All samples exhibit signatures of mixing of Chornobyl and nuclear weapons fallout, with 135Cs/137Cs ratios ranging from 0.67 to 1.97. Although Chornobyl has been widely believed to be the prime source of 137Cs in wild boars, we find that “old” 137Cs from weapons fallout significantly contributes to the total level (10–68%) in those specimens that exceeded the regulatory limit. In some cases, weapons-137Cs alone can lead to exceedances of the regulatory limit, especially in samples with a relatively low total 137Cs level. Our findings demonstrate that the superposition of older and newer legacies of 137Cs can vastly surpass the impact of any singular yet dominant source and thus highlight the critical role of historical releases of 137Cs in current environmental pollution challenges.

Synopsis

Sixty years old 137Cs from nuclear weapons fallout contributes significantly to the notorious contamination levels in wild boars in Central Europe that were previously believed to be dominated by Chornobyl.

Introduction

In the face of climate change, nuclear energy is experiencing a renaissance as a low-carbon option to feed humanity’s hunger for energy. (1) However, the release of radionuclides into the environment from nuclear accidents or nuclear weapons fallout poses potential threats to public health and societies and economic activities as some radionuclides are capable of persistently contaminating the food chain, resulting in widespread and long-term risk of radiation exposure. (2,3) The fission product cesium-137 (137Cs, half-life T1/2 = 30.08 y) is a prominent example of such contaminants as it is ubiquitously present in the environment. It originates from the fallout of atmospheric nuclear explosions from the mid-20th century (weapons-137Cs) and nuclear accidents, most prominently the Chornobyl (4) and Fukushima (5,6) nuclear accidents (reactor-137Cs).

For safety regulations, many countries have employed strict regulatory limits for 137Cs levels in general food products (e.g., EU < 600 Bq·kg–1 and Japan: <100 Bq·kg–1). (7) However, although routine radiation surveillance provides essential quantitative information on 137Cs contamination levels, the attribution of a contamination to its origins remains poorly understood as the ubiquitous weapons-137Cs cannot be distinguished from any reactor-137Cs. This analytical challenge impedes the comprehensive understanding of the origin of environmental 137Cs contamination, which is a critical prerequisite for a quantitative assessment of the responsibilities for certain 137Cs legacies and the establishment of more targeted strategies for environmental remediation and protection. More than ever, with threats of nuclear strikes or accidental releases in the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war, it is now imperative to be able to identify the source of any release of 137Cs and evaluate their environmental consequences.

Synopsis

Sixty years old 137Cs from nuclear weapons fallout contributes significantly to the notorious contamination levels in wild boars in Central Europe that were previously believed to be dominated by Chornobyl.

Introduction

ARTICLE SECTIONS

Jump To

In the face of climate change, nuclear energy is experiencing a renaissance as a low-carbon option to feed humanity’s hunger for energy. (1) However, the release of radionuclides into the environment from nuclear accidents or nuclear weapons fallout poses potential threats to public health and societies and economic activities as some radionuclides are capable of persistently contaminating the food chain, resulting in widespread and long-term risk of radiation exposure. (2,3) The fission product cesium-137 (137Cs, half-life T1/2 = 30.08 y) is a prominent example of such contaminants as it is ubiquitously present in the environment. It originates from the fallout of atmospheric nuclear explosions from the mid-20th century (weapons-137Cs) and nuclear accidents, most prominently the Chornobyl (4) and Fukushima (5,6) nuclear accidents (reactor-137Cs). For safety regulations, many countries have employed strict regulatory limits for 137Cs levels in general food products (e.g., EU < 600 Bq·kg–1 and Japan: <100 Bq·kg–1). (7) However, although routine radiation surveillance provides essential quantitative information on 137Cs contamination levels, the attribution of a contamination to its origins remains poorly understood as the ubiquitous weapons-137Cs cannot be distinguished from any reactor-137Cs. This analytical challenge impedes the comprehensive understanding of the origin of environmental 137Cs contamination, which is a critical prerequisite for a quantitative assessment of the responsibilities for certain 137Cs legacies and the establishment of more targeted strategies for environmental remediation and protection. More than ever, with threats of nuclear strikes or accidental releases in the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war, it is now imperative to be able to identify the source of any release of 137Cs and evaluate their environmental consequences.

While isotopic signatures of actinides (e.g., uranium and plutonium) have been used successfully to distinguish the contributions between various sources, (8,9) radiocesium isotopic fingerprints have not yet been applied routinely for source identification. Cesium-135 is an ideal and long-lived candidate (T1/2 = 2.3 My) after a release, better suited than fast-fading 134Cs (T1/2 = 2.07 y). Also, the production mechanism of 135Cs provides more detailed information on the nuclear origin of a contamination, which hence allows attribution of a radiocesium contamination to its source via its distinct 135Cs/137Cs ratio. Its mother nuclide (135Xe) has a large cross-section for thermal neutron capture, resulting in suppressed onset of 135Cs under the high neutron flux density of a reactor core. (10) By contrast, despite the intense but short neutron flux at the moment of a nuclear explosion, 135Xe mostly “survives” the explosion because most primary fission products of the 135 isobar are 135Te and 135I, which have yet to decay to 135Xe. (11)

A nuclear explosion hence yields a relatively high 135Cs/137Cs ratio, whereas a reactor yields a low ratio. Nowadays, analytical protocols for commercial triple quadrupole inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-QQQ-MS) as well as thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) are available for the precise determination of 135Cs/137Cs, thus allowing the application of the 135Cs/137Cs ratio as an isotopic fingerprint in nuclear forensics and environmental tracing studies. (12−19) In any case, the application of 135Cs/137Cs as a forensic fingerprint is still far from routine as it requires meticulous chemical separation and sophisticated analytical procedures.

Synopsis

Sixty years old 137Cs from nuclear weapons fallout contributes significantly to the notorious contamination levels in wild boars in Central Europe that were previously believed to be dominated by Chornobyl.

Introduction

ARTICLE SECTIONS

Jump To

In the face of climate change, nuclear energy is experiencing a renaissance as a low-carbon option to feed humanity’s hunger for energy. (1) However, the release of radionuclides into the environment from nuclear accidents or nuclear weapons fallout poses potential threats to public health and societies and economic activities as some radionuclides are capable of persistently contaminating the food chain, resulting in widespread and long-term risk of radiation exposure. (2,3) The fission product cesium-137 (137Cs, half-life T1/2 = 30.08 y) is a prominent example of such contaminants as it is ubiquitously present in the environment. It originates from the fallout of atmospheric nuclear explosions from the mid-20th century (weapons-137Cs) and nuclear accidents, most prominently the Chornobyl (4) and Fukushima (5,6) nuclear accidents (reactor-137Cs). For safety regulations, many countries have employed strict regulatory limits for 137Cs levels in general food products (e.g., EU < 600 Bq·kg–1 and Japan: <100 Bq·kg–1). (7) However, although routine radiation surveillance provides essential quantitative information on 137Cs contamination levels, the attribution of a contamination to its origins remains poorly understood as the ubiquitous weapons-137Cs cannot be distinguished from any reactor-137Cs. This analytical challenge impedes the comprehensive understanding of the origin of environmental 137Cs contamination, which is a critical prerequisite for a quantitative assessment of the responsibilities for certain 137Cs legacies and the establishment of more targeted strategies for environmental remediation and protection. More than ever, with threats of nuclear strikes or accidental releases in the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war, it is now imperative to be able to identify the source of any release of 137Cs and evaluate their environmental consequences.

While isotopic signatures of actinides (e.g., uranium and plutonium) have been used successfully to distinguish the contributions between various sources, (8,9) radiocesium isotopic fingerprints have not yet been applied routinely for source identification. Cesium-135 is an ideal and long-lived candidate (T1/2 = 2.3 My) after a release, better suited than fast-fading 134Cs (T1/2 = 2.07 y). Also, the production mechanism of 135Cs provides more detailed information on the nuclear origin of a contamination, which hence allows attribution of a radiocesium contamination to its source via its distinct 135Cs/137Cs ratio. Its mother nuclide (135Xe) has a large cross-section for thermal neutron capture, resulting in suppressed onset of 135Cs under the high neutron flux density of a reactor core. (10) By contrast, despite the intense but short neutron flux at the moment of a nuclear explosion, 135Xe mostly “survives” the explosion because most primary fission products of the 135 isobar are 135Te and 135I, which have yet to decay to 135Xe. (11) A nuclear explosion hence yields a relatively high 135Cs/137Cs ratio, whereas a reactor yields a low ratio. Nowadays, analytical protocols for commercial triple quadrupole inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-QQQ-MS) as well as thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) are available for the precise determination of 135Cs/137Cs, thus allowing the application of the 135Cs/137Cs ratio as an isotopic fingerprint in nuclear forensics and environmental tracing studies. (12−19) In any case, the application of 135Cs/137Cs as a forensic fingerprint is still far from routine as it requires meticulous chemical separation and sophisticated analytical procedures.

Bavaria, southeastern Germany, is notorious for its heavy 137Cs contamination following the Chornobyl nuclear accident. (20) It was reported that 137Cs inventory in surface soil ranged from 102 to 105 Bq·m–2 in April 1986 [data from the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS), Germany]. As a potent accumulator of 137Cs, (21,22) regional wild boars (Sus scrofa) were subsequently contaminated, and the 137Cs activity concentrations in their meat exceeded the regulatory limit by approximately 1–2 orders of magnitude. However, unlike most forest species, which initially also exhibited high 137Cs contamination in their bodies followed by a decline with time (i.e., a short ecological half-life), (23,24) 137Cs levels in wild boars have not shown a significant decline trend since 1986. (20,25)

In certain locations and instances, the decline in contamination levels is even slower than the physical half-life of 137Cs. (26) This phenomenon has been termed “wild boar paradox” and is generally attributed to the ingestion of 137Cs accumulating hypogeous fungi (e.g., deer truffle, Elaphomyces) by wild boars. (27,28) Depending on the soil composition, especially clay mineral content, (29) these underground mushrooms are a critical repository of the downward migrating 137Cs. They are one major food item for wild boars, particularly during winter when food on the surface is scarce. (30) However, due to the lack of convincing evidence for identifying the sources of 137Cs, the origins of the persistent contamination in wild boars remains unclear.


Here, we analyzed the 137Cs activities together with 135Cs/137Cs ratios in wild boar meat samples, collected from 11 Bavarian districts during 2019–2021. Reporting the largest environmental sample set of 135Cs/137Cs to date (n = 48), we undertook a critical comparison with the published values and validated the feasibility of utilizing 135Cs/137Cs for source identification. Using a mixing model, we estimated the contribution of weapons-137Cs and reactor-137Cs, which not only deepens our understanding of the “wild boar paradox” but may also allow a future location-specific prediction of the evolution of the 137Cs contamination in wild boars with time. Lastly, our method can be applied for the traceability of 137Cs in any environmental samples in the future.

Materials and Methods……………………………………………………..

Results and Discussion………………………………………………………..

……..more https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.est.3c03565

September 8, 2023 Posted by | environment, Germany, Reference | 2 Comments

Germany facing up to its nuclear waste problem

German nuclear phaseout leaves radioactive waste problem

Klaus Deuse, August 30, 2023  https://www.dw.com/en/german-nuclear-phaseout-leaves-radioactive-waste-problem/a-66661614?maca=en-Facebook-sharing&mibextid=2JQ9oc&fbclid=IwAR1xPxzvz3kfLoNV1JbUx70rWCRa5tiML4tl2jffIm0ILDquq2-av2j7bxw

While Germany searches for a permanent storage facility for its nuclear waste, it risks sitting on piles of dangerous waste for decades. The problem drains public finances by hundreds of millions of euros every year.

Germany ended the era of nuclear energy in Europe’s biggest economy when it decommissioned the last three remaining nuclear power plants on April 15 this year. Decades of nuclear power generation, however, have left a legacy that is unlikely to go away as smoothly as the phaseout: nuclear waste.

Since a permanent German storage facility is out of sight in the near future, the spent fuel rods, packed into specialized containers called Casks for Storage and Transport of Nuclear Material (CASTOR), will likely remain in interim storage for decades.

About 1,200 CASTOR containers are currently stored at 17 interim sites in Germany. A state-owned company, the Bundeseigene Gesellschaft für Zwischenlagerung mbH (BGZ), is tasked with operating the sites.

BGZ spokesperson Janine Tokarski told DW that the company finally expects “about 1,800 containers from across Germany to be designated for final disposal.”

Another state company, the Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal (BGE), is exploring sites in Germany for the final disposal of the dangerous waste. According to Tokarski of BGZ, experts plan to find a site and, more importantly, reach a political consensus on it “in the 2040s at the earliest.”

From then on, another 20 to 30 years are likely to be spent on planning and construction, said Tokarski. She anticipates the beginning of final storage “in the 2060s at the earliest.” The shipping of all the waste from the various interim sites will probably take another 30 years, she added.

The century-long operation is expected to cost hundreds of billions of euros. Last year alone, BGZ spent €271 million ($292 million) just to ensure Germany’s nuclear waste is safely stored — €191 million of the sum on operating the interim sites and €80 million on investments in them.

A nuclear fortress

In 1992, the first CASTOR containers with highly radioactive fuel rods were stored in the interim storage site of Ahaus in northwestern Germany.

The 200-meter-long (218-yard-long) central storage building towers 20 meters high above the flat landscape of the Münsterland region and is protected by a wire fence surrounding the sprawling 5,700-square-meter (61,354-square-feet) site.

Bisected by a reception and maintenance area, the building currently holds more than 300 yellow casks containing burned fuel rods. Additionally, six CASTOR containers, each 6 meters long and weighing 120 tons, are stored in one of the two halls, keeping the waste leak-tight for a calculated 40 years.

Leak tightness is achieved through a pressure switch installed in the double-wall sealing system of these containers, said David Knollmann from BGZ in Ahaus.

“A gas is inserted between the two walls, specifically helium gas, at a certain pressure. This switch ensures the pressure doesn’t fall below a certain level,” he told DW.

David Knollmann proudly added that in 30 years, there hasn’t been a single case of a container requiring repairs.

The nuclear safety at the Ahaus interim storage site is not only overseen by German nuclear authorities but also by Euratom, an independent nuclear energy organization run by European Union member states, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Their auditors inspect the site regularly but without advance notice.

Pressure of time

In addition to the two central interim storage facilities in Ahaus and Gorleben, Germany operates other decentralized temporary storage facilities at the sites of all former German nuclear power plants.

Moreover, additional waste, shipped for reprocessing to France and the UK, will eventually return to Germany. Knollmann said this will only happen “when all the necessary regulatory conditions are met.”

Much of the waste, he explained, comes from “dismantled nuclear power plants” and includes contaminated pumps and filters. Those would eventually be stored at the Schacht Konrad site near the town of Salzgitter, a former iron ore mine proposed as a deep geological repository for medium- and low-level radioactive waste.

The Schacht Konrad mine, said Tokarski, is expected to become operational as a nuclear waste storage “around the early 2030s.”

All German interim storage sites are subject to limited operating permits of 40 years. For example, the permit for the Ahaus site will be up for renewal by 2028 at the latest. As all experts agree that a final central repository for Germany’s nuclear waste won’t be fully operational before 2090 at the earliest, the country faces the problem of what to do with the radioactive material until then.

Without political consensus on the issue, Ahaus residents fear that their neighborhood’s storage facility might secretly become “a final repository solution.”

September 4, 2023 Posted by | Germany, Reference, wastes | Leave a comment

Chancellor Scholz dismisses talk of keeping nuclear energy option open in Germany

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz dismissed a suggestion by a junior coalition
partner that the country should keep open the option of using its closed
nuclear power plants, declaring that atomic energy is a “dead horse” in
Germany.

Germany switched off its last three nuclear reactors in April,
completing a process that received wide political support after Japan’s
Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster in 2011. But some argued for a rethink
after energy prices spiked because of the war in Ukraine. Among those who
advocated a reprieve were members of the Free Democrats, a pro-business
party that is part of Scholz’s governing coalition.

Daily Mail 2nd Sept 2023

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-12472971/Scholz-dismisses-talk-keeping-nuclear-energy-option-open-Germany.html

September 4, 2023 Posted by | Germany, politics | Leave a comment

German Chancellor Scholz speaks out against new nuclear power, Deutschlandfunk reports

September 2, 2023  https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/german-chancellor-scholz-speaks-out-against-new-nuclear-power-deutschlandfunk-2023-09-01/

FRANKFURT, – German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said he is against a new nuclear power debate in the country, in an interview released late on Friday with German radio station Deutschlandfunk.

“The issue of nuclear power is a dead horse in Germany,” said Scholz, leader of Germany’s social democrats (SPD).

Scholz’s coalition partner, the free democrats (FDP), recently demanded Germany should keep an nuclear option.

For new nuclear power plants to be built, significant time and investment would be required, Scholz said, estimating at least 15 billion euros ($16.16 billion) would have to be spent per power plant over the next 15 years.

On the widely debated topic of an industrial electricity price cap in Germany, the chancellor expressed doubt how this could be funded, naming options including taxpayer money and debt.

($1 = 0.9282 euros)

Reporting by Emma-Victoria Farr; Editing by Leslie Adler and Josie Kao

September 3, 2023 Posted by | Germany, politics | Leave a comment

Luck Is Not a Strategy for the Ukraine, The Germans Take the “Evidence-based” Path. 

We Chat with Nuclear Expert Dr. Paul Dorfman

Hot Globe, STEVE CHAPPLE, JUL 20, 2023

“………………………………………………………………………………. HOT GLOBE: It’s always bothered me that Saudi Arabia because of the Trump administration has now got access to the beginnings of nuclear power, and to a future nuclear bomb. The idea of selling small nuclear reactors around the world raises a pretty problematic point.

DORFMAN: That’s absolutely true. Saudi has made no bones about its nuclear ambitions and I mean its military nuclear ambitions. Saudi diplomats have said quite clearly that they’re looking towards Iran and that they’re seriously thinking about both civil and military nuclear. So there’s a potential for an arms race, a military nuclear arms race in the Middle East region. It’s actually even more bad news for the Middle East because in a proxy war if say, for example, Russian and America wanted to have a bit of a go and they didn’t want to absolutely destroy each other’s country where would they be fighting their proxy nuclear war? The first region that comes to mind is the Middle East and Saudi and Iran.

The economies of small nuclear reactors depend absolutely on production to scale.  It’s been proven time and time again that in order to make any money at all, to break even on small nuclear production, you need to sell them abroad. Now, selling them abroad to whom, for what reasons? You’d be selling them to developing nations who may or may not have the capacity to regulate, to protect, to defend in depth, and so therefore you would be significantly expanding the potential for military nuclear risk whether that means a dirty bomb or further nuclear development.

 HOT GLOBE: A slightly different question here, but Germany had ongoing nuclear plants and even though they were still producing electricity, they’ve shut those down. That may be a little puzzling to some Americans. Can you explain that?

DORFMAN: First of all, what Germany does is evidence-based policy. Germany puts out its scientific, technological questions, its energy questions, to well-funded high level research units. They go away and do their research. They come back with their research. They give it to the government departments and then the government makes a decision. So it’s evidence-based policy making. Over the years Germany has said well, we want to get to net-zero and we’re kind of worried about nuclear. Now around 2011 when Fukushima happened–remember Chancellor Merkel is a PhD chemist. She realized like many of us that even in an advanced society things could go badly wrong since accidents are by definition accidental.

HOT GLOBE: Good line

DORFMAN: Yeah, who knew? [laughs] So when Fukushima happened, Merkel and many others in Germany said well, look, we can’t stand the pain of this.  I was having supper with Naoto Kan, the premier of Japan at the time of Fukushima after we both spoke in Westminster. Even then I was shocked when he turned to me and said that if the wind had been in the wrong direction, they would have lost Tokyo. The majority of the pollution went out into the Pacific Ocean. Now to the point about Germany. It’s landlocked so the Germans looked at the possibility of an accident and they came up with the numbers. It would cost trillions and trillions and trillions of Euros if they had a nuclear accident and they said look, we really can’t be doing this. This is just crazy, basically, and so we’re going to do “the German energy transition.” We’re going to try to lead the world on this and we’re going to move stepwise into renewables-plus, that’s renewables solar wind energy storage, interconnection, demand site management, energy management, distributed grids and a significant centralized upgrade of grids, too.

Now clearly Germany has a core problem, a fossil fuel problem, but they didn’t want to go down the fissile fuel route so Germany has said well OK for the time being we’re going to rely on gas but then we’re going to move to a full renewable economy. Well, the war has speeded that up. Since the war Germany has burnt less coal and Germany has shuttered all its nuclear power plants. It’s done this because what Germany says it will do, it does, unlike many other states. It set upon a route to go renewables. Now there is no such thing as a free lunch. Everything costs and there’s no perfect solution to the energy crisis, but what Germany is trying to do is to lead the world in this so-called energy transition, and I won’t spout numbers but basically what has happened is you’ve just seen significant renewable deployment, significant storage and a water storage as it were deployment which is sort of integrated into the power system and also integrated into the democratic system whereby by local communities also own the local renewable aspects of the local renewable power generation. It’s basically saying well look yes we can do this rather like Americans, you know, we have a dream, we will try to do this, it will be difficult but we will do our best to get there since the costs and the risks of nuclear are far too great. Let’s find a realistic, sustainable, positive, constructive way through……..
more https://hotglobe.substack.com/p/nuclear-power-is-already-a-climate

July 23, 2023 Posted by | ENERGY, Germany, safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Germany Rejects Cluster Bombs For Ukraine As Clip Surfaces Of Biden Admin Previously Calling Them A ‘War Crime’

Zero Hedge, BY TYLER DURDEN, SATURDAY, JUL 08, 2023 

In light of the Biden White House approving cluster bombs for Ukraine, under the justification that ‘but Russia used them first’, below is a quick trip down memory lane…

First, here is then White House press secretary Jen Psaki unequivocally condemning the use of cluster munitions as a potential “war crime” in 2022. The implication behind the exchange is that only the “bad guys” use them…

[Video here on original]

Next, below is a lengthy letter from top-ranking Congressional Democrats in a 2013 written to then President Barack Obama highlighting the evils of cluster bombs, explaining they are “indiscriminate, unreliable and pose an unacceptable danger to US forces and civilians alike.”

The letter emphasized they “cause unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure, in many cases long after the cessation of hostilities,” and also recalled that “During Operation Desert Storm, US-dropped cluster submutnions caused more US troops casualties than any single Iraqi weapon system.”

Back when Democrats were outraged over cluster bombs and the potential for war crimes and indiscriminate killing…

[documentery evidence here on original]

It’s no wonder that key US allies in Europe are now objecting to the decision to supply Kiev with the internationally banned weapons. 

“Germany opposes sending cluster munitions to Ukraine, its foreign minister said on Friday, a day after U.S. officials said Washington was planning to provide Kyiv with the weapons, widely denounced for killing and maiming civilians,” Reuters reports. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock told reporters in Vienna: “I have followed the media reports. For us, as a state party, the Oslo agreement applies.”

As for NATO leadership, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg shrugged off reports that the US is set to announce cluster bombs for Ukraine. “This will be for governments to decide, not for Nato to decide,” he said Friday. He essentially said that because Russia is already deploying them, this makes it okay for Ukraine to do the same…… https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/germany-rejects-cluster-bombs-ukraine-clip-surfaces-biden-admin-previously-cal1

July 11, 2023 Posted by | Germany, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Nuclear. The Flamanville EPR impacted by the shutdown of the first reactor in China?

In China, the first EPR reactor is again shut down after the discovery of “excessive oxidation” on the reactor claddings. What effect on Flamanville (Manche)?

4 Jul 23 

It looks like a new pebble in the shoe for the EPR , which already had plenty of it. Officially, however, everything is fine. Shutdown of the Taishan 1 reactor in the first quarter of this year was scheduled. This began on January 31, 2023 .

To this reloading operation, the Chinese operator, of which EDF is a 30% shareholder, added inspections. The objective announced by Taishan Nuclear, three weeks ago, is to “gather data for long-term stable operation “, without giving more details. This shutdown was normally only supposed to last a month…

What effect on Flamanville?

But, according to Le Canard enchaîné , this shutdown is linked to the discovery of “excessive oxidation” on the reactor sheaths.

Designed by EDF, the Chinese EPR of Taishan 1 has broken down due to poor workmanship on the made in France sheaths which protect the nuclear fuel. The most beautiful effect, less than a year from the start of the Flamanville EPR!

These sheaths, manufactured by Framatome , are used in particular to transmit the heat given off by the uranium to the water in the primary circuit. Taishan Nuclear would have discovered that in use, friction would tend to slightly damage these fuel sheaths. To date, no restart date has been mentioned.

The first EPR model built in the world, the Taishan 1 reactor has suffered numerous breakdowns since its commissioning in 2018. This technical shutdown could cost France dearly, while a similar problem had been observed a few years ago. on one of the reactors of the Chooz power plant, in the Ardennes (stopped for five months at the time).

If EDF and Framatone have not communicated in recent days, this umpteenth episode is problematic , while a relaunch of the expansion of the EPR is expected in France, and hoped for internationally. 

These five months of shutdown of Taishan 1 are added to the counter of the long months of inactivity of the reactor since its commissioning. While EDF announces that it wants to start up the Flamanville EPR next year, this breakdown shows that the start-up of an EPR reactor is not the guarantee of reliable and abundant production.Greenpeace France

July 8, 2023 Posted by | Germany, technology | Leave a comment

Germany’s power mix boasts more renewables, lower spot market prices – despite nuclear exit

Germany’s shutdown of nuclear power plants in April did not result in a
ramp-up of lignite-fired power plants, despite concerns. Instead, there has
been a significant increase in the share of renewables in the electricity
mix, and the proportion of coal-generated electricity has fallen by more
than 20%.

Electricity in Germany has become cheaper and cleaner since its
last three nuclear power plants were shut down, according to new data from
the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE. Net electricity
production from lignite and hard coal has decreased by more than 20%, while
natural gas has experienced a minor decline.

In contrast, renewables have
reached a record share of 57.7% of net electricity generation. According to
Fraunhofer ISE, the German energy system successfully managed the nuclear
phase-out. The decommissioned reactors’ reduced output was offset by lower
consumption, decreased exports, and increased imports.

 PV Magazine 4th July 2023  https://www.pv-magazine.com/2023/07/04/germanys-nuclear-exit-leads-to-more-renewables-lower-spot-market-prices/

Germany’s power mix boasts more renewables, lower spot market prices – despite nuclear exit

July 6, 2023 Posted by | Germany, renewable | 1 Comment

Expert: Germany’s energy system has coped with nuclear shutdown

06/18/2023  https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/E-ON-SE-3818998/news/Expert-Energy-system-has-coped-with-nuclear-shutdown-44138125/
– The German energy system has not experienced any problems after the shutdown of the last three nuclear power plants in mid-April, according to an expert. “The energy supply has coped very well with the nuclear phase-out,” Claudia Kemfert, an energy economist at the German Institute for Economic Research, told the Augsburger Allgemeine newspaper (Monday edition).

“The remaining three nuclear reactors still produced just under six percent of the electricity. The loss of this electricity production was lost in the noise of the European electricity market,” Kemfert said. The volumes that were eliminated were easy to replace: “Electricity production from renewable energies has increased significantly in Germany,” Kemfert explained. Electricity has also become cheaper, she added. “The price of electricity on the borsen has fallen during the period of the nuclear phase-out,” she pointed out

In May, the borsen electricity price for next-day delivery averaged around 82 euros per megawatt hour, the lowest since July 2021

June 19, 2023 Posted by | business and costs, ENERGY, Germany | Leave a comment

Germany’s green revolution puts nuclear power in the past

Renewed support for renewables and an end to nuclear power keep Germany on its carbon neutral path

By Linda Pentz Gunter 21 May 23

Germany is a country of sensible shoes. And, I might add, supremely comfortable ones. Germans do buttery leather as well as they do beer.

Germany’s energy policy is similarly sensible. Germans see no reason to choose the slowest, most expensive, most dangerous and decidedly non-renewable energy source with which to address the climate crisis. 

Consequently, Germany rejected nuclear power, and on Saturday April 15, it closed the last of its reactors. Germany, like its even more sensible neighbor, Austria — where nothing nuclear may even traverse its terrain — is now a nuclear-free country. Almost. The next step for the German anti-nuclear movement will be to close the URENCO uranium enrichment facility there and the Lingen fuel fabrication plant. And of course there remain nuclear weapons in Germany, not theirs, but ours.

While France continues to wobble along on its high-fashion nuclear stilettos, turning ankles and snapping off heels whenever the going gets rough, Germany will trudge on inexorably, and comfortably, to its stated goal of carbon neutral by 2045.

Germany also plans to end it coal use possibly as soon as 2030, but certainly by 2038. Although, you’d never know it, with all the alarmist hype in circulation post nuclear shutdown. The nuclear lobby, already in propaganda over-drive, has now gone supersonic in its efforts to persuade the world that Germany’s choice to close those last three reactors — never mind that their energy has already been replaced by renewables —will mean burning more coal.

The decision to prolong the operating time of its last three reactors until April 2023 (they were originally due to close at the end of 2022) was largely political, designed to appease rightwing voices within the governing alliance led by the Social Democrats. “We could, in fact, have already shut down the nuclear power plants by January 1 of this year without the lights going out,” said German economist, Claudia Kemfert. “The extension was more like a psychological comfort blanket, as we had an oversupply of electricity,” she told the Washington Post.

Germany didn’t need those last three reactors to keep its green revolution on track. And it especially didn’t need them through this winter, after rejecting the supply of gas from Russia in response to that country’s invasion of Ukraine. German heating is not electric. So nuclear power had no role to play in easing that situation. 

Meanwhile, power prices on the European Energy Exchange for the first quarter of 2024 were more than twice as high in France than in Germany. Much of this was due to loss of market confidence in French state energy company, EDF, to get sufficient numbers of their troubled nuclear reactors back on line to meet demand. 

This did not change after Germany’s last three reactors closed. As Bruno Burger of Energy Charts noted as a caption to the graphic below [ on original] : “The shutdown of the last three German nuclear power plants has no visible effect on weekly Future Electricity Prices in Germany.”

The nuclear power contribution to Germany’s energy mix has been steadily declining since the renewable energy boom, known as the Energiewende, was launched in 2000 with the Renewable Energy Act. A precondition of the Act’s passage was that as nuclear power was phased out it would be replaced by renewable energy and energy efficiency (although demand should have been brought down much faster, much further) and not by fossil fuels. 

In 2000, the renewables share in German electricity was just over 6%. The nuclear share was 30%. In just 23 years, those numbers have more than reversed, with today’s share of on- and off-shore wind plus solar at just over 46% and nuclear at 4.6% in the last week before the final reactor closures. Germany remains on track to achieve its carbon neutral goal by 2045.

The renewable energy boom was greatly helped by the implementation of a feed-in tariff that helped to create confidence and certainty for renewable energy investors who were guaranteed a fixed price for 20 years, above the standard market price. This spurred a big investment, not just by companies, farmers, and coops, but by individuals and many municipalities.

This led to local success stories such as Morbach, a small town about 92 miles west of Frankfurt that boasts 14 wind turbines, 4,000 square meters of solar panels and a biogas plant. Combined, these generate three times more electricity than the community of 11,000 people needs. They sell the surplus back to the grid.

Simply put, the nuclear phaseout opened the way for renewable energy growth in Germany and put the country on the path to a fossil fuel-free future as well.  Without the former, the latter would not have happened.

Critics who falsely ascribe Germany’s continued use of coal, including brown coal or lignite, to the nuclear phaseout, fail to understand that these upticks are driven by the export market and are not related to domestic consumption or the nuclear shutdown.

Ironically it is nuclear France, dependent on electric heat, that is partially responsible for the demand for German coal. This was especially so this past winter when the French nuclear sector all but collapsed with more than 50% of its nuclear capacity down due to serious safety issues combined with scheduled maintenance.

In contrast, in 2022, Germany succeeded in weaning itself off Russian gas entirely and supplying France with 15 billion kWh of electricity net.

Furthermore, Germany’s lignite and coal production remains well below earlier levels and Germany is legally committed to end coal use by 2038. The current government is working to advance this date to 2030. 

According to the 2022 World Nuclear Industry Status Report: “Lignite peaked in 2013 and then declined—especially in 2019–2020—before increasing again by 20.2 percent in 2021. However, lignite generation remained below the 2019-level and 25 percent below the 2010 level. 

“Hard coal also peaked in 2013 then dropped to 64 percent below the 2010-level. While it has seen, at 27.7 percent, the strongest increase in 2021 of any power generation technology, it also remains below the 2019 numbers. 

“Natural gas fluctuated since 2010 and peaked in 2020 at 2.6 percent above the 2010-level before dropping by 5.3 percent in 2021.”

In fact, Germany’s struggle to get off fossil fuels lies mainly in the transport rather than the electricity sector. The country’s love affair with the car and speed limit-free autobahns is a long engagement that now needs to be broken.  

Germany’s path to a carbon neutral economy is all about the trajectory, which is on track, despite bumps in the road. As always, it is about a political commitment rather than any technological challenges. If the current government sticks to its word to greatly accelerate renewable energy implementation, the Energiewende, by no means a perfect roadmap, will get itself back on track.

Mistakes were undoubtedly made. Even after then Chancellor Angela Merkel had her epiphany in 2011 in light of the Japan nuclear disaster at Fukushima, making an overnight decision to restore Germany on the path to nuclear shutdown, she subsequently made drastic cuts in solar subsidies, something environmentalists described as “nothing less than a solar phase-out law”.

But despite this, Germany remains one of the few Western countries that has demonstrated a consistent commitment both to a nuclear phaseout and to climate chaos abatement.

The German anti-nuclear movement is greatly to be credited with much of this progress. It has long been one of the most powerful and politically effective. Like the sensible shoes they march in, green advocates in Germany understood exactly what their fight was about and the significance of that final nuclear shutdown. I hope they are having a jolly good party. They deserve it. Then it will be back to vigilance over the Energiewende — and hopefully to removing US nuclear weapons from German soil and closing those uranium fuel fabrication plants. Because that is the kind of thing that only people power can get done.

“The German nuclear phase-out is a victory of reason over the lust for profit; over powerful corporations and their client politicians,” read a statement from Greenpeace. “It is a people-powered success against all the odds.”

Linda Pentz Gunter is the international specialist at Beyond Nuclear and writes for and curates Beyond Nuclear International.

May 22, 2023 Posted by | Germany, Reference, renewable | Leave a comment

Germany’s Nuclear Energy Phase-Out, Explained

NIRS, May 8, 2023

On April 15, 2023 utilities in Germany shut down the country’s three
last remaining nuclear power plants. These closures mark the successful
planned phase-out of German nuclear energy from the nation’s grid. What does this mean for Germany? What lessons should the U.S. take away from the
German energy transition?

Germany’s Energiewende (“energytransition”) is an overarching policy commitment to achieve a low-carbon, nuclear-free economy and transition to renewable energy. While the recently completed phase-out of nuclear power is a major milestone for Germany’s energy transition, it was by no means a perfect process nor is the current
energy system in Germany a perfect example to follow.

But, Germany’s transition shows that an energy policy grounded in environmental values works – and the earlier climate policy is implemented, the sooner the
climate policy goals can be realized. Above all, the German energy
transition shows the tremendous power of active citizenry, organized social
movements, and activism to transform policy and successfully demand change.

more https://www.nirs.org/germanys-nuclear-energy-phase-out-explained/

May 13, 2023 Posted by | ENERGY, Germany | 1 Comment

Chart of the day: Germany produces 40GW of solar for first time

Germany has passed through the 40GW mark for solar production for the first
time. The new benchmark was reached at 12.30pm local time on May 4. It
shows that solar output was more than six times bigger than any other
source at the time, and accounted for nearly two thirds of the total
64.6GW, of which around 1.3GW was being exported to other countries. Brown
coal generation was the second biggest at that time, followed by biomass
and onshore wind.

Renew Economy 5th May 2023

Chart of the day: Germany produces 40GW of solar for first time

May 8, 2023 Posted by | Germany, renewable | Leave a comment

The Asse nuclear waste interim storage facility continues to cause controversy.

www.nuclearwastewatch.ca Germany, By David Sadler  May 4, 2023

What to do with thousands of barrels of nuclear waste as long as there is no repository? This question concerns the federal government and the residents of Asse. The former mine is dilapidated and needs to be cleared. Environment Minister Lemke got an idea on site.

In the dispute over the Asse site in Lower Saxony as an interim storage facility for nuclear waste, the fronts remain hardened. The former salt dome is dilapidated and should be cleared in about ten years. Around 126,000 barrels of low- and medium-level radioactive nuclear waste are currently stored there. As long as there is no repository in Germany, they have to be stored temporarily. The plans of the responsible Federal Agency for Disposal (BGE) to look for a site near the Asse are met with resistance.

When Federal Environment Minister Steffi Lemke visited the site, several citizens’ initiatives called for the Green politician to give her authority. Lemke must instruct the BGE as the operator to finally arrange for the site comparison for an interim storage facility requested by environmental groups and residents, explained the Asse II coordination group. For years, the BGE has acted against the interests of people and the environment in the area around the dilapidated salt dome.

BGE wants intermediate transports avoid

“We say that the interim storage facility has to be close to where we collect and treat the waste,” replied BGE Managing Director Stefan Studt. It is important to avoid intermediate transports. From the point of view of the operating company, the location is suitable and, above all, can be approved, which Studt described as a “relevant standard”.

Lemke: conditions “absolutely unacceptable”

Environment Minister Lemke does not see a quick solution either. “I don’t have an alternative interim storage facility in my luggage,” she told the representatives of the citizens’ initiatives. But you have to ensure that this nuclear waste is taken out and stored as responsibly as possible – until it can go to a repository. “We will certainly continue this discussion,” she said. The nuclear waste in the former Asse mine was stored under conditions that were “absolutely unacceptable”.

Therefore, the German Bundestag decided to salvage the radioactive waste from the Asse as quickly as possible. A retrieval of the waste is planned and should start around 2033. The plan has long been the subject of strong criticism in the affected region and recently even led to a critical monitoring process ended became.

A challenge arises with the search for safe disposal of the nuclear waste.Problems due to the lack of a repository

“I’m really happy that we shut down the last three nuclear power plants in Germany on April 15 and were thus able to prevent even more highly radioactive waste from accumulating,” said the Greens politician. “I can tell you that this is not a matter of course, but that it has kept me busy in recent months.” In some cases, continued operation was demanded with great carelessness and the problems with the non-existent repository were completely ignored.

There is currently more than 120,000 cubic meters of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste in interim storage facilities throughout Germany. The garbage is, for example, parts of plants that have been contaminated, protective clothing, tools and equipment from nuclear power plants. According to the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BASE), this only accounts for one percent of the activity, but accounts for 95 percent of the total volume of radioactive waste.

In an even slower scenario, a repository could even not be found until 2068.billion cost after nuclear phase-out

Then there are the costs: A commission has estimated the total costs for decommissioning and dismantling of the reactors as well as the transport and storage of the waste at 48.8 billion euros. As a result, a fund was set up into which the operators of the nuclear power plants had to pay. The interim and final storage is to be paid for with this amount – however, it is still uncertain whether the sum will be sufficient.

Critics and some experts see the camps as a security risk. With the former iron ore mine Schacht Konrad in Salzgitter, a repository for low-level and intermediate-level radioactive waste has been identified, which is scheduled to go into operation in 2027. The search for a repository for high-level radioactive waste has so far been unsuccessful.

May 7, 2023 Posted by | Germany, wastes | Leave a comment

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