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The US might lose a war with China, congressional commission says

Insufficient industry, readiness, innovation, and funding hamper military’s ability to prevail in conflict, key experts find.

By Patrick Tucker, Science & Technology Editor, Defense One, July 29, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/07/us-might-lose-war-china-congressional-commission-says/398418/

The U.S. military “lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat,” in the judgment of a congressional commission whose new report finds that collaboration between Russia, China, and other autocratic states is increasing the chance of a multi-front conflict—and that the U.S. would have trouble sustaining such a fight.

For more than a year, the former lawmakers, military leaders, and policy experts on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy have studied how well the U.S. military is executing the 2022 national defense strategy. The group released their report on Monday and will present its findings to the Senate Armed Services committee on Tuesday.

The group found big gaps between the Defense Department’s ambitions of deterring or prevailing in a major conflict and reality. One of the reasons they came to that conclusion is the current state of the U.S. defense industrial base compared to China’s.

“Unclassified public wargames suggest that, in a conflict with China, the United States would largely exhaust its munitions inventories in as few as three to four weeks, with some important munitions (e.g., anti-ship missiles) lasting only a few days. Once expended, replacing these munitions would take years,” the report states.

Furthermore, the growing collaboration between autocratic powers make it nearly inevitable that China and Russia would coordinate against the United States in the event of an armed conflict with one or the other.  

“The United States should assume that if it enters a direct conflict involving Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, that country will benefit from economic and military aid from the others. We also believe that this partnership increases the likelihood that a conflict with one would expand to multiple fronts, causing simultaneous demands on U.S. and allied resources,” the report states. 

Of the commission’s many recommendations, most are similar to efforts the Pentagon is already undertaking, including reaching out more aggressively to the private sector, particularly new information-technology focused startups, to establish a new industrial base, and reevaluating counterproductive regulatory impediments to buying and selling defense technology. 

Other recommendations are more pointed, such as abandoning outdated “programs of record” in order to procure key pieces of equipment, and loosening ship maintenance rules, allowing more maintenance in foreign ports, and being more willing to buy weapons and supplies from other countries. 

But for the most part, the commission’s report paints a picture of a situation years in the making that can’t be righted quickly. 

“Today, the United States has a DIB with too few people, too few companies, declining and unstable financial support, and insufficient production capacity to meet the needs of the Joint Force in both peacetime and wartime,” the group said.

August 2, 2024 Posted by | China, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

China Stops Arms Control Talks With the US Over Arms Sales to Taiwan

 The Chinese Foreign Ministry says the US continues to do things that go against Beijing’s ‘core interests’

Anti War, by Dave DeCamp, JULY 18, 2024 

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that Beijing had stopped arms control talks with the US over continued US arms sales to Taiwan and other steps that go against China’s “core interests.”

The US and China held consultations on arms control back in November 2023. A reporter asked Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian about comments from US officials suggesting China declined to hold another round.

“Over the past weeks and months, despite China’s firm opposition and repeated protest, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and done things that severely undermine China’s core interests and the mutual trust between China and the US. This has seriously compromised the political atmosphere for continuing the arms control consultations,” Lin said.

“Consequently, the Chinese side has decided to hold off discussion with the US on a new round of consultations on arms control and non-proliferation. The responsibility fully lies with the US,” the spokesman added………………………………………………………more https://news.antiwar.com/2024/07/17/china-stops-arms-control-talks-with-the-us-over-arms-sales-to-taiwan/

July 20, 2024 Posted by | China, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

China is installing the wind and solar equivalent of five large nuclear power stations per week

Instead of nuclear, solar is now intended to be the foundation of China’s new electricity generation system.

ABC Science / By technology reporter James Purtill, 16 July 24,  https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2024-07-16/chinas-renewable-energy-boom-breaks-records/104086640

In short:

China is installing record amounts of solar and wind, while scaling back once-ambitious plans for nuclear.

While Australia is falling behind its renewables installation targets, China may meet its end-of-2030 target by the end of this month, according to a report.

What’s next?

Energy experts are looking to China, the world’s largest emitter and once a climate villain, for lessons on how to rapidly decarbonise.

While Australia debates the merits of going nuclear and frustration grows over the slower-than-needed rollout of solar and wind power, China is going all in on renewables.

New figures show the pace of its clean energy transition is roughly the equivalent of installing five large-scale nuclear power plants worth of renewables every week.

A report by Sydney-based think tank Climate Energy Finance (CEF) said China was installing renewables so rapidly it would meet its end-of-2030 target by the end of this month — or 6.5 years early. 

It’s installing at least 10 gigawatts of wind and solar generation capacity every fortnight.

By comparison, experts have said the Coalition’s plan to build seven nuclear power plants would add fewer than 10GW of generation capacity to the grid some time after 2035. 

Energy experts are looking to China, the world’s largest emitter, once seen as a climate villain, for lessons on how to go green, fast.

“We’ve seen America under President Biden throw a trillion dollars on the table [for clean energy],” CEF director Tim Buckley said.

“China’s response to that has been to double down and go twice as fast.”

Smart Energy Council CEO John Grimes, who recently returned from a Shanghai energy conference, said China has decarbonised its grid almost as quickly as Australia, despite having a much harder task due to the scale of its energy demand.

“They have clear targets and every part of their government is harnessed to deliver the plan,” he said.

China accounts for about a third of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. A recent drop in emissions (the first since relaxing COVID-19 restrictions), combined with the decarbonisation of the power grid, may mean the country’s emissions have peaked.

“With the power sector going green, emissions are set to plateau and then progressively fall towards 2030 and beyond,” CEF China energy policy analyst Xuyang Dong said.

So how is China building and connecting panels so fast, and what’s the role of nuclear in its transition?

Like building solar farms near Perth to power Sydney

Because its large cities of the eastern seaboard are dominated by apartment buildings, China hasn’t seen an uptake of rooftop solar like in Australia.

To find space for all the solar panels and wind turbines required for the nation’s energy needs, the planners of China’s energy transition have looked west, to areas like the Gobi Desert.

The world’s largest solar and wind farms are being built on the western edge of the country and connected to the east via the world’s longest high-voltage transmission lines.

These lines are so long they could span the length of our continent.

In Australian terms, it’s the equivalent of using solar panels near Perth to power homes in Sydney.

Mr Buckley said China’s approach was similar to the Australian one of developing regional “renewable energy zones” for large-scale electricity generation.

“They’re doing what Australia is doing with renewable energy zones but they’re doing it on steroids,” he said.

What about ‘firming’ the grid?

One of the issues with switching a grid to intermittent renewables is ensuring a steady supply of power.

In technical terms, this is the difference between generation capacity (measured in gigawatts) and actual energy output (measured in gigawatt-hours, or generation over time).

Renewables have a “capacity factor” (the ratio of actual output to maximum potential generation) of about 25 per cent, whereas nuclear’s is as high as 90 per cent.

So although China is installing solar and wind generation equivalent to five large nuclear power plants per week, their output is closer to one nuclear plant per week.

Renewables account for more than half of installed capacity in China, but only amount to about one-fifth of actual energy output over a year, the CEF’s Tim Buckley said.

To “firm” or stabilise the supply of power from its renewable energy zones, China is using a mix of pumped hydro and battery storage, similar to Australia. 

“They’re installing 1GW per month of pumped hydro storage,” Mr Buckley said.

“We’re struggling to build the 2GW Snowy 2.0 in 10 years.”

There are some major differences between Australia and China’s approaches, though.  Somewhat counterintuitively, China has built dozens of coal-fired power stations alongside its renewable energy zones, to maintain the pace of its clean energy transition.

China was responsible for 95 per cent of the world’s new coal power construction activity last year. 

The new plants are partly needed to meet demand for electricity, which has gone up as more energy-hungry sectors of the economy, like transport, are electrified.

The coal-fired plants are also being used, like the batteries and pumped hydro, to provide a stable supply of power down the transmission lines from renewable energy zones, balancing out the intermittent solar and wind.

Despite these new coal plants, coal’s share of total electricity generation in the country is falling. 

The China Energy Council estimated renewables generation would overtake coal by the end of this year.

The CEF’s Xuyang Dong said despite the country’s reliance on coal, “having China go green at this speed and scale provides the world with a textbook to do the same”.

“China is installing every week the equivalent of what we’re doing every year.”

Despite this speed, China wasn’t installing renewables fast enough to meet its 2060 carbon neutrality target, she added.

“According to our analysis, [the current rate of installation] is not ambitious enough for China.”

What about nuclear?

China is building new nuclear plants, although nowhere near as fast as it once intended.

In 2011, Chinese authorities announced fission reactors would become the foundation of the country’s electricity generation system in the next “10 to 20 years”.

But Japan’s 2011 Fukushima disaster prompted a moratorium on inland nuclear plants, which have to use river water for cooling and are more vulnerable to frequent flooding.

Meanwhile, over the following decade, solar became the cheapest electricity in the world. 

From 2010 to 2020, the installed cost of utility-scale solar PV declined by 81 per cent on a global average basis.

As well as cheap, it was safe, which made solar farms quicker to build than nuclear reactors.

Instead of nuclear, solar is now intended to be the foundation of China’s new electricity generation system.
Authorities have steadily downgraded plans for nuclear to dominate China’s energy generation. At present, the goal is 18 per cent of generation by 2060.

China installed 1GW of nuclear last year, compared to 300GW of solar and wind, Mr Buckley said.

“That says they’re all in on renewables.

“They had grand plans for nuclear to be massive but they’re behind on nuclear by a decade and five years ahead of schedule on solar and wind.”

How is China transitioning so fast?

In June of this year, on the eve of the Coalition’s nuclear policy announcement, former Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk, who’s now a Smart Energy Council “international ambassador”, led a delegation of Australians to the world’s largest clean energy conference in Shanghai.

The annual Smart Energy Conference hosts more than 600,000 delegates across three days.

Its scale underlines China’s increasing dominance of the global clean energy economy and, for some attendees, prompted unenviable comparisons with Australia’s progress.

Mr Buckley, who was part of the delegation, said he was “blown away”.

“China is winning this race.”

John Grimes, the Smart Energy Council CEO who also attended, said Australia could learn from the Chinese government’s ability to execute a long-term, difficult and costly transition plan, rather than relying on market forces to find a solution.

“Australia’s transition is going too slow, there was a lost decade of action,” he said.

“The world today spends about $7 trillion a year on coal, gas and oil and that money is going to find a new home.

Who is going to be the economic winner in that global economic transition? It’s going to be China.”

He and other energy experts are frustrated with the progress of Australia’s transition, including the discussion of nuclear power and the “weaponisation of dissent” from community groups over new wind farms and transmission lines.

Stephanie Bashir, CEO of the Nexa energy advisory, said Australia’s transition was tangled in red tape.

“The key hold-up for a lot of projects is the slow planning approvals,” Ms Bashir, who also attended the conference, said.

“In China they decide they’re going to do something and then they go and do it.”

The Australian Energy Market Operator’s (AEMO) plan to decarbonise the grid and ensure the lights stay on when the coal-fired power stations close requires thousands of kilometres of new transmission lines and large-scale solar and wind farms.

Australia is installing about half the amount of renewables per year required under the plan.

Due to this shortfall, many experts say its unlikely to meet its 2030 target of 82 per cent renewables in the grid and 43 per cent emissions reduction.

“We need to build 6GW each year from now until each power station closes, and so far we’re only bringing online 3GW,” Ms Bashir said.

“If we identify some projects are nation-building … and we need them for transition, we just have to get on with it.”

Mr Buckley predicted China would accelerate its deployment of renewables.

“My forecast is it will lift 20 per cent per annum on current levels.”

July 17, 2024 Posted by | China, renewable | Leave a comment

U.S. and China hold first informal nuclear talks in five years

By Greg Torode, Gerry Doyle and Laurie Chen, June 22, 2024

HONG KONG, (Reuters) – The United States and China resumed semi-official nuclear arms talks in March for the first time in five years, with Beijing’s representatives telling U.S. counterparts that they would not resort to atomic threats over Taiwan, according to two American delegates who attended.

The Chinese representatives offered reassurances after their U.S. interlocutors raised concerns that China might use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons if it faced defeat in a conflict over Taiwan. Beijing views the democratically governed island as its territory, a claim rejected by the government in Taipei.

“They told the U.S. side that they were absolutely convinced that they are able to prevail in a conventional fight over Taiwan without using nuclear weapons,” said scholar David Santoro, the U.S. organiser of the Track Two talks, the details of which are being reported by Reuters for the first time.

Participants in Track Two talks are generally former officials and academics who can speak with authority on their government’s position, even if they are not directly involved with setting it. Government-to-government negotiations are known as Track One.

Washington was represented by about half a dozen delegates, including former officials and scholars at the two-day discussions, which took place in a Shanghai hotel conference room.

Beijing sent a delegation of scholars and analysts, which included several former People’s Liberation Army officers.

A State Department spokesperson said in response to Reuters’ questions that Track Two talks could be “beneficial”. The department did not participate in the March meeting though it was aware of it, the spokesperson said.

Such discussions cannot replace formal negotiations “that require participants to speak authoritatively on issues that are often highly compartmentalized within (Chinese) government circles,” the spokesperson said.

Members of the Chinese delegation and Beijing’s defence ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

The informal discussions between the nuclear-armed powers took place with the U.S. and China at odds over major economic and geopolitical issues, with leaders in Washington and Beijing accusing each other of dealing in bad faith…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. more https://www.reuters.com/world/us-china-hold-first-informal-nuclear-talks-5-years-eyeing-taiwan-2024-06-21/

June 23, 2024 Posted by | China, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

Why a substantive and verifiable no-first-use treaty for nuclear weapons is possible

a no-first-use treaty could prohibit verbal threats of first use of nuclear weapons by the governments and militaries of states parties. Threatening to use nuclear weapons first is a means of sending a coercive signal. Such threats can be a major cause of escalation of nuclear confrontation and constitute a dangerous nuclear risk that must be reduced. A no-first-use treaty can consider any verbal threat of first use of nuclear weapons as a violation that is not only harmful but also detectable. A clause prohibiting the threat of first use of nuclear weapons, if included in the treaty, is verifiable. With a no-first-use treaty in place, if a state party intends to threaten to use nuclear weapons first would mean it can only withdraw from the treaty or violate its no-first-use commitment, raising the cost of signaling a nuclear threat. In this way, a no-first-use treaty could play a significant role in nuclear risk reduction

By Li Bin | June 4, 2024  https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-news/us-issues-major-nuclear-weapons-alert-amid-fears-of-all-out-war-if-that-day-comes-101717854501474.html

Since conducting its first nuclear detonation in 1964, China has pledged to never be the first to use nuclear weapons and has urged other nuclear weapon states to make the same commitment by proposing that they negotiate a no-first-use treaty.

In the United States, there have also been domestic policy initiatives, including in 2017 when US Vice-President Joe Biden commented that “deterring—and if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack should be the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal.” However, successive US administrations have failed to formally adopt a “sole-purpose” policy, nor have they responded positively to China’s no-first-use proposals. And there is little hope that President Biden will move forward with this policy before the US presidential election in November.

But silence is consent: Both presidential candidates, Biden and Donald Trump, need now to explain to their domestic and international audiences why the United States should not adopt the “sole-purpose” policy and why they refused as presidents to negotiate a no-first-use treaty with China.

Criticism. The “sole purpose” and “no-first-use” policies may differ in some details, but in general they are very similar (and I don’t distinguish between the two here). There are two sets of reasons for criticizing the idea of no-first-use. First, for some, a no-first-use policy is not considered credible or verifiable. Others argue that the United States must retain the option of first use of nuclear weapons and that a no-first-use policy is not in the United States’ interest. This second argument, however, should be judged and debated by US experts and lawmakers.

Continue reading →

June 11, 2024 Posted by | China, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

China and Russia Issue Nuclear Warnings

CEPA. By Michael Sheridan, May 28, 2024

The leaders of Russia and China have jointly shifted their stance on nuclear weapons, signaling a move away from decades of cautious Chinese thinking.

The Chinese-Russian accord is significant because it was accompanied by a joint challenge to the West’s buildup of its alliances and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

While the nuclear element of the joint communique following the May 16 summit of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin was not trumpeted and received little media attention, the two countries spelled out points of agreement on issues of significance.

The backdrop is China’s accelerated expansion of its nuclear forces and new fields of missile silos, leading the Pentagon to predict it may more than triple its capability to 1,500 weapons by 2035.

While Beijing is believed to adhere to a historical pledge that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, its actual doctrine remains obscure, there is a worrying absence of military dialogue with its rivals and recent purges at the top of its nuclear forces add to the uncertainties.

Nonetheless, it is clear that President Xi sees nuclear weapons as pieces on the global chessboard in a way that no previous leader of the People’s Republic thought necessary or desirable. Mao Zedong himself dismissed the atomic bomb as “a paper tiger.”…………………………………………………………………………….


Xi and Putin expressed “serious concern” that the US “under the pretext of conducting joint exercises with its allies that are clearly aimed at China and Russia” was acting to deploy land-based intermediate-range missile systems in the Asia-Pacific region (possibly a reference to plans to sell 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles to Japan and defend the so-called first island chain that rings China’s coasts.)

They did not specify the systems referred to but warned the US and NATO against providing “extended deterrence” to individual allies. They also singled out the AUKUS pact tightening defense cooperation between the US, Britain, and Australia.

In unusually specific language, the two leaders warned against “building infrastructure in Australia, a signatory to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, that could be used for US and British nuclear forces to conduct operations and to carry out US-UK-Australian nuclear submarine co-operation.”………………………………….. https://cepa.org/article/china-and-russia-issue-nuclear-warnings/

May 31, 2024 Posted by | China, politics international, Russia | 1 Comment

Rare spat shows China and North Korea still at odds on nuclear weapons

Japan Times, BY JOSH SMITH, SEOUL, May 29, 2024

North Korea’s rare swipe at China this week underscored how Beijing and Pyongyang do not entirely see eye-to-eye on the latter’s illicit nuclear weapons arsenal, despite warming ties in other areas, analysts and officials in South Korea said.

The North condemned China, Japan and South Korea on Monday for discussing denuclearization of the peninsula, calling their joint declaration after a summit in Seoul a “grave political provocation” that violates its sovereignty.

Even though Beijing helped tone down the statement by advocating mention of the peninsula rather than the North specifically, that was enough to raise its neighbor’s hackles, one analyst said.

“It is notable that North Korea criticized a joint statement that China had signed onto, even after Beijing helped water down the statement,” added Patricia Kim, of the Brookings Institution in the United States.

In their remarks, the three nations “reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” but unlike the last such statements in 2019 and earlier, did not commit to pursue denuclearization.

Since international talks with the United States and other countries stalled in 2019, North Korea has moved to reject the concept of ever giving up its nuclear weapons.

“This is about North Korea emphasizing its stance that any diplomatic rhetoric suggesting Pyongyang should eventually denuclearize is unacceptable,” said Tong Zhao, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“After enshrining its nuclear status in the constitution and reprimanding anyone who questions it, North Korea is raising demands for formal international recognition as a nuclear-armed country.”……………………………………… more https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/05/29/asia-pacific/politics/china-north-korea-nuclear-weapons/—

May 30, 2024 Posted by | China, North Korea, politics international | Leave a comment

Xi outlines solution to Ukraine conflict

 https://www.sott.net/article/491542-Xi-outlines-solution-to-Ukraine-conflict 19 May 24

Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed that peace negotiations recognized by both Russia and Ukraine are the best way to end the ongoing conflict between the two nations.

Speaking during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday at the Chinese leader’s residential compound at Zhongnanhai, Xi argued that the entire global security architecture must be amended in order to end the fighting and avoid similar hostilities in the future, according to the Xinhua news outlet.

Putin is on his first state visit to China since he took office for the fifth time earlier this month.

Xi was cited as saying:

“China supports the timely convening of an international peace conference recognized by both Russia and Ukraine, with equal participation by all parties, and fair discussion of all options. Beijing is willing to aid in brokering the peace talks.”

“Global powers must address both the symptoms and the root cause [of the conflict], and we must consider both the present and the long term.

“The fundamental solution to the Ukraine crisis is to promote the construction of a balanced, effective, and sustainable new security architecture.”

Beijing has repeatedly rejected Western pressure to join in the condemnation of Russia over the Ukraine conflict. Since last year, China has been promoting a peace formula consisting of 12 points, including the cessation of hostilities and unilateral sanctions, mutual respect for national security concerns and the sovereignty of nations, and the rejection of a ‘Cold War’ mentality.

Kiev has rejected the formula as unrealizable because it does not demand a retreat of Russian forces from territories Kiev claims as its own. Ukraine has long insisted that a peace settlement can only be achieved on its terms, which include a return of all former Ukrainian territories, the withdrawal of Russian troops, and an international tribunal for Russian leaders.

Kiev’s Western backers plan to hold a summit on the Ukraine conflict in Switzerland next month, to which Russia has not been invited. Beijing has yet to officially confirm whether it will send a delegation.

Russia has welcomed China’s proposed peace formula from the start, having repeatedly stressed that it remains open to a political solution to the conflict. In an interview with Xinhua ahead of his visit to China, Putin said Beijing’s initiative showed “the genuine desire… to help stabilize the situation” in the region. He added that he would endorse the formula as it calls for a dialogue based on mutual consideration of the interests of all sides involved in the conflict, including Russia.

May 20, 2024 Posted by | China, politics international, Ukraine | Leave a comment

U.S. rejects China’s proposal to ban first use of nuclear weapons.

People’s World May 16, 2024   BY JOHN WOJCIK, MARK GRUENBERG AND BEN CHACKO

The U.S. has dismissed Chinese calls for a no-first-use treaty between nuclear weapons states, saying it has questions about China’s “sincerity.”

The outright dismissal of China’s proposal followed a major speech in which Biden announced radical tariffs of up to 100 percent, on steel imports from China. That speech follows months of U.S. military buildup in the waters off the coast of China, including the placement of additional nuclear submarines around the Korean peninsula, all in the name of “protecting” Taiwan, which is, of course, a part of China itself.

Undersecretary of State Bonnie Jenkins, the country’s top arms control official, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last night that the U.S. worried China had increased its number of nuclear warheads to over 500, might have 1,000 by 2030, and that this was proof that the country was not “sincere” about its proposal to ban first use of the apocalypse-engendering weapons.

The Biden administration’s claim that China had increased the number of its warheads to 500 is just that – an unverified claim. In addition, the U.S. has 12 times that number with an admitted 3,700 of such warheads.

The U.S. says China refuses to engage in nuclear disarmament talks with it. China actually has engaged in talks, first by discussing with the U.S. the need for the U.S. to reduce its outrageously large number of missiles, as compared to China’s number, to show it is serious about fairness. And now it has added to those talks with its proposal to ban the first use of the weapons.

China’s position is that it has an arsenal that is tiny in comparison with that of the United States and that the size of the arsenals has to be part of serious talks. China has also gotten India to sign a no-first-use deal between those two countries. While all these initiatives by China were underway the U.S. was busy unilaterally canceling nuclear arms deals between the U.S. and Russia and continuing to push expansion of NATO not just up to the borders of Russia but into the Pacific regions near China.

China also stores its warheads and delivery systems separately, to avoid the risk of launches by accident or misunderstanding, as almost happened in 1983, when Soviet lieutenant Stanislav Petrov recognized reports of incoming U.S. missiles as a system malfunction and prevented a retaliatory strike which could have begun World War III.

The new, highest-ever U.S. tariffs on Chinese products were announced by President Biden shortly before the Chinese peace initiatives were rejected by his administration. The tariffs would apply to government-subsidized Chinese steel, aluminum, solar cells, electric vehicles—rising to 100% tariffs this year—and their batteries, semiconductors, and some raw materials.

The Biden tariffs are much higher than the Trump tariffs that Biden opposed when Trump was president……………………………… more https://peoplesworld.org/article/u-s-rejects-chinas-proposal-to-ban-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/—

May 18, 2024 Posted by | China, USA, weapons and war | 1 Comment

China and Russia Disagree on North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons

Beijing and Moscow have different perspectives on – and different appetites for – Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

The Diplomat, By Wooyeal Paik, May 15, 2024

China has been ambivalent about North Korea and its strategic behaviors for the last few decades, leading scholars in China to describe North Korea as both “strategic asset” and “strategic liability.” North Korea, China’s sole military ally with an official treaty, the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1961, has proved tough to handle, if not outright volatile, for its security and economic patron.

Nonetheless, North Korea’s geopolitical importance to China as a buffer state against the United States and its East Asian allies (South Korea and Japan) has not lessened. Even in the era of high-tech weapons such as missiles, military satellites, nuclear submarines, and fifth-generation fighter jets, all of which serve to reduce the strategic value of physical buffer zones, it is still effective and valuable for China not to confront the mighty hostile power, the United States, on its immediate land border. Ground forces are still the ultimate military presence, and sharing a border with a U.S. allied, unified Korea would also come at a psychological cost for China.

Beyond its role as a buffer state, North Korea’s value as leverage or a bargaining chip for China in Beijing’s relations with South Korea and the United States has been well recognized. In 2024, however, China may consider adding another layer to this leverage by supporting North Korea’s nuclear program, as Russia has done. 

North Korea is a de facto nuclear state with a set of viable delivery mechanisms including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

This nuclear element of the Kim regime has been regarded as the quintessential reason for an ever-growing regional security instability in Northeast Asia and beyond. 

For China, North Korea – and particularly its nuclear program – is a strategic liability. China prioritizes stability in its neighborhood, but North Korea purposefully pursues instability right next to China. This conflict of interests between the treaty allies exacerbates Chinese national security concerns, particularly regarding the United States and its hub-and-spoke system in the Indo-Pacific area. 

In response to North Korea’s rapid nuclear and missile developments, the United States has significantly ramped up its military presence on and around the Korean Peninsula, in consultation with its ally, South Korea. That includes the regular deployment of strategic (i.e., nuclear-capable) U.S. assets to the region, something China is not comfortable with.

Russia, however, takes a different view. Over the past year, Moscow has shifted its strategic approach to the North Korea’s nuclear capability and provocations, from viewing them as a nuisance that disrupts the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime to a tactical countermeasure against the United States. From Russia’s perspective, distracting the U.S. – the primary military and economic presence as the NATO leader – is a goal unto itself, as Washington is a major obstacle to Russia’s desire to conquer Ukraine and influence the post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe. 

Russia has been importing North Korean weapons – 152 mm artillery ammunition,122 mm multiple rocket launcher ammunition, and other conventional weapons – for use against Ukraine. In return, it’s widely believed that North Korea receives Russia’s technical assistance for the research and development of advanced space and weapons technologies: nuclear-powered submarines, cruise and ballistic missiles, military reconnaissance satellites. North Korea also receives food and energy in addition to rare international support for its pariah regime. 

Russia actively endorses North Korea as a nuclear state and supports its “legitimate” use of nuclear weapons for its self-defense and beyond. As Kim Jong Un embraces a lower nuclear threshold, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his ruling elites have also expressed their willingness to employ low-yield tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine and European NATO countries. 

Thus, North Korea has evolved into a double-layered tool for Russia, acting as both a buffer state and a nuclear threat against the United States in Northeast Asia and Europe. This accelerates the convergence of security between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions.

Despite Russia’s high-profile advances with North Korea, China is still thought to be the only nation with significant influence over Pyongyang. ……………………………………………………….. more https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/china-and-russia-disagree-on-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons/

May 17, 2024 Posted by | China, North Korea, politics international, Russia | Leave a comment

China and the U.S. Are Numb to the Real Risk of War.

Like China, the United States is mired in jingoism and confusion. Like China, it has no idea what it would do if things go wrong.

With the 2024 U.S. presidential election heating up, the one thing every candidate, Democrat or Republican, has done is to show how tough they could get on China.

Like China, the United States is mired in jingoism and confusion. Like China, it has no idea what it would do if things go wrong. With the 2024 U.S. presidential election heating up, the one thing every candidate, Democrat or Republican, has done is to show how tough they could get on China.

The pair are dangerously close to the edge of nuclear war over Taiwan—again.

May 12, 2024, By Sulmaan Wasif Khan, the Denison chair of international history and diplomacy at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/12/china-us-taiwan-strait-war-nuclear-weapons-military-biden-xi-history/

On the morning of April 5, 2023, Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, met with then-U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in Simi Valley, California. This was a meeting Beijing had warned against in the strictest of terms. It was therefore a meeting that both sides found necessary to have. China had to be shown that it could not dictate whom either Taiwan or the United States met with. On this, both Taipei and Washington were agreed.

China delivered on its promised forceful response by engaging in military drills and sending warships and planes scudding around Taiwan. The median line and Taiwan’s air defense identification zone were breached. One aircraft carrier, the Shandong, entered the waters just south of Japan. Violations of the “One China” principle, Beijing had to make clear, were not going to be taken quietly. And in seeking to make that clear, it deepened the risk of war.

This article is adapted from The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between by Sulmaan Wasif Khan,

Commentators dismissed Beijing’s response to the Tsai-McCarthy meeting as less intense than the one that had attended then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022. But the dismissal itself highlighted the gravity of the problem. A certain level of military activity had become normalized. It was as though the world now took for granted the presence of missiles and aircraft carriers, the shows of force that demanded a response in kind. The week after the meeting in California, the United States and the Philippines launched their largest joint military exercise to date. It was a way of showing China that there were other militaries that could operate in the region. The new normal meant more ships and planes operating in close proximity to one another, mutual recrimination, and mutual suspicion.

Beijing and Washington have become desensitized to the risk these circumstances pose. But in the militarization of foreign policy and the failure to grasp the full significance of that militarization, the pair are one accident and a bad decision removed from a catastrophic war. Mathematicians speak of the “edge of chaos”: the final point separating order from doom. A system operating at this edge has no room for error. This is where the accumulated weight of the past has brought the United States, China, and Taiwan. They walked right up to the edge of a war that could go nuclear several times in the past: in 1954-55, 1958, and 1996. Now, they seem to be living on that edge permanently.

In recent years, China’s policy has alienated Taiwan completely. As China has bullied, threatened, and displayed force at home and abroad, it has made unification unacceptable to much of the Taiwanese electorate. And it has enjoyed only mixed success in trying to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. It has managed to buy off many of Taiwan’s erstwhile allies, but its conduct over COVID-19 and support for Russia despite the invasion of Ukraine have cost it friends, too—and those former friends have turned to the island across the strait.

Since at least 2021, Taiwan has had a seemingly endless parade of visitors, from Germany’s education minister to Liz Truss, the former U.K. prime minister. In November 2021, the European Parliament sent its first official delegation to the island; the head of the delegation, Raphaël Glucksmann, told Tsai, “We in Europe are also confronted with interference from authoritarian regimes and we came here to learn from you.” In October 2022, Tsai received lawmakers from Lithuania and Ukraine; the former had recently established a representative office in Taiwan despite Beijing’s anger, while the latter was making a gesture of solidarity with a country that, unlike China, had been sharp in its criticism of Moscow. A Japanese parliamentary delegation that arrived in December 2022spoke glowingly of Tsai’s defense plans and emphasized Japan’s own determination to keep the status quo in the region from being “changed by force or unilaterally.” China has warned against or condemned many of these visits.

Beijing has only itself to blame for Taiwan’s strengthened diplomatic position. Its wolf warrior nationalism and reluctance to break with Moscow have cost it European support. If visits from foreign politicians were to translate into condemnation of China at the United Nations, Beijing could veto a Security Council resolution. In this case, like Russia, China would find itself a pariah state—and unlike Russia, China cares about how it is seen by the world. China’s own corrosive nationalism has eaten into its body politic, too It has not torn itself apart in a bout of political bloodletting, but it has certainly let loose the kind of jingoism that would allow that to happen. What it will decide to do in a crisis is uncertain. Beijing itself does not know.

The United States, meanwhile, seems intent on reviving a defense treaty with Taipei that it once spent more than a decade trying to break. Taiwan has become a means of showing China just how tough the United States can get. Washington is not clear on how getting tough will alter Beijing’s conduct, but “deterrence” is the concept invoked most often. A show of force, the thinking goes, will deter China from aggression. But what if deterrence fails? What if the show of force backs China into a corner from which it feels it has no option but to lash out? To this, Washington has few answers beyond preparing for war.

Some U.S. pundits have waxed lyrical about how they would fight a war with China. Taiwan, they opined, will be turned into a “porcupine” with hardened defenses. One former defense official suggested the use of “low-yield tactical nuclear weapons” in the event of a conflict with China. (The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki qualify as low yield.) The possibility of Russian President Vladimir Putin using such weapons sent shock waves of horror through the world, but the idea of employing them in a war with China became normal in some circles. There was no guarantee that, once the nuclear taboo was breached, the weapons would stay “low yield.” But the question of what would happen if the two powers escalated to higher-yield arms and plunged the world into nuclear holocaust has been left unresolved.

It is as though the United States is being haunted by all the ghosts of its long past with China and Taiwan, forcing it to relive questions it had once thought resolved. U.S. military leader Douglas MacArthur wanted to wage war against China in 1950. President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered using nuclear weapons against China in 1955 and 1958. Today, Washington abides by the “One China” principle, but it wants Taiwan to enjoy “self-determination.” It vows that it does not dispute the formulation that Taiwan is a part of China, but it will help Taiwan resist Chinese coercion. It wishes to promote Taiwan’s presence in international organizations, but it remains unwilling to recognize Taiwan itself. The United States has shifted from pure ambiguity to ambiguity with a tilt in favor of Taiwan—and it has done so because it decided China is an enemy.

Like China, the United States is mired in jingoism and confusion. Like China, it has no idea what it would do if things go wrong. With the 2024 U.S. presidential election heating up, the one thing every candidate, Democrat or Republican, has done is to show how tough they could get on China. Republicans vying for the nomination got in on the act early; former President Donald Trump has denounced French President Emmanuel Macron for “kissing Xi’s ass,” referring to Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Joe Biden, with the power of the incumbent, has not stopped at rhetoric. Whether supporting a TikTok ban unless the app is sold or calling for increased tariffs on Chinese goods, his policies are calibrated to demonstrate toughness on China.

Taiwan’s own presidential elections, held on Jan. 13, showed just how deeply the island’s electorate had turned against unification. At first, William Lai, the candidate from Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), vowed not to alter the status quo, though he accused Beijing of doing so. Taiwan, he argued, was already sovereign. There was no need to change what worked. But his caution soon vanished. While campaigning, Lai defined success for Taiwan as its leaders being able to visit the White House. This was a gauntlet thrown down—Taiwanese officials are blocked from visiting Washington. The Biden administration immediately demanded an explanation. This was not, U.S. officials made clear, how the relationship worked. Where Tsai had been prudent, Lai was willing to push his luck.

The Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party, was not leaning toward Beijing, either. Its nominee, Hou You-yi, the mayor of New Taipei City, said that he would reject both “one country, two systems” and a formal move for independence, but that if Taiwan were attacked, he would face the challenge. Taiwan, according to Hou, needed to be ready to defend itself. On the crucial question of how to deal with China, there was little difference between the policies Lai and Hou espoused.

A third candidate, Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, was calculatedly vague on China policy. His campaign made clear that he was depending on votes from traditional KMT supporters: those who would have favored a closer relationship with China. He claimed that he would find the middle ground between the KMT’s appeasement of China and the DPP’s provocation of it; he would make Taiwan a bridge for Sino-American communication rather than a front in a Sino-American war. How he proposed to do all this was left undefined.

Lai eventually won the presidency, but it was not the ringing triumph Tsai had won four years earlier. Lai scraped through with a mere 40 percent of the vote, his victory made easier by the fact that Hou and Ko had failed to join forces. As he prepares to take office on May 20, Lai faces a deeply divided, volatile populace and a legislature in which the DPP is bereft of a majority.

This is a point China has been quick to underline. The DPP, it huffed after the election, is not representative of “majority public opinion.” What is lost on Beijing is that the other candidates made clear that unification was not something they were willing to countenance either. Hou had made a point of not inviting Ma Ying-jeou, the last KMT member to serve as Taiwan’s president, to his rallies; he knew that to associate himself with Ma’s embrace of China would have doomed his candidacy. Beijing still does not understand Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States continues to disavow support for Taiwanese independence while making plans for further delegations to the island. With the U.S. presidential election going into fifth gear, the risk of miscalculation will only rise.

At the edge of chaos, a single choice can make the difference between order and catastrophe. More than 80 years on from the Cairo Declaration, which held that Taiwan would be “restored to the Republic of China” at the end of World War II, we can see that there were myriad moments that could have yielded different outcomes, for better or for worse. If President Franklin D. Roosevelt had insisted on self-determination for Taiwan after World War II, if the Korean War had not happened, if Beijing had made “one country, two systems” work, if Taiwan had developed a nuclear weapon, if Pelosi’s plane had indeed been shot at—if someone had made a different decision at any of those moments, the world would be a radically different place.

When deterrence, toughness, and pride drive policy, the room for error diminishes to virtually nil. China, Taiwan, and the United States are at a point where the choices they make could spell the difference between peace and nuclear holocaust. Those choices are best made with the historical record—and all its unrealized possibilities—firmly in mind.

May 12, 2024 Posted by | China, politics, USA | Leave a comment

A Closer Look at Two Operational Small Modular Reactor Designs

There are literally dozens of small modular reactor (SMR) and microreactor designs being developed by different companies around the world, and some of the work has been going on for decades. Yet, only two designs have actually been built and put into commercial operation. POWER takes a closer look at both of them.

Power, by Aaron Larson 1 May 24

Many nuclear power supporters have long thought small modular reactors (SMRs) would revolutionize the industry. Advocates expect SMRs to shorten construction schedules and bring costs down through modularization and factory construction. They often cite numerous other benefits that make SMRs seem like no-brainers, and yet, only two SMR designs have ever been built and placed in commercial operation.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publishes booklets biennially on the status of SMR technology. In the IAEA’s most recent booklet, it notes 25 land-based water-cooled SMRs and another eight marine-based water-cooled designs are under development globally. It also lists 17 high-temperature gas-cooled SMRs, eight liquid-metal-cooled fast-neutron-spectrum SMRs, 13 molten-salt SMRs, and 12 microreactors. If you do the math, that’s 83 SMR designs under development, but only the KLT-40S and HTR-PM are actually operational.

KLT-40S

The KLT-40S is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) that was developed in Russia. It is an advanced version of the KLT-40 reactor, which has been used in nuclear-powered icebreakers. The first KLT-40S units, and, to date, the only two of these units to enter commercial operation, were deployed in the Akademik Lomonosov—the world’s first purpose-built floating nuclear power plant (FNPP, Figure 1 on original).

Main Design Features.………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Deployment Details.…………………………….

Construction and testing of the FPU was completed in 2017 at the Baltic shipyard. In May 2018, the vessel was towed 4,000 kilometers (km), around Finland and Sweden, to Murmansk, completing the first leg of its journey to Pevek. Fuel loading was completed in Murmansk in October 2018. First criticality was achieved in November 2018, then in August 2019, the vessel embarked on the second leg of its journey—a distance of 4,700 km—towed by two tugboats to the Arctic port town of Pevek, where it was connected to the grid on Dec. 19, 2019. Akademik Lomonosov was fully commissioned on May 22, 2020, and it currently provides heat to the town of Pevek and supplies electricity to the regional Chaun-Bilibino power system.

HTR-PM

On Dec. 6, 2023, China National Nuclear Corp. announced it had commenced commercial operation of the high-temperature gas-cooled modular pebble bed (HTR-PM) reactor demonstrator. The HTR-PM project was constructed at a site in Rongcheng, Shandong Province, roughly midway between Beijing and Shanghai in eastern China…………………………………

Main Design Features.…………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Deployment Details.……………………………………………………………………. The civil work for the nuclear island buildings was completed in 2016 with the first of two reactor pressure vessels installed in March that year. The fuel plant reached its expected production capacity in 2017. Startup commissioning and testing of the primary circuit were finished by the end of 2020. The HTR-PM achieved first criticality in September 2021, and was ultimately grid connected on Dec. 20, 2021.

Spotty Results at Best

While it is laudable that these SMRs—the KLT-40S and HTR-PM—have been placed in commercial operation, their performance since entering service has come under fire. In The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2023 (WNISR), a Mycle Schneider Consulting Project, co-funded by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection, it says both designs have operated at low capacity factors recently.

Concerning the Chinese HTR-PM, the WNISR says, “Between January and December 2022, the reactors operated for only 27 hours out of a possible maximum of 8,760 hours. In the subsequent three months, they seem to have operated at a load factor of around 10 percent.” The Russian units’ performance has been nearly as dismal. “The operating records of the two KLT-40S reactors have been quite poor. According to the IAEA’s PRIS [Power Reactor Information System] database, the two reactors had load factors of just 26.4 and 30.5 percent respectively in 2022, and lifetime load factors of just 34 and 22.4 percent. The reasons for the mediocre power-generation performance remain unclear,” the report says.

Meanwhile, the promises of shortened timelines and lower costs were not borne out by these projects. “The experience so far in constructing these two SMRs as well as estimates for reactor designs like NuScale’s SMR show that these designs are also subject to the historical pattern of cost escalations and time overruns. Those cost escalations do make it even less likely that SMRs will become commercialized, as the collapse of the Carbon Free Power Project involving NuScale reactors in the United States illustrated,” the WNISR says………….. https://www.powermag.com/a-closer-look-at-two-operational-small-modular-reactor-designs/

May 4, 2024 Posted by | China, Russia, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

Blinken threatens China over Russia ties (VIDEO)

 https://www.sott.net/article/490922-Blinken-threatens-China-over-Russia-ties-VIDEO 26 Apr 24

The US Secretary of State says Washington is prepared to impose more sanctions on Beijing over the alleged transfer of military components.

Washington is ready to introduce more sanctions against China over its alleged transfer of dual-use goods and components, which can supposedly be used by the Russian military industrial complex, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Friday.

Speaking at a press conference in Beijing following his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the US official recalled that Washington has already imposed sanctions against more than 100 Chinese entities and is “fully prepared to act” and “take additional measures.”

Blinken claimed that China’s alleged support for the Russian defense industry raises concerns not only about the situation in Ukraine, but also about a “medium to long-term threat that many Europeans feel viscerally that Russia poses to them.”

Earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal had also reported that the US was drafting sanctions that could cut off some Chinese banks from the global financial system unless Beijing severs its economic ties with Russia.

Earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal had also reported that the US was drafting sanctions that could cut off some Chinese banks from the global financial system unless Beijing severs its economic ties with Russia.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=rRfYY8gmpyY%3Fsi%3DlxLu-kFvnZE0A8Ol

The outlet claimed that US officials believe trade with China has allowed Russia to rebuild its military industrial capacity and could help it defeat Ukraine in a war of attrition.

Beijing has vehemently rejected accusations of “fueling” the Ukraine conflict and has instead blamed NATO for instigating the crisis by continuing its expansion in Europe and refusing to respect Russia’s national security concerns.

Following his meeting with Blinken, President Xi suggested that the US and China “should be partners, not rivals” and should strive towards achieving “mutual success and not harm each other.”

“I proposed three major principles: mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. They are not only a summary of past experience, but also a guide to the future,” the Chinese leader was quoted as saying.

Beijing has maintained a policy of neutrality on the Ukraine conflict, with Chinese officials repeatedly stating that the country is not selling weapons to either Russia or Ukraine. Earlier this month, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning insisted that China “regulates the export of dual-use articles in accordance with laws and regulations,” urging “relevant countries” not to “smear or attack the normal relations between China and Russia.”

In December last year, US President Joe Biden issued a decree which enabled sanctions on foreign financial institutions that continue to deal with Russia. It targeted lenders outside US and EU jurisdictions that help Russia source sensitive items, which reportedly include semiconductors, machine tools, chemical precursors, ball bearings, and optical systems.

April 28, 2024 Posted by | China, politics international | Leave a comment

Tens of thousands evacuated from massive China floods

https://youtube.com/watch?v=H5U_VaCPGWk%3Fsi%3DOgFrGOaE_OncnR7y

 Authorities have evacuated nearly 60,000 people from their homes in
Guangdong, as days of heavy rain caused massive flooding in China’s most
populous province. Eleven people have gone missing, while no casualties
have been reported so far.

Footage on state media and online show large
swathes of land inundated by the floods and rescuers ferrying people on
lifeboats in waist-deep water. Several major rivers have burst their banks,
and authorities are closely monitoring “dangerously high” water levels.
They had warned that the level of a river in northern Guangdong could hit a
“once in 100 years” peak on Monday morning, though this had yet to
materialise by noon.

 BBC 22nd April 2024

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp0gd5ezj9lo

April 23, 2024 Posted by | China, climate change | Leave a comment

The short march to China’s hydrogen bomb

Bulletin, April 11, 2024. (very lengthy historic and technical detail. Good graphics)

On December 28, 1966, China successfully conducted its first hydrogen bomb test—only two years and two months after the successful explosion of its first atomic bomb. In so doing, China became the fastest among the five initial nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France, collectively known as P5) to pass from its first atomic bomb explosion to a first hydrogen bomb detonation.

There is still very limited knowledge in Western literature about how China built its first H-bomb. Based on newly available information—including Chinese blogs, memoirs, and other publicly available publications—this account reconstructs the history of how China made a breakthrough in understanding hydrogen bomb principles and built its first H-bomb—without foreign help.

Beyond the previously untold story of China’s early exploration of the hydrogen bomb theory, the article also explores in detail the so-called “100 days in Shanghai”—a milestone of China’s hydrogen bomb development—and describes the efforts that led to a series of three nuclear tests that happened in 1966 and 1967 and that are often called “the trilogy” of the H-bomb development in China.

Early explorations

Moscow’s broken promise

China officially started its nuclear weapon program on January 15, 1955.[1] About two years later, China and the Soviet Union signed the New Defense Technical Accord in Moscow. Under that agreement, Moscow would provide Beijing with a prototype of an atomic bomb model and relevant technical materials. In June 1959, however, as many major relevant facilities in the Chinese nuclear weapon program were at the peak of construction, Soviet-Sino relations deteriorated,[2] and Moscow sent a letter to Beijing formally announcing it would not provide the promised model and data. From the second half of 1959 onward, the Second Ministry of Machine Building Industry—China’s government ministry overseeing the nuclear industry—followed central government policy and relied on the country’s own capabilities to complete the task of developing the atomic bomb.[3]

In early 1960, the weaponeers of the Beijing institute of nuclear weapon research—called the Ninth Institute and placed under the leadership of the Second Ministry[4]—started to explore atomic bomb science and technology. As those weaponeers started working hard on the atomic bomb program, then-Minister of the Second Ministry Liu Jie began considering ways to conduct the nation’s hydrogen bomb development. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

On January 7, 1965, Liu Jie delivered a speech at the meeting of the Second Ministry, conveying Mao’s new instructions to the audience: “If we have hydrogen bombs and missiles, wars may not be fought, and peace will be more secure. We make the atomic bombs but will not be too many. It will be used to scare [enemies] and embolden [ourselves].” Mao also said that “it still needs three years to have the hydrogen bomb, which is too slow.” [23]

……………………………………… On February 3, 1965, the Second Ministry set the goal of testing the first hydrogen bomb device in 1968.[25]………………………………………………

…………………From February 1965 onward, the weaponeers tried different routes and proposed different ideas, but none was successful. ………………………………………………………………………

Gathering in Shanghai

In late September 1965, Yu Min and over 50 researchers gathered in Shanghai for what may have been the most intense period in the development of the hydrogen bomb………………….

……………………………….For nearly 100 days—and nights—all the physicists, mathematicians, and research assistants gathered in Shanghai would arrange shifts and take turns in the computer room around the clock to solve problems.[43]

…………………………………………………………………………….The group in Shanghai also continued the optimization design work of the boosted three-phase hydrogen aerial bomb.

Finally, in early January 1966, the researchers returned to Beijing with the new hydrogen bomb principle they had sought so hard for nearly 100 days and nights in Shanghai.

Testing the Bomb

………………………………………………..A new two-year plan included preparations for three nuclear tests that aimed for a breakthrough in confirming the H-bomb principle.

………………………….Low-yield hydrogen bomb (device 629).………………………………………………………………………………………………On December 28, 1966, the hydrogen bomb device 629-1 successfully exploded.[70] 

………………..Third test: Full-yield hydrogen bomb (device 639)

…………………………………………………………………………………………..On June 17, 1967, China successfully conducted its first hydrogen bomb (device 639) air-burst test, which was coded operation 21-73……………………………..
more https://thebulletin.org/2024/04/the-short-march-to-chinas-hydrogen-bomb/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=MondayNewsletter04152024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_ChinaHydrogenBomb_04112024

April 17, 2024 Posted by | China, weapons and war | Leave a comment

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