“Fukushima Pride” – publicity event to promote Fukushima food in Paris
Fukushima food promoted in Paris https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20180325_07/ The governor of Japan’s Fukushima Prefecture is in Paris to promote farm products that are suffering from a damaged reputation following the 2011 nuclear accident.
Masao Uchibori is visiting Europe following the 7th anniversary of the massive earthquake and tsunami that triggered the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
Uchibori organized the “Fukushima Pride” tasting event on Saturday at a shopping mall near Paris. Rice and fruit products were handed out to shoppers.
One visitor said she likes the dried peaches a lot and is not concerned about the safety of Fukushima produce now that it is widely circulated.
France has seen Japanese cuisine surge in popularity, which is pushing up the import of luxury foodstuffs and sake rice wine.
Uchibori expressed hope that France will help Fukushima overcome lingering concerns about the safety of its food and make inroads into the global market.
The Japanese government has been calling on other countries to lift import restrictions on its food products, after they cleared radiation screening.
In December, the European Union lifted import controls on some produce and seafood from regions affected by the nuclear accident.
Sanitising the Fukushima nuclear waste situation: Japanese newspaper succumbs to pressure
The Great Train Photo Robbery https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2018/03/13/the-great-train-photo-robbery/
Nuclear lobby gearing up to convert youth to the nuclear faith
Investing in Youth: IAEA, International Youth Nuclear Congress Sign Agreement,
Henry Sokolski Blows Up 5 Myths about Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Program
5 Myths about Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Program, Enabling Riyadh would only make the region’s nuclear landscape riskier. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-myths-about-saudi-arabias-nuclear-program-24771
Much has been written about Saudi Arabia’s plans for nuclear power since the Trump administration announced last fall that it would conclude a civilian nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh. Almost all of this commentary suggests Washington must accommodate the kingdom’s desire to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, two activities that bring states to the brink of making bombs. In particular, commentators repeatedly raise five points—none of which are sound.
Myth #1: Saudi Arabia needs nuclear power to meet its growing electrical demand.
Most recently, the Saudis announced that instead of sixteen large power reactors, they are only building two. Some have argued that this slippage reflects the kingdom’s desire to finance reactor construction with its oil revenues. With the price of oil dropping from $100 a barrel several years ago to roughly $60 a barrel today, the schedule for nuclear construction had to slide. If true, this suggests the Saudi nuclear “imperative” is less than urgent.
A more compelling explanation is that Saudis don’t need nuclear power. In fact, recent studies found that the Saudis could more cheaply meet their energy and environmental requirements by developing its natural-gas resources and investing in renewables—photovoltaic, concentrated solar power and wind. They also found economic value in upgrading the kingdom’s electrical grid and reducing subsidies that artificially drive up electrical demand. This should not be surprising. The United Arab Emirates, Riyadh’s next-door neighbor, which began construction of four power reactors several years ago, just announced that the UAE would not be building any more nuclear plants. Why? Cheaper alternatives: in addition to plentiful natural gas and wind resources, the Emirates are now investing in photovoltaic systems and solar thermal storage systems, which together can operate twenty-four hours a day more cheaply than nuclear. These findings also apply to Saudi Arabia.
Myth #2: Without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh, America will forgo billions of dollars of nuclear hardware and know-how exports to the kingdom.
This point presumes that the kingdom will stick with its 2012 energy plan, which it has already backed away from. It also mistakenly assumes that America still manufactures export reactors. The only American-headquartered firm that is actively interested in exporting to the kingdom is Westinghouse. It is entirely foreign owned and is a reactor designer, not a manufacturer. It’s currently in bankruptcy proceedings, and is eager to be bought by a Canadian holding firm. Naturally, Westinghouse would like its prospective buyers to believe that it has a clear shot at the Saudi market.
Unfortunately it’s, at best, a long shot. Westinghouse’s design, the AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere. The reactor’s construction is embarrassingly behind schedule and over budget both in China and the United States. Mismanagement by Westinghouse caused two reactors in South Carolina to be terminated after an expenditure of $9 billion, which, in turn, nearly bankrupted Westinghouse’s Japanese owner, Toshiba. Finally, American nuclear know-how and other nonnuclear electrical generating parts can and have been exported in support of non-American reactors abroad without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement. These goods would likely make up a majority of American nuclear exports to the kingdom but, again, their export does not require negotiating a nuclear cooperative agreement.
Myth #3: If Westinghouse does not win the bid, the Russians or Chinese will, reducing American nuclear influence in the region.
This argument is perhaps the most egregious. Consider: an unspoken motive for the kingdom to pursue a nuclear program is to develop an option to make nuclear weapons, if needed, to deter Iran. This would all but preclude buying Russian. Rosatom, after all, is building Iran’s reactors. If Saudi Arabia buys Russian, it is all but asking Moscow to let Iran know exactly what the kingdom is doing in the nuclear realm. Consider also Russia’s recent ill-fated nuclear dealings with South Africa (a contributing factor in forcing President Zumafrom office) and Turkey (where Rosatom’s financial inflexibility prompted Turkey’s private financiers, who were underwriting half of the undertaking, to pull out of the project).
As for buying Chinese, doing so is also risky. The Chinese recently encountered “safety concerns” that delayed operation in Taishan of both its Westinghouse AP1000, and a French-based design. As for China’s top export nuclear design, the Hualong One (HPR 1000) reactor, the British won’t be done certifying it until 2022. China’s other possible export system, the CAP 1400, based on the yet-unproven AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere.
What’s left? The kingdom’s original bid requirements were for two reactors that would produce 2,800 megawatts. The only country that has a reactor that is operating, that is properly licensed, and that has been built roughly on time and on budget that could meet this requirement is Korea’s APR-1400. The Saudis only changed their original bid requirements after the United States, China, Russia and France all complained. Given Korea’s relative success in building four APR-1400 reactors on time and on budget in the United Arab Emirates, and its success in operating a licensed APR-1400 in South Korea, the Korean reactor is still the odds-on favorite to win the Saudi bid.
No, it doesn’t. Saudi nuclear backers argue that the kingdom should enrich, given the uranium reserves the Saudis have discovered. Uranium, however, is plentiful globally and priced at historic lows (less than $22 a pound), as are uranium-enrichment services. More important, the kingdom would have to spend billions on a variety of plants to enrich uranium and produce its own nuclear fuel. Starting such an undertaking might make economic sense if the kingdom had roughly a dozen large reactors up and running. It currently has none, and has only opened a process to buying two.
Myth #5: United States has more to gain by accommodating Saudi Arabia’s demand that it be allowed to enrich uranium than resisting it.
Trumpeting these myths, proponents of a permissive U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal argue that Washington lacks the leverage to secure a Saudi pledge not to make enrich or reprocess. The best Washington can do, it is argued, is to ask Riyadh to defer such dangerous nuclear activities for several years. Some even suggestthat acceding to Riyadh’s wishes is in Washington’s interest, since allowing the Saudis the capacity to make nuclear weapons–usable fuels might help “deter” Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
None of this seems sound. As already noted, the Korean APR-1400 is most likely to win the Saudi contract. Given this reactor’s American technical content, senior Korean officials are convinced they cannot export it to the kingdom unless the Saudis first reach a nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States. For this reason (and others besides), Seoul is inclined to take American guidance. Meanwhile, President Trump is trying to get the European parties to the Iran nuclear deal to devise a tighter follow-on understanding. A riskier approach would be for the United States to break from its policy (solidified in the 2009 U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperative agreement) to get non-weapons states in the Middle East to forswear enriching and reprocessing.
Besides the odd optics of looking like a version of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (which President Trump says is “the worst deal ever”), allowing Riyadh to enrich and reprocess would immediately excite the humors of the UAE and Egypt. Both have U.S. nuclear cooperative agreements that allow them to request their agreements be modified if the United States offers any of their neighbors a more generous nuclear deal. Then there’s Morocco and Turkey: their nuclear agreements with Washington are up for renewal in 2021 and 2023. They too are likely to ask for equal treatment as soon as possible. How this serves anyone’s long-term interest is, at best, unclear.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future. He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the U.S. secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993.
If Saudi Arabia is to have a prosperous economic future, we are told, it must meet its growing power requirements by burning less oil. For this, nuclear proponents insist, the Saudis need sixteen large reactors. Although often repeated, this is not true. In 2012, the Saudis announced their intention to build sixteen reactors by 2032. By 2017, Saudi planners had pushed this back to 2040. Shortly thereafter, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman backed an national development plan for 2030 that didn’t mention nuclear power, but instead focused on investing in renewables.
Most recently, the Saudis announced that instead of sixteen large power reactors, they are only building two. Some have argued that this slippage reflects the kingdom’s desire to finance reactor construction with its oil revenues. With the price of oil dropping from $100 a barrel several years ago to roughly $60 a barrel today, the schedule for nuclear construction had to slide. If true, this suggests the Saudi nuclear “imperative” is less than urgent.
A more compelling explanation is that Saudis don’t need nuclear power. In fact, recent studies found that the Saudis could more cheaply meet their energy and environmental requirements by developing its natural-gas resources and investing in renewables—photovoltaic, concentrated solar power and wind. They also found economic value in upgrading the kingdom’s electrical grid and reducing subsidies that artificially drive up electrical demand. This should not be surprising. The United Arab Emirates, Riyadh’s next-door neighbor, which began construction of four power reactors several years ago, just announced that the UAE would not be building any more nuclear plants. Why? Cheaper alternatives: in addition to plentiful natural gas and wind resources, the Emirates are now investing in photovoltaic systems and solar thermal storage systems, which together can operate twenty-four hours a day more cheaply than nuclear. These findings also apply to Saudi Arabia.
Myth #2: Without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh, America will forgo billions of dollars of nuclear hardware and know-how exports to the kingdom.
This point presumes that the kingdom will stick with its 2012 energy plan, which it has already backed away from. It also mistakenly assumes that America still manufactures export reactors. The only American-headquartered firm that is actively interested in exporting to the kingdom is Westinghouse. It is entirely foreign owned and is a reactor designer, not a manufacturer. It’s currently in bankruptcy proceedings, and is eager to be bought by a Canadian holding firm. Naturally, Westinghouse would like its prospective buyers to believe that it has a clear shot at the Saudi market.
Unfortunately it’s, at best, a long shot. Westinghouse’s design, the AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere. The reactor’s construction is embarrassingly behind schedule and over budget both in China and the United States. Mismanagement by Westinghouse caused two reactors in South Carolina to be terminated after an expenditure of $9 billion, which, in turn, nearly bankrupted Westinghouse’s Japanese owner, Toshiba. Finally, American nuclear know-how and other nonnuclear electrical generating parts can and have been exported in support of non-American reactors abroad without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement. These goods would likely make up a majority of American nuclear exports to the kingdom but, again, their export does not require negotiating a nuclear cooperative agreement.
Myth #3: If Westinghouse does not win the bid, the Russians or Chinese will, reducing American nuclear influence in the region.
This argument is perhaps the most egregious. Consider: an unspoken motive for the kingdom to pursue a nuclear program is to develop an option to make nuclear weapons, if needed, to deter Iran. This would all but preclude buying Russian. Rosatom, after all, is building Iran’s reactors. If Saudi Arabia buys Russian, it is all but asking Moscow to let Iran know exactly what the kingdom is doing in the nuclear realm. Consider also Russia’s recent ill-fated nuclear dealings with South Africa (a contributing factor in forcing President Zumafrom office) and Turkey (where Rosatom’s financial inflexibility prompted Turkey’s private financiers, who were underwriting half of the undertaking, to pull out of the project).
As for buying Chinese, doing so is also risky. The Chinese recently encountered “safety concerns” that delayed operation in Taishan of both its Westinghouse AP1000, and a French-based design. As for China’s top export nuclear design, the Hualong One (HPR 1000) reactor, the British won’t be done certifying it until 2022. China’s other possible export system, the CAP 1400, based on the yet-unproven AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere.
What’s left? The kingdom’s original bid requirements were for two reactors that would produce 2,800 megawatts. The only country that has a reactor that is operating, that is properly licensed, and that has been built roughly on time and on budget that could meet this requirement is Korea’s APR-1400. The Saudis only changed their original bid requirements after the United States, China, Russia and France all complained. Given Korea’s relative success in building four APR-1400 reactors on time and on budget in the United Arab Emirates, and its success in operating a licensed APR-1400 in South Korea, the Korean reactor is still the odds-on favorite to win the Saudi bid.
Myth # 4: It makes economic sense for the kingdom to enrich uranium to fuel its own reactors.
No, it doesn’t. Saudi nuclear backers argue that the kingdom should enrich, given the uranium reserves the Saudis have discovered. Uranium, however, is plentiful globally and priced at historic lows (less than $22 a pound), as are uranium-enrichment services. More important, the kingdom would have to spend billions on a variety of plants to enrich uranium and produce its own nuclear fuel. Starting such an undertaking might make economic sense if the kingdom had roughly a dozen large reactors up and running. It currently has none, and has only opened a process to buying two.
Myth #5: United States has more to gain by accommodating Saudi Arabia’s demand that it be allowed to enrich uranium than resisting it.
Trumpeting these myths, proponents of a permissive U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal argue that Washington lacks the leverage to secure a Saudi pledge not to make enrich or reprocess. The best Washington can do, it is argued, is to ask Riyadh to defer such dangerous nuclear activities for several years. Some even suggestthat acceding to Riyadh’s wishes is in Washington’s interest, since allowing the Saudis the capacity to make nuclear weapons–usable fuels might help “deter” Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
None of this seems sound. As already noted, the Korean APR-1400 is most likely to win the Saudi contract. Given this reactor’s American technical content, senior Korean officials are convinced they cannot export it to the kingdom unless the Saudis first reach a nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States. For this reason (and others besides), Seoul is inclined to take American guidance. Meanwhile, President Trump is trying to get the European parties to the Iran nuclear deal to devise a tighter follow-on understanding. A riskier approach would be for the United States to break from its policy (solidified in the 2009 U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperative agreement) to get non-weapons states in the Middle East to forswear enriching and reprocessing.
Besides the odd optics of looking like a version of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (which President Trump says is “the worst deal ever”), allowing Riyadh to enrich and reprocess would immediately excite the humors of the UAE and Egypt. Both have U.S. nuclear cooperative agreements that allow them to request their agreements be modified if the United States offers any of their neighbors a more generous nuclear deal. Then there’s Morocco and Turkey: their nuclear agreements with Washington are up for renewal in 2021 and 2023. They too are likely to ask for equal treatment as soon as possible. How this serves anyone’s long-term interest is, at best, unclear.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future. He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the U.S. secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993.
It’s a myth that thorium nuclear reactors were ever commercially viable
Dispelling Claim 2: Thorium did not get a chance in the nuclear energy development because it is not usable for military purposes Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology? Nuclear Monitor, by Dr. Rainer Moormann 1 March 2018
In the early stages of nuclear technology in the USA (from 1944 to the early 1950s), reprocessing technology was not yet well developed. Better developed were graphite moderated reactors that used natural uranium and bred plutonium.
For the use of thorium (which, other than uranium, does not contain fissile components), enriched uranium or possibly plutonium would have been indispensable.
Initially, neither pathway for thorium development was chosen because it would have automatically reduced the still limited capacity for military fissile materials production. (Thorium has a higher capture cross section for thermal (that means slow) neutrons than U-238. For that reason, it needs as fertile material in reactors a higher fissile density than U-238.)
Only when the US enrichment capacity at about 1950 delivered sufficient enriched uranium, the military and later civil entry into thorium technology started: in 1955 a bomb with U-233 from thorium was exploded, and a strategic U-233 reserve of around 2 metric tons was created. The large head-start of the plutonium bomb could not be overtaken any more, and plutonium remained globally the leading military fission material (although, according to unconfirmed sources, Indian nuclear weapons contain U-233).
The US military research concluded in 1966 that U-233 is a very potent nuclear weapon material, but that it offers hardly any advantages over the already established plutonium. Because light water reactors with low-enriched uranium (LEU) were already too far developed, thorium use remained marginal also in civil nuclear engineering: for instance, the German “thorium reactor” THTR-300 in Hamm operated only for a short time, and in reality it was a uranium reactor (fuel: 10% weapon-grade 93% enriched U-235 and 90% thorium) because the amount of energy produced by thorium did not exceed 25%.
The weapons proliferation risks of thorium nuclear reactors
Dispelling Claim 3: Thorium use has hardly any proliferation risk Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology? Nuclear Monitor, by Dr. Rainer Moormann 1 March 2018
The proliferation problem of Th / U-233 needs a differentiated analysis ‒ general answers are easily misleading. First of all, one has to assess the weapon capability of U-233. Criteria for good suitability are a low critical mass and a low rate of spontaneous fission. The critical mass of U-233 is only 40% of that of U-235, the critical mass of plutonium-239 is around 15% smaller than for U-233. A relatively easy to construct nuclear explosive needs around 20 to 25 kg U-233.
The spontaneous fission rate is important, because the neutrons from spontaneous fission act as a starter of the chain reaction; for an efficient nuclear explosion, the fissile material needs to have a super-criticality of at least 2.5 (criticality is the amount of new fissions produced by the neutrons of each fission.)
When, because of spontaneous fissions, a noticeable chain reaction already starts during the initial conventional explosion trigger mechanism in the criticality phase between 1 and 2.5, undesired weak nuclear explosions would end the super-criticality before a significant part of the fissile material has reacted. This largely depends on how fast the criticality phase of 1 to 2.5 is passed. Weapon plutonium (largely Pu-239) and moreover reactor plutonium have – different from the mentioned uranium fission materials U-235 and U-233 – a high spontaneous fission rate, which excludes their use in easy to build bombs.
More specifically, plutonium cannot be caused to explode in a so-called gun-type fission weapon, but both uranium isotopes can. Plutonium needs the far more complex implosion bomb design, which we will not go into further here. A gun-type fission weapon was used in Hiroshima – a cannon barrel set-up, in which a fission projectile is shot into a fission block of a suitable form so that they together form a highly super-critical arrangement. Here, the criticality phase from 1 to 2.5 is in the order of magnitude of milliseconds – a relatively long time, in which a plutonium explosive would destroy itself with weak nuclear explosions caused by spontaneous fission.
One cannot find such uranium gun-type fission weapons in modern weapon arsenals any longer (South Africa’s apartheid regime built 7 gun-type fission weapons using uranium-235): their efficiency (at most a few percent) is rather low, they are bulky (the Hiroshima bomb: 3.6 metric tons, 3.2 meters long), inflexible, and not really suitable for carriers like intercontinental rockets.
On the other hand, gun-type designs are highly reliable and relatively easy to build. Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reckons that larger terror groups would be capable of constructing a nuclear explosive on the basis of the gun-type fission design provided they got hold of a sufficient amount of suitable fissile material.1
Bombs with a force of at most 2 to 2.5 times that of the Hiroshima bomb (13 kt TNT) are conceivable. For that reason, the USA and Russia have tried intensively for decades to repatriate their world-wide delivered highly enriched uranium (HEU).
A draw-back of U-233 in weapon technology is that – when it is produced only for energy generation purposes – it is contaminated with maximally 250 parts per million (ppm) U-232 (half-life 70 years).2 That does not impair the nuclear explosion capability, but the uranium-232 turns in the thorium decay chain, which means ‒ as mentioned above ‒ emission of the highly penetrating radiation of Tl-208. A strongly radiating bomb is undesirable in a military environment – from the point of view of handling, and because the radiation intervenes with the bomb’s electronics.
In the USA, there exists a limit of 50 ppm U-232 above which U-233 is no longer considered suitable for weapons.
Nevertheless, U-232 does not really diminish all proliferation problems around U-233. First of all, simple gun-type designs do not need any electronics; furthermore, radiation safety arguments during bomb construction will hardly play a role for terrorist organisations that use suicide bombers.
Besides that, Tl-208 only appears in the end of the decay chain of U-232: freshly produced or purified U-233/U-232 will radiate little for weeks and is easier to handle.2 It is also possible to suppress the build-up of uranium-232 to a large extent, when during the breeding process of U-233 fast neutrons with energies larger than 0.5 MeV are filtered out (for instance by arranging the thorium in the reactor behind a moderating layer) and thorium is used from ore that contains as little uranium as possible.
A very elegant way to harvest highly pure U-233 is offered by the proposed molten salt reactors with integrated reprocessing (MSR): During the breeding of U-233 from thorium, the intermediate protactinium-233 (Pa-233) is produced, which has a half-life of around one month. When this intermediate is isolated – as is intended in some molten salt reactors – and let decay outside the reactor, pure U-233 is obtained that is optimally suited for nuclear weapons.
An advantage of U-233 in comparison with Pu-239 in military use is that under neutron irradiation during the production in the reactor, it tends to turn a lot less into nuclides that negatively influence the explosion capability. U-233 can (like U-235) be made unsuitable for use in weapons by adding U-238: When depleted uranium is already mixed with thorium during the feed-in into the reactor, the resulting mix of nuclides is virtually unusable for weapons.
However, for MSRs with integrated reprocessing this is not a sufficient remedy. One would have to prevent separation of protactinium-233.9
The conclusion has to be that the use of thorium contains severe proliferation risks. These are less in the risk that highly developed states would find it easier to lay their hands on high-tech weapons, than that the bar for the construction of simple but highly effective nuclear explosives for terror organisations or unstable states will be a lot lower.
Thorium nuclear reactors: no safer than conventional uranium reactors
Dispelling Claim 4: Thorium reactors are safer than conventional uranium reactors Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology? Nuclear Monitor, by Dr. Rainer Moormann 1 March 2018
The fission of U-233 results in roughly the same amounts
of the safety-relevant nuclides iodine-131, caesium-137
and strontium-90 as that of U-235. Also, the decay heat is
virtually the same. The differences in produced actinides (see
next claim) are of secondary importance for the risk during
operation or in an accident. In this perspective, thorium use
does not deliver any recognisable safety advantages.
Of greater safety relevance is the fact that uranium-233
fission produces 60% less so-called delayed neutrons than
U-235 fission. Delayed neutrons are not directly created
during the fission of uranium, but from some short-lived
decay products. Only due to the existence of delayed
neutrons, a nuclear reactor can be controlled, and the
bigger their share (for instance 0.6% with U-235), the
larger is the criticality range in which controllability is given
(this is called delayed criticality). Above this controllable
area (prompt criticality) a nuclear power excursion can
happen, like during the Chernobyl accident. The fact that
the delayed super-critical range is with U-233 considerably
smaller than with U-235, is from a safety point of view an
important technical disadvantage of thorium use.
During the design of thermal molten salt reactors (breeders),
the conclusion was that the use of thorium brings problems
with criticality safety that do not appear with classical
uranium use in this type of reactors. For that reason, it was
necessary to turn the attention to fast reactors for the use
of thorium in molten salt reactors. Although this conclusion
cannot be generalised, it shows that the use of thorium can
lead to increased safety problems.
As mentioned, a serious safety problem is the necessity to
restart breeder and reprocessing technology with thorium.
Thorium is often advertised in relation to the development
of so-called advanced reactors (Generation IV). The
safety advantages attributed to thorium in this context are
mostly, however, not germane to thorium (the fuel) but
rather due to the reactor concept. Whether or not these
advanced reactor concepts bring overall increased safety
falls outside the scope of this article, but that is certainly
not a question with a clear “yes” as the answer.
Thorium reactors – NOT a solution to nuclear waste problem
Dispelling Claim 5: Thorium decreases the waste problem
Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology? Nuclear Monitor, by Dr. Rainer Moormann 1 March 2018
Thorium use delivers virtually the same fission products
as classical uranium use. That is also true for those
isotopes that are important in issues around long-term
disposal. Those mobile long-lived fission products
(I-129, Tc-99, etc.) determine the risk of a deep geological
disposal when water intrusion is the main triggering event
for accidents. Thorium therefore does not deliver an
improvement for final disposal.
Proponents of thorium argue that thorium use does not
produce minor actinides (MA)5, nor plutonium. They argue
that these nuclides are highly toxic (which is correct) and
they compare only the pure toxicity by intake into the body
for thorium and uranium use, without taking into account
that these actinides are hardly mobile in final disposal
even in accidents.
The Thorium lobby – religious fervour in attacking critics of the nuclear industry
Thorium Church: a trojan horse in the “green” movements. Here the Removal Tool. “How do I know if my preferred “green” organization, or group, or leader… is infected by the ‘thorium church’ trojan horse?”. How to protect yourself from malicious propaganda of Thorium Church or from related compromised group or organizations. nonukes Italy, By Massimo Greco (June 2015)
What are trojan horses?
Trojan horses, otherwise known as trojans, are programs or applications that are inadvertently opened by the user, who expects the file to be something else.. by the same way “thorium supporters” are infecting forums, mailing list, debacts and environmental organizations.
It’s a strategy that is working in progress from some year. In few years they infected large part of the web.
Like any malware, thorium’s priests are insinuated through any open space or open port .. and they are able to act at different levels. Mutating depending on the circumstances, improvising them selves as technicians or economists with the sole purpose of creating deviationism which in practice consists of annoying redirect to their cause that is regularly touted as a “green” solution or, even, “pacifist” or as a miraculous solution for the “salvation of the climate”.
Their function is aggressive, especially when you try to contradict them. Continue reading
Scan your environmental group for “thorium troll” infection
nonukes Italy, By Massimo Greco (June 2015) “How do I know if my preferred “green” organization, or group, or leader… is infected by the ‘thorium church’ trojan horse?”
“……..Scanning and Removal, First check if the leader or “group leader” you are referring knows the problem of thorium, whether it has never taken a position on it. If the answer is “I do not know the problem” or “what you’re talking about,” you have the first certainty that your organization or target group is NOT protected.
If the answer is: “It is not a problem that concerns us”, “there is no matter in our topic or with antinuclear matter or uranium …”, or even worse … “nuclear thorium could be a clean way but the NWO prevents “… then you have the most certain that your group or environmental organization is terribly infected and that the leader is highly compromised.
If you are doing this survey “in public”, in a forum related to your organization reference, and after posting these sacrosanct questions and you are reproached or assaulted without causing or leading an intervention by the “admin” able to defend you, that’s another proof that your organization, or environmental group, results hugely infected.
You can also do a very easy search to see if the “admin” or the “most active” subjects are related to pro-thorium forums or registered as supporters of fan in groups offering thorium as a “savior” or “green”, especially when you attend to spam and suspicious behavior in the forums or social networks. You can do the same search about chemtrails or “HAARP” deviationism. As better Explained before, Thorium Church used very much the conspiracy decoy in order to mislead, confused and make it weak, vulnerable and unpractical environmental movements.
How to protect yourself from malicious propaganda of Thorium Church or from related compromised group or organizations.
If, as explained above, your reference group or environmental organization is infected: leave the group. This way you will avoid being accomplices. Thou hast tried, you have already taken the necessary steps. You’re not responsible. You have tried to change things.
If you are a “leader” or admin of a forum, or group… or green or environmental organization, you have to eject such people before they get completely the control of any topic. You have the duty to eject these individuals, without any hesitation of “democracy” and “freedom of confusion”… Because they, in the spaces controlled by the Thorium Church, do not allow you ever to contradict them and erase systematically, as their typical practice, anything that might cast doubt on their truth or propaganda. And, in any case, as admin or “leader” you have a duty to treat these subjects like any nuclearist that want to provoke discussion on the space that you are owning, or controlling.
If you are owning a youtube channel or any social page on social networks and you want to get protection from the thorium worm.. specially concerning antinuclear or environmental documents:
Simply “turn off” the option about “free comments” and choice comments under authorization or moderate. If you are admin of social pages delete their worms (spamming) and eject the vehicle of infection (for the reasons better explained before).
“How can I become active against cultural damages of pro-nuclear business propaganda of the Thorium Church?”
Ofcourse there are many different ways. Remember that pro-nuclear lobbies are pushing for the “new generation of nuclear power”, that means not only tradicional way of uranium. In fact they are talking about “nuclear of future”. So, “green”, environmentalist organizations, antinuclear people need to look about future strategies of the lobbies and not only to the past or the temporary, local, contingencies.
In recent years many antinuclear resources and internationally famous have taken a position on thorium. Just think about documents released by Bellona, Beyond Nuclear or to the Excellent article from Bob Alvarez on why thorium is not the wonder fuel it’s being promoted as and a brief history of the US’s persistent failure in making thorium safe or efficient ending with the expected trail of dangerous, weaponizable, waste… or the position of Helen Caldicott, violently attacked by the priests of the Thorium Church with a lot of insults like at the time of the “Scarlet Letter”…
[Dr. Arjun Makhijani on the downsides of the proposed thorium reactors (by Dr. Helen Caldicott)]
So it’s important to diffuse all the events, documents and positions, everywhere is possible, in order to counteract the mala information and debunking thorium commercials spot on the net.
To start an international and active support of the antinuclear movement in Indonesia, Malaysia, specially concerning the mobilization around Lynas, Koodankulam and any Rare Earth opposition in the West Asia. Promoting an active “UPGRADE” of all the antinuclear organizations.
Not only. You can help also supporting all the RNA spaces. Like this. For a new “NoThorium” activism. RNA was the first organization that started activism against thorium in Italy and in Paris. And at this moment has and diffuses the most rich archive of documents against thorium.
Better active today than radioactive tomorrow http://www.nonukes.it/rna/news326.html
USA nuclear weapons agency trying to repair their macho image? Appointment of Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty as security chief
She may be very smart, and even have a bit of integrity. I hope so. But are we here seeing the macho nuclear weapons lobby copying the “new nukes” gimmick of appointing a good-looking young woman to front their dangerous operation?
First woman in history takes helm of US nuclear weapons arsenal, Washington Examiner by John Siciliano | Energy 
Secretary Rick Perry on Thursday swore in the first woman in history as head of the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal.
Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty was sworn in as administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which under President Trump’s fiscal 2019 budget proposal would comprise nearly half of the Energy Department’s funding.
“The selection of Gordon-Hagerty, who [came] to USEC without any experience operating a company, surprised some enrichment industry analysts,” USEC Watch commented December 22, 2003. “But some sources suggested that the new COO [would] concentrate on improving USEC’s relationships with DOE and with the national security community. https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Lisa_E._Gordon-Hagerty
“MILITARY PLUTONIUM To be manufactured at Hinkley”
“MILITARY PLUTONIUM To be manufactured at Hinkley”
The charade of Atoms for Peace, Dr David Lowry , 23 Feb 18, “……Atoms for Peace ( in reality a cynical project promoting US global nuclear technology dominance launched by President Eisenhower at the UN in New York in December 1953) using a special atomic train taking nuclear scientists around the country promoting nuclear power.
But it was a charade. The first public hint came with a public announcement on 17 June 1958 by the Ministry of Defence, on: “the production of plutonium suitable for weapons in the new [nuclear ] power stations programme as an insurance against future defence needs…” in the UK’s first generation Magnox (after the fuel type, magnesium oxide) reactor.
A week later in the UK Parliament, Labour Roy Mason, who incidentally later became Defence Secretary, asked (HC Deb 24 June 1958 vol 590 cc246-8246) why Her Majesty’s Government had
“decided to modify atomic power stations, primarily planned for peaceful purposes, to produce high-grade plutonium for war weapons; to what extent this will interfere with the atomic power programme; and if he will make a statement.?” to be informed by the Paymaster General, Reginald Maudling
“At the request of the Government, the Central Electricity Generating Board has agreed to a small modification in the design of Hinkley Point and of the next two stations in its programme so as to enable plutonium suitable for military purposes to be extracted should the need arise.
The modifications will not in any way impair the efficiency of the stations. As the initial capital cost and any additional operating costs that may be incurred will be borne by the Government, the price of electricity will not be affected.
The Government made this request in order to provide the country, at comparatively small cost, with a most valuable insurance against possible future defence requirements. The cost of providing such insurance by any other means would be extremely heavy.”
The headline story in the Bridgwater Mercury, serving the community around Hinkley, on that day (24 June} was:
“MILITARY PLUTONIUM To be manufactured at Hinkley”
The article explained: “An ingenious method has been designed for changing the plant without reducing the output of electricity…”
CND was reported to be critical, describing this as a “distressing step” insisting
“The Government is obsessed with a nuclear militarism which seems insane.”
The then left wing Tribune magazine (on 27 June 1958) was very critical of the deal under the headline ‘Sabotage in the Atom Stations’:
“For the sake of making more nuclear weapons, the Government has dealt a heavy blow at the development of atomic power stations.
And warned:
“Unless this disastrous decision is reversed, we shall pay dearly in more ways than one for the sacrifice made on the grim alter of the H-bomb.”
The late Michael Foot, that great inveterate peace-monger, who later became Labour leader, was then the Tribune editor……..http://drdavidlowry.blogspot.com.au/2018/02/the-charade-of-atoms-for-peace.html
Saudis want nuclear energy to ‘save oil’ (nothing to do with chance for nuclear weapons?)
The world’s largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, is exploring the use of nuclear energy for domestic energy consumption as part of its transition away from an oil-based system.
“We are looking at a number of countries that have nuclear technology for peaceful purposes… so that we can save the oil and export it in order to generate revenue,” Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir said at the Munich Security Conference.
Nuclear propaganda to the kids – Boy Scouts this time
Boy Scouts try their hand at nuclear science at Byron plant RRStar Feb 17, 2018, BYRON — The alarm was buzzing and the lights were blinking in the Byron Nuclear Generating Station simulation room Saturday.
It was a faux reactor trip, and dozens of Boy Scouts were there to learn how the plant staff would respond in such a crisis…….
Scouts had the opportunity to take two four-hour classes to earn two merit badges. But those interested in nuclear science only had time for one badge, since that career path took all day and concluded with a tour of the plant. …….
Before going into the simulation room, Scouts studying nuclear science sat in classrooms and learned about different types of radiation and ionization.
This is the first time in a while the plant hosted the merit badge event; its been held at Sauk Valley for the past 15 years or so.
Paul Dempsey, the station’s community manager, said bringing the Scouts to Byron also benefits the station.
“This takes the plant into future generations,” he said. “We have plenty of guys who got their (nuclear science) merit badge who now work for us.”…….http://www.rrstar.com/news/20180217/boy-scouts-try-their-hand-at-nuclear-science-at-byron-plant
Russia’s nuclear macho men spin propaganda to Indian kids
I had a bit of a laugh, reading this one.
Russia is using the same pathetic old comics and jolly stories that Western nuclear companies have now 
given up on.
And once again – it’s the macho nuclear men that are doing the nuclear spinning to kids. (The West now uses sophisticated young women as much as they can, with more subtle propaganda)
Nuclear ABC: Rosatom Explains Nuclear Science to Indian School Children, https://sputniknews.com/asia/201802091061516702-nuclear-eduction-indian-children/
New Delhi (Sputnik) — During the festival that was held from 6 to 9 February, experts gave presentations and held interactive sessions with children and teachers from different schools in Delhi. The occasion was designed to nurture the interest of children towards nuclear physics, Rosatom officials told Sputnik.
Nuclear experts and scientists of Rosatom also visited some schools in Delhi and conducted awareness sessions for children on the peaceful use of the atomic energy. Rosatom also released a book titled ‘Nuclear ABC’ in English and Hindi to help in the awareness drive. The book was jointly released on Thursday by Russian Ambassador to India Nikolay Kudashev, Professor Emeritus of Jawaharlal University R Rajaraman, Fedor Rozovskiy, Director of Russian Center along with officials of Rosatom at the Russian Centre for Science and Culture, New Delhi. The book launch was attended by hundreds of school children.
“The book is yet another instance of the rich history of Indo-Russian scientific cooperation dating back to the Soviet era,” professor R. Rajaraman said during the launch.
Prof Rajaraman hailed Russia’s assistance in achieving its nuclear energy targets.
1 This Month
19 February – VIRTUAL EVENT-Decision Time: AI and Our Nuclear Arsenal
12:45 p.m. Central / 1:45 p.m. Eastern
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