Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine sank earlier this year, says senior US defence official
ABC News, 27 Sept 24
In short:
China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine sank earlier this year, according to a senior US defence official.
A series of satellite images from Planet Labs from June appear to show cranes at the Wuchang shipyard, where the submarine would have been docked.
What’s next?
China’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 by 2025 and 80 by 2035, the US Department of Defense has said.
A senior US defence official has said that China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine sank earlier this year, marking a potential embarrassment for Beijing as it seeks to expand its military capabilities.
China already has the largest navy in the world, with over 370 ships, and it has embarked on production of a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines.
The US defence official, speaking on condition of anonymity on Thursday, local time, said China’s new first-in-class nuclear-powered attack submarine sank alongside a pier sometime between May and June.
A Chinese embassy spokesperson in Washington said they had no information to provide.
“In addition to the obvious questions about training standards and equipment quality, the incident raises deeper questions about the PLA’s internal accountability and oversight of China’s defence industry — which has long been plagued by corruption,” the official said, using an acronym for the People’s Liberation Army.
“It’s not surprising that the PLA Navy would try to conceal the sinking,” the official added………………………………………………. more https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-27/one-of-china-submarine-sank-says-us-defence-official/104406362
US Navy chief unveils plan to be ready for possible war with China by 2027
The announcement of the goals comes as US leaders are treading a fine line, pledging a commitment to the defence of Taiwan while also working to keep communication open with Beijing to deter greater conflict.
Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China to be reunited, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state.
But Washington opposes any attempt to take the island by force and is legally bound to support Taiwan’s military defence capability.
Admiral Lisa Franchetti says lessons from combat in the Red Sea and Ukraine’s Black Sea fight can help the US prepare for an attack on Taiwan
SCMP, Associated Press, 19 Sep 2024
The US Navy is taking lessons from its combat in the Red Sea over the past year and what Ukraine has done to hold off the Russians in the Black Sea to help US military leaders prepare the service for a potential future conflict with China.
From drones and unmanned surface vessels to the more advanced operation of shipboard guns, the US Navy is expanding its combat skills and broadening training. It is also working to overcome recruiting struggles so it can have the sailors it needs to fight the next war.
Admiral Lisa Franchetti, chief of naval operations, is laying out a series of goals, including several that will be highly challenging to meet, in a new navigation plan she described in an interview. The objective is to be ready to face what the Pentagon calls its key national security challenge – China.
“I’m very focused on 2027. It’s the year that President Xi [Jinping] told his forces to be ready to invade Taiwan,” Franchetti said. “We need to be more ready.”
The new plan, released on Wednesday, includes what she considers seven priority goals, ranging from removing delays in ship depot maintenance to improving US Navy infrastructure, recruiting and the use of drones and autonomous systems.
One significant challenge is to have 80 per cent of the force be ready enough at any given time to deploy for combat if needed – something she acknowledged is a “stretch goal”. The key, she said, is to get to a level of combat readiness where “if the nation calls us, we can push the ‘go’ button and we can surge our forces to be able to meet the call”.
The announcement of the goals comes as US leaders are treading a fine line, pledging a commitment to the defence of Taiwan while also working to keep communication open with Beijing to deter greater conflict.
Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China to be reunited, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state.
But Washington opposes any attempt to take the island by force and is legally bound to support Taiwan’s military defence capability.
An important element in any Asia-Pacific conflict will be the need to control the seas. Franchetti said the US can learn from how the Ukrainians have used drones, air strikes and long-range unmanned vessels to limit Russian ship activity in the western Black Sea and keep access open to critical ports.
“If you look at the Ukrainian success in really keeping the Russian Black Sea fleet pushed all the way over into the east, that’s all about sea denial and that’s very important,” Franchetti said. She added that Ukraine has been innovating on the battlefield by using existing systems, such as drones, in different ways.
The US Navy’s months-long battle with the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen has provided other lessons…………………………………………………………………. https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3279048/us-navy-chief-unveils-plan-be-ready-possible-war-china-2027
Surge in Russian uranium sent to China
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/09/17/ukraine-russia-war-latest-news27/
Washington fears Russia is sending large quantities of enriched uranium to China in an effort to evade sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine.
Chinese imports of enriched uranium from Russia, the world’s largest exporter of the radioactive metal, soared in 2022 and 2023, according to data released by the World Bank.
The US is now investigating whether the uranium, used as nuclear power plant fuel, is then being imported to America.
China only started to send vast quantities of enriched uranium to the US after Congress passed a ban on the import of the metal from Russia after the Ukraine invasion.
“As China may be seeking to carve out a greater role for itself in world enriched uranium markets, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium may facilitate the pursuit of Beijing’s ambitions,” said a report in March by the London-based Royal United Services Institute think tank.
China keeps door firmly closed to Japanese seafood imports
Japan Times, Zhoushan, China – 24 Aug 24
China is keeping its door tightly shut to Japanese fishery products after imposing an import ban a year ago in protest against the discharge of treated water into the sea from a crippled nuclear power plant in Japan.
Despite Tokyo’s repeated assurances that the procedure is safe, Chinese officials still refer to the treated water, which contains small amounts of radioactive tritium, as “nuclear-contaminated water.”
Tokyo and Beijing are in talks over the issue but there are no clues yet as to how the situation could be resolved.
In a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa late last month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Beijing’s demand that an international system to monitor the water release be established.
China imposed the blanket ban on fishery products from Japan on Aug. 24 last year immediately after the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant started releasing treated water.
Chinese trade statistics show that no fishery products, except aquarium fish, have been imported from Japan since September last year…………………………………………..
The Japanese food company’s sales in China have yet to return to normal levels. “The situation remains tough,” the food company official said.
The impact of the import ban has spread further than Beijing had anticipated.
A woman in her 40s in Beijing said she has not eaten marine products for a long while.
……………………………………………Beijing has said seafood sold in China is safe because strict radiation inspections are conducted in China.
But a dealer in fishery products in Zhoushan said that the ocean is connected. It is illogical that Japanese products are dangerous and Chinese products are safe, the dealer said.
In China, experts’ views that the treated water would reach the Chinese coast as early as this spring spread in state media and on social media. ……………………………………………… https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2024/08/24/china-ban-japan-seafood/—
US crying wolf over China’s ‘nuclear threat’ while expanding nuclear arsenal
Aug 22, 2024 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1318466.shtml
On Tuesday, a New York Times report caused quite a stir: US President Joe Biden has ordered US forces to prepare for “possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North Korea.” It sounds like the US president was instructing the military to prepare for doomsday, observers pointed out.
The report revealed that in March, Biden approved a highly classified nuclear strategy plan called “Nuclear Employment Guidance,” which for the first time reorients the US’ deterrent strategy to focus on the so-called threat posed by China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal. The article states that this shift comes as the Pentagon believes China’s stockpiles will rival the size and diversity of the US’ and Russia’s over the next decade.
With over 5,000 nuclear warheads, the US possesses the world’s largest and most advanced nuclear arsenal. So why does it repeatedly target China in its nuclear threat rhetoric? This can be traced back to a dilemma faced by the US Department of Defense – how to justify maintaining such a massive nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War world. To secure more defense budgets for the domestic military-industrial complex, the US chooses to constantly manufacture or exaggerate baseless “nuclear threats.” And China has become the best excuse.
What the US truly seeks is to ensure that its power far exceeds that of any other country in the world, allowing it to threaten and coerce other nations at will, without fear of retaliation. As a hegemonic state, US’ security is built on the insecurity of other countries. To maintain its hegemonic status, the US struggles to ensure its absolute superiority in power, with nuclear weapons being a crucial tool in maintaining its global dominance. Therefore, this new nuclear strategy plan is an excuse for expanding its nuclear arsenal and sustaining its military hegemony.
China and the US have fundamentally different perceptions of the strategic role of nuclear weapons. China has repeatedly emphasized that it pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defense, and is committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. China does not engage in any nuclear arms race with any other country, and keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. The notion of establishing an offensive nuclear hegemony or pursuing the so-called goal of rivaling the nuclear arsenal size of the US does not align with China’s strategic logic. As experts pointed out, China’s development of nuclear weapons is aimed at avoiding threats from other nuclear-armed states.
No matter how the US fabricates or exaggerates the so-called China threat narrative, China’s nuclear development follows its own set pace, including a measured increase in the quantity and quality of its nuclear arsenal, which will not be swayed by the US’ interference. This is a necessary measure for China in a complex international environment to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity – a legitimate act of self-defense, Shen Yi, a professor at Fudan University, told the Global Times.
The US repeatedly harps on the “China nuclear threat” narrative, yet it is, in fact, the one that poses the biggest nuclear threat to the world. In possession of the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, the US follows a nuclear policy that allows first-use of nuclear weapons. In recent years, the US has invested heavily to miniaturize nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold of their use in real-combat, and used nuclear weapons as a bait to hijack its allies and partners. Its irresponsible decisions and actions have resulted in the proliferation of nuclear risks, and its attempts to maintain hegemony and intimidate the world with nuclear power have been fully exposed.
There will be no winners in a nuclear war. We urge the US to abandon Cold War mentality, recognize that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security policies, and take concrete actions to promote global strategic stability, instead of doing the opposite. Instead of smearing and hyping up China, the US should reflect on itself and consider how to rebuild mutual trust with China through dialogue and sincerity.
The U.S. and China Can Lead the Way on Nuclear Threat Reduction
Policies of “no first use” are a model for nuclear states.
Foreign Policy, By Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a retired senior colonel in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. August 20, 2024,
Since the end of the Cold War, the role of nuclear weapons has only grown. Nuclear arsenals are being strengthened around the world, with many nuclear states continuing to modernize their arsenals. In June, outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the alliance was in talks to deploy more nuclear weapons, taking them out of storage and placing them on standby. Robert C. O’Brien, a former national security advisor to former U.S. President Donald Trump, has urged him to conduct nuclear tests if he wins a new term, arguing that it would help the United States “maintain technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles.”
There are two bleak conclusions about nuclear diplomacy in this age. First, it will be impossible to ban such weapons anytime soon. Since its passage in 2017, no nuclear-armed states have signed the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, some of them instead contending that it will distract attention from other disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives.
It is also very hard, if not impossible, to convince these states to reduce their nuclear stockpiles amid ever-intensifying geopolitical and military competition. On the contrary, in February 2023, Russia announced that it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
In response, the United States has also suspended the sharing and publication of treaty data. In November, Russia went a step further and withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing “an imbalance” with the United States, which has failed to ratify the treaty since it opened for signature in 1996.
Amid such a situation, it is impossible for Beijing to stand by idly. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that the size of China’s nuclear arsenal has increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, and it is expected to continue to grow. For the first time, China may also now be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime. According to the U.S. Defense Department, China is likely to increase its nuclear warheads to 1,500 by 2035.
Given this reality, perhaps the most promising near-term way to guard against nuclear risks is not by limiting the number of nuclear weapons but by controlling the policies that govern their use. In this regard, a pledge by nuclear-armed states of “no first use” of nuclear weapons looks to be the most realistic approach in reducing the escalation of nuclear threats.
In theory, no first use refers to a policy by which a nuclear-armed power formally refrains from the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in warfare, except in the case of doing so as a second strike in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapon of mass destruction.
Of the five nuclear states that have signed onto the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—only China has ever declared a no-first-use policy. On Oct. 16, 1964, when China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, the country immediately declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and unconditionally committed itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones…………………………………………..
All nuclear powers could afford to adopt a formal no-first-use policy—taking the moral high ground without reducing their capabilities for retaliation.
Though it has never adopted a no-first-use policy itself, the United States’ nuclear posture is actually more similar to China’s than it seems. In its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the Biden administration declared that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons “in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” But it is hard to imagine which interests are so vital that they might require Washington to use nuclear weapons as a first measure to defend them.
To be sure, it is important for the United States to assure its allies that it will follow through on its deterrent promises. It is equally hard to imagine who would venture to launch a nuclear strike on a U.S. ally, knowing the dire potential consequences.
The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, meanwhile, is operationally independent. But in terms of its nuclear policy, the British government has made it clear that “we would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies.” France, meanwhile adheres to a principle of “strict sufficiency.”
The real challenge, then, is getting Russia to commit to a no-first-use policy. The Soviet Union adopted a formal policy of no first use in 1982. But after its dissolution, the Russian Federation reversed this approach in 1993, likely to mitigate the comparative weakness of the Russian Armed Forces in the post-Soviet era………………………………………………….
A dual-track approach may be the best bet for the adoption of a formal no-first-use policy.
In Europe, NATO can start with a unilateral no-first-use pledge against Russia as a gesture of goodwill. Even if such an offer isn’t immediately reciprocated by Russia, it might begin to thaw tensions.
As a second—and crucial—step, NATO could pledge to halt any further expansion of its alliance in exchange for Moscow adopting a no-first-use policy This would be a difficult pill for the alliance to swallow. But after Sweden’s and Finland’s entry earlier this year, there are only three aspiring countries on the waiting list: the barely significant Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Georgia and Ukraine, which have deeply problematic ongoing conflicts with Russia that NATO is sensitive about.
The path forward would likely be smoother if it went through Asia. Both Russia and China have already agreed to no first use against each other. China and the United States could reach a similar agreement, thus de-escalating potential conflicts involving U.S. allies—such as the Philippines and Japan—as well as the dangers that could be provoked through accidental collisions in the sea or air. A U.S.-led example might then make it easier to bring the Europeans on board.
This may seem far-fetched in the current geopolitical climate, but there is precedent for it. When India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in May 1998, they incurred swift condemnation from the U.N. Security Council, which called for both countries to sign both the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In a rare show of solidarity, China and the United States made a joint declaration in June 1998 agreeing to de-target their nuclear weapons against each other.
This was largely a symbolic and unverifiable step. But it was not only a defusing of tensions, but also good to see nuclear states at least partially honoring the vision of nuclear disarmament laid out in Article VI of the NPT. And this China-U.S. joint statement eventually led to another joint statement among the five nuclear-armed permanent Security Council states in May 2000, which affirmed that their nuclear weapons are not targeted at each other or at any other states.
No first use is a big step forward from nontargeting. It’s not out of bounds to imagine that, with enough diplomatic capital, a similar but more important pledge of no first use could be made today. In fact, in January 2022—only a month before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—these five nuclear powers agreed in a joint statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
What is more significant is that during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow last year, China and Russia reiterated this commitment, even amid Russia’s ongoing war.
If, indeed, a nuclear war cannot be won, then what is stopping these nuclear powers from taking a no-first-use pledge? Nuclear weapons didn’t help the United States in its wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—or the Russians in Ukraine. A commitment of no first use by the nuclear-armed states would give people hope that a nuclear-free world, however distant, is still possible one day.
This essay is published in cooperation with the Asian Peace Programme at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/20/nuclear-weapons-war-no-first-use-policy/—
Understanding China’s Approach to Nuclear Deterrence
China has also always adhered to a “no first use” (NFU) doctrine regarding its nuclear forces, precluding it from adopting an asymmetric escalation posture. That it is entirely reliant on its own strategic nuclear capabilities for deterrence also precludes it from adopting a catalytic posture, as it does not need to, nor can it rely on, a nuclear patron to intervene in crises on its behalf.
Alex Alfirraz Scheers, https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/understanding-chinas-approach-to-nuclear-deterrence/
It has never been more crucial to understand China’s approach to deterrence, in order to bring a much-needed sense of perspective to Sino-American nuclear dynamics
The case for U.S. nuclear superiority made by several high-profile nuclear policy experts in the United States has tacitly increased tensions between Washington and Beijing. Any decision to pursue the recommendations outlined in the U.S. Strategic Posture Review to respond to China’s alleged efforts to achieve nuclear parity with the United States will only create a more uncertain and dangerous international threat environment. Hence, it has never been more crucial to understand China’s approach to deterrence, in order to bring a much-needed sense of perspective to Sino-American nuclear dynamics. More importantly, cultivating a sense of understanding is critical to attaining and maintaining peace.
This article seeks to contextualize China’s nuclear journey, and to serve as a reminder to policymakers and the general public alike that while China’s nuclear journey has been far from straightforward, China’s nuclear intentions have historically been to prevent and not to provoke nuclear conflict.
China has been a nuclear power since 1964. Up until the 1990s, China only had roughly 20 strategic nuclear capable delivery systems. Its approach to deterrence in that period, according to Nicola Leveringhaus, was not strategic, but rather can be understood by analyzing technological constraints, domestic politics, and its leadership decision-making considerations on nuclear and national security issues.
During the Cold War, China’s main strategic threats were posed by the USSR and the United States. Then, nuclear weapons served as a deterrent against any acts of aggression by the superpowers. In the 21st century, China has undertaken massive nuclear modernization and expansion. Today, China’s nuclear forces are numbered at roughly 440 warheads, and according to Pentagon estimates will number 1,500 warheads by 2035.
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, and the emergence of regional nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan as well as a continued U.S. threat perception, China’s nuclear deterrent is positioned to prevent acts of aggression regionally and against the United States.
Indeed, according to Caitlin Talmadge and Joshua Rovner, “The specific nature of China’s improvements do seem oriented toward bolstering the country’s assured retaliation posture in response to growing threats from ever more capable U.S. counterforce and missile defense systems.”
Yet, throughout China’s nuclear history, it has consistently adopted a deterrence by punishment posture, and has stressed the importance of maintaining an effective second-strike retaliatory capability.
A deterrence by punishment posture enables China to threaten nuclear retaliation against a nuclear strike on its vital interest, and a secure second-strike capability refers to China’s ability to absorb a nuclear strike and to retaliate with a nuclear response. Both require highly survivable nuclear capabilities, and a resilient national security infrastructure, which China appears to have continually pursued.
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has invested heavily in developing a triad of land, air and sea-based nuclear capabilities. While the proliferation of nuclear silos from which to launch its DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) constitutes the largest land-based nuclear build-up in China’s history, they bolster China’s strategic deterrence capability by signaling to the United States that it is investing in long-range delivery systems that can reach targets in the continental United States.
Nevertheless, as Vipin Narang observed, “The types of capabilities that China developed are consistent with a retaliatory posture aimed at deterring nuclear coercion and nuclear use.” China has also always adhered to a “no first use” (NFU) doctrine regarding its nuclear forces, precluding it from adopting an asymmetric escalation posture. That it is entirely reliant on its own strategic nuclear capabilities for deterrence also precludes it from adopting a catalytic posture, as it does not need to, nor can it rely on, a nuclear patron to intervene in crises on its behalf.
As Brandon Babin stated, “China has defined its active defense national military strategy as ‘striking only after the enemy has struck.’” Nevertheless, recent Chinese efforts to develop more nuclear options, such as theater nuclear weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles, indicate that China is potentially reviewing its deterrence posture.
Current estimates of their nuclear forces suggest that China appears to adopt a posture that includes countervalue targets, holding at risk their adversaries’ densely populated centers. The size of China’s nuclear forces logically orients it toward adopting countervalue targeting, as a counterforce posture would require a nuclear force size capable of successfully hitting an adversary’s nuclear forces.
A damage limitation approach, therefore, would simply not be feasible with their force size. As it stands, counterforce would prove ineffective for China if ever it is engaged in a nuclear conflagration with the United States. Again, Narang here is salient: “Chinese posture features…strong centralized controls, survivability through dispersed and concealed stewardship procedures and numerical ambiguity, and punitive retaliatory strikes against key countervalue targets.”
Adopting countervalue targeting enables China to effectively deter adversaries without requiring it to possess robust nuclear forces with sophisticated delivery systems. Changes in force size, however, will surely increase China’s nuclear options and will afford China with a breadth of maneuverability previously unattainable.
China’s targets also align with its deterrence by punishment posture. Its primary targets, as illustrated by its DF-1 to D-5 ICBMs, are strategic in character. These targets illustrate that China’s approach is also shaped by the fact that since the end of the Cold War, it does not face any direct existential security threats on its borders. Recent skirmishes with India have not escalated to levels of war-fighting sufficient to warrant genuine concern and are unlikely to result in the kind of direct military engagement seen in the 1969 conflict with the Soviet Union.
There is precedent – however obscure – for China to trade blows with a nuclear power: The Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 are the only time in history that a nuclear China clashed militarily with another nuclear power. However, given that the likelihood for a recurrence of such clashes remains low, never mind the likelihood of regional nuclear escalation involving China, policymakers in the United States should not seek to pursue superiority simply to fuel a sense of insecurity in China.
Having said that, China’s main strategic concern revolves around Taiwan, and its nuclear deterrence strategy is ultimately oriented toward preventing what it refers to as a “high-intensity war” with the United States. How the next president of the United States will affect China’s calculus remains to be seen, but recent reports regarding China’s decision not to pursue arms control talks with the United States surely do not bode well for Sino-American cooperation on nuclear matters.
Whether a President Trump or a President Harris can lead to a course reversal for the better remains to be seen. Nevertheless, China’s approach to nuclear deterrence looks likely to continue to be informed by its efforts to protect its vital interests and to deter conflict with the United States, through threatening a retaliatory nuclear strike and by preserving assured second-strike capabilities.
While concerns mount over the prospect of a future nuclear conflict between the United States and China, a concerted U.S. pursuit of nuclear superiority will do little to decrease tensions with China and preserve the peace, however fragile it may currently appear to be.
The US might lose a war with China, congressional commission says
Insufficient industry, readiness, innovation, and funding hamper military’s ability to prevail in conflict, key experts find.
By Patrick Tucker, Science & Technology Editor, Defense One, July 29, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/07/us-might-lose-war-china-congressional-commission-says/398418/
The U.S. military “lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat,” in the judgment of a congressional commission whose new report finds that collaboration between Russia, China, and other autocratic states is increasing the chance of a multi-front conflict—and that the U.S. would have trouble sustaining such a fight.
For more than a year, the former lawmakers, military leaders, and policy experts on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy have studied how well the U.S. military is executing the 2022 national defense strategy. The group released their report on Monday and will present its findings to the Senate Armed Services committee on Tuesday.
The group found big gaps between the Defense Department’s ambitions of deterring or prevailing in a major conflict and reality. One of the reasons they came to that conclusion is the current state of the U.S. defense industrial base compared to China’s.
“Unclassified public wargames suggest that, in a conflict with China, the United States would largely exhaust its munitions inventories in as few as three to four weeks, with some important munitions (e.g., anti-ship missiles) lasting only a few days. Once expended, replacing these munitions would take years,” the report states.
Furthermore, the growing collaboration between autocratic powers make it nearly inevitable that China and Russia would coordinate against the United States in the event of an armed conflict with one or the other.
“The United States should assume that if it enters a direct conflict involving Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, that country will benefit from economic and military aid from the others. We also believe that this partnership increases the likelihood that a conflict with one would expand to multiple fronts, causing simultaneous demands on U.S. and allied resources,” the report states.
Of the commission’s many recommendations, most are similar to efforts the Pentagon is already undertaking, including reaching out more aggressively to the private sector, particularly new information-technology focused startups, to establish a new industrial base, and reevaluating counterproductive regulatory impediments to buying and selling defense technology.
Other recommendations are more pointed, such as abandoning outdated “programs of record” in order to procure key pieces of equipment, and loosening ship maintenance rules, allowing more maintenance in foreign ports, and being more willing to buy weapons and supplies from other countries.
But for the most part, the commission’s report paints a picture of a situation years in the making that can’t be righted quickly.
“Today, the United States has a DIB with too few people, too few companies, declining and unstable financial support, and insufficient production capacity to meet the needs of the Joint Force in both peacetime and wartime,” the group said.
China Stops Arms Control Talks With the US Over Arms Sales to Taiwan
The Chinese Foreign Ministry says the US continues to do things that go against Beijing’s ‘core interests’
Anti War, by Dave DeCamp, JULY 18, 2024
The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that Beijing had stopped arms control talks with the US over continued US arms sales to Taiwan and other steps that go against China’s “core interests.”
The US and China held consultations on arms control back in November 2023. A reporter asked Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian about comments from US officials suggesting China declined to hold another round.
“Over the past weeks and months, despite China’s firm opposition and repeated protest, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and done things that severely undermine China’s core interests and the mutual trust between China and the US. This has seriously compromised the political atmosphere for continuing the arms control consultations,” Lin said.
“Consequently, the Chinese side has decided to hold off discussion with the US on a new round of consultations on arms control and non-proliferation. The responsibility fully lies with the US,” the spokesman added………………………………………………………more https://news.antiwar.com/2024/07/17/china-stops-arms-control-talks-with-the-us-over-arms-sales-to-taiwan/
China is installing the wind and solar equivalent of five large nuclear power stations per week
Instead of nuclear, solar is now intended to be the foundation of China’s new electricity generation system.
ABC Science / By technology reporter James Purtill, 16 July 24, https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2024-07-16/chinas-renewable-energy-boom-breaks-records/104086640
In short:
China is installing record amounts of solar and wind, while scaling back once-ambitious plans for nuclear.
While Australia is falling behind its renewables installation targets, China may meet its end-of-2030 target by the end of this month, according to a report.
What’s next?
Energy experts are looking to China, the world’s largest emitter and once a climate villain, for lessons on how to rapidly decarbonise.
While Australia debates the merits of going nuclear and frustration grows over the slower-than-needed rollout of solar and wind power, China is going all in on renewables.
New figures show the pace of its clean energy transition is roughly the equivalent of installing five large-scale nuclear power plants worth of renewables every week.
A report by Sydney-based think tank Climate Energy Finance (CEF) said China was installing renewables so rapidly it would meet its end-of-2030 target by the end of this month — or 6.5 years early.
It’s installing at least 10 gigawatts of wind and solar generation capacity every fortnight.
By comparison, experts have said the Coalition’s plan to build seven nuclear power plants would add fewer than 10GW of generation capacity to the grid some time after 2035.
Energy experts are looking to China, the world’s largest emitter, once seen as a climate villain, for lessons on how to go green, fast.
“We’ve seen America under President Biden throw a trillion dollars on the table [for clean energy],” CEF director Tim Buckley said.
“China’s response to that has been to double down and go twice as fast.”
Smart Energy Council CEO John Grimes, who recently returned from a Shanghai energy conference, said China has decarbonised its grid almost as quickly as Australia, despite having a much harder task due to the scale of its energy demand.
“They have clear targets and every part of their government is harnessed to deliver the plan,” he said.
China accounts for about a third of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. A recent drop in emissions (the first since relaxing COVID-19 restrictions), combined with the decarbonisation of the power grid, may mean the country’s emissions have peaked.
“With the power sector going green, emissions are set to plateau and then progressively fall towards 2030 and beyond,” CEF China energy policy analyst Xuyang Dong said.
So how is China building and connecting panels so fast, and what’s the role of nuclear in its transition?
Like building solar farms near Perth to power Sydney
Because its large cities of the eastern seaboard are dominated by apartment buildings, China hasn’t seen an uptake of rooftop solar like in Australia.
To find space for all the solar panels and wind turbines required for the nation’s energy needs, the planners of China’s energy transition have looked west, to areas like the Gobi Desert.
The world’s largest solar and wind farms are being built on the western edge of the country and connected to the east via the world’s longest high-voltage transmission lines.
These lines are so long they could span the length of our continent.
In Australian terms, it’s the equivalent of using solar panels near Perth to power homes in Sydney.
Mr Buckley said China’s approach was similar to the Australian one of developing regional “renewable energy zones” for large-scale electricity generation.
“They’re doing what Australia is doing with renewable energy zones but they’re doing it on steroids,” he said.
What about ‘firming’ the grid?
One of the issues with switching a grid to intermittent renewables is ensuring a steady supply of power.
In technical terms, this is the difference between generation capacity (measured in gigawatts) and actual energy output (measured in gigawatt-hours, or generation over time).
Renewables have a “capacity factor” (the ratio of actual output to maximum potential generation) of about 25 per cent, whereas nuclear’s is as high as 90 per cent.
So although China is installing solar and wind generation equivalent to five large nuclear power plants per week, their output is closer to one nuclear plant per week.
Renewables account for more than half of installed capacity in China, but only amount to about one-fifth of actual energy output over a year, the CEF’s Tim Buckley said.
To “firm” or stabilise the supply of power from its renewable energy zones, China is using a mix of pumped hydro and battery storage, similar to Australia.
“They’re installing 1GW per month of pumped hydro storage,” Mr Buckley said.
“We’re struggling to build the 2GW Snowy 2.0 in 10 years.”
There are some major differences between Australia and China’s approaches, though. Somewhat counterintuitively, China has built dozens of coal-fired power stations alongside its renewable energy zones, to maintain the pace of its clean energy transition.
China was responsible for 95 per cent of the world’s new coal power construction activity last year.
The new plants are partly needed to meet demand for electricity, which has gone up as more energy-hungry sectors of the economy, like transport, are electrified.
The coal-fired plants are also being used, like the batteries and pumped hydro, to provide a stable supply of power down the transmission lines from renewable energy zones, balancing out the intermittent solar and wind.
Despite these new coal plants, coal’s share of total electricity generation in the country is falling.
The China Energy Council estimated renewables generation would overtake coal by the end of this year.
The CEF’s Xuyang Dong said despite the country’s reliance on coal, “having China go green at this speed and scale provides the world with a textbook to do the same”.
“China is installing every week the equivalent of what we’re doing every year.”
Despite this speed, China wasn’t installing renewables fast enough to meet its 2060 carbon neutrality target, she added.
“According to our analysis, [the current rate of installation] is not ambitious enough for China.”
What about nuclear?
China is building new nuclear plants, although nowhere near as fast as it once intended.
In 2011, Chinese authorities announced fission reactors would become the foundation of the country’s electricity generation system in the next “10 to 20 years”.
But Japan’s 2011 Fukushima disaster prompted a moratorium on inland nuclear plants, which have to use river water for cooling and are more vulnerable to frequent flooding.
Meanwhile, over the following decade, solar became the cheapest electricity in the world.
From 2010 to 2020, the installed cost of utility-scale solar PV declined by 81 per cent on a global average basis.
As well as cheap, it was safe, which made solar farms quicker to build than nuclear reactors.
Instead of nuclear, solar is now intended to be the foundation of China’s new electricity generation system.
Authorities have steadily downgraded plans for nuclear to dominate China’s energy generation. At present, the goal is 18 per cent of generation by 2060.
China installed 1GW of nuclear last year, compared to 300GW of solar and wind, Mr Buckley said.
“That says they’re all in on renewables.
“They had grand plans for nuclear to be massive but they’re behind on nuclear by a decade and five years ahead of schedule on solar and wind.”
How is China transitioning so fast?
In June of this year, on the eve of the Coalition’s nuclear policy announcement, former Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk, who’s now a Smart Energy Council “international ambassador”, led a delegation of Australians to the world’s largest clean energy conference in Shanghai.
The annual Smart Energy Conference hosts more than 600,000 delegates across three days.
Its scale underlines China’s increasing dominance of the global clean energy economy and, for some attendees, prompted unenviable comparisons with Australia’s progress.
Mr Buckley, who was part of the delegation, said he was “blown away”.
“China is winning this race.”
John Grimes, the Smart Energy Council CEO who also attended, said Australia could learn from the Chinese government’s ability to execute a long-term, difficult and costly transition plan, rather than relying on market forces to find a solution.
“Australia’s transition is going too slow, there was a lost decade of action,” he said.
“The world today spends about $7 trillion a year on coal, gas and oil and that money is going to find a new home.
Who is going to be the economic winner in that global economic transition? It’s going to be China.”
He and other energy experts are frustrated with the progress of Australia’s transition, including the discussion of nuclear power and the “weaponisation of dissent” from community groups over new wind farms and transmission lines.
Stephanie Bashir, CEO of the Nexa energy advisory, said Australia’s transition was tangled in red tape.
“The key hold-up for a lot of projects is the slow planning approvals,” Ms Bashir, who also attended the conference, said.
“In China they decide they’re going to do something and then they go and do it.”
The Australian Energy Market Operator’s (AEMO) plan to decarbonise the grid and ensure the lights stay on when the coal-fired power stations close requires thousands of kilometres of new transmission lines and large-scale solar and wind farms.
Australia is installing about half the amount of renewables per year required under the plan.
Due to this shortfall, many experts say its unlikely to meet its 2030 target of 82 per cent renewables in the grid and 43 per cent emissions reduction.
“We need to build 6GW each year from now until each power station closes, and so far we’re only bringing online 3GW,” Ms Bashir said.
“If we identify some projects are nation-building … and we need them for transition, we just have to get on with it.”
Mr Buckley predicted China would accelerate its deployment of renewables.
“My forecast is it will lift 20 per cent per annum on current levels.”
U.S. and China hold first informal nuclear talks in five years
By Greg Torode, Gerry Doyle and Laurie Chen, June 22, 2024
HONG KONG, (Reuters) – The United States and China resumed semi-official nuclear arms talks in March for the first time in five years, with Beijing’s representatives telling U.S. counterparts that they would not resort to atomic threats over Taiwan, according to two American delegates who attended.
The Chinese representatives offered reassurances after their U.S. interlocutors raised concerns that China might use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons if it faced defeat in a conflict over Taiwan. Beijing views the democratically governed island as its territory, a claim rejected by the government in Taipei.
“They told the U.S. side that they were absolutely convinced that they are able to prevail in a conventional fight over Taiwan without using nuclear weapons,” said scholar David Santoro, the U.S. organiser of the Track Two talks, the details of which are being reported by Reuters for the first time.
Participants in Track Two talks are generally former officials and academics who can speak with authority on their government’s position, even if they are not directly involved with setting it. Government-to-government negotiations are known as Track One.
Washington was represented by about half a dozen delegates, including former officials and scholars at the two-day discussions, which took place in a Shanghai hotel conference room.
Beijing sent a delegation of scholars and analysts, which included several former People’s Liberation Army officers.
A State Department spokesperson said in response to Reuters’ questions that Track Two talks could be “beneficial”. The department did not participate in the March meeting though it was aware of it, the spokesperson said.
Such discussions cannot replace formal negotiations “that require participants to speak authoritatively on issues that are often highly compartmentalized within (Chinese) government circles,” the spokesperson said.
Members of the Chinese delegation and Beijing’s defence ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
The informal discussions between the nuclear-armed powers took place with the U.S. and China at odds over major economic and geopolitical issues, with leaders in Washington and Beijing accusing each other of dealing in bad faith…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. more https://www.reuters.com/world/us-china-hold-first-informal-nuclear-talks-5-years-eyeing-taiwan-2024-06-21/
Why a substantive and verifiable no-first-use treaty for nuclear weapons is possible
a no-first-use treaty could prohibit verbal threats of first use of nuclear weapons by the governments and militaries of states parties. Threatening to use nuclear weapons first is a means of sending a coercive signal. Such threats can be a major cause of escalation of nuclear confrontation and constitute a dangerous nuclear risk that must be reduced. A no-first-use treaty can consider any verbal threat of first use of nuclear weapons as a violation that is not only harmful but also detectable. A clause prohibiting the threat of first use of nuclear weapons, if included in the treaty, is verifiable. With a no-first-use treaty in place, if a state party intends to threaten to use nuclear weapons first would mean it can only withdraw from the treaty or violate its no-first-use commitment, raising the cost of signaling a nuclear threat. In this way, a no-first-use treaty could play a significant role in nuclear risk reduction
By Li Bin | June 4, 2024 https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-news/us-issues-major-nuclear-weapons-alert-amid-fears-of-all-out-war-if-that-day-comes-101717854501474.html
Since conducting its first nuclear detonation in 1964, China has pledged to never be the first to use nuclear weapons and has urged other nuclear weapon states to make the same commitment by proposing that they negotiate a no-first-use treaty.
In the United States, there have also been domestic policy initiatives, including in 2017 when US Vice-President Joe Biden commented that “deterring—and if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack should be the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal.” However, successive US administrations have failed to formally adopt a “sole-purpose” policy, nor have they responded positively to China’s no-first-use proposals. And there is little hope that President Biden will move forward with this policy before the US presidential election in November.
But silence is consent: Both presidential candidates, Biden and Donald Trump, need now to explain to their domestic and international audiences why the United States should not adopt the “sole-purpose” policy and why they refused as presidents to negotiate a no-first-use treaty with China.
Criticism. The “sole purpose” and “no-first-use” policies may differ in some details, but in general they are very similar (and I don’t distinguish between the two here). There are two sets of reasons for criticizing the idea of no-first-use. First, for some, a no-first-use policy is not considered credible or verifiable. Others argue that the United States must retain the option of first use of nuclear weapons and that a no-first-use policy is not in the United States’ interest. This second argument, however, should be judged and debated by US experts and lawmakers.
Continue readingChina and Russia Issue Nuclear Warnings
CEPA. By Michael Sheridan, May 28, 2024
The leaders of Russia and China have jointly shifted their stance on nuclear weapons, signaling a move away from decades of cautious Chinese thinking.
The Chinese-Russian accord is significant because it was accompanied by a joint challenge to the West’s buildup of its alliances and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
While the nuclear element of the joint communique following the May 16 summit of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin was not trumpeted and received little media attention, the two countries spelled out points of agreement on issues of significance.
The backdrop is China’s accelerated expansion of its nuclear forces and new fields of missile silos, leading the Pentagon to predict it may more than triple its capability to 1,500 weapons by 2035.
While Beijing is believed to adhere to a historical pledge that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, its actual doctrine remains obscure, there is a worrying absence of military dialogue with its rivals and recent purges at the top of its nuclear forces add to the uncertainties.
Nonetheless, it is clear that President Xi sees nuclear weapons as pieces on the global chessboard in a way that no previous leader of the People’s Republic thought necessary or desirable. Mao Zedong himself dismissed the atomic bomb as “a paper tiger.”…………………………………………………………………………….
Xi and Putin expressed “serious concern” that the US “under the pretext of conducting joint exercises with its allies that are clearly aimed at China and Russia” was acting to deploy land-based intermediate-range missile systems in the Asia-Pacific region (possibly a reference to plans to sell 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles to Japan and defend the so-called first island chain that rings China’s coasts.)
They did not specify the systems referred to but warned the US and NATO against providing “extended deterrence” to individual allies. They also singled out the AUKUS pact tightening defense cooperation between the US, Britain, and Australia.
In unusually specific language, the two leaders warned against “building infrastructure in Australia, a signatory to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, that could be used for US and British nuclear forces to conduct operations and to carry out US-UK-Australian nuclear submarine co-operation.”………………………………….. https://cepa.org/article/china-and-russia-issue-nuclear-warnings/
Rare spat shows China and North Korea still at odds on nuclear weapons
Japan Times, BY JOSH SMITH, SEOUL, May 29, 2024
North Korea’s rare swipe at China this week underscored how Beijing and Pyongyang do not entirely see eye-to-eye on the latter’s illicit nuclear weapons arsenal, despite warming ties in other areas, analysts and officials in South Korea said.
The North condemned China, Japan and South Korea on Monday for discussing denuclearization of the peninsula, calling their joint declaration after a summit in Seoul a “grave political provocation” that violates its sovereignty.
Even though Beijing helped tone down the statement by advocating mention of the peninsula rather than the North specifically, that was enough to raise its neighbor’s hackles, one analyst said.
“It is notable that North Korea criticized a joint statement that China had signed onto, even after Beijing helped water down the statement,” added Patricia Kim, of the Brookings Institution in the United States.
In their remarks, the three nations “reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” but unlike the last such statements in 2019 and earlier, did not commit to pursue denuclearization.
Since international talks with the United States and other countries stalled in 2019, North Korea has moved to reject the concept of ever giving up its nuclear weapons.
“This is about North Korea emphasizing its stance that any diplomatic rhetoric suggesting Pyongyang should eventually denuclearize is unacceptable,” said Tong Zhao, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“After enshrining its nuclear status in the constitution and reprimanding anyone who questions it, North Korea is raising demands for formal international recognition as a nuclear-armed country.”……………………………………… more https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/05/29/asia-pacific/politics/china-north-korea-nuclear-weapons/—
Xi outlines solution to Ukraine conflict
https://www.sott.net/article/491542-Xi-outlines-solution-to-Ukraine-conflict 19 May 24
Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed that peace negotiations recognized by both Russia and Ukraine are the best way to end the ongoing conflict between the two nations.
Speaking during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday at the Chinese leader’s residential compound at Zhongnanhai, Xi argued that the entire global security architecture must be amended in order to end the fighting and avoid similar hostilities in the future, according to the Xinhua news outlet.
Putin is on his first state visit to China since he took office for the fifth time earlier this month.
Xi was cited as saying:
“China supports the timely convening of an international peace conference recognized by both Russia and Ukraine, with equal participation by all parties, and fair discussion of all options. Beijing is willing to aid in brokering the peace talks.”
“Global powers must address both the symptoms and the root cause [of the conflict], and we must consider both the present and the long term.
“The fundamental solution to the Ukraine crisis is to promote the construction of a balanced, effective, and sustainable new security architecture.”
Beijing has repeatedly rejected Western pressure to join in the condemnation of Russia over the Ukraine conflict. Since last year, China has been promoting a peace formula consisting of 12 points, including the cessation of hostilities and unilateral sanctions, mutual respect for national security concerns and the sovereignty of nations, and the rejection of a ‘Cold War’ mentality.
Kiev has rejected the formula as unrealizable because it does not demand a retreat of Russian forces from territories Kiev claims as its own. Ukraine has long insisted that a peace settlement can only be achieved on its terms, which include a return of all former Ukrainian territories, the withdrawal of Russian troops, and an international tribunal for Russian leaders.
Kiev’s Western backers plan to hold a summit on the Ukraine conflict in Switzerland next month, to which Russia has not been invited. Beijing has yet to officially confirm whether it will send a delegation.
Russia has welcomed China’s proposed peace formula from the start, having repeatedly stressed that it remains open to a political solution to the conflict. In an interview with Xinhua ahead of his visit to China, Putin said Beijing’s initiative showed “the genuine desire… to help stabilize the situation” in the region. He added that he would endorse the formula as it calls for a dialogue based on mutual consideration of the interests of all sides involved in the conflict, including Russia.
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