China Is Not Our Enemy

 So I coordinate our CODEPINK’s China is our enemy campaign, and the campaign was created in response to this rise in recent years of anti-China sentiments and the actions that our government has been taking to accelerate the new Cold War offensive against Beijing, and that includes spending billions of dollars militarizing Asia Pacific region, utilizing military economic coercion to push US interests outright labeling China an enemy, demonizing essentially anything China does, and all of which has led to a rise in Asian American hate around the country. 

 So the campaign seeks to do two things. The first is to educate the public how their minds are being shaped for war. And we do this by teaching our audience about China, dismantling the lies being told by the media, by politicians, and then also informing on all the tax dollars being spent preparing for war with China. And the second thing that we try to do is redirect all that energy into a push for peace. And that’s why we emphasize the need for friendship and cooperation with China for working together on climate justice, nuclear disarmament and other extremely important issues today.

SCHEERPOST, 10 Jan 25, Robert Scheer interviews Megan Russell, a writer, academic and CODEPINK’s China is Not Our Enemy Campaign Coordinator.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. in the past 50 or so years, you know, China has accomplished an incredible amount of progress, something they don’t talk about enough, in my opinion, is how China managed to eradicate extreme poverty. And that’s not just a minimum income level. It also means access to food, to clothes, health care, clean housing, free education, you know, means infrastructure, means functioning systems and and through the past half a century, you know, through market reforms, rural collectivization and other poverty alleviation programs, China was ultimately successful in its in its mission. And by 2021, I believe the last 100 million people were taken out of extreme poverty, which was nearly 900 million people total. And many UN officials call it the greatest anti-poverty achievement in history, which it is. That’s 1.4 billion people without extreme poverty. That’s about the entire continent of Africa or the US and Europe combined. 

…………………………………………….This turn toward China, and this new narrative that China is some sort of existential threat to us, even though China has never threatened war or even invaded or intervened in a nation for 50 years, which is a sharp contrast to US history, which is very heavily involved in overseas conflicts. But, you know, China’s been focused on its internal growth and accomplishing its own goals. And non interventionism, of course, is one of its foundational policy pillars. 

The American saber-rattling against China has been increasing almost as fast as China’s own development in the past few years. China’s economic prosperity and international influence is undeniable yet American politicians continue to treat their rise as a threat to their global hegemony. Joining host Robert Scheer on this episode of Scheer Intelligence is Megan Russell, a writer, academic and CODEPINK’s China is Not Our Enemy Campaign Coordinator.

Scheer is quick to point out the intergenerational dynamic between his own work on China as a fellow in the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley in the 1960s and Russell’s recent experience living in China and studying in Shanghai. Both witnessed and experienced the American perspective of China and how it has continued to undermine it. Scheer and Russell focus on her latest article, which calls out New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman for his portrayal of China and how his deficient op-ed mirrors the broader perception of China in the United States. While many may think that China is an authoritarian country with people living under the heel of Xi Jinping, the actual material conditions of its population are often left out.

“Something [people] don’t talk about enough, in my opinion, is how China managed to eradicate extreme poverty. And that’s not just a minimum income level, it also means access to food, to clothes, healthcare, clean housing, free education. It means infrastructure, means functioning systems,” Russell says.

People also point to working conditions and the outsourcing of American jobs to China as a means of attacking them. To this, Russell explains, “All China has done is use the system in place to develop and try to provide opportunities to its incredibly vast population, while still maintaining its proto-socialist policies. It’s us that has exported the production of all our goods to make a few more dollars.”

In the end, the US stands to lose, not only in a trade war, but also in the climate aspect, since China has also made great strides towards combatting the climate crisis. Russell cites their plan of reaching carbon neutrality by 2060 and tells Scheer, “China has really undergone this internal green energy revolution, doing far more than any other country to combat climate change.”

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Megan Russell  

…………………………………………………………………………………..Megan Russell  

Yeah, you know, a lot of times the first thing people ask me when they hear that I lived in China was that was “Was it scary?” Did I feel threatened and watched? Someone actually just asked me that yesterday, and it’s very real to them, though it always sounds a little silly to me, because I actually felt very safe in China more than I felt in most other countries, I would say, maybe all of them. And that’s, you know, my honest answer. You know, crime rates are very low in China. I never had any safety issues. I lived there a year. I traveled extensively by myself to many provinces on all sides of the country. I never felt unsafe. I never worried about pickpockets. I never worried about being robbed. I never felt the discomfort of being a woman alone. You know, everyone has a different experience, but this was my experience, 

………………………………………………………………………………………………………  the success of China is, you know, very triggering to this idea of Western exceptionalism. You know that any form of socialism could actually improve the lives of the people, could actually obtain any measure of success. And this exceptional exceptionalism is based on ideals, right on this imagined perfection of free markets and democracy, yes, but also on colonial racist doctrines. And that’s really, you know, at the root of it, a lot of this negativity as well. Unfortunately, though, it’s, you know, often disguised or dressed up like something else. It’s at the root of it, a dehumanization of China and Chinese people that they are worth less, that they aren’t deserving of of jobs or opportunities or of success. And I think this manifests itself very easily into a global system that is, you know, inherently based on a division of humanity that we have been forced to accept as normal and and that doesn’t just go for China, of course, but the entire Global South……………………………………………………………………………..

Robert Scheer…………………………………………………………………… you know, we need to manufacture consent for militarization, for war, because it’s far easier with public support, and it helps maintain internal stability here as well. And this is why you’ve seen, you know, this steady rise of anti-China messaging and and fear mongering. You know, just last fall, the House passed a bill to fund $1.6 billion to anti-China propaganda around the world. You know, that’s $1.6 billion of going to information warfare. Because, you know, in order to pursue this agenda, you need to convince the rest of the world that, or at least the United States, that China is a threat and and many people aren’t, you know, convinced enough. And also, along with that, you know, there was a whole China week where they passed 25 anti China bills, including the propaganda Bill, you know, all with the end goal of countering the influence of the Communist Party of China………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… more https://scheerpost.com/2025/01/10/china-is-not-our-enemy/

January 12, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, politics international, USA | Leave a comment

  Can Trump Trump China (or Vice Versa)?

When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it “acknowledged” that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military presence there.

For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful weaponry.

the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in when it comes to Taiwan this time around.

Trump Confronts a Rising China

Can He Manage U.S.-China Relations Without Precipitating World War III?

By Michael Klare, December 17, 2024,  https://scheerpost.com/2024/12/19/trump-confronts-a-rising-china/

Gaza, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela: President-elect Donald Trump will face no shortage of foreign-policy challenges when he assumes office in January. None, however, comes close to China in scope, scale, or complexity. No other country has the capacity to resist his predictable antagonism with the same degree of strength and tenacity, and none arouses more hostility and outrage among MAGA Republicans. In short, China is guaranteed to put President Trump in a difficult bind the second time around: he can either choose to cut deals with Beijing and risk being branded an appeaser by the China hawks in his party, or he can punish and further encircle Beijing, risking a potentially violent clash and possibly even nuclear escalation. How he chooses to resolve this quandary will surely prove the most important foreign test of his second term in office.

As Waltz and others around Trump see it, China poses a multi-dimensional threat to this country’s global supremacy. In the military domain, by building up its air force and navy, installing military bases on reclaimed islands in the South China Sea, and challenging Taiwan through increasingly aggressive air and naval maneuvers, it is challenging continued American dominance of the Western Pacific. Diplomatically, it’s now bolstering or repairing ties with key U.S. allies, including India, Indonesia, Japan, and the members of NATO. Meanwhile, it’s already close to replicating this country’s most advanced technologies, especially its ability to produce advanced microchips. And despite Washington’s efforts to diminish a U.S. reliance on vital Chinese goods, including critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, it remains a primary supplier of just such products to this country.

Fight or Strike Bargains?

For many in the Trumpian inner circle, the only correct, patriotic response to the China challenge is to fight back hard. Both Representative Waltz, Trump’s pick as national security adviser, and Senator Marco Rubio, his choice as secretary of state, have sponsored or supported legislation to curb what they view as “malign” Chinese endeavors in the United States and abroad.

What such a deal might look like is anyone’s guess, but it’s hard to see how Trump could win significant concessions from Beijing without abandoning some of the punitive measures advocated by the China hawks in his entourage. Count on one thing: this complicated and confusing dynamic will play out in each of the major problem areas in U.S.-China relations, forcing Trump to make critical choices between his transactional instincts and the harsh ideological bent of his advisers.

Trump, China, and Taiwan

Of all the China-related issues in his second term in office, none is likely to prove more challenging or consequential than the future status of the island of Taiwan. At issue are Taiwan’s gradual moves toward full independence and the risk that China will invade the island to prevent such an outcome, possibly triggering U.S. military intervention as well. Of all the potential crises facing Trump, this is the one that could most easily lead to a great-power conflict with nuclear undertones.

When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it “acknowledged” that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military presence there. However, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Washington was also empowered to cooperate with a quasi-governmental Taiwanese diplomatic agency, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and provide Taiwan with the weapons needed for its defense. Moreover, in what came to be known as “strategic ambiguity,” U.S. officials insisted that any effort by China to alter Taiwan’s status by force would constitute “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area” and would be viewed as a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” although not necessarily one requiring a military response.

For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful weaponry. For their part, Chinese officials repeatedly declared that Taiwan was a renegade province that should be reunited with the mainland, preferably by peaceful means. The Taiwanese, however, have never expressed a desire for reunification and instead have moved steadily towards a declaration of independence, which Beijing has insisted would justify armed intervention.

As such threats became more frequent and menacing, leaders in Washington continued to debate the validity of “strategic ambiguity,” with some insisting it should be replaced by a policy of “strategic clarity” involving an ironclad commitment to assist Taiwan should it be invaded by China. President Biden seemed to embrace this view, repeatedly affirming that the U.S. was obligated to defend Taiwan under such circumstances. However, each time he said so, his aides walked back his words, insisting the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so.

The Biden administration also boosted its military support for the island while increasing American air and naval patrols in the area, which only heightened the possibility of a future U.S. intervention should China invade. Some of these moves, including expedited arms transfers to Taiwan, were adopted in response to prodding from China hawks in Congress. All, however, fit with an overarching administration strategy of encircling China with a constellation of American military installations and U.S.-armed allies and partners.

From Beijing’s perspective, then, Washington is already putting extreme military and geopolitical pressure on China. The question is: Will the Trump administration increase or decrease those pressures, especially when it comes to Taiwan?

That Trump will approve increased arms sales to and military cooperation with Taiwan essentially goes without saying (as much, at least, as anything involving him does). The Chinese have experienced upticks in U.S. aid to Taiwan before and can probably live through another round of the same. But that leaves far more volatile issues up for grabs: Will he embrace “strategic clarity,” guaranteeing Washington’s automatic intervention should China invade Taiwan, and will he approve a substantial expansion of the American military presence in the region? Both moves have been advocated by some of the China hawks in Trump’s entourage, and both are certain to provoke fierce, hard-to-predict responses from Beijing.

Many of Trump’s closest advisers have, in fact, insisted on “strategic clarity” and increased military cooperation with Taiwan. Michael Waltz, for example, has asserted that the U.S. must “be clear we’ll defend Taiwan as a deterrent measure.” He has also called for an increased military presence in the Western Pacific. Similarly, last June, Robert C. O’Brien, Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, wrote that the U.S. “should make clear” its “commitment” to “help defend” Taiwan, while expanding military cooperation with the island.

Trump himself has made no such commitments, suggesting instead a more ambivalent stance. In his typical fashion, in fact, he’s called on Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and expressed anger at the concentration of advanced chip-making on the island, claiming that the Taiwanese “did take about 100% of our chip business.” But he’s also warned of harsh economic measures were China to impose a blockade of the island, telling the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, “I would say [to President Xi]: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%.” He wouldn’t need to threaten the use of force to prevent a blockade, he added, because President Xi “respects me and he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.”

Such comments reveal the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in when it comes to Taiwan this time around. He could, of course, try to persuade Beijing to throttle back its military pressure on the island in return for a reduction in U.S. tariffs — a move that would reduce the risk of war in the Pacific but leave China in a stronger economic position and disappoint many of his top advisers. If, however, he chooses to act “crazy” by embracing “strategic clarity” and stepping up military pressure on China, he would likely receive accolades from many of his supporters, while provoking a (potentially nuclear) war with China.

In January 2018, the first Trump administration imposed tariffs of 30% on imported solar panels and 20%-50% on imported washing machines, many sourced from China. Two months later, the administration added tariffs on imported steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), again aimed above all at China. And despite his many criticisms of Trump’s foreign and economic policies, President Biden chose to retain those tariffs, even adding new ones, notably on electric cars and other high-tech products. The Biden administration has also banned the export of advanced computer chips and chip-making technology to China in a bid to slow that country’s technological progress.

Accordingly, when Trump reassumes office on January 20th, China will already be under stringent economic pressures from Washington. But he and his associates insist that those won’t be faintly enough to constrain China’s rise. The president-elect has said that, on day one of his new term, he will impose a 10% tariff on all Chinese imports and follow that with other harsh measures. Among such moves, the Trump team has announced plans to raise tariffs on Chinese imports to 60%, revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (also known as “most favored nation”) status, and ban the transshipment of Chinese imports through third countries.

Most of Trump’s advisers have espoused such measures strongly. “Trump Is Right: We Should Raise Tariffs on China,” Marco Rubio wrote last May. “China’s anticompetitive tactics,” he argued, “give Chinese companies an unfair cost advantage over American companies… Tariffs that respond to these tactics prevent or reverse offshoring, preserving America’s economic might and promoting domestic investment.”

But Trump will also face possible pushback from other advisers who are warning of severe economic perturbations if such measures were to be enacted. China, they suggest, has tools of its own to use in any trade war with the U.S., including tariffs on American imports and restrictions on American firms doing business in China, including Elon Musk’s Tesla, which produces half of its cars there. For these and other reasons, the U.S.-China Business Council has warned that additional tariffs and other trade restrictions could prove disastrous, inviting “retaliatory measures from China, causing additional U.S. jobs and output losses.”

As in the case of Taiwan, Trump will face some genuinely daunting decisions when it comes to economic relations with China. If, in fact, he follows the advice of the ideologues in his circle and pursues a strategy of maximum pressure on Beijing, specifically designed to hobble China’s growth and curb its geopolitical ambitions, he could precipitate nothing short of a global economic meltdown that would negatively affect the lives of so many of his supporters, while significantly diminishing America’s own geopolitical clout. He might therefore follow the inclinations of certain of his key economic advisers like transition leader Howard Lutnick, who favor a more pragmatic, businesslike relationship with China. How Trump chooses to address this issue will likely determine whether the future involves increasing economic tumult and uncertainty or relative stability. And it’s always important to remember that a decision to play hardball with China on the economic front could also increase the risk of a military confrontation leading to full-scale war, even to World War III.

And while Taiwan and trade are undoubtedly the most obvious and challenging issues Trump will face in managing (mismanaging?) U.S.-China relations in the years ahead, they are by no means the only ones. He will also have to decide how to deal with increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, continued Chinese economic and military-technological support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, and growing Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.

In these, and other aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry, Trump will be pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more pragmatic, transactional approach. During the campaign, he backed each approach, sometimes in the very same verbal outburst. Once in power, however, he will have to choose between them — and his decisions will have a profound impact on this country, China, and everyone living on this planet.

January 6, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, politics international, USA | Leave a comment