Many years for UK government to find a nuclear waste sit with suitable geology and a willing community
NWS chief executive Corhyn Parr said: “We need enough suitable geology to
accommodate a GDF and to support safety cases to build, operate and close
the facility. “Our assessments show evidence of limited volume of suitable
rock for a GDF in the Allerdale search area, including the adjacent inshore
area.”
NSW said finding a suitable site and a willing community, along with
securing the necessary consents and permits, could take about 15 years. The
assessment of three other potential sites is continuing and “the door also
remains open” for new communities to join the process, it added.
BBC 28th Sept 2023
British communities torn between the lure of government bribes and the realities of hosting toxic radioactive trash virtually forever
#nuclear #antinuclear #nuclear-free #NoNukes
Ken Smith moved to the Lincolnshire coast to see out his retirement,
writing crime novels while surrounded by beaches, arcades, holiday parks
and nature reserves. Recently, however, his retreat has been disturbed. The
Mablethorpe resident has found himself unexpectedly on the front lines of a
struggle affecting countries across the world, centred on how to deal with
nuclear waste.
The fate of Mablethorpe will determine how Britain tackles a
problem that has been building for seven decades. As the government seeks a
better solution to radioactive waste, communities are torn between the lure
of economic opportunities versus the realities of living next to a disposal
site. Theddlethorpe, a few miles up the road, is one of three areas in
England being considered by the UK for a 36km square underground site to
dispose of nuclear waste as it decays, some of it over hundreds of
thousands of years.
FT 28th Sept 2023
https://www.ft.com/content/29961733-a72c-406c-8884-4091c0dfd828
Finland’s nuclear waste: delay in completing the review of operating licence application and safety assessment.
Finland’s Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) said its review of
Posiva Oy’s operating licence application for the world’s first used fuel
disposal facility is taking longer than expected and will not be completed
by the end of this year as planned.
Radioactive waste management company
Posiva submitted its application, together with related information, to the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (TEM) on 30 December 2021 for
an operating licence for the used fuel encapsulation plant and final
disposal facility currently under construction at Olkiluoto. The repository
is expected to begin operations in the mid-2020s. Posiva is applying for an
operating licence for a period from March 2024 to the end of 2070.
The government will make the final decision on Posiva’s application, but a
positive opinion by STUK is required beforehand. The ministry requested
STUK’s opinion on the application by the end of this year. The regulator
began its review in May 2022 after concluding Posiva had provided
sufficient material. However, STUK has now said its safety assessment and
opinion on the application will not be completed this year.
World Nuclear News 28th Sept 2023
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Completion-of-Finnish-repository-review-delayed
Japan to release second batch of wastewater from Fukushima nuclear plant next week
UN-approved release to go ahead despite China’s ban on all Japanese sea imports following first batch
Japan will begin releasing a second batch of wastewater from the crippled
Fukushima nuclear plant from next week, its operator has said, an exercise
that angered China and others when it began in August.
Guardian 29th Sept 2023
Nuclear experts raise new concerns about industry-led policy proposals to separate plutonium in Canada
Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility Sept. 25 2023 http://www.ccnr.org/Media_Release_final_Sept_25_2023.pdf
Twelve internationally recognized nuclear experts have sent an open letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, expressing new concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation risks associated with a government-funded nuclear reprocessing project in New Brunswick.
The authors cite new information obtained through Access to Information. They quote from recently released internal documents that reveal a governmental “policy-making process on reprocessing in collaboration with the international CANDU Owners Group (COG)”.
The letter points out that such activity runs counter to the G7 statement that Canada endorsed in Hiroshima, on 19 May 2023, pledging “to reduce the production and accumulation of weapons-usable nuclear material for civil purposes around the world.”
In 2021, Ottawa gave $50.5 million to Moltex, a UK-based company. Moltex plans to separate plutonium and other materials from used nuclear fuel already stored at Point Lepreau nuclear plant on the Bay of Fundy. Moltex hopes to use the materials as fuel in its “molten salt” reactor.
Moltex says its technology is proliferation resistant, that the material extracted is not “weapons usable”. However, the letter cites two expert U.S. studies , published in 2009 and 2023, that challenge that claim. Both conclude that protection against weapons use is marginal at best.
Reprocessing is a technology for extracting plutonium from used nuclear fuel. It is a sensitive technology because plutonium is a nuclear explosive. Any nation or subnational group with access to separated plutonium can use it to make a nuclear bomb.
In 1974 India exploded its first atomic bomb using plutonium from a Canadian research reactor. U.S. President Carter banned reprocessing in 1977, and Canada followed suit by nixing commercial reprocessing in Canada.
Civilian reprocessing runs the risk of spreading the bomb by making weapons-usable materials more easily available. This is especially true when such technology is exported, as Moltex eventually hopes to do. But even without exports, government funding of reprocessing sends a signal to other countries that reprocessing is perfectly acceptable as a civilian energy strategy.
The Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility warns that the new information raises questions about the extent to which nuclear promoters are writing public policy on nuclear issues in Canada.
In fact, Canada’s 2019 Impact Assessment Act exempts reprocessing plants of a certain size from Environmental Assessment, implying that such plants are under consideration. A plant producing 100 tonnes of plutonium per year (enough for 15,000 A-Bombs annually) is exempt from review.
Frank von Hippel, PhD, Professor of Peace and International Affaoirs, Princton University, fvhippel@princeton.edu
Gordon Edwards, PhD, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, ccnr@web.ca, (514) 489 5118.
Susan O’Donnell, Coalition for Responsible Energy Development N.B., susanodo.ca@gmail.com , (506) 261 1727
What will happen to 140-tonne stockpile of combustible sodium at Dounreay?
Dounreay’s operators have still to decide what to do with the remaining 140
tonne stockpile of sodium on site. Plans are afoot to build a new plant to
neutralise what is one of the most hazardous legacies from its days as the
UK’s testbed for fast reactors.
But Magnox Ltd has not ruled out hauling
the material to a disposal plant, if it can find one able and willing to do
the job. An update was given at Wednesday evening’s meeting of Dounreay
Stakeholder Group (DSG) when the site management came under fire for not
dealing with the issue years ago.
John O’Groat Journal 25th Sept 2023
Andreyeva Bay cleanup slows to a snail’s pace since invasion of Ukraine
https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2023-09-andreyeva-bay-cleanup-slows-to-a-snails-pace-since-invasion-of-ukraine 18 Sept 23 Charles Digges
In 2017, Russia began a landmark project ridding one of its most dangerous Cold War relics of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The effort to clean up Andreyeva Bay — a submarine base near Murmansk uniquely positioned to contaminate the Barents Sea — was the culmination of a years-long and often strained cooperative effort between Moscow and numerous European nations, chief among them Norway and the United Kingdom.
The outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022 disrupted that progress and drained the project of millions in international funding as European nations suspended their contributions in protest of Moscow’s invasion.
In the early days of the war, officials with Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, insisted they would continue Andreyeva Bay’s cleanup without international assistance, though it was unclear on what funding that would be done.
It wasn’t until Rosatom’s annual conference convened in Murmansk this past July that any news of how these projects were progressing saw the light of day. But even then, the audience a was select one. Bellona — which had attended the annual Rosatom meeting in prewar times — has only viewed the conference presentations in written form.
In fact, none of Rosatom’s former international partners whose funding has driven the Andreyeva Bay project — nations like Norway, France, the United Kingdom and others from Europe— were invited. Instead, the international delegation consisted primarily of countries like Belarus, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan and others from the Moscow-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States.
“Most of these countries don’t know anything about the Arctic,” said Bellona’s Alexander Nikitin, who is a former member of Rosatom’s Public Council, which was disbanded when the invasion began. “They were invited so the organizers could call the event ‘international.’”
As it turns out, Rosatom hasn’t made any significant progress on the cleanup since the war estranged it from its primary international partners. The problems that remained at the Andreyeva Bay site before war broke out are the same problems Rosatom is addressing now. And where the cleanup was forecast to be completed by 2028 before the Ukraine invasion, current projections by Rosatom officials put the completion date much later.
The disruption to Andreyeva Bay and other cleanup projects threatens to turn back the clock on more than two decades of environmental progress in Northwest Russia.
History
Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States built more than 400 nuclear submarines, assuring each superpower the ability to fire nuclear missiles from sea even after their land-based silos had been decimated by a first strike. The fjords and coastlines around Murmansk adjacent to Norway became the hub of the Soviet Northern Fleet, and a dumping ground for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
After the Iron Curtain was drawn back, the disturbing scale of this legacy came to light. It was revealed that a storage building at Andreyeva Bay — the now notorious Building No 5 — had leaked some 600,000 metric tons of irradiated water into the Barents Sea from a nuclear fuel storage pool in 1982. The site contained 22,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies pulled from more than 100 subs, many kept in rusted containers stored in the open air.
This slow-motion nuclear disaster continued to unfold in near secrecy until Bellona brought it to international attention in 1996, when it published a groundbreaking report on Northwest Russia’s nuclear woes.
Fearing contamination, Norway spearheaded a sweeping cleanup effort with other Western nations. Combined they spent more than $1 billion to dismantle 197 decommissioned Soviet nuclear subs that rusted dockside, still loaded with spent nuclear fuel. One thousand Arctic navigation beacons powered by strontium batteries were replaced, many with solar powered units provided by the Norwegians.
Then, six years ago, the first batches of spent nuclear fuel began their journey away from Andreyeva Bay to safer storage — a process meant to continue for another decade thereafter. By 2021, more than half of the spent fuel assemblies had been removed. Later that year, damaged spent fuel fragments lying at the bottom of Building No 5’s storage pools had also been extracted. Real progress was being made.
Progress since the beginning of the war
Since the beginning of the war, however, the tempo of removing spent fuel assemblies has nearly ground to a halt. If 2017, the first year of the removal, saw 18 batches of spent fuel transported away from the site, then in 2022, according to various reports, only two batches left Andreyeva Bay.
The disposition of solid radioactive waste at the site, which includes solid waste inside the storage buildings, also remains unclear and appears to have slowed considerably as a result of the war. As of 2022, some 9,500 cubic meters of it — or roughly 51 percent of the entire legacy waste at the site — remained in place. This waste was scheduled to depart for other storage bases, such as the Gremikha site, by 2026. Now, that’s schedule may be unrealistic.
About half of Andreyeva Bay’s infrastructure— structures like Building No 5 and Building No 3-A, to which spent fuel in Building No 5 was rushed after the 1982 leak — remains irradiated and in need of safe rehabilitation or dismantlement. But since the schedule for removing solid waste from these structures has been pushed back from 2026 to sometime in the 2030s, dates for the completion of the dismantlement are likewise unclear.
Should that ever get done, what’s left of Building No 5 will present other problems. On the whole, the building itself represents some 15,300 tons of low- to medium level radioactive waste. The two options for dealing with this are to demolish the building and bury the debris in a radioactive waste storage facility, or encasing it in a sarcophagus, not unlike the one used at Chernobyl. As with the other issues at Andreyeva Bay, no real prospective conclusion date for disposing of Building No 5 has been discussed since the outbreak of war.
This is the first in a series of articles examining the state of nuclear cleanup in Russia since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. charles@bellona.no
In 2023, the risky part of Andreyeva Bay nuclear cleanup starts
Donor countries agree to fund an additional study on how to extract the damaged spent nuclear fuel from Tank 3A.
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ecology/2017/12/2023-risky-part-andreeva-bay-nuclear-cleanup-starts by Thomas Nilsen
Read in Russian | Читать по-русски
Take a closer look at this photo and you will understand the scoop of the most challenging and risky work to be done at the Cold War storage site for submarine nuclear fuel on Russia’s Kola Peninsula. For 35 years, highly radioactive fuel assemblies have been stored in these rusty, partly destroyed steel pipes where concrete of poor quality was filled in the space between. Some of the fuel assemblies are stuck in the canisters, while some of the canisters are stuck in the cells.
Message is clear: Do not try to lift any of the assemblies before you are sure nothing falls out.
At a recent meeting in London, donor countries discussed the progress after the first nuclear fuel assemblies were shipped away from the other tanks in Andreeva Bay towards Mayak in June.
The experts all agree it is necessary to conduct a whole range of work to prepare Tank 3A for unloading. Additional €100,000 was granted for the study. Another €675,000 was granted to study another messy challenge in Andreeva Bay; the smashed spent fuel assembles on the floor of the former water-pool storage in Building No. 5, the information portal Russian Atomic Community reports.
Unloading work at Tank 2A and 2B will go on until 2023 before possible work on unloading the dangerous mess at Tank 3A can start.
Andrey Zolotkov, a nuclear expert with the environmental group Bellona says YES with capitalized letters when asked by the Barents Observer via Skype whether Tank 3A poses the biggest risk in the cleanup work.
Equal to Chernobyl
The British nuclear engineering company Nuvia has calculated the total radionuclide inventory in the three tanks to be equal to the remains of Reactor No. 4 inside the Chernobyl sarcophagus. Some 22,000 spent fuel assemblies are stored in the tanks, coming from 90-100 reactor cores powering the Soviet Navy’s Cold War submarines sailing out from the Kola Peninsula from the late 1950s till 1982. Nuvia says it is some six tonnes of fissile uranium-235 in the fuel, about two times the amount of fissile material inside the exploded Chernobyl reactor in Ukraine.
Tank 3A does also pose the highest risk for radiation doses to working personell and ways to do the job with robotics has to be developed. Nobody want people to stay too long near the destroyed assemblies and get exposed.
Another deemed challenging job ahead is to locate and secure the six damaged spent fuel elements on the floor of Building No. 5 in Andreeva Bay. The building served as a storage-pool for the spent fuel assemblies before 1982, but due to a water-leak and rusty wires, many fuel assemblies fell to the floor. That was the reason why the assemblies were hastily moved over to the tanks 2A, 2B and 3A. In that process, however, six damaged fuel assemblies and some uranium powder from others were left on the floor. Today, they pose a serious radiation hazard risk.
Funding from Europe and Canada
The nuclear cleanup work in Andreeva Bay on the Barents Sea coast is financed by the so-called Northern Window of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), a cooperative program with Russia’s State Nuclear Corporation Rosatom.
Norway has over the last two decades financed infrastructure improvements in Andreeva Bay making the removal of spent nuclear fuel possible.
The NDEP’s funded work started in 2003. Additional to the European Union, nuclear legacy cleanup work in North-West Russia is funded by Sweden, Finland, Belgium, France, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Andreeva Bay is located about 55 kilometers from Russia’s border to Norway in the north.
September 14, 2023: Dounreay decommissioning end date that proved to be unachievable
By Alan Hendry – alan.hendry@hnmedia.co.uk, 14 September 2023
The end of an era for Caithness… the last chapter in a pioneering
industrial story that began in the black-and-white world of the 1950s… a
final farewell to our great atomic age… Or at least, it would have been
if a prediction made 11 years ago had proved to be accurate.
It was in May 2012 that Roger Hardy, then managing director of Dounreay Site Restoration
Ltd (DSRL), announced a target for the demolition of the nuclear site that
had transformed the county’s socio-economic landscape over the course of
six decades. Dounreay’s operators were setting a specific end date of
September 14, 2023.
That was when all redundant facilities needed to be
flattened and the waste sorted, segregated and made safe for the long term,
according to Mr Hardy. It was a big ask, he acknowledged at the time, but
staff were responding to the challenge: “No-one seems hugely surprised by
what we think is achievable.”
It was destined not to be achievable after
all. The current deadline for the clean-up is 2033, a full decade beyond
that 2012 forecast – although questions have been raised as to whether
even this revised schedule is a realistic one. Earlier this year,
ex-councillor Roger Saxon, a former chairman of Dounreay Stakeholder Group,
expressed the view that 2033 would be unachievable. He was concerned that
momentum had been lost on the decommissioning programme.
John O’Groat Journal 14th Sept 2023
Don’t underestimate ravages of climate crisis when storing nuclear waste:
Meg Sears, 11 Sept 23, https://preventcancernow.ca/dont-underestimate-ravages-of-climate-crisis-when-storing-nuclear-waste/
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission should heed Mother Nature’s warning and deny the present proposal. In today’s weather, much less the future, the commission is unlikely to meet its goal to keep nuclear waste secure for hundreds of years.
What happens when a federal Environmental Impact Assessment is fundamentally flawed? Will authorities pause for a rethink when a key assumption and design limitation of the assessment is wrong, risking catastrophic failure?
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is facing this late-day reality test as it is poised to rule whether the Chalk River can go ahead as planned.
The 2021 Environmental Impact Statement for near-surface nuclear waste disposal lists severe rainfall as the top risk for stability of the hillside site. Excessive rain could result in the nuclear waste being swept down the hill and into Perch Lake, Perch Creek, and the Ottawa River a kilometre away. Chemicals would pollute the ecosystem and food sources, as well as drinking water for millions of people in smaller towns, as well as in Ottawa and cities downstream.
On Aug. 10, 2023, where the Rideau, Ottawa and Gatineau rivers tumble together, chiefs of Kebaowek, Kitigan Zibi Anishinabeg and Mitchibikonik Inik First Nations, elders and other experts, made final submissions to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. As they spoke against the nuclear waste disposal site at Chalk River, attendees heard the roar of rain drumming on the roof.
During this event, Ottawa streets and basements flooded, traffic stopped, power failed, sewers backed up, and more than 300 million litres of untreated water flowed into the Ottawa River. At least, unlike nuclear waste, untreated sewer water degrades within weeks—not years or generations.
The Environmental Impact Statement weather severity estimates are out of date. It defines “heavy rainfall” to be more than 0.7 cm per hour—one seventh of what fell during the hearing. The statement also cites a 2013 estimate of low tornado risks—an insult to fresh memories of catastrophic tornadoes and derechos in Eastern Ontario.
The acceleration of climate disasters is boggling Canada’s long-term predictions of the scale of extreme weather. The nuclear waste disposal facility was designed to withstand end-of-the century estimates of less than five cm of precipitation in a day for Deep River, and over five cm in a day—not an hour—for Ottawa.
Ottawa’s not alone in breaking rainfall records. July 2023 brought rainfall disasters to Nova Scotia, with rainfall up to 50 cm per hour measured in one location. Much of the province experienced 20 cm in a day, causing widespread damage. The climate predictions from the federal government call for much less—up to 9 cm in a day by the end of the century.
If an Environmental Impact Assessment for a bridge was discovered to be flawed—that the bridge would not withstand a storm as severe as what occurred just last month—it would be pause for thought and a good reason to reconsider the plans. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission should heed the warning from Mother Nature and deny the present proposal. In today’s weather, much less the coming years’, the Commission is unlikely to meet its objective to keep nuclear waste secure for hundreds of years.
Are They Already Cutting Corners on Worker Protection at DOE’s New Plutonium Processing Plant?
plutonium is toxic at the scale of micrograms, deadly at the scale of milligrams, and useable in nuclear weapons of mass destruction at the scale of kilograms. This is why plutonium work requires rigid, intensive safety systems, referred to as “defense in depth,” to protect workers and the surrounding people and landscape; as well as extreme levels of security and material accounting.
CounterPunch, BY DON MONIAK 11 Sept 23
As of this past Labor Day, there are strong indications that future workers at the planned, new Savannah River Plutonium Processing Plant (SRPPF) may face unnecessary, increased risks of exposure to radiological hazards inherent in plutonium toxicity and chemical complexity.
According to an August 3, 2023 letter from the Defense National Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), the SRPPF project leadership team does not consider vital plutonium processing safety equipment as “safety significant controls.”
According to the letter, NNSA’s project leadership team believes a reliance on worker sense of sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch is sufficient to detect and/or prevent accidents such as plutonium fires and dispersal of plutonium oxide powder.
In the hierarchy of nuclear safety, the Department of Energy standards place “Safety Significant Controls” above administrative controls that are reliant upon the absence of human error.
The motive for SRPPF project team’s preference for administrative controls is unknown.
The New Plutonium Processing Plant.
The plutonium/MOX (Pu/MOX) fuel facility was a massive, multi-billion dollar endeavor designed to help dispose of dozens of tons of surplus nuclear weapons plutonium (Pu). This Savannah River Site(SRS) project was abandoned in the late 2010’s, following a chronic array of technical issues, mismanagement, major cost overruns, cutting of corners, and the lack of commercial Pu/MOX fuel customers.
After the project was abandoned, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) decided to repurpose the unfinished facility into a new “plutonium pit”production plant. The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) was then renamed the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Plant (SRPPF). This $11 billion plus repurposed facility is already burdened by cost overruns—-the original estimate was $3.7 billion.
Plutonium pits are referred to as the primary nuclear explosives, or triggers,” (1) that dominate the known U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Pits acquired their quaint nickname by virtue of the resemblance of the configuration of high explosives surrounding the primary nuclear explosive to stone fruit like peaches and plums—an example of early nuclear weaponeers’ inside humor.
The Pu pits are pressure vessels with nested shells of material, comprised of other non-nuclear parts, including the metal cladding, welds, a pit tube, neutron tamper(s) and initiator, as well as the usually hollow-cored plutonium hemispheres. In most pit designs, a sealed pit tube carries deuterium-tritium gas into the hollow-core to boost the nuclear explosive power of weapons.
But unlike the sweet, fruity, and and delectable flesh surrounding plum and peach pits, a Pu pit is surrounded by a high explosives package powerful enough to implode the plutonium metal sphere contained in the pit. This is not like compressing a tin can, as plutonium is the most durable of the transuranic heavy metals.
The current plan is to annually produce at least eighty new plutonium pits in the SRPPF. Pit fabrication was once the exclusive task at the long-closed Rocky Flats plant in Colorado, and the work processes constitute the most dirty—in terms of waste production—and dangerous workplace in the national nuclear weapons complex. In this century, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has failed miserably to reconstitute a tiny fraction of the Rocky Flats pit production rate.
Pit production is unlikely to be the only task at the SRPPF. An estimated ten to twelve-thousand surplus plutonium pits, containing a sum of 30 to 34-metric tonnes of plutonium, could also be processed at a plutonium pit disassembly and conversion line at the SRPPF. The resulting plutonium oxide powder would then be sent to the SRS K-Area’s Pu waste production facility, where the powder is diluted to a three to five percent level within a larger mixture of inert materials………………………….
Some Plutonium Processing Hazards
There is a negligible level of debate that plutonium is toxic at the scale of micrograms, deadly at the scale of milligrams, and useable in nuclear weapons of mass destruction at the scale of kilograms. This is why plutonium work requires rigid, intensive safety systems, referred to as “defense in depth,” to protect workers and the surrounding people and landscape; as well as extreme levels of security and material accounting.
The most hazardous plutonium operations involve plutonium pit fabrication. After pit disassembly, the plutonium within pits is converted to a finely dispersed powder form (2), made up of sticky grains containing energetic alpha particles that easily damage soft lung tissues. Sticky plutonium oxide particles clinging to ductwork can also hinder ventilation systems over time.
Recycling plutonium for pit production then requires difficult and dangerous processes to remove impurities and undesirable decay products such as intensely radioactive Americium-241. (3) The resulting plutonium form is transferred to the next step, the plutonium foundry.
The foundry work involves a complex ten-step process, summarized as melting, casting, and heat treating of plutonium metal. Gallium is added at a one-percent ratio to produce an alloy that is considered almost as easy to machine as aluminum or silver. The risk from explosion, criticality, and spill hazards must be rigidly controlled; while contaminated parts such as crucibles pose unique waste management measures.
The final plutonium processing step is machining the foundry product into a precise sub-critical configuration. Like any machining, Plutonium metal work casts tiny shavings and creates fine dust.
These shavings can ignite upon exposure to air and lead to larger fires that can destroy glove boxes and ventilation systems, and cause large releases of plutonium into the atmosphere. The Rocky Flats experience suggests that fires of any size are not a remote possibility, they are a probability.
The task is to keep Pu metal fires small and nondestructive, while preventing injury and harmful exposures to workers. A small fire can render costly equipment useless. A large fire can lead to a countryside contaminated with particles that become more intensely radioactive for decades.
Extreme care must also be taken to keep plutonium metal in a non-critical configuration at all times. The wrong geometry or placement of metal pieces in the wrong configuration can produce the deadly blue light that signifies criticality accidents. In 2009, a number of Los Alamos criticality engineers walked off the job at the lab’s pit production line, citing a casual approach to criticality safety.
The final step is assembly, where the parts that make pits tick are introduced. The making of these parts pose their own toxic hazards, such as the fine dust from machining beryllium metal.
Those are just several aspects of the safety issues involved with the plutonium pit fabrication.
The True, and False, Necessity for New Pit Fabrication and Production. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
The Pit Plant’s Initial Design: One Less Layer of Safety Depth?
Because of all these factors, new pit production is considered essential, and a new, smaller scale—by Cold War Standards—plutonium pit fabrication capacity is presently in the preliminary design phase at the SRPPF complex.
The highest standards of safety are expected to prevent accidents or mitigate the impacts of spills, fires, leaks, and dispersion of fine radioactive dust. A less rigid approach to safety is quite unexpected for a high hazard, hardened nuclear facility that would only be the second its kind in the weapons complex—-the last being the Rocky Flats plant built in the 1950’s.
But according to the August 3, 2023 letter from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), the DOE/NNSA’s project leadership team does not consider vital plutonium processing safety equipment as “safety significant controls.”…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….more https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/09/11/are-they-already-cutting-corners-on-worker-protection-at-does-new-plutonium-processing-plant/
Japan’s Insane Immoral, Illegal Radioactive Dumping
CounterPunch, BY ROBERT HUNZIKER 8 Sept 23
Japan cannot possibly outlive the atrocity of dumping radioactive wastewater into the Pacific Ocean. In fact, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is an example of how nuclear meltdowns negatively impact the entire world, as its toxic wastewater travels across the world in ocean currents. The dumping of stored toxic wastewater from the meltdown in 2011 officially started on August 24th, 2023. Meanwhile, the country restarts some of the nuclear plants that were shut down when the Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Power Plant exploded.
Fukushima’s broken reactors are an example of why nuclear energy is a trap that can’t handle global warming or extreme natural disasters. Nuclear is an accident waiting to happen, for several reasons, including victimization by forces of global warming.
According to Dr. Paul Dorfman, chair of the Nuclear Consulting Group, former secretary to the UK Scientific Advisory Committee on Internal Radiation, and Visiting Fellow, University of Sussex: “It’s important to understand that nuclear is very likely to be a significant climate casualty. For cooling purposes nuclear reactors need to be situated by large bodies of water, etc. …” Essentially, global warming is nuclear energy’s Waterloo; it has already seriously endangered France’s 56 nuclear reactors with partial shutdowns because of extreme global warming. Nuclear reactors cannot survive global warming. See “the nuclear energy trap” link at the end of this article.
TEPCO’s treacherous act of dumping radioactive water into a wide-open ocean is a deliberate violation of human decency, as it clearly violates essential provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) General Safety Guide No. 8 (GSG-8).
Japan should be forced to stop its diabolical exercise of potentially destroying precious life. Shame on the IAEA and shame on the member countries of the G7 for endorsing this travesty. They’ve christened the ocean an “open sewer.” Hark! Come one, come all, dump your trash, open toxic spigots, bring chemicals, bring fertilizers, bring plastic, bring radioactive waste that’s impossible to dispose… the oceans are open sewers. It’s free! Yes, it’s free but only weak-minded people would allow a broken-down crippled nuclear power plant to dump radioactive waste into the world’s ocean. It is a testament to human frailty, weakness, insipience, not courage.
According to Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, TEPCO’s ALPS-treated Radioactive Water Dumping Plan Violates Essential Provisions of IAEA’s General Safety Guide No. 8 (GSG-8) and Corresponding Requirements in Other IAEA Documents, June 28, 2023: “The IAEA is an important United Nations institution. Like the rest of the Expert Panel, the author of this paper has been reluctant to criticize the IAEA. Yet, its outright refusal to apply its own guidance documents in full measure is stark. Its constricted view of the dumping plan has allowed it to evade its responsibilities to many countries. Its eagerness to assure the public that harm will be “negligible” has been carried to the point of grossly overstating well-known facts about tritium. The serious lapses of the IAEA in the Fukushima radioactive water matter have made criticism unavoidable.”………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
“At high doses, ionizing radiation can cause immediate damage to a person’s body, including, at very high doses, radiation sickness and death. At lower doses, ionizing radiation can cause health effects such as cardiovascular disease and cataracts, as well as cancer. It causes cancer primarily because it damages DNA, which can lead to cancer-causing gene mutations.” (Source: National Cancer Institute)
How is it possible to justify dumping any amount of radioactive wastewater into the Pacific Ocean? Is the world’s consciousness so low, so lacking a moral compass, that it’s okay to dump the most toxic material on the planet into the oceans?
Stop destroying the oceans!
And please contemplate the dire ramifications of the nuclear energy trap. more https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/09/08/japans-insane-immoral-illegal-radioactive-dumping/?fbclid=IwAR0IaIETBoTgZeDUmJ3caeJAlFFWGPrdCtsqt5oR0A7XP8NEl1fKqLJwu54
Robert Hunziker lives in Los Angeles and can be reached at rlhunziker@gmail.com.
UK / ‘No Easy Options’ For Disposal Of Plutonium Stockpile, Says Report
“simpler and cheaper to consider it a waste material alongside the other legacies from the nuclear industry, and safely dispose of it.”
NUCNET, bBy David Dalton, 6 September 2023
There are no easy options when it comes to the “unavoidably complex” task of managing the UK’s plutonium stockpile, but more research, development and innovation is needed to underpin any decision, a report says.
The report, prepared by the Dalton Nuclear Institute at Manchester University, calls for a national dialogue led by “trusted voices” and based on a clear view of the government’s thinking of the role, if any, plutonium might play in meeting future UK energy needs.
The stockpile could be used as fuel for existing or future thermal reactors. It could also be combined with the UK’s 100,000 tonne supply of depleted, natural and low-enriched uranium to fuel new fast reactors, which has the potential to power the UK for centuries. Both options could lead to the reduction of the UK’s nuclear legacy burden.
Another option is to dispose of the stockpile in the planned UK deep geological repository.
Professor Clint Sharrad, acting director of the Dalton Nuclear Institute, said while this all sounds promising, successfully delivering such outcomes would take time, money, organisation, and commitment.
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, a government body, is in the process of repackaging the plutonium stocks, stored at Sellafield in northwest England, into more robust containment.
“Being wary of the current global political and economic climate, it may be that extracting the energy from UK plutonium in the not-too-distant future becomes unnecessarily expensive and political barriers may be too difficult to overcome,” Prof Sharrad said.
“Therefore, it might be simpler and cheaper to consider it a waste material alongside the other legacies from the nuclear industry, and safely dispose of it.”
The stockpile originates from reprocessing spent fuel from the UK’s reactor fleets, plus some material derived from outside the UK….. https://www.nucnet.org/news/no-easy-options-for-disposal-of-uranium-stockpile-says-report-9-3-2023
UK and Japan’s governments funding research on problem of nuclear waste
Two projects have been awarded a share of £1 million, delivered by the
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), part of UK
Research and Innovation (UKRI), to address challenges in: radioactive waste
treatment, packaging, and storage; remote handling, robotic, and autonomous
systems in decommissioning; environmental behaviour of radionuclide release
and management of risk and degraded infrastructure.
The UK-Japan Civil Nuclear Research programme is a partnership between UKRI and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The research
projects are being led by academics at the universities of Strathclyde and
Sheffield.
UK Research & Innovation 8th Sept 2023
https://www.ukri.org/news/uk-japan-partnership-to-develop-new-tech-for-nuclear-waste-disposal/
Biden’s horse-trading on nuclear technology and fuels is an unprecedented proliferation risk
he is funding not just prudent nuclear research, but also their boondoggles to expand use of plutonium and HEU fuel. To ensure US military support for the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) deal, he is acquiescing to Navy insistence on using weapons-grade uranium reactor fuel, even in exported submarines. However, recent spikes in demand for nuclear weapons, among friends and foes alike, suggests this is a dangerously short-sighted approach.
Bulletin, By Alan J. Kuperman | September 6, 2023
News media in the United States rarely report on nuclear proliferation until it reaches the crisis stage—as in North Korea and Iran. By then, however, it is typically too late to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Effective nonproliferation must begin much earlier, not only by suppressing demand for nuclear weapons but also by restricting supplies of the fissionable materials necessary to build them in the first place. Sadly, the Biden administration is bungling this latter responsibility.
To acquire the bomb, nuclear aspirants must first obtain its key ingredient: plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). So, as demand for nuclear weapons grows in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, one would expect the US government to do everything it can to clamp down on supply. Instead, President Joe Biden is actually doing just the opposite, by promoting commerce in weapon-usable nuclear materials as a bargaining chip for other issues. Unless the president reverses course, one of his greatest foreign policy legacies could wind up being global nuclear proliferation.
The spike in demand for nuclear weapons has been driven by several key events over the past two decades………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Considering this growing demand for nuclear weapons, an essential policy to avert proliferation is to block the supply of the necessary fissionable materials. Regrettably, the Biden administration instead has taken four steps that would foster proliferation of both plutonium and weapons-grade uranium.
First, President Biden is funding US companies like Oklo that want to reprocess used reactor fuel—how plutonium is obtained in the first place, by separating it from nuclear waste—and then deploy its fuel recycling technology “on a global scale.” This would reverse nearly half a century of bipartisan US policy opposing such activity at home and abroad, which has succeeded at restricting commercial reprocessing to only two countries, France and Russia, both of which already have nuclear weapons.
Second, the Biden administration is providing a $2 billion subsidy to Bill Gates (currently the fifth richest person in the world) to develop exotic “fast” nuclear reactors, which originally were designed explicitly to increase supplies of plutonium. Gates’s nuclear energy startup Terrapower promises not to use them this way, but the reactors are so expensive that countries importing them could cite economics to justify turning them into plutonium factories.
Third, the president is pursuing construction of a civilian US research reactor using weapons-grade HEU fuel for the first time since the 1960s, thereby threatening to undermine decades of progress in delegitimizing this dangerous fuel globally.
Fourth, the White House has agreed to export tons of weapons-grade uranium—an amount sufficient for hundreds of nuclear bombs—to fuel Australia’s forthcoming SSN-AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines. This announcement already has prompted at least one other country, Iran, to suggest that it too may produce HEU for naval fuel—a well-known back door to nuclear weapons. The good news is that Australia’s submarines likely could be redesigned to use low-enriched uranium that is unsuitable for nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the Biden administration recently canceled funding for the eight-year-old program to develop such proliferation-resistant naval fuel.
Why is President Biden doing all this? The US president seems to think he can prevent proliferation solely by quashing demand—using carrots and sticks to persuade countries not to seek the bomb—despite evidence to the contrary. So, he feels free to relax supply restrictions in political horse-trades. For example, to persuade legislators to support solar and wind power, he is funding not just prudent nuclear research, but also their boondoggles to expand use of plutonium and HEU fuel. To ensure US military support for the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) deal, he is acquiescing to Navy insistence on using weapons-grade uranium reactor fuel, even in exported submarines. However, recent spikes in demand for nuclear weapons, among friends and foes alike, suggests this is a dangerously short-sighted approach.
Of course, the United States should continue trying to reduce demand for proliferation, including by avoiding attacking any more countries that have halted their nuclear weapons programs like Iraq and Libya. But if President Biden imagines that demand-suppression is a silver bullet that gives him license to expand civilian commerce in nuclear weapons-usable materials, he is deeply mistaken. Unless Biden changes course, his promotion of such dangerous nuclear technologies will enable supply to meet demand—in the market of mass destruction. https://thebulletin.org/2023/09/bidens-horse-trading-on-nuclear-technology-and-fuels-is-an-unprecedented-proliferation-risk/
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