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  Can Trump Trump China (or Vice Versa)?

When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it “acknowledged” that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military presence there.

For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful weaponry.

the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in when it comes to Taiwan this time around.

Trump Confronts a Rising China

Can He Manage U.S.-China Relations Without Precipitating World War III?

By Michael Klare, December 17, 2024,  https://scheerpost.com/2024/12/19/trump-confronts-a-rising-china/

Gaza, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela: President-elect Donald Trump will face no shortage of foreign-policy challenges when he assumes office in January. None, however, comes close to China in scope, scale, or complexity. No other country has the capacity to resist his predictable antagonism with the same degree of strength and tenacity, and none arouses more hostility and outrage among MAGA Republicans. In short, China is guaranteed to put President Trump in a difficult bind the second time around: he can either choose to cut deals with Beijing and risk being branded an appeaser by the China hawks in his party, or he can punish and further encircle Beijing, risking a potentially violent clash and possibly even nuclear escalation. How he chooses to resolve this quandary will surely prove the most important foreign test of his second term in office.

As Waltz and others around Trump see it, China poses a multi-dimensional threat to this country’s global supremacy. In the military domain, by building up its air force and navy, installing military bases on reclaimed islands in the South China Sea, and challenging Taiwan through increasingly aggressive air and naval maneuvers, it is challenging continued American dominance of the Western Pacific. Diplomatically, it’s now bolstering or repairing ties with key U.S. allies, including India, Indonesia, Japan, and the members of NATO. Meanwhile, it’s already close to replicating this country’s most advanced technologies, especially its ability to produce advanced microchips. And despite Washington’s efforts to diminish a U.S. reliance on vital Chinese goods, including critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, it remains a primary supplier of just such products to this country.

Fight or Strike Bargains?

For many in the Trumpian inner circle, the only correct, patriotic response to the China challenge is to fight back hard. Both Representative Waltz, Trump’s pick as national security adviser, and Senator Marco Rubio, his choice as secretary of state, have sponsored or supported legislation to curb what they view as “malign” Chinese endeavors in the United States and abroad.

What such a deal might look like is anyone’s guess, but it’s hard to see how Trump could win significant concessions from Beijing without abandoning some of the punitive measures advocated by the China hawks in his entourage. Count on one thing: this complicated and confusing dynamic will play out in each of the major problem areas in U.S.-China relations, forcing Trump to make critical choices between his transactional instincts and the harsh ideological bent of his advisers.

Trump, China, and Taiwan

Of all the China-related issues in his second term in office, none is likely to prove more challenging or consequential than the future status of the island of Taiwan. At issue are Taiwan’s gradual moves toward full independence and the risk that China will invade the island to prevent such an outcome, possibly triggering U.S. military intervention as well. Of all the potential crises facing Trump, this is the one that could most easily lead to a great-power conflict with nuclear undertones.

When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it “acknowledged” that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military presence there. However, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Washington was also empowered to cooperate with a quasi-governmental Taiwanese diplomatic agency, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and provide Taiwan with the weapons needed for its defense. Moreover, in what came to be known as “strategic ambiguity,” U.S. officials insisted that any effort by China to alter Taiwan’s status by force would constitute “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area” and would be viewed as a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” although not necessarily one requiring a military response.

For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful weaponry. For their part, Chinese officials repeatedly declared that Taiwan was a renegade province that should be reunited with the mainland, preferably by peaceful means. The Taiwanese, however, have never expressed a desire for reunification and instead have moved steadily towards a declaration of independence, which Beijing has insisted would justify armed intervention.

As such threats became more frequent and menacing, leaders in Washington continued to debate the validity of “strategic ambiguity,” with some insisting it should be replaced by a policy of “strategic clarity” involving an ironclad commitment to assist Taiwan should it be invaded by China. President Biden seemed to embrace this view, repeatedly affirming that the U.S. was obligated to defend Taiwan under such circumstances. However, each time he said so, his aides walked back his words, insisting the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so.

The Biden administration also boosted its military support for the island while increasing American air and naval patrols in the area, which only heightened the possibility of a future U.S. intervention should China invade. Some of these moves, including expedited arms transfers to Taiwan, were adopted in response to prodding from China hawks in Congress. All, however, fit with an overarching administration strategy of encircling China with a constellation of American military installations and U.S.-armed allies and partners.

From Beijing’s perspective, then, Washington is already putting extreme military and geopolitical pressure on China. The question is: Will the Trump administration increase or decrease those pressures, especially when it comes to Taiwan?

That Trump will approve increased arms sales to and military cooperation with Taiwan essentially goes without saying (as much, at least, as anything involving him does). The Chinese have experienced upticks in U.S. aid to Taiwan before and can probably live through another round of the same. But that leaves far more volatile issues up for grabs: Will he embrace “strategic clarity,” guaranteeing Washington’s automatic intervention should China invade Taiwan, and will he approve a substantial expansion of the American military presence in the region? Both moves have been advocated by some of the China hawks in Trump’s entourage, and both are certain to provoke fierce, hard-to-predict responses from Beijing.

Many of Trump’s closest advisers have, in fact, insisted on “strategic clarity” and increased military cooperation with Taiwan. Michael Waltz, for example, has asserted that the U.S. must “be clear we’ll defend Taiwan as a deterrent measure.” He has also called for an increased military presence in the Western Pacific. Similarly, last June, Robert C. O’Brien, Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, wrote that the U.S. “should make clear” its “commitment” to “help defend” Taiwan, while expanding military cooperation with the island.

Trump himself has made no such commitments, suggesting instead a more ambivalent stance. In his typical fashion, in fact, he’s called on Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and expressed anger at the concentration of advanced chip-making on the island, claiming that the Taiwanese “did take about 100% of our chip business.” But he’s also warned of harsh economic measures were China to impose a blockade of the island, telling the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, “I would say [to President Xi]: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%.” He wouldn’t need to threaten the use of force to prevent a blockade, he added, because President Xi “respects me and he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.”

Such comments reveal the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in when it comes to Taiwan this time around. He could, of course, try to persuade Beijing to throttle back its military pressure on the island in return for a reduction in U.S. tariffs — a move that would reduce the risk of war in the Pacific but leave China in a stronger economic position and disappoint many of his top advisers. If, however, he chooses to act “crazy” by embracing “strategic clarity” and stepping up military pressure on China, he would likely receive accolades from many of his supporters, while provoking a (potentially nuclear) war with China.

In January 2018, the first Trump administration imposed tariffs of 30% on imported solar panels and 20%-50% on imported washing machines, many sourced from China. Two months later, the administration added tariffs on imported steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), again aimed above all at China. And despite his many criticisms of Trump’s foreign and economic policies, President Biden chose to retain those tariffs, even adding new ones, notably on electric cars and other high-tech products. The Biden administration has also banned the export of advanced computer chips and chip-making technology to China in a bid to slow that country’s technological progress.

Accordingly, when Trump reassumes office on January 20th, China will already be under stringent economic pressures from Washington. But he and his associates insist that those won’t be faintly enough to constrain China’s rise. The president-elect has said that, on day one of his new term, he will impose a 10% tariff on all Chinese imports and follow that with other harsh measures. Among such moves, the Trump team has announced plans to raise tariffs on Chinese imports to 60%, revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (also known as “most favored nation”) status, and ban the transshipment of Chinese imports through third countries.

Most of Trump’s advisers have espoused such measures strongly. “Trump Is Right: We Should Raise Tariffs on China,” Marco Rubio wrote last May. “China’s anticompetitive tactics,” he argued, “give Chinese companies an unfair cost advantage over American companies… Tariffs that respond to these tactics prevent or reverse offshoring, preserving America’s economic might and promoting domestic investment.”

But Trump will also face possible pushback from other advisers who are warning of severe economic perturbations if such measures were to be enacted. China, they suggest, has tools of its own to use in any trade war with the U.S., including tariffs on American imports and restrictions on American firms doing business in China, including Elon Musk’s Tesla, which produces half of its cars there. For these and other reasons, the U.S.-China Business Council has warned that additional tariffs and other trade restrictions could prove disastrous, inviting “retaliatory measures from China, causing additional U.S. jobs and output losses.”

As in the case of Taiwan, Trump will face some genuinely daunting decisions when it comes to economic relations with China. If, in fact, he follows the advice of the ideologues in his circle and pursues a strategy of maximum pressure on Beijing, specifically designed to hobble China’s growth and curb its geopolitical ambitions, he could precipitate nothing short of a global economic meltdown that would negatively affect the lives of so many of his supporters, while significantly diminishing America’s own geopolitical clout. He might therefore follow the inclinations of certain of his key economic advisers like transition leader Howard Lutnick, who favor a more pragmatic, businesslike relationship with China. How Trump chooses to address this issue will likely determine whether the future involves increasing economic tumult and uncertainty or relative stability. And it’s always important to remember that a decision to play hardball with China on the economic front could also increase the risk of a military confrontation leading to full-scale war, even to World War III.

And while Taiwan and trade are undoubtedly the most obvious and challenging issues Trump will face in managing (mismanaging?) U.S.-China relations in the years ahead, they are by no means the only ones. He will also have to decide how to deal with increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, continued Chinese economic and military-technological support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, and growing Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.

In these, and other aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry, Trump will be pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more pragmatic, transactional approach. During the campaign, he backed each approach, sometimes in the very same verbal outburst. Once in power, however, he will have to choose between them — and his decisions will have a profound impact on this country, China, and everyone living on this planet.

January 6, 2025 Posted by | China, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

China sanctions US defense firms

 https://www.rt.com/news/610080-china-sanctions-us-defense-firms/ 27 Dec 24

Beijing has placed restrictions on Washington’s military assistance to Taiwan, the foreign ministry has said.

Beijing has imposed sanctions on seven US defense companies and their executives in response to Washington’s sale of arms to Taiwan in violation of the One-China principle, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on Friday.

The move comes after outgoing US President Joe Biden last week authorized a $571.3 million military aid package to Taiwan.

Washington’s actions “interfere in China’s internal affairs, and undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry said as it announced the restrictions.

The companies targeted by the sanctions include Insitu Inc., Hudson Technologies Co., Saronic Technologies, Inc., Raytheon Canada, Raytheon Australia, Aerkomm Inc., and Oceaneering International Inc.

The ministry said “relevant senior executives” of the companies had also been blacklisted, without providing any names.

The sanctions will freeze “movable and immovable” assets belonging to US firms and their executives within China, and ban organizations and individuals in the country from trading or collaborating with them, the ministry stated.

The restrictions, which will contribute to already strained relations between Beijing and Washington, were announced after Biden approved a record $895 billion defense budget, which surpassed last year’s allocation by $9 billion.

The bill does not refer to Ukraine aid, however, it contains measures aimed at strengthening the US presence and defense capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily to “counter China.” Beijing has already condemned the bill, citing its “negative content on China” and attempts to play up the ‘China threat’ narrative. 

Beijing has repeatedly stressed that it considers the self-governing island of Taiwan to be an inalienable part of the country under the One-China principle. It has denounced Washington’s arms sales to Taipei, accusing the US of fomenting tensions over Taiwan.

December 30, 2024 Posted by | China, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

‘We need to be prepared’: China adapts to era of extreme flooding

“The Chinese leadership tends to see the long game,” Li said. “To demonstrate their far-sight and to prevent further risks, more should be done to prepare for the impacts of climate change systematically.”

While some residents take to building houses in trees, officials recognise need for national response to climate disasters

Amy Hawkins , Guardian 24th Dec 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/24/we-need-to-be-prepared-china-adapts-to-era-of-extreme-flooding

Every summer, Dongting Hu, China’s second-largest freshwater lake, swells in size as flood water from the Yangtze River flows into its borders. Dams and dikes are erected around the lake’s edges to protect against flooding. But this year, not for the first time, they were overwhelmed.

For three days in early July, more than 800 rescue workers in Hunan province scrambled to block the breaches. One rupture alone took 100,000 cubic metres of rock to seal, according to Zhang Yingchun, a Hunan official. At least 7,000 people had to be evacuated. It was one of a series of disasters to hit China as the country grappled with a summer of extreme weather. By August, there had been 25 large floods, the biggest number since records began in 1998, reported state media.

Xi Jinping, China’s president, “urged all-out rescue and relief work” to safeguard the people affected by the flooding in Hunan, state media reported.

One of those people was Ren Benxin, an archaeologist who lives on a small, forested island in the upper tributaries of Dongting Hu. He calls his idyllic home Soultopia. As well as carrying out archaeological research, he provides accommodation for travellers and looks after the herd of stray cats and dogs that he has adopted over the years.

On 5 July, his home was flooded. “First, I rescued the animals. Then, I rescued the supplies,” he said. “It was the first time in 10 years that I’d experienced something like this.”

The wooden huts in Ren’s corner of the islet were nearly completely submerged in muddy water. Chickens used the remnants of destroyed buildings as rafts to avoid drowning. Ren traversed the island in a small plastic dinghy. One of his dogs, Eason, fell ill after drinking dirty flood water, and died a few days later.

“Two years ago, we had a severe drought, and this year it’s been floods. I think we need to be prepared for anything,” Ren said.

Experiences like Ren’s are becoming more common in China, as 

 global heating makes extreme weather events more likely, as well as undermining communities’ defences against those disasters.

Dongting Hu exemplifies these challenges. It was once China’s largest freshwater lake. But decades of agricultural development meant that huge swathes of its land were reclaimed for farming, reducing the lake’s storage capacity. Both droughts and floods are becoming more serious and severe.

At least six Chinese provinces experienced major flooding in 2024. As well as the floods in Hunan, heavy rainfall in Guangdong, China’s most populous province, forced more than 110,000 people to relocate. After years of treating weather disasters as isolated incidents that require a local response, Chinese officials are becoming increasingly aware of the need to adapt to extreme weather events on a national scale.

“The harsh reality is here: the lack of climate action will cost China and present a social security threat,” said Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute.

At the Cop29 UN climate crisis conference in November, China published an action plan for climate adaptation, vowing to establish a technical platform to monitor and forecast extreme weather events and to share its knowledge of improving early warning mechanisms.

It marked a shift the country which has long acknowledged the science of the climate crisis, but has focused its environmental cleanup efforts on issues such as air pollution – rather than severe but relatively rare floods and droughts.

“The Chinese leadership tends to see the long game,” Li said. “To demonstrate their far-sight and to prevent further risks, more should be done to prepare for the impacts of climate change systematically.”

For flooding victims like Ren, an official recognition of – and compensation for – the damage wrought by the climate crisis cannot come soon enough. The repair work cost him more than 70,000 yuan (£7,600), although the authorities did send some relief workers to help.

For now, Ren is developing his own ways to adapt to climate breakdown. He shuns electrical appliances after his were destroyed in the flood, and uses wood burners for cooking and heating. He plans to build a new home suspended in trees, so as to be safe from floods.

“I think extreme weather is more frequent now. So I have to be prepared for anything. If I like the place, I’ll stay.”

Additional research by Chi-hui Lin and Jason Tzu Kuan Lu

December 29, 2024 Posted by | China, climate change | Leave a comment

China not part of nuclear arms race, says envoy

US, with largest arsenal, called on to stop misrepresenting nation’s policy

By MINLU ZHANG at United Nations and SHAO XINYING in Beijing | CHINA DAILY 2024-10-21  https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202410/21/WS671596c9a310f1265a1c88ef.html

A Chinese arms control official called on the United States on Friday to “stop misrepresenting China’s nuclear policy” and said that China “has not, and will not, engage in a nuclear arms race”.

A representative of the US told the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on Friday that Russia is violating the New START Treaty and employing “irresponsible nuclear rhetoric” amid the Ukraine crisis. The representative also claimed that China has not fully disclosed the extent of its nuclear weapons modernization.

Shen Jian, China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs, told the committee that China’s no-first-use policy “requires maintaining a certain level of ambiguity regarding its nuclear arsenal to ensure the survivability of its limited nuclear forces”.


“As long as no country uses nuclear weapons against China, it will not face a nuclear threat from China. This is the most meaningful form of transparency,” Shen said.

He said the US possesses the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenal, adding that it adheres to “the policy of preemptive nuclear strikes, and even tailors nuclear deterrence strategies for other countries”.

“The transparency of the US display of nuclear power is nothing more than a ‘muscle show’ that will not make other countries feel safe,” he said.

“China has consistently maintained its nuclear forces at the minimum level required for national security and has not, and will not, engage in a nuclear arms race,” the Chinese envoy said.

He said China must “appropriately” modernize its nuclear forces to “ensure the safety, reliability and survivability of its minimum nuclear deterrent”, as “China’s external security environment continues to deteriorate”, noting that certain countries are developing global missile defense systems and other weapons that “impact strategic stability”.

He urged the US to “stop misrepresenting China’s nuclear policy”. For 60 years, China has adhered to a no-first-use policy with a high degree of stability, consistency and predictability, he said. Recently, China again formally proposed that nuclear-armed states negotiate a “No First Use Treaty” or issue a joint political statement on the matter as soon as possible.

China has engaged in arms control and nonproliferation dialogues with many countries around the world, including the US, Shen said. As the current coordinator of the P5 mechanism, China is also actively promoting dialogue and cooperation among the five nuclear-weapon states.

The P5 mechanism is a dialogue process among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US.

Shen said that the US should stop projecting its logic that “power inevitably seeks dominance “onto China.

China not part of nuclear arms race, says envoy

US, with largest arsenal, called on to stop misrepresenting nation’s policy

By MINLU ZHANG at United Nations and SHAO XINYING in Beijing | CHINA DAILY | Updated: 2024-10-21 07:48

A Chinese arms control official called on the United States on Friday to “stop misrepresenting China’s nuclear policy” and said that China “has not, and will not, engage in a nuclear arms race”.

A representative of the US told the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on Friday that Russia is violating the New START Treaty and employing “irresponsible nuclear rhetoric” amid the Ukraine crisis. The representative also claimed that China has not fully disclosed the extent of its nuclear weapons modernization.

Shen Jian, China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs, told the committee that China’s no-first-use policy “requires maintaining a certain level of ambiguity regarding its nuclear arsenal to ensure the survivability of its limited nuclear forces”.

“As long as no country uses nuclear weapons against China, it will not face a nuclear threat from China. This is the most meaningful form of transparency,” Shen said.

He said the US possesses the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenal, adding that it adheres to “the policy of preemptive nuclear strikes, and even tailors nuclear deterrence strategies for other countries”.

“The transparency of the US display of nuclear power is nothing more than a ‘muscle show’ that will not make other countries feel safe,” he said.

“China has consistently maintained its nuclear forces at the minimum level required for national security and has not, and will not, engage in a nuclear arms race,” the Chinese envoy said.

He said China must “appropriately” modernize its nuclear forces to “ensure the safety, reliability and survivability of its minimum nuclear deterrent”, as “China’s external security environment continues to deteriorate”, noting that certain countries are developing global missile defense systems and other weapons that “impact strategic stability”.

He urged the US to “stop misrepresenting China’s nuclear policy”. For 60 years, China has adhered to a no-first-use policy with a high degree of stability, consistency and predictability, he said. Recently, China again formally proposed that nuclear-armed states negotiate a “No First Use Treaty” or issue a joint political statement on the matter as soon as possible.

China has engaged in arms control and nonproliferation dialogues with many countries around the world, including the US, Shen said. As the current coordinator of the P5 mechanism, China is also actively promoting dialogue and cooperation among the five nuclear-weapon states.

The P5 mechanism is a dialogue process among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US.

Shen said that the US should stop projecting its logic that “power inevitably seeks dominance “onto China.

Shen said that over the past 20 years, the US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Iran nuclear deal, and these moves undermine the international arms control regime.

According to The New York Times, amid ongoing global conflicts, the US plans to allocate an estimated $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years to modernize its arsenal.

Shen noted that while some countries have criticized China and Russia with regard to their nuclear arsenals, they made “no mention of other nuclear-weapon states upgrading their arsenals”. He called this a “double standard “and emphasized that such actions, which “draw lines based on ideology and stir up bloc confrontation”, will not advance nuclear disarmament.

Wang Zhen, a researcher of international politics at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of International Relations, told China Daily that “the US’ misrepresenting of China’s nuclear development serves mainly to justify its upgrading of its nuclear arsenal, and the so-called ‘China nuclear threat’ is used as an excuse to adjust its nuclear strategy”.

He said that the US, despite its huge nuclear arsenal, clings to a first-use nuclear deterrence policy, which “underscores its pursuit of nuclear hegemony”.

October 21, 2024 Posted by | China, weapons and war | Leave a comment

China’s openness about its latest nuclear missile test shows growing confidence vis-à-vis the United States

The rare public ICBM test seems to have been specifically aimed at dissuading Washington from using nuclear weapons in a potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait

Bulletin, By Hui Zhang | October 16, 2024

China’s Ministry of National Defense announced last month that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying a simulated warhead into the Pacific Ocean and that the missile accurately fell into the designated area. This was the first time since 1980 that China had test-fired an ICBM into international waters.

But the test launch was part of routine annual training, the ministry added, in line with international law and international practice, and not directed against any country or target.

Just as observers were vigorously speculating about the type of missile used in the test, China Junhao (China’s military media wing) cut short the discussions, releasing pictures of the launch site—a very rare step given that the Chinese army has not made public a photo of the launch of a new ICBM for decades.

China’s Ministry of National Defense announced last month that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying a simulated warhead into the Pacific Ocean and that the missile accurately fell into the designated area. This was the first time since 1980 that China had test-fired an ICBM into international waters.

But the test launch was part of routine annual training, the ministry added, in line with international law and international practice, and not directed against any country or target.

Just as observers were vigorously speculating about the type of missile used in the test, China Junhao (China’s military media wing) cut short the discussions, releasing pictures of the launch site—a very rare step given that the Chinese army has not made public a photo of the launch of a new ICBM for decades…………………

With this new launch test, China certainly wants to show a forceful response to suspicion about its nuclear deterrence capabilities in the wake of recent corruption scandals and command instability in its rocket force. The test shows that the rocket force has an operational and credible nuclear force that can help ensure China’s ability to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent—a key element of President Xi Jinping’s long-held military objectives and emphasis on strengthening China’s nuclear forces, an emphasis initiated in 2015.

The rare public ICBM test seems to have been specifically aimed at dissuading Washington from using nuclear weapons in a potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait. The unusual transparency surrounding the test shows how China is becoming increasingly confident vis-à-vis the United States. It also could offer a rare opportunity for engaging in risk reduction talks.

A new missile type. Unlike the United States, which usually tests its ICBMs in international waters, China has usually fired its ICBMs over its homeland, using a lofted or depressed trajectory to keep the missile inside Chinese territory. China’s last full-trajectory flight test of an ICBM (the DF-5) was conducted in May 1980………………………………….

Where the 1980 test was meant to be a trump card for deterring Moscow, today’s DF-31AG test is aimed at deterring Washington………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Changing target. China now perceives the United States as being its main threat, and the question of whether China has a credible and reliable deterrent against a US first nuclear strike has become more important in Chinese government circles. At least, this appears to be the strategic calculation that Xi currently pursues………………………………………….

Since 2012 and Xi’s presidential tenure, however, China has been substantially modernizing, expanding, and diversifying its nuclear forces to address perceived threats from the United States. …………………………..

China has expanded its nuclear arsenal at unprecedented speed and scale. It has increased its total warhead count from about 260 in 2016 to about 500 in 2024. Most of the increase has come in the shape of ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States—from about 65 in 2016 to about 240 in 2024. The US Defense Department projected that China would possess over 1,000 warheads by 2030.

The observable transformation of China’s nuclear posture and the projections for its expansion over the next decade raise the question of whether China has changed its nuclear strategy.[8] Until recently, Chinese officials and government documents reaffirmed China’s commitment to a no-first-use policy and a self-defense nuclear strategy.[9] Under this nuclear policy and strategy, China has always confirmed that it “keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.” The major question is how to interpret the “minimum” needs of a nuclear force for a secured second-strike capability.

Searching for a minimum and “effective” deterrent. China’s officials have never declared a specific number of weapons required for its minimum level. Such a level is never static. It depends on several factors, including estimates of survivability during a nuclear attack and a projected enemy’s missile defense systems. …………………….

………….. since 2000, the US missile defense plan has been a major driver of China’s nuclear modernization and buildup…………………………….

At this stage, it is not clear whether Xi Jinping has decided to empower the country’s nuclear force beyond assuring such a reliable second-strike capability. However, while there is little evidence to show that China has changed its long-standing nuclear strategy and no-first-use policy, recent qualitative and quantitative improvements in the nuclear forces demonstrate that Chinese leaders may now pursue a more ambitious nuclear strategy.

A more confident China—and the need to reduce risk. Without a clear understanding of China’s goals and motivations, a new arms race could be triggered with the United States, which would reverse China’s long-standing policy against such engagements. It is now the time for both countries to conduct dialogues to avoid a nuclear arms race and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. Both sides should undertake risk-reduction and military confidence-building measures to address security concerns, clarify strategic intentions, and increase transparency. They should also engage in “strategic stability” talks.

As a first step, China and the United States could negotiate a bilateral agreement on mutual notification for ballistic missile and space launches, which would significantly reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation……………………..https://thebulletin.org/2024/10/chinas-openness-about-its-latest-nuclear-missile-test-shows-growing-confidence-vis-a-vis-the-united-states/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=ThursdayNewsletter10172024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_ChinaNuclearMissileTest_10162024

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October 19, 2024 Posted by | China, weapons and war | Leave a comment

China to head green energy boom with 60% of new projects in next six years

China is expected to account for almost 60% of all renewable energy
capacity installed worldwide between now and 2030, according to the
International Energy Agency. The IEA’s highly influential renewable energy
report found that over the next six years renewable energy projects will
roll out at three times the pace of the previous six years, led by the
clean energy programmes of China and India.

It found that the world’s
renewable energy capacity is on course to outpace the 2030 goals set by
governments to roughly equal the power systems in China, the EU, India and
the US combined. Fatih Birol, the executive director of the IEA, said:
“If I could sum this [trend] up in two words they would be: China,
solar.”

Guardian 9th Oct 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/oct/09/china-to-head-green-energy-boom-with-60-of-new-projects-in-next-six-years

October 12, 2024 Posted by | China, renewable | Leave a comment

What reports got wrong about China’s ‘sunken nuclear submarine’

Western news organizations often miss crucial context—and even the real news—about Chinese military modernization.

Defense One, By J. Michael Dahm and Peter W. Singer 4 Oct 24

The purported sinking of a Chinese nuclear submarine at a Wuhan shipyard pier is the latest example of Western reporting on military developments in China that overlooks important details and context, or even takes the wrong lessons from the fragments of stories they tell.

The incident, which took place in June, drew some mention the following month on social media and even in the defense press, but it went viral after a Sept. 26 report in the Wall Street Journal touched off coverage from Fox News to CBS. What apparently lit up the U.S. media landscape were the assertions, attributed to unnamed U.S. defense officials, that the submarine was nuclear-powered. Many of the subsequent reports suggested that the incident revealed safety concerns about a new class of PLA Navy nuclear submarine and a serious setback for China’s military modernization.

These are mischaracterizations. Moreover, the reporting actually buried the lead. The shipyard accident tells us very little about the future of PLA naval modernization, but the submarine itself does.

The afflicted boat was said to be a “Type 041 Zhou-class submarine” powered by a nuclear reactor. But tracing that claim to its origins reveals the importance of context and of using varied sources………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

The point is that a preponderance of public sourcing indicates there is far more uncertainty about the ship itself than the headlines would have it. Indeed, there is nothing in the available reporting that indicates an actual nuclear incident. The satellite photos showed four crane barges that may have been deployed to raise a sunken object, but no nuclear-response efforts were detected. This was not Chernobyl.

……………………………….. This story also underlines a larger problem in Western media reporting on China’s military in recent years: too often, it swings between two extremes that portray the PLA as either comically inept or ten feet tall……………………………………

…………… The issues in U.S.-China security are of growing domestic interest and political importance, especially during an election season. As such, it is ever more vital that mass media reporting on PLA capabilities avoids the temptation to hunt for “clicks” and “eyeballs” and instead seeks out the details and context necessary to fully understand the implications of China’s military modernization.

J. Michael Dahm is a Senior Associate with BluePath Labs, a Senior Fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, and a Lecturer in International Affairs at the George Washington University.

P.W. Singer is a best-selling author of such books on war and technology as Wired for War, Ghost Fleet, and Burn-In; senior fellow at New America; and co-founder of Useful Fiction, a strategic narratives company.  https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2024/10/chinas-sunken-nuclear-sub-was-likely-nothing-sort/400001/

October 6, 2024 Posted by | China, spinbuster | Leave a comment

Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine sank earlier this year, says senior US defence official

ABC News, 27 Sept 24

In short:

China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine sank earlier this year, according to a senior US defence official.

A series of satellite images from Planet Labs from June appear to show cranes at the Wuchang shipyard, where the submarine would have been docked.

What’s next?

China’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 by 2025 and 80 by 2035, the US Department of Defense has said.

A senior US defence official has said that China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine sank earlier this year, marking a potential embarrassment for Beijing as it seeks to expand its military capabilities.

China already has the largest navy in the world, with over 370 ships, and it has embarked on production of a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines.

The US defence official, speaking on condition of anonymity on Thursday, local time, said China’s new first-in-class nuclear-powered attack submarine sank alongside a pier sometime between May and June.

A Chinese embassy spokesperson in Washington said they had no information to provide.

“In addition to the obvious questions about training standards and equipment quality, the incident raises deeper questions about the PLA’s internal accountability and oversight of China’s defence industry — which has long been plagued by corruption,” the official said, using an acronym for the People’s Liberation Army.

“It’s not surprising that the PLA Navy would try to conceal the sinking,” the official added………………………………………………. more https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-27/one-of-china-submarine-sank-says-us-defence-official/104406362

October 1, 2024 Posted by | China, incidents | Leave a comment

US Navy chief unveils plan to be ready for possible war with China by 2027

The announcement of the goals comes as US leaders are treading a fine line, pledging a commitment to the defence of Taiwan while also working to keep communication open with Beijing to deter greater conflict.

Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China to be reunited, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state.

But Washington opposes any attempt to take the island by force and is legally bound to support Taiwan’s military defence capability.

Admiral Lisa Franchetti says lessons from combat in the Red Sea and Ukraine’s Black Sea fight can help the US prepare for an attack on Taiwan

SCMP, Associated Press, 19 Sep 2024

The US Navy is taking lessons from its combat in the Red Sea over the past year and what Ukraine has done to hold off the Russians in the Black Sea to help US military leaders prepare the service for a potential future conflict with China.

From drones and unmanned surface vessels to the more advanced operation of shipboard guns, the US Navy is expanding its combat skills and broadening training. It is also working to overcome recruiting struggles so it can have the sailors it needs to fight the next war.

Admiral Lisa Franchetti, chief of naval operations, is laying out a series of goals, including several that will be highly challenging to meet, in a new navigation plan she described in an interview. The objective is to be ready to face what the Pentagon calls its key national security challenge – China.

“I’m very focused on 2027. It’s the year that President Xi [Jinping] told his forces to be ready to invade Taiwan,” Franchetti said. “We need to be more ready.”

The new plan, released on Wednesday, includes what she considers seven priority goals, ranging from removing delays in ship depot maintenance to improving US Navy infrastructure, recruiting and the use of drones and autonomous systems.

One significant challenge is to have 80 per cent of the force be ready enough at any given time to deploy for combat if needed – something she acknowledged is a “stretch goal”. The key, she said, is to get to a level of combat readiness where “if the nation calls us, we can push the ‘go’ button and we can surge our forces to be able to meet the call”.

The announcement of the goals comes as US leaders are treading a fine line, pledging a commitment to the defence of Taiwan while also working to keep communication open with Beijing to deter greater conflict.

Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China to be reunited, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state.

But Washington opposes any attempt to take the island by force and is legally bound to support Taiwan’s military defence capability.

An important element in any Asia-Pacific conflict will be the need to control the seas. Franchetti said the US can learn from how the Ukrainians have used drones, air strikes and long-range unmanned vessels to limit Russian ship activity in the western Black Sea and keep access open to critical ports.

“If you look at the Ukrainian success in really keeping the Russian Black Sea fleet pushed all the way over into the east, that’s all about sea denial and that’s very important,” Franchetti said. She added that Ukraine has been innovating on the battlefield by using existing systems, such as drones, in different ways.

The US Navy’s months-long battle with the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen has provided other lessons…………………………………………………………………. https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3279048/us-navy-chief-unveils-plan-be-ready-possible-war-china-2027

September 20, 2024 Posted by | China, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Surge in Russian uranium sent to China

 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/09/17/ukraine-russia-war-latest-news27/

Washington fears Russia is sending large quantities of enriched uranium to China in an effort to evade sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine.

Chinese imports of enriched uranium from Russia, the world’s largest exporter of the radioactive metal, soared in 2022 and 2023, according to data released by the World Bank.

The US is now investigating whether the uranium, used as nuclear power plant fuel, is then being imported to America.

China only started to send vast quantities of enriched uranium to the US after Congress passed a ban on the import of the metal from Russia after the Ukraine invasion.

“As China may be seeking to carve out a greater role for itself in world enriched uranium markets, increased imports of Russian enriched uranium may facilitate the pursuit of Beijing’s ambitions,” said a report in March by the London-based Royal United Services Institute think tank.

September 19, 2024 Posted by | China, Russia, Uranium | Leave a comment

China keeps door firmly closed to Japanese seafood imports

Japan Times, Zhoushan, China – 24 Aug 24

China is keeping its door tightly shut to Japanese fishery products after imposing an import ban a year ago in protest against the discharge of treated water into the sea from a crippled nuclear power plant in Japan.

Despite Tokyo’s repeated assurances that the procedure is safe, Chinese officials still refer to the treated water, which contains small amounts of radioactive tritium, as “nuclear-contaminated water.”

Tokyo and Beijing are in talks over the issue but there are no clues yet as to how the situation could be resolved.

In a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa late last month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Beijing’s demand that an international system to monitor the water release be established.

China imposed the blanket ban on fishery products from Japan on Aug. 24 last year immediately after the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant started releasing treated water.

Chinese trade statistics show that no fishery products, except aquarium fish, have been imported from Japan since September last year…………………………………………..

The Japanese food company’s sales in China have yet to return to normal levels. “The situation remains tough,” the food company official said.

The impact of the import ban has spread further than Beijing had anticipated.

A woman in her 40s in Beijing said she has not eaten marine products for a long while.

……………………………………………Beijing has said seafood sold in China is safe because strict radiation inspections are conducted in China.

But a dealer in fishery products in Zhoushan said that the ocean is connected. It is illogical that Japanese products are dangerous and Chinese products are safe, the dealer said.

In China, experts’ views that the treated water would reach the Chinese coast as early as this spring spread in state media and on social media. ……………………………………………… https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2024/08/24/china-ban-japan-seafood/—

August 27, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, China | Leave a comment

US crying wolf over China’s ‘nuclear threat’ while expanding nuclear arsenal

Aug 22, 2024  https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1318466.shtml

On Tuesday, a New York Times report caused quite a stir: US President Joe Biden has ordered US forces to prepare for “possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North Korea.” It sounds like the US president was instructing the military to prepare for doomsday, observers pointed out.

The report revealed that in March, Biden approved a highly classified nuclear strategy plan called “Nuclear Employment Guidance,” which for the first time reorients the US’ deterrent strategy to focus on the so-called threat posed by China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal. The article states that this shift comes as the Pentagon believes China’s stockpiles will rival the size and diversity of the US’ and Russia’s over the next decade.

With over 5,000 nuclear warheads, the US possesses the world’s largest and most advanced nuclear arsenal. So why does it repeatedly target China in its nuclear threat rhetoric? This can be traced back to a dilemma faced by the US Department of Defense – how to justify maintaining such a massive nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War world. To secure more defense budgets for the domestic military-industrial complex, the US chooses to constantly manufacture or exaggerate baseless “nuclear threats.” And China has become the best excuse.

What the US truly seeks is to ensure that its power far exceeds that of any other country in the world, allowing it to threaten and coerce other nations at will, without fear of retaliation. As a hegemonic state, US’ security is built on the insecurity of other countries. To maintain its hegemonic status, the US struggles to ensure its absolute superiority in power, with nuclear weapons being a crucial tool in maintaining its global dominance. Therefore, this new nuclear strategy plan is an excuse for expanding its nuclear arsenal and sustaining its military hegemony.

China and the US have fundamentally different perceptions of the strategic role of nuclear weapons. China has repeatedly emphasized that it pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defense, and is committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. China does not engage in any nuclear arms race with any other country, and keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. The notion of establishing an offensive nuclear hegemony or pursuing the so-called goal of rivaling the nuclear arsenal size of the US does not align with China’s strategic logic. As experts pointed out, China’s development of nuclear weapons is aimed at avoiding threats from other nuclear-armed states.

No matter how the US fabricates or exaggerates the so-called China threat narrative, China’s nuclear development follows its own set pace, including a measured increase in the quantity and quality of its nuclear arsenal, which will not be swayed by the US’ interference. This is a necessary measure for China in a complex international environment to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity – a legitimate act of self-defense, Shen Yi, a professor at Fudan University, told the Global Times. 

The US repeatedly harps on the “China nuclear threat” narrative, yet it is, in fact, the one that poses the biggest nuclear threat to the world. In possession of the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, the US follows a nuclear policy that allows first-use of nuclear weapons. In recent years, the US has invested heavily to miniaturize nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold of their use in real-combat, and used nuclear weapons as a bait to hijack its allies and partners. Its irresponsible decisions and actions have resulted in the proliferation of nuclear risks, and its attempts to maintain hegemony and intimidate the world with nuclear power have been fully exposed.

There will be no winners in a nuclear war. We urge the US to abandon Cold War mentality, recognize that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security policies, and take concrete actions to promote global strategic stability, instead of doing the opposite. Instead of smearing and hyping up China, the US should reflect on itself and consider how to rebuild mutual trust with China through dialogue and sincerity.

August 24, 2024 Posted by | China, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The U.S. and China Can Lead the Way on Nuclear Threat Reduction

Policies of “no first use” are a model for nuclear states.

Foreign Policy, By Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a retired senior colonel in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. August 20, 2024,

Since the end of the Cold War, the role of nuclear weapons has only grown. Nuclear arsenals are being strengthened around the world, with many nuclear states continuing to modernize their arsenals. In June, outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the alliance was in talks to deploy more nuclear weapons, taking them out of storage and placing them on standby. Robert C. O’Brien, a former national security advisor to former U.S. President Donald Trump, has urged him to conduct nuclear tests if he wins a new term, arguing that it would help the United States “maintain technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles.”

There are two bleak conclusions about nuclear diplomacy in this age. First, it will be impossible to ban such weapons anytime soon. Since its passage in 2017, no nuclear-armed states have signed the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, some of them instead contending that it will distract attention from other disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives.

It is also very hard, if not impossible, to convince these states to reduce their nuclear stockpiles amid ever-intensifying geopolitical and military competition. On the contrary, in February 2023, Russia announced that it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

In response, the United States has also suspended the sharing and publication of treaty data. In November, Russia went a step further and withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing “an imbalance” with the United States, which has failed to ratify the treaty since it opened for signature in 1996.

Amid such a situation, it is impossible for Beijing to stand by idly. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that the size of China’s nuclear arsenal has increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, and it is expected to continue to grow. For the first time, China may also now be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime. According to the U.S. Defense Department, China is likely to increase its nuclear warheads to 1,500 by 2035.

Given this reality, perhaps the most promising near-term way to guard against nuclear risks is not by limiting the number of nuclear weapons but by controlling the policies that govern their use. In this regard, a pledge by nuclear-armed states of “no first use” of nuclear weapons looks to be the most realistic approach in reducing the escalation of nuclear threats.

In theory, no first use refers to a policy by which a nuclear-armed power formally refrains from the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in warfare, except in the case of doing so as a second strike in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapon of mass destruction.

Of the five nuclear states that have signed onto the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—only China has ever declared a no-first-use policy. On Oct. 16, 1964, when China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, the country immediately declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and unconditionally committed itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones…………………………………………..

All nuclear powers could afford to adopt a formal no-first-use policy—taking the moral high ground without reducing their capabilities for retaliation.

Though it has never adopted a no-first-use policy itself, the United States’ nuclear posture is actually more similar to China’s than it seems. In its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the Biden administration declared that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons “in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” But it is hard to imagine which interests are so vital that they might require Washington to use nuclear weapons as a first measure to defend them.

To be sure, it is important for the United States to assure its allies that it will follow through on its deterrent promises. It is equally hard to imagine who would venture to launch a nuclear strike on a U.S. ally, knowing the dire potential consequences.

The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, meanwhile, is operationally independent. But in terms of its nuclear policy, the British government has made it clear that “we would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies.” France, meanwhile adheres to a principle of “strict sufficiency.”

The real challenge, then, is getting Russia to commit to a no-first-use policy. The Soviet Union adopted a formal policy of no first use in 1982. But after its dissolution, the Russian Federation reversed this approach in 1993, likely to mitigate the comparative weakness of the Russian Armed Forces in the post-Soviet era………………………………………………….

A dual-track approach may be the best bet for the adoption of a formal no-first-use policy.

In Europe, NATO can start with a unilateral no-first-use pledge against Russia as a gesture of goodwill. Even if such an offer isn’t immediately reciprocated by Russia, it might begin to thaw tensions.

As a second—and crucial—step, NATO could pledge to halt any further expansion of its alliance in exchange for Moscow adopting a no-first-use policy This would be a difficult pill for the alliance to swallow. But after Sweden’s and Finland’s entry earlier this year, there are only three aspiring countries on the waiting list: the barely significant Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Georgia and Ukraine, which have deeply problematic ongoing conflicts with Russia that NATO is sensitive about.

The path forward would likely be smoother if it went through Asia. Both Russia and China have already agreed to no first use against each other. China and the United States could reach a similar agreement, thus de-escalating potential conflicts involving U.S. allies—such as the Philippines and Japan—as well as the dangers that could be provoked through accidental collisions in the sea or air. A U.S.-led example might then make it easier to bring the Europeans on board.

This may seem far-fetched in the current geopolitical climate, but there is precedent for it. When India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in May 1998, they incurred swift condemnation from the U.N. Security Council, which called for both countries to sign both the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In a rare show of solidarity, China and the United States made a joint declaration in June 1998 agreeing to de-target their nuclear weapons against each other.

This was largely a symbolic and unverifiable step. But it was not only a defusing of tensions, but also good to see nuclear states at least partially honoring the vision of nuclear disarmament laid out in Article VI of the NPT. And this China-U.S. joint statement eventually led to another joint statement among the five nuclear-armed permanent Security Council states in May 2000, which affirmed that their nuclear weapons are not targeted at each other or at any other states.

No first use is a big step forward from nontargeting. It’s not out of bounds to imagine that, with enough diplomatic capital, a similar but more important pledge of no first use could be made today. In fact, in January 2022—only a month before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—these five nuclear powers agreed in a joint statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

What is more significant is that during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow last year, China and Russia reiterated this commitment, even amid Russia’s ongoing war.

If, indeed, a nuclear war cannot be won, then what is stopping these nuclear powers from taking a no-first-use pledge? Nuclear weapons didn’t help the United States in its wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—or the Russians in Ukraine. A commitment of no first use by the nuclear-armed states would give people hope that a nuclear-free world, however distant, is still possible one day.

This essay is published in cooperation with the Asian Peace Programme at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/20/nuclear-weapons-war-no-first-use-policy/—

August 22, 2024 Posted by | China, politics, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

Understanding China’s Approach to Nuclear Deterrence

 China has also always adhered to a “no first use” (NFU) doctrine regarding its nuclear forces, precluding it from adopting an asymmetric escalation posture. That it is entirely reliant on its own strategic nuclear capabilities for deterrence also precludes it from adopting a catalytic posture, as it does not need to, nor can it rely on, a nuclear patron to intervene in crises on its behalf. 

 Alex Alfirraz Scheers, https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/understanding-chinas-approach-to-nuclear-deterrence/

It has never been more crucial to understand China’s approach to deterrence, in order to bring a much-needed sense of perspective to Sino-American nuclear dynamics

The case for U.S. nuclear superiority made by several high-profile nuclear policy experts in the United States has tacitly increased tensions between Washington and Beijing. Any decision to pursue the recommendations outlined in the U.S. Strategic Posture Review to respond to China’s alleged efforts to achieve nuclear parity with the United States will only create a more uncertain and dangerous international threat environment. Hence, it has never been more crucial to understand China’s approach to deterrence, in order to bring a much-needed sense of perspective to Sino-American nuclear dynamics. More importantly, cultivating a sense of understanding is critical to attaining and maintaining peace.

This article seeks to contextualize China’s nuclear journey, and to serve as a reminder to policymakers and the general public alike that while China’s nuclear journey has been far from straightforward, China’s nuclear intentions have historically been to prevent and not to provoke nuclear conflict.

China has been a nuclear power since 1964. Up until the 1990s, China only had roughly 20 strategic nuclear capable delivery systems. Its approach to deterrence in that period, according to Nicola Leveringhaus, was not strategic, but rather can be understood by analyzing technological constraints, domestic politics, and its leadership decision-making considerations on nuclear and national security issues.

During the Cold War, China’s main strategic threats were posed by the USSR and the United States. Then, nuclear weapons served as a deterrent against any acts of aggression by the superpowers. In the 21st century, China has undertaken massive nuclear modernization and expansion. Today, China’s nuclear forces are numbered at roughly 440 warheads, and according to Pentagon estimates will number 1,500 warheads by 2035.

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, and the emergence of regional nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan as well as a continued U.S. threat perception, China’s nuclear deterrent is positioned to prevent acts of aggression regionally and against the United States.

Indeed, according to Caitlin Talmadge and Joshua Rovner, “The specific nature of China’s improvements do seem oriented toward bolstering the country’s assured retaliation posture in response to growing threats from ever more capable U.S. counterforce and missile defense systems.” 

Yet, throughout China’s nuclear history, it has consistently adopted a deterrence by punishment posture, and has stressed the importance of maintaining an effective second-strike retaliatory capability.

A deterrence by punishment posture enables China to threaten nuclear retaliation against a nuclear strike on its vital interest, and a secure second-strike capability refers to China’s ability to absorb a nuclear strike and to retaliate with a nuclear response. Both require highly survivable nuclear capabilities, and a resilient national security infrastructure, which China appears to have continually pursued.

Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has invested heavily in developing a triad of land, air and sea-based nuclear capabilities.  While the proliferation of nuclear silos from which to launch its DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) constitutes the largest land-based nuclear build-up in China’s history, they bolster China’s strategic deterrence capability by signaling to the United States that it is investing in long-range delivery systems that can reach targets in the continental United States. 

Nevertheless, as Vipin Narang observed, “The types of capabilities that China developed are consistent with a retaliatory posture aimed at deterring nuclear coercion and nuclear use.”  China has also always adhered to a “no first use” (NFU) doctrine regarding its nuclear forces, precluding it from adopting an asymmetric escalation posture. That it is entirely reliant on its own strategic nuclear capabilities for deterrence also precludes it from adopting a catalytic posture, as it does not need to, nor can it rely on, a nuclear patron to intervene in crises on its behalf. 

As Brandon Babin stated, “China has defined its active defense national military strategy as ‘striking only after the enemy has struck.’” Nevertheless, recent Chinese efforts to develop more nuclear options, such as theater nuclear weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles, indicate that China is potentially reviewing its deterrence posture. 

Current estimates of their nuclear forces suggest that China appears to adopt a posture that includes countervalue targets, holding at risk their adversaries’ densely populated centers.  The size of China’s nuclear forces logically orients it toward adopting countervalue targeting, as a counterforce posture would require a nuclear force size capable of successfully hitting an adversary’s nuclear forces.

A damage limitation approach, therefore, would simply not be feasible with their force size. As it stands, counterforce would prove ineffective for China if ever it is engaged in a nuclear conflagration with the United States. Again, Narang here is salient: “Chinese posture features…strong centralized controls, survivability through dispersed and concealed stewardship procedures and numerical ambiguity, and punitive retaliatory strikes against key countervalue targets.”

Adopting countervalue targeting enables China to effectively deter adversaries without requiring it to possess robust nuclear forces with sophisticated delivery systems. Changes in force size, however, will surely increase China’s nuclear options and will afford China with a breadth of maneuverability previously unattainable.  

China’s targets also align with its deterrence by punishment posture. Its primary targets, as illustrated by its DF-1 to D-5 ICBMs, are strategic in character. These targets illustrate that China’s approach is also shaped by the fact that since the end of the Cold War, it does not face any direct existential security threats on its borders. Recent skirmishes with India have not escalated to levels of war-fighting sufficient to warrant genuine concern and are unlikely to result in the kind of direct military engagement seen in the 1969 conflict with the Soviet Union.

There is precedent – however obscure – for China to trade blows with a nuclear power: The Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 are the only time in history that a nuclear China clashed militarily with another nuclear power. However, given that the likelihood for a recurrence of such clashes remains low, never mind the likelihood of regional nuclear escalation involving China, policymakers in the United States should not seek to pursue superiority simply to fuel a sense of insecurity in China.   

Having said that, China’s main strategic concern revolves around Taiwan, and its nuclear deterrence strategy is ultimately oriented toward preventing what it refers to as a “high-intensity war” with the United States. How the next president of the United States will affect China’s calculus remains to be seen, but recent reports regarding China’s decision not to pursue arms control talks with the United States surely do not bode well for Sino-American cooperation on nuclear matters. 

Whether a President Trump or a President Harris can lead to a course reversal for the better remains to be seen. Nevertheless, China’s approach to nuclear deterrence looks likely to continue to be informed by its efforts to protect its vital interests and to deter conflict with the United States, through threatening a retaliatory nuclear strike and by preserving assured second-strike capabilities. 

While concerns mount over the prospect of a future nuclear conflict between the United States and China, a concerted U.S. pursuit of nuclear superiority will do little to decrease tensions with China and preserve the peace, however fragile it may currently appear to be.  

August 6, 2024 Posted by | China, politics international | Leave a comment

The US might lose a war with China, congressional commission says

Insufficient industry, readiness, innovation, and funding hamper military’s ability to prevail in conflict, key experts find.

By Patrick Tucker, Science & Technology Editor, Defense One, July 29, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/07/us-might-lose-war-china-congressional-commission-says/398418/

The U.S. military “lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat,” in the judgment of a congressional commission whose new report finds that collaboration between Russia, China, and other autocratic states is increasing the chance of a multi-front conflict—and that the U.S. would have trouble sustaining such a fight.

For more than a year, the former lawmakers, military leaders, and policy experts on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy have studied how well the U.S. military is executing the 2022 national defense strategy. The group released their report on Monday and will present its findings to the Senate Armed Services committee on Tuesday.

The group found big gaps between the Defense Department’s ambitions of deterring or prevailing in a major conflict and reality. One of the reasons they came to that conclusion is the current state of the U.S. defense industrial base compared to China’s.

“Unclassified public wargames suggest that, in a conflict with China, the United States would largely exhaust its munitions inventories in as few as three to four weeks, with some important munitions (e.g., anti-ship missiles) lasting only a few days. Once expended, replacing these munitions would take years,” the report states.

Furthermore, the growing collaboration between autocratic powers make it nearly inevitable that China and Russia would coordinate against the United States in the event of an armed conflict with one or the other.  

“The United States should assume that if it enters a direct conflict involving Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, that country will benefit from economic and military aid from the others. We also believe that this partnership increases the likelihood that a conflict with one would expand to multiple fronts, causing simultaneous demands on U.S. and allied resources,” the report states. 

Of the commission’s many recommendations, most are similar to efforts the Pentagon is already undertaking, including reaching out more aggressively to the private sector, particularly new information-technology focused startups, to establish a new industrial base, and reevaluating counterproductive regulatory impediments to buying and selling defense technology. 

Other recommendations are more pointed, such as abandoning outdated “programs of record” in order to procure key pieces of equipment, and loosening ship maintenance rules, allowing more maintenance in foreign ports, and being more willing to buy weapons and supplies from other countries. 

But for the most part, the commission’s report paints a picture of a situation years in the making that can’t be righted quickly. 

“Today, the United States has a DIB with too few people, too few companies, declining and unstable financial support, and insufficient production capacity to meet the needs of the Joint Force in both peacetime and wartime,” the group said.

August 2, 2024 Posted by | China, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

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