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What does “Denuclearisation” actually mean to Kim Jong Un? to Donald Trump?

How Kim Jong Un and Trump Differ on Denuclearization.  Bloomberg , By David Tweed and Kanga Kong   

Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un are preparing to meet face-to-face in Singapore on June 12, a prospect that seemed unthinkable just a year ago when the leaders of the U.S. and North Korea were exchanging insults and threats. The main topic will be denuclearization, but they appear to have different ideas of what that means and how long it might take. Overcoming those differences will be key to reaching a historic outcome.

1. What is the U.S. stance on denuclearization?

The U.S. wants to see “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula. Known in the arms-control world as “CVID,” this would involve dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program and stripping Kim of the ability to make nuclear bombs in the future.

2. What does denuclearization mean for North Korea?

North Korea in April committed to work toward “complete denuclearization,” without elaborating on what that meant. In 2016, a government spokesman called for “the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula and this includes the dismantlement of nukes in South Korea and its vicinity.” More recently, North Korea has framed its willingness to get rid of nuclear weapons in more of a global context, implying that it will do so in concert with established nuclear powers like the U.S., China and Russia.

3. Does the U.S. have nuclear weapons on the peninsula?

The U.S. hasn’t stationed them in South Korea since 1992, but it does provide a so-called nuclear umbrella that guarantees the safety of allies South Korea and Japan. Kim may ask the U.S. to remove the nuclear bombers it has stationed in Guam and cease patrols by its nuclear-armed submarines. The U.S. would be unlikely to agree to any measures that would leave its allies vulnerable.

4. What about the time frame for removing nuclear weapons?

Speed is crucial for the U.S. to avoid a lengthy process that provides sanctions relief for North Korea as well as time to advance its nuclear program even further. Even so, North Korea has made it clear it will not accept the so-called Libya model proposed by U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton under which the regime ships its nuclear arsenal out of the country in return for security guarantees and sanctions relief. ……….https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/how-kim-jong-un-and-trump-differ-on-denuclearization-quicktake

June 6, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

Kim Jong Un approaching the nuclear summit with confidence, now that he has a nuclear arsenal

North Korea’s Nuclear Progress Led Kim to Talks, Clapper Says, By Anthony Capaccio, Chris Strohm, and 

Shannon Pettypiece June 5, 2018,
  • Clapper says Kim’s regime doesn’t feel like a ‘supplicant’ now
  •  
    Ex-DNI chief says he backs Trump’s decision to attend summit

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s decision to sit down with the U.S. was fueled by his regime’s view that it made significant achievements in its nuclear weapons program and would no longer be a “supplicant” in talks, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said.

Clapper said it may not matter whether North Korea actually has the technology to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead that can successfully hit a U.S. target. That’s less important to the regime than the psychological boost it received from demonstrating its prowess in testing ICBMs and more powerful nuclear bombs.

…… “whatever it is, they now are confident enough so that they can go to the negotiating table and not show up as a supplicant, which has always been the case.”….https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/north-korea-s-nuclear-progress-led-kim-to-talks-clapper-says

June 6, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international | Leave a comment

A swift verified nuclear disarmament by North Korea is simply not feasible

Rather than pushing for a swift disarmament, the report suggests small, achievable steps, including a continued freeze on nuclear and ballistic missile tests and a shut-down of the enrichment facility at Yongbyon. It might take six to 10 years of phased concessions on both sides before the nuclear risk is substantially eliminated

A nuclear deal with North Korea would require unprecedented access to secret weapons sites, LA Times, By DAVID S. CLOUD, JUN 03, 2018 

President Trump wants North Korea to do something unprecedented in the history of arms control — to reveal all the secrets of a vast nuclear weapons complex it has spent decades concealing and billions to build.

No one expects that kind of breakthrough when Trump sits down with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on June 12 in Singapore. Even Trump has acknowledged the summit will start “a process.”

But if Kim subsequently agrees to disarm in stages over the next decade or longer, the most likely outcome if a nuclear deal ultimately is struck, the massive effort would require hundreds of international nuclear inspectors to help dismantle warheads, shut down facilities, interview North Korean scientists, unravel procurement systems, physically tag and monitor bomb-making equipment, and do much more.

At this point, not enough nuclear experts may exist to visit the hundreds of buildings, track down the voluminous records and conduct the comprehensive inspections required to verify compliance. Nothing approaching such a sweeping agreement with a closed police state like North Korea has been attempted in the history of nuclear disarmament.

“This situation is without precedent,” said Daryl Kimball, a nonproliferation expert with the Arms Control Assn., a Washington policy organization. “No country that has openly conducted test explosions and amassed a nuclear arsenal as North Korea has done has ever willingly eliminated its stockpile.”

U.S. intelligence agencies believe Pyongyang has assembled as many as 60 nuclear weapons and built a widely dispersed network of secret development and production facilities, some deep underground in the country’s rugged northern mountains, to create fissile material and testing components, and to assemble and store the actual warheads.

As part of any deal, U.S. officials also are likely to seek restrictions on North Korea’s ballistic missiles, especially those capable of hitting U.S. soil. Additional outside experts thus would be needed to inspect missile factories and test sites.

No matter how intrusive the inspections, there would be almost no way to guarantee North Korea wasn’t concealing a stash of components or a fully assembled warhead in case Kim or his successors faced a future threat to their survival, former officials and inspectors said.

“Say they declare 30 nukes. Can you verify 30? Yes,” said Robert Gallucci, who led 1994 talks with North Korea for the Clinton administration and is a professor at Georgetown University. “Can we ever, ever be certain they don’t have five other nukes somewhere? Absolutely not.”

If an accord with North Korea is struck, Pyongyang probably first would be required to submit a full accounting of its nuclear program — back to the beginning — to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency based in Vienna. That would be followed by comprehensive IAEA inspections aimed at confirming — or disproving — details in the documents.

Given the scale of Pyongyang’s program, the IAEA would need to hire and train a major new workforce and build or buy sophisticated monitoring equipment, from sensors to cameras, to ensure North Korea doesn’t cheat. The agency also would need the U.N. Security Council to approve the operation and fund it with a budget increase.

The IAEA said last year it had about 300 inspectors, including 80 who are working to monitor Iran’s 27 mostly dormant nuclear facilities as part of the 2015 nuclear accord that Trump abandoned last month. Iran and the other signatories are still honoring the agreement.

North Korea, by contrast, is believed to have up to 100 clandestine sites, according to a report by Rand Corp., a think tank based in Santa Monica. And Iran never built any nuclear weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Trump administration officials say their goal is complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament, a high bar in a country that has pursued nuclear weapons for decades and on a far larger scale than Iran, Iraq, Libya and South Africa ever did. Those countries all gave up or were forced to give up their nuclear programs.

……… IAEA inspectors last arrived at North Korea’s main nuclear complex at Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang, in 2007. All international inspectors were expelled in 2009 when North Korea pulled out of so-called six-party talks in Beijing and resumed its nuclear enrichment program.

Any inspectors sent to North Korea would not be operating completely in the dark, however.

They presumably would have access to IAEA reports, satellite surveillance and intelligence from the U.S. and other countries about known and suspected nuclear facilities, identities of key scientists to interview, information from defectors, and even reports from experts allowed to visit key sites.

Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos, N.M., has toured North Korea’s major nuclear facilities four times and is the only U.S. scientist to visit its facility for enriching uranium, a bomb fuel. U.S. intelligence agencies had not spotted its construction.

A new study on the issue that Hecker coauthored with fellow Stanford University researchers Robert Carlin and Elliot Serbin warns that “in the short term, North Korea will surely hedge its bets by retaining parts of the program.”

Uranium enrichment facilities “would be problematic,” they wrote. “North Korea has covert facilities that it is unlikely to declare and eliminate initially.”

Rather than pushing for a swift disarmament, the report suggests small, achievable steps, including a continued freeze on nuclear and ballistic missile tests and a shut-down of the enrichment facility at Yongbyon. It might take six to 10 years of phased concessions on both sides before the nuclear risk is substantially eliminated………….http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-norkor-disarm-20180531-story.html

June 4, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, weapons and war | 1 Comment

North Korea likely to follow Pakistan’s nuclear path, not Libya’s

North Korea Wants to End up Like Pakistan, Not Libya https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/north-korea-pakistan-libya/561341/A poor country made enormous sacrifices to get nuclear weapons—and has them still. DOMINIC TIERNEY 
So are there any models of “rogue” regimes with nuclear programs that might appeal to North Korea? The answer is yes. But, unfortunately, it’s a state that kept its nuclear deterrent intact: Pakistan. If Pyongyang is weighing up two possible futures—Libya vs. Pakistan—it’s not much of a choice.

Pakistan began to seriously pursue nuclear weapons in the 1970s, motivated by a desire to deter its more powerful rival India, as well as match India’s nuclear capability. The Pakistani politician Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who later became prime minister, claimed, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves—even go hungry—but we will get one of our own.” In 1998, on a clear and bright day in the Chagai district, Pakistan carried out a series of nuclear tests. Pakistan’s chief scientific officer said “All praise be to Allah” and pushed the button, causing the mountain to shake in a vast explosion.

In 2016, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated that Pakistan had 130 to 140 warheads and predicted that it would nearly double its arsenal by 2025. Islamabad could deliver nuclear weapons by medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, F-16 fighters, and tactical systems for short-range use on the battlefield.

We can be confident that North Korea is paying close attention to Islamabad’s experience. After all, the two countries share important similarities. They both face an enduring rivalry with a far more powerful democratic state that used to be part of the same country (India and South Korea). Furthermore, both North Korea and Pakistan have, at times, flouted international norms. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan never signed the treaty. For decades, North Korea and Pakistan have been informal allies, trading conventional weapons and supporting Iran in the Iran-Iraq War.

In addition, Pakistan’s nuclear capability led the West to handle the country with kid gloves. The United States provided millions of dollars of material assistance to guard Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile, including helicopters and nuclear detection equipment. Pakistan’s nuclear capability is also one reason why Washington continued to provide billions of dollars in military and economic aid, even though Islamabad supported the Taliban insurgency that battled U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Pakistan gained prestige as the only Muslim-majority country with nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the nuclear program as “Pakistan’s finest hour.” The nuclear program is also domestically popular. The nuclear tests in 1998 that shook mountains led to jubilant street celebrations.

Of course, all of this came at a cost. The money poured into Pakistan’s nuclear program could have been spent on health or education. The nuclear tests in 1998 were condemned around the world. After refusing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Pakistan faces restrictions on importing civili

civilian nuclear technology. Nuclear weapons may deter India, but they also risk accidents and even escalation to nuclear war.

But for North Korea, the balance sheet still favors the Pakistan model: a poor country that ate grass to build a nuclear deterrent, seeks to be accepted as a recognized nuclear power, supports denuclearization in principle but only as part of a broader international disarmament effort (that will likely never happen), successfully deters a more powerful rival, and gains domestic prestige and international status.

Saddam and Qaddafi made their choices, and they’re both dead. North Korea wants to follow a different path. Why not become the Pakistan of East Asia?

May 30, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international | Leave a comment

Trump administration could so easily blow the chance of a diplomatic solution for the Korean Peninsula

Korea’s “Season of Summits”https://wordpress.com/read/blogs/39598748/posts/5355-29 May 18 The upcoming “will they—won’t they” US-DPRK summit, either by accident or by design, has the potential to re-set the strategic atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula…but only if Washington and Pyongyang can find a convergence of common interest.

There are limitations on American action on the Korean peninsula that constrain its menu of choice vis-à-vis North Korea (DPRK). The absence of a substantive relationship between the US and North Korea limits Washington’s economic and diplomatic leverage. However, as the more powerful party with overwhelming nuclear superiority and clear capacity to deter the DPRK nuclear threat, the US does have capacity to re-set the terms of the relationship by reducing the heat in negotiations. Washington can do this by changing the focus for the negotiations.

The long game

North Korea can be deterred as a nuclear power. A peace treaty to formally end the Korean War represents the best pathway to managing regional security and ensuring the safety of the people who live in the region. Under the umbrella of a formalised peace regime, human security concerns within North Korea are more likely to be constructively addressed. Engagement and interaction is the best vehicle for this, based on an understanding of complex systems and social change processes within the DPRK.

Summits are symbols that act as markers in a much broader process of relationship-building, based on confidence-building measures and clear, achievable implementation steps. Confidence-building measures develop the relationship between negotiating parties and gradually evolve the level of trust necessary to progress to subsequent steps on the negotiation pathway.

Depth of relationships are also a source of leverage; one of the reasons why the United States has struggled to influence the DPRK is that it does not have substantive economic links through which to influence the government in Pyongyang. This lack of leverage is why US officials have argued for China to play a more substantive role in pressuring North Korea, because China has a relationship with the DPRK that it can leverage. Rightly or wrongly, the US has dealt itself out of direct influence over North Korea through its various policies of strategic isolation and maximum pressure.

We should also understand that from a complex systems perspective, relationships—be they economic, governmental, institutional, or people-to-people—create flows of information, wealth and resources in and out of the DPRK. Those flows interact with and turbo-charge social change processes already underway in the DPRK, as we have seen with such flows between the DPRK and China. The result is a change, developing over time, in the relationship between the North Korean state and its people over time through the marketisation and Yuan-isation of the economy, and proliferation of information technologies into the country.

Focusing on the wrong prize

Regardless of whether or not the US-DPRK summit ultimately goes ahead, it is concerning that the Trump administration could blow an opportunity to meaningfully change the strategic goalposts on the Korean Peninsula by focussing on the wrong prize.

The only real trinket of value that Washington has to offer Kim Jong Un is a formal treaty to conclude the Korean War. It is likely that North Korea very much wants to negotiate an agreement with the United States, but under Pyongyang’s terms. It is no revelation to long-term North Korea watchers that those terms do not include “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation” (CVID).

The problem with Trump’s insistence on CVID is that there is no mutually agreeable starting point for a discussion with North Korea on those terms. There is no outcome in which the regime willingly relinquishes its nuclear weapons program because the Kim regime is so heavily invested in nuclear weapons as the foundation of its security strategy, economic development pathway, and domestic political legitimacy.

The negotiations surrounding the summit need to find a lowest common denominator that both parties can agree on. We saw this in the inter-Korean summit where Moon and Kim settled on easy-win engagement measures and mutually-beneficial security measures as the starting point for a confidence-building pathway.

CVID is a dead-end

The US and the DPRK clearly do not trust each other, and both parties have good reasons to be guarded ahead of a “will they—won’t they” summit. Most media attention coming out of the inter-Korean summit focused on Article 3.4 of the Panmunjom Declaration, which called for “complete denuclearisation” and “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” building on the call in Article 1.1 for both parties to work together on implementing the 2005 Joint Statement on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the 13 February Agreement of 2007.

However, this clause does not mean North Korea has committed to denuclearisation as that concept is understood by the Trump administration. In the wake of his second meeting with Kim Jong-un, Moon Jae-in insisted that the North Koreans are committed to denuclearisation, clearly hoping to maintain the diplomatic momentum to ensure the US-DPRK summit takes place. However, the North Korean interpretation of a nuclear-free Korea implies the full nuclear weapons relinquishment of the United States and ultimate fulfilment of the spirit of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

North Korea’s recent demolition of tunnels at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site are a gesture of goodwill to Washington, offering up a now-obsolete facility with an eye toward the upcoming US-DPRK summit. We have seen this kind of offering before, when the North Koreans demolished the cooling tower at their Yeongbyeon reactor in 2008.

Moon Jae-in’s tactical ego-stroking comments about Trump deserving the Nobel Peace Prize aside, one can argue that South Korea does not have high confidence in the Trump administration. South Korea’s diplomatic efforts in 2018 have been geared to guiding the US into a more conciliatory position with North Korea and make it politically safer for Trump to negotiate for an agreement with Pyongyang, knowing that there are influential American officials in Trump’s ear counselling for war.

Fears of American bellicosity in Seoul are not unwarranted. American hawks view any kind of engagement with North Korea as a “loss,” as “appeasement”—one of the most juvenile and misapplied terms in the international relations lexicon—and are well aware of the difficulty of getting any negotiated deal ratified in a Republican-majority Congress (recalling the fate of the Agreed Framework). National Security Advisor John Bolton’s recent comments comparing North Korea to Libya reinforce this perception. The irony of the present moment is a deal is more likely to stick in the US if it is owned by a Republican president. Such are the ironies and opportunities of Korean Peninsula diplomacy in 2018.

This article was originally published in Australian Outlook.  Access the original article here.

May 30, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

Kim Jong-un knows what he wants from the summit. Does President Trump?

The Korean nuclear roller coaster: Has time run out for a summit? Brookings, Jonathan D. Pollack
Tuesday, May 29, 2018 The turbulence and drama on the Korean Peninsula over the past week defies imagination. On May 24, President Trump withdrew from his planned summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, acting almost as impulsively as when he first agreed to the meeting in early March. Following a conciliatory response from Pyongyang’s senior nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan, the president two days later sharply reversed course and said that the summit might still take place.

Not to be outdone, on May 26 Kim Jong-un abruptly convened a second meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in on the North Korean side of the truce village of Panmunjom. The next day, American and North Korean officials began to interact on the language of a possible communiqué. Separate consultations between the United States and North Korea in Singapore were expected to begin today, on May 29, with North Korea represented by Kim Jong-un’s de facto chief of staff, Kim Ch’ang-soon. Additional discussions have taken place between Chinese and North Korean officials in Beijing, perhaps connected to a possible stopover by Kim Jong-un while traveling to Singapore, which would be his third visit to China in less than two months. One of Kim Jong-un’s closest aides and a vice chairman of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee, General Kim Yong-chol, is now en route to New York, and is expected to serve as the lead point-of-contact with U.S. officials in deliberations over the Singapore meeting.

These heightened activities all suggest that the summit will indeed go forward, though there has been no formal announcement to this effect.

However, two facts remain incontestable. There is as yet no U.S.-North Korea agreement on the terms of a summit, and time is running out to reach such an understanding. An unspoken but unmistakable anxiety thus pervades these intensified political and diplomatic maneuvers. Only 10 days before President Trump’s presumed departure for Singapore, it is stunning how little remains agreed to, even in broad conceptual terms. Advocates of diplomacy argue that this is the purpose of face-to-face negotiations. But the contrasts in the language and expectations of the two leaderships remain glaring, even after two visits by Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang, first as CIA director and subsequently as secretary of state.

The fundamental issue is what the summit is supposed to be about. ……….

Kim Jong-un knows what he wants from the summit. Does President Trump? Is the president prepared to accept the risks of an inconclusive outcome or an outright failure in Singapore? What would U.S. policy options be in the event of such a failure? Time will tell. But for now, time is running out. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/29/the-korean-nuclear-roller-coaster-has-time-run-out-for-a-summit/

May 30, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

Yes, there are concerns, but North Korea’s dismantling of the nuclear weapons site is a positive step

N Korea’s Destroyed Nuke Site Lays Basis for Denuclearization Talks – Expert  https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201805261064829259-north-korea-site-destruction-talks-prospect/ WASHINGTON 27 May 18,  – North Korea’s dismantling of its nuclear weapons test site should be seen as a positive step towards resolving the crisis on the Korean peninsula, Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright said in a statement on Friday.

“North Korea’s action should not be trivialized but viewed as an important step to reduce tensions and lay the basis for denuclearization negotiations,” Albright said. “It is not fair to portray it as part of an effort to hide or disguise its nuclear weapons capabilities.”

North Korea’s action, he added, is even better than a freeze because it represents a permanent disabling of the site. Three minutes of film footage taken by a journalist makes it clear that major buildings and tunnel entrances were destroyed, according to Albright.

But like many disabling steps, North Korea could likely resume nuclear weapons tests within a few months by digging tunnels in nearby mountains, Albright said. Moreover, the action does not affect North Korea’s existing stockpile of nuclear bombs and its ability to make additional weapons, even if the lack of a test facility could inhibit the nation’s ability to field reliable and deliverable warheads, according to the release.

On Friday, Trump signaled that the meeting with Kim may actually go forward after the US president received a “warm” letter from Pyongyang. In comments published by North Korea’s state-run news agency KCNA, Kim said on Friday that he wanted the United States to know Pyongyang wants to sit down at “any time” to solve problems with Washington.

Before founding the institute, Albright worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 1992 to 1997 and was the first non-governmental inspector of the Iraqi nuclear program. He was also a Senior Staff Scientist at the Federation of American Scientists.

May 28, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment

North Korea destroys its nuclear weapons site

North Korea claims it has demolished its nuclear testing site   North Korea has carried out what it said is the demolition of its nuclear test site, setting off a series of explosions over several hours in the presence of foreign journalists. ABC News, 25 May 18 

Key points:
  • Closing of North Korea’s nuclear test site was announced by Kim Jong-un before planned summit with US President Donald Trump
  • North Korea brought in a small group of foreign journalists to witness the event
  • Demolition comes after North Korea labelled US Vice President Mike Pence a “political dummy”

The explosions at the nuclear test site deep in the mountains of the North’s sparsely populated north-east were centred on three tunnels at the underground site and a number of buildings in the surrounding area.

North Korea had completely dismantled its Punggye-ri nuclear test ground “to ensure the transparency of discontinuance of nuclear test,” state news agency KCNA said.

The dismantling of the nuclear test ground “completely closed the tunnel entrances,” it said, adding that two tunnels there had been ready for use in “powerful underground nuclear tests”.

There was no leakage of radioactive material or adverse impact on the surrounding environment from the dismantling, the agency added.

“The discontinuance of the nuclear test is an important process moving towards global nuclear disarmament,” KCNA said……. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-24/north-korea-says-its-has-demolished-its-nuclear-test-site/9797594

May 25, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment

In nuclear talks, Kim Jong Un fears risking the same fate as Muammar Gaddafi of Libya

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un provides guidance on a nuclear weapons program in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang September 3, 2017. KCNA via REUTERS

Why North Korea is angered by ‘Libya Model’ in nuclear talks https://www.smh.com.au/world/why-north-korea-is-angered-by-libya-model-in-nuclear-talks-20180517-h10674.html
By Megan Specia and David Sange, 

When North Korea suddenly threw a historic summit with the United States into question on Wednesday, it cited – five times – the fate of another country and another leader, half a world away, as an example of why no one should trust American efforts to disarm another nation.

The country was Libya, and the leader was Muammar Gaddafi, who made a bad bet that he could swap his nascent nuclear program for economic integration with the USA.

That deal, executed by the Bush administration nearly 15 years ago, is a footnote to American histories of that era. But it has always loomed large for the North Koreans.

The planned June 12 meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has been regarded by disarmament advocates as an opportunity to end decades of animosity between North Korea and the US.

But in the mind of Trump’s new national security adviser, John Bolton, who was an architect of the Libya deal, that is the model of how things should play out as the two leaders meet: Complete nuclear disarmament in return for the promise of economic integration. Bolton said as much last weekend.

In issuing its threat to back out of the summit meeting, the North referred to Bolton’s comments, calling them a “Libya mode of nuclear abandonment”.

So why is the Libya model suddenly becoming a sticking point in the meeting between Trump and Kim?

What happened in Libya

In 2003, Gaddafi saw the US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, and may well have concluded he was next. In a lengthy, secret set of negotiations with Britain and the US, he agreed to voluntarily hand over the equipment he had purchased from Abdul Qadeer Khan, a leader of the Pakistani nuclear program. North Korea and Iran had also been customers of Khan, who was later placed under house arrest after his activities were exposed.

The Libya material was flown out of the country, much of it placed at a US weapons laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. When president George W. Bush announced the deal, he made a clear reference to North Korea and Iran when he said “I hope other leaders will find an example” in Libya’s action.

What happened less than a decade later might be at the heart of what Kim appears to fear.

The US and its European allies began a military action against Libya in 2011 to prevent Gaddafi’s threatened massacre of civilians. US president Barack Obama acceded to arguments from secretary of state Hillary Clinton to join the European-led action.

But no one in the Situation Room debated what message the decision to turn on Gaddafi might send to other countries the US was trying to persuade to relinquish their weapons, according to interviews conducted later with more than half a dozen people engaged in the discussion.

The Libya intervention allowed anti-government rebels to put Gaddafi on the run, and months later they pulled him from a ditch and killed him. Since then, Libya has devolved into a dysfunctional state. And North Korea has taken notice.

North Korea’s Libya fears

North Korea’s fear of meeting the same fate as Libya – or maybe more specifically its leader meeting the same fate as Gaddafi – has appeared to factor into North Korea’s thinking about its own weapons program for years.

In 2011, after the US and allies launched airstrikes in Libya, North Korea’s foreign minister said the denuclearisation of the North African nation had been an “an invasion tactic to disarm the country”.

After Gaddafi was killed, the narrative in North Korea became clear: Had he not surrendered his nuclear program, North Korean officials said, he might still be alive.

In 2016, shortly after North Korea conducted a nuclear test, its state-run news outlet, the Korean Central News Agency, made direct reference to Libya and Iraq. “History proves that powerful nuclear deterrence serves as the strongest treasured sword for frustrating outsiders’ aggression,” the agency said.

“The Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the Gaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the fate of destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development and giving up nuclear programs of their own accord,” it said.

But North Korea was also clear to draw a line between itself and the two nations. Its statement on Wednesday said it was off base to suggest that the “dignified state” of North Korea could share the same destiny as Libya or Iraq, which “collapsed due to yielding the whole of their countries to big powers”.

“The world knows too well that our country is neither Libya nor Iraq, which have met miserable fates,” the statement said. The North made explicit reference to a homegrown achievement that Gaddafi never neared: It had already become a nuclear-armed country.

Unlike North Korea, Libya was not actually a nuclear weapons state. During inspections in 2003, the Americans discovered Libya had centrifuges that could be used to produce highly enriched uranium – fuel for a bomb.

“It is absolutely absurd to dare compare the DPRK, a nuclear weapon state, to Libya, which had been at the initial state of nuclear development,” the North Korean statement said, using the initials for the country’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

North Korea has tested six nuclear weapons, and US intelligence agencies believe it has 20 to 60 more, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States.

What is the White House saying about the Libya model?

North Korea’s statement Wednesday also made direct reference to Bolton.

In his first televised interviews after becoming national security adviser last month, Bolton told Face the Nation on CBS and Fox News Sunday that Libya’s denuclearisation was what he envisioned when moving ahead with North Korea talks.

“We have very much in mind the Libya model from 2003, 2004,” he said on Fox. “There are obviously differences. The Libyan program was much smaller, but that was basically the agreement that we made.”

When a reporter asked Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, specifically about the Libya model and if the administration’s approach to North Korea would be the same, she backed away from Bolton’s comparison.

“I haven’t seen that as part of any discussions, so I am not aware that that’s a model that we are using,” Sanders said Wednesday. “There is not a cookie cutter on how this works.”  New York Times

 

May 18, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international | 2 Comments

Trump’s planned summit meeting with Kim Jong Un in doubt

North Korea Threatens to Call Off Summit Meeting With Trump, NYT, By Choe Sang-Hun and Mark Landler, 查看简体中文版查看繁體中文版  SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea threw President Trump’s planned summit meeting with its leader, Kim Jong-un, into doubt on Wednesday, threatening to call off the landmark encounter if the United States insisted on “unilateral nuclear abandonment.”

The warning, made by the North’s disarmament negotiator, caught Trump administration officials off guard and set off an internal debate over whether Mr. Kim was merely posturing in advance of the meeting in Singapore next month or was erecting a serious new hurdle.
The abrupt change in tone began early Wednesday, when North Korea indefinitely postponed high-level talks with South Korea over the North’s sudden objection to joint military drills by the South and the United States that began last week. The North also raised the possibility of scrapping the meeting with Mr. Trump.

Then hours later, the North broadened the source of its anger and sharpened the threat to the summit with Mr. Trump.

Kim Kye-kwan, a vice foreign minister, rejected the administration’s demand that it quickly dismantle its nuclear program as Libya had done 15 years ago, singling out John R. Bolton, Mr. Trump’s new national security adviser, for condemnation.

“If the United States is trying to drive us into a corner to force our unilateral nuclear abandonment, we will no longer be interested in such dialogue and cannot but reconsider our proceeding to the D.P.R.K.-U.S. summit,” the statement said, using the abbreviation for the North’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Mr. Kim said his country would never follow the path of Libya and Iraq, which he said met a “miserable fate” at the hands of “big powers.”……https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/world/asia/north-korea-postpones-talks.html?emc=edit_na_20180515&nl=breaking-news&nlid=55383028ing-news&ref=cta

 

May 16, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

North Korea promises ‘total ban’ on nuclear tests: satellite photos show removal work at its test site

Satellite photo offers clue as N Korea promises ‘total ban’ on nuclear tests , SMH, 16 May 18, Geneva: North Korea will join international efforts to ban nuclear tests, its ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Han Tae Song, told the Conference on Disarmament on Tuesday.

North Korea, which is believed to have tested six nuclear weapons, has said it will dismantle its only known nuclear test site this month ahead of a meeting on June 12 between US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un.

It comes as a satellite photo appeared to back up North Korea’s claim, showing that buildings have already been dismantled at the country’s only test site…….

An analysis on Monday by the 38 North website said commercial imagery taken last week showed several operational support buildings had been razed, and rails for mining carts apparently removed.

North Korea said it will dismantle its Punggye-ri test site between May 23 and 25 in the presence of local and international media. The site was used for each of its six underground nuclear test explosions………

The analysis said no tunnel entrances at the test site appeared to have been permanently closed yet.

The pictures, taken on 7 May, are “the first definitive evidence that dismantlement of the test site was already well underway,” 38 North, a website run by former US diplomats, said. https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/satellite-photo-offers-clue-as-n-korea-promises-total-ban-on-nuclear-tests-20180516-p4zfim.html

 

May 16, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international | Leave a comment

North Korea threatens to cancel US summit over military drills 

SBS, 16 May 18  North Korea on Wednesday called into question a much-anticipated and unprecedented summit between its leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump, the South’s Yonhap news agency reported.

Pyongyang also cancelled high-level talks due Wednesday with Seoul over the Max Thunder joint military exercises between the US and the South, Seoul said.

The US will “have to undertake careful deliberations about the fate of the planned North Korea-US summit in light of this provocative military ruckus”, Yonhap quoted the North’s official news agency KCNA as saying.

The drills between the two allies’ air forces were a rehearsal for invasion and a provocation at a time when inter-Korean relations were warming, it cited KCNA as adding.

The language used is a sudden and dramatic return to the rhetoric of the past from Pyongyang, which has long argued that it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against the US. …….

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported that Pyongyang had called the June 12 summit into question over joint military exercises between the US and the South.

The US will “have to undertake careful deliberations about the fate of the planned North Korea-US summit in light of this provocative military ruckus,” Yonhap quoted the North’s official news agency KCNA as saying.  https://www.sbs.com.au/news/north-korea-threatens-to-cancel-us-summit-over-military-drills

May 16, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international | Leave a comment

USA tells North Korea it must ship out nuclear weapons soon after nuclear summit

Telegraph 14th May 2018 ,The United States has told North Korea that is must start shipping nuclear
weapons, fissile material and some of its long-range missiles out of the
country within a couple of months of the June summit between Kim Jong-un,
the North Korean leader, and President Donald Trump, according to South
Korean media.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/14/us-pressures-north-korea-ship-nuclear-weapons-overseas-sanctions/

May 16, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

Grave danger in hasty methods of closing down North Korea’s nuclear test site

Telegraph 11th May 2018 , Closing down North Korea’s nuclear test site at Punggye-ri is going to be
more complicated and fraught with risk than has previously been suggested, with analysts suggesting that acting in haste for short-term political gain might lead to an environmental crisis.

One suggestion is to use explosives to seal the entrances to the three tunnels that have been drilled into the
mountain, although the concern is that further detonations at the already weakened site could lead to a collapse of internal spaces and the release of massive amounts of radioactivity into the atmosphere.

Given the danger, the alternative is to bury the entire site in a mixture of lime and sand.

The drawback with this approach is that it would take a long time to completely seal the site, erosion would eventually uncover the site once again and foreign experts would be required to be on-site for an extended
period of time, which the North Korean authorities may object to.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/11/north-korean-nuclear-test-site-closure-raises-fears-environmental/

May 12, 2018 Posted by | North Korea, safety | Leave a comment

Expert commentary on the Trump decision to leave the Iran nuclear deal: its implications for North Korea

The Trump decision: dangerous, irresponsible, and full of implications for North Korea https://thebulletin.org/commentary/trump-decision-dangerous-irresponsible-and-full-implications-north-korea11802 EXPERT COMMENTARY 9 MAY 2018, Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, Arms Control Association

Trump’s decision to reimpose sanctions on Iran clearly violates the multilateral Iran nuclear deal, known officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). While the move is unsurprising—given Trump’s failure to recognize the nonproliferation value of the deal and frequent threats to walk away—it is dangerous and irresponsible, and it risks manufacturing a nuclear crisis that the international community cannot afford.

There was no legitimate reason for Trump to reimpose sanctions. For the past two years, the nuclear deal has verifiably restricted Iran’s nuclear program and subjected it to intrusive monitoring and verification. Even critics of the deal, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have admitted that there is no evidence that Iran is in violation of the agreement.

Trump’s main criticism—that the deal paves the way to an Iranian nuclear weapon in 10 years—is based on a flawed analysis that discounts the value that the permanent monitoring mechanisms and prohibitions put in place by the deal possess. They are a bulwark against nuclear weapons development.

By violating the deal, Trump has only isolated the United States and undermined Washington’s credibility. His “plan B” —to negotiate a “better deal” with Iran— is completely unrealistic. After this clear demonstration that the United States cannot be counted on to implement an agreement in good faith, Trump will hard pressed to gain any support for sanctions, let alone new talks. As a result, Trump is inciting a proliferation crisis, rather than working with allies to develop a long-term diplomatic strategy that would build on the agreement in the years ahead and address Iran’s malign activities outside of the accord.

Despite Trump’s reckless decision to reimpose sanctions, it would be premature to declare the nuclear deal dead. The JCPOA is a multilateral agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council and Washington’s P5+1 partners—China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—which have pledged to implement the deal, irrespective of US actions. And these states and the European Union have powerful tools at their disposal to block the secondary effects of US sanctions.

It will be critical that these states move quickly to insulate legitimate business from US sanctions, demonstrating to Iran that there is still an incentive—trade with Europe and other developed economies—to continue abiding by the nuclear commitments made under the accord. Failure to ensure that Iran has international trading opportunities will make it more likely that Tehran will respond to Trump’s violation by breaching the nuclear limits. While Iran is unlikely to dash for a bomb, Iranian officials have left the door open to restart uranium enrichment to 20 percent uranium 235, a level of fissionable material currently prohibited by the deal. If Iran choses this path it would destabilize the region and increase the risks of conflict.

Trump’s decision has nonproliferation consequences beyond Iran. Trump is about to sit down at an important summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to discuss denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Violating the Iran deal undermines US credibility in those negotiations and sends a message to Kim Jong-un that even if an agreement is reached and North Korea abides by its terms, there’s no guarantee that Washington will fulfill its commitments. This is a dangerous precedent to set and risks this historic opportunity to de-escalate tensions with North Korea.

May 11, 2018 Posted by | Iran, North Korea, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

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