UK lawmakers seek reassurances after nuclear missile test fails for second time
By CNN, Associated Press9News Staff, Feb 22, 2024
British lawmakers are seeking reassurances about the nation’s nuclear deterrent after a test of the system failed dramatically last month when an unarmed missile crashed into the sea near the submarine from which it was launched.
It marks the second time in eight years that the country’s Trident II ballistic missiles have malfunctioned during trials.
An “anomaly occurred” during the test on board the nuclear-powered submarine HMS Vanguard, a UK Ministry of Defence spokesperson said on Wednesday in a statement……………
Britain’s Trident nuclear deterrent system suffered an earlier failure off the coast of Florida in June 2016, a US defence official with direct knowledge of the incident previously told CNN.
The latest incident, first reported by The Sun newspaper, occurred during an exercise on January 30 near Florida. https://www.9news.com.au/world/uk-trident-nuclear-missile-test-fails-sparking-concerns-about-program/0fe0541b-67e9-4690-b31a-291e81d8bc5b
The Complexity of Nuclear Submarine Safeguards Impacts the Current Landscape
By Leonam dos Santos Guimarâes*
RIO DE JANEIRO | 14 February 2024 (IDN) — The topic of applying safeguards to nuclear submarine fuel, with a focus on ensuring security and proliferation resistance, involves a complex interplay of international regulations, agreements, and technical considerations.
A pivotal aspect of this discussion centers on the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, particularly in the context of military-to-military transfer of nuclear material for submarine programs. It has been argued that there should be no automatic exclusion from safeguards for nuclear material simply because it is used in military activities.
The emphasis is on ensuring that the non-application of safeguards is as limited as possible, encompassing all processes outside the actual use of relevant nuclear material in the submarine, such as enrichment, fuel fabrication, storage, transportation, reprocessing, and disposal.
AUKUS
The application of safeguards to the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, and United States) Nuclear Submarine program is a complex and highly technical subject, requiring a nuanced understanding of international nuclear non-proliferation norms, the specific details of the AUKUS agreement, and the technical aspects of nuclear submarine technology. The AUKUS pact, a security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, announced in September 2021, involves the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. This arrangement has significant implications for nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards. The following points are pertinent AUKUS agreement:
Nature of Nuclear Technology in Submarines: The nuclear reactors used in submarines are designed for propulsion and not for the production of nuclear weapons. However, they do use weapon degree HEU, which can be weaponized. This necessitates strict safeguards to ensure that the HEU is not diverted for non-peaceful purposes.
Australia’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Commitments: Australia is a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As such, Australia is obliged to maintain a civilian nuclear program exclusively for peaceful purposes and under international safeguards. The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines places Australia in a unique position, as it will have to demonstrate that its new capabilities are not being used for prohibited military purposes, like nuclear weapons development.
International Safeguards and Oversight: The IAEA plays a crucial role in the implementation of safeguards. Australia, along with the UK and the US, must work closely with the IAEA to develop a framework that ensures the submarine program adheres to Australia’s non-proliferation commitments. This could involve regular inspections, monitoring, and verification mechanisms.
Regional and Global Implications: The deployment of nuclear-powered submarines by Australia could have significant implications for regional security dynamics, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. There is a need for transparency and dialogue to address any concerns raised by neighboring countries and to prevent any escalation of regional arms races.
Technological and Operational Safeguards: Apart from international oversight, there are also technical and operational safeguards that are integral to the program. These include secure handling and accounting of nuclear materials, physical protection measures, and safety protocols to prevent accidents or unauthorized use.
Legal and Policy Frameworks: The AUKUS partners will need to develop robust legal and policy frameworks that align with international norms and bilateral agreements. This includes legislative and regulatory measures that govern the use, transfer, and disposal of nuclear materials and technology.
The application of safeguards
The application of safeguards to the AUKUS Nuclear Submarine program is a critical aspect of its implementation. It requires a balanced approach that addresses the non-proliferation concerns while allowing Australia to enhance its defense capabilities. Ensuring the program’s compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation norms and maintaining transparency will be essential in mitigating any regional tensions and in bolstering global nuclear security………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. more https://indepthnews.net/the-complexity-of-nuclear-submarine-safeguards-impacts-the-current-landscape/
Safety panel urges Fukushima nuclear plant operator to better communicate with public
Feb. 14, 202, By MARI YAMAGUCHI, TOKYO, https://japantoday.com/category/national/safety-panel-urges-fukushima-nuclear-plant-operator-to-better-communicate-with-the-public-after-leak
A panel of safety experts has urged the operator of the tsunami-wrecked Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan to communicate more quickly with the public over incidents such as last week’s leak of contaminated water.
Thirteen years after the Fukushima disaster in which the plant suffered triple meltdowns following the 2011 earthquake, safety culture at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings company has improved but there is still work to do, said Dale Klein, a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairperson who now serves as an advisor to TEPCO’s reform committee.
The panel’s news briefing Tuesday on its periodic assessment came a week after highly radioactive water leaked from a treatment machine during maintenance work at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. TEPCO said no one was injured, and radiation monitoring shows no leakage escaped the compound.
But the leak triggered criticism in and outside Japan. Any leak of radioactive water is a sensitive topic.
In another accidental leak in October, four workers were sprayed with radioactive liquid waste while cleaning a treatment facility. Two were briefly hospitalized for skin contamination, though none showed symptoms of poisoning.
Klein said both incidents could have been prevented, and TEPCO needs to quickly analyze what happened in such mishaps and “very quickly communicate to the public what happened and why.”
For risk control, many companies, including TEPCO, often try to know everything before they say anything publicly, Klein said. But in the age of social media, speculation spreads quickly, he said.
The filtering machine involved in last week’s incident is part of TEPCO’s controversial wastewater discharge project, which began in August.
The discharges, expected to continue for decades, have been strongly opposed by fishing groups and neighboring countries including China, which banned imports of all Japanese seafood. The Japanese government hopes the International Atomic Energy Agency’s assistance and reviews affirming the discharges have met international safety standards would further help address concerns in and outside the country.
The TEPCO safety experts acknowledged improved safety culture at TEPCO. It noted the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s lifting of a suspension on the utility to resume preparations to restart another nuclear power plant, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, after addressing lax safeguarding measures.
The next big hurdle is consent from the local community.
“TEPCO must build trust every day, all the time,” Klein said. “(Trust) is hard to gain but easy to lose.”
Congress takes aim at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
By Victor Gilinsky | February 12, 2024, Victor Gilinsky is a physicist and was a commissioner of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. https://thebulletin.org/2024/02/congress-takes-aim-at-the-nuclear-regulatory-commission-its-a-deja-vu-all-over-again/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=MondayNewsletter02122024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_NuclearRegulartoryCommission_02122024
Politico reports that congressional promoters of “advanced” nuclear plants are blaming the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as the main obstacle to their deployment. The report singles out Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Joe Manchin (D-WV) and cites his and his colleagues blocking the reappointment to the commission of Jeff Baran, who tended to lean toward safety more than his fellow commissioners, as the start of a campaign to bring the agency to heel. Such crude bullying of a safety agency, especially by people who don’t understand what it involves, is so obviously improper as not to need further comment. But there is more to the story.
The triggering event for Sen. Manchin’s ire appears to be the faltering of NuScale, the leading firm touting the development of small modular reactors (SMRs), and the most likely to succeed commercially. The NuScale reactor design had some hiccups in satisfying the NRC’s requirements for a license, but its fundamental problem was its inability to attract customers. That commercial failure darkens the prospects of the rest of the nuclear industry’s stable of “advanced” designs, whose variety makes licensing more difficult. Safety is a subtle business (think of the Boeing door problem) and depends on design details.
More fundamentally, at risk is the dream of the nuclear industry and the US Energy Department—spun out in hearings before the Senate Energy Committee—of building large numbers of such reactors and exporting them around the world, with the United States regaining undisputed global leadership in nuclear technology.
If this beautiful dream isn’t working out, somebody must be at fault, and who better to blame than the nuclear licensing authorities for paying too much attention to safety. If you think this way, the obvious fix is to reorient the NRC. Legislation to do that (ADVANCE Act, S-1111) has passed the Senate with strong bipartisan support. As Sen. Shelley Capito (R-WV), the act’s chief sponsor, put it: “we must establish regulatory pathways for next-generation nuclear designs to be approved quickly and without burdensome unnecessary costs.”
There is a sense here of “deja vu all over again.” The most prominent in the pipeline of “advanced” reactor designs are fast reactors. (Sidebar: They rely on fast neutrons and are cooled by liquid sodium, whereas all currently operating US power reactors rely on slow neutrons and are cooled by water.)
The most prominent design of this type is TerraPower’s (Bill Gates’s) Natrium reactor. Despite its “advanced” label, this type of power reactor was developed by the US Atomic Energy Commission in the 1960s and 1970s. The prototype Clinch River plant, about the same size as Natrium, was then the country’s largest energy project. The AEC’s central goal, backed at the time by the powerful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, was to shift US electricity generation to such reactors, starting around 1980. The advantage of these reactors is that, fueled with plutonium, there are enough excess neutrons to convert uranium in the reactor into more plutonium than is being consumed; thus it is possible to “breed” plutonium, hence the name “breeder reactor.” Natrium can be fueled in this way and likely would be if it gained wide acceptability.
Just as supporters of new “advanced” reactors see NRC safety licensing as a threat, so the AEC’s fast reactor developers saw that agency’s semi-independent reactor licensing division as standing in the way and sought to undermine it. (“Regulatory,” as it was called then, was split off from the AEC in 1975 and became the NRC. In time, the rest of the AEC became the Energy Department.) The licensing division was treated by the AEC commissioners as a stepchild and kept weak so as not to threaten the big-budget reactor project.
In the end, this strategy didn’t help the fast breeder reactor project. It got canceled because it didn’t make sense economically. But the weakness of the AEC regulatory organization had important consequences affecting the safety of the power reactors utilities bought in large numbers starting in the mid-1960s. Under pressure from the industry and commissioners, plants got licensed after rather skimpy safety reviews. So as not to constrain the licensing process, the AEC commissioners did not approve any safety regulations for power reactors until 1971. All but two of today’s 94 US operating power reactors were ordered before 1974. When it later became evident the early power reactors needed important safety upgrades, especially after the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, the nuclear industry resisted them.
In the late 1990s, it became evident that some of the plants’ safety documents—necessary for operation—were a mess. Then-NRC Chair Shirley Jackson tried to apply the NRC regulations strictly. The plant owners didn’t like this kind of oversight and got to New Mexico Sen. Pete Domenici, their senatorial godfather, who, in a private meeting, threatened Jackson with a huge budget cut. She got the point quickly, fired offending staff, hired Arthur Anderson management consultants to “improve” the licensing process, and ended the detailed public rating of nuclear power plants that the companies hated because Wall Street used the ratings for bond issues. After those changes, Domenici said he was happy. He boasted about coercing her in his book, A Brighter Tomorrow: “Since that meeting with Chairman Jackson, I have been very impressed with the NRC. They are now a solid, predictable regulatory agency.” There haven’t been many industry complaints since NRC fell into line—that is, until recently.
While the historical industry attacks on the NRC put self-interest above public safety, the agency, after its accommodating responses, didn’t come out looking good, either. A more recent change in the way the commission describes its responsibilities raises further questions about its priorities. It concerns the safety standard in the Atomic Energy Act (Sec. 182): “adequate protection of the public health and safety.” That phrase was cited by the agency for decades as the source of its authority and was the safety standard applied in commission actions.
Perhaps a dozen years ago, for reasons unknown but guessable, the commissioners began to use a modified version of the statutory standard, which now reads (for example, Strategic Plan 2022-2026) “reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.” There is no denying that the added phrase waters down the Sec. 182 standard, which itself has not changed.
Do Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions under that modified standard even conform with the Atomic Energy Act? The Senate energy committee might usefully address itself to that question before it undertakes any more brow-beating of the already-timid NRC.
Latest Fukushima leak exposes failures in nuclear crisis management
Xinhua 2024-02-12, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202402/12/WS65c9eda7a3104efcbdaeab75.html
In a chilling revelation that sent shockwaves through the world, a new nuclear waste leak has unearthed the gaping crack in Japan’s professed claim of responsible handling the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
The leakage of about 5.5 tons of water containing radioactive materials from the plant also highlights the need for international supervision of Japan’s controversial discharge of the Fukushima nuclear-contaminated water into the ocean.
It is estimated that 22 billion becquerels of radioactive materials such as cesium and strontium are contained in the leaked water, and the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), claimed on Wednesday that monitoring of a nearby drainage channel did not show any significant radiation level changes.
This begs the question: What constitutes a “significant” level?
Nearly 13 years after the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami, recurring leaking incidents still hint at the utility’s mismanagement and the Japanese government’s inadequacy in overseeing it.
On Oct. 26, 2023, just one week before Japan started the third round of release, two men were hospitalized after being accidentally splashed with radioactive liquid at the plant. On Aug. 11, 2023, days before the first round of discharge started, TEPCO found leaks in a hose used to transfer nuclear-contaminated water, which, as it said, would not affect the discharge plan.
Even more concerning, the causes of these incidents have fully exposed the chaos and disorder of TEPCO’s internal management. The leak on Wednesday stemmed from a valve left open during cleaning operations, while the October incident resulted from a loose hose channeling contaminated solutions. In August, TEPCO attributed a leak to cracks approximately four centimeters in length found in a hose.
The deficiencies in the fundamental equipment raise questions about the potential for similar occurrences and whether TEPCO conducts regular inspections of its equipment.
While TEPCO this time claimed that there is no risk to the public and that the surrounding environment remains unaffected by the leak, its history of cover-ups and opacity has eroded public trust.
For instance, it took TEPCO over two years after the 2011 tsunami to acknowledge that radioactive tritium had leaked into the Pacific Ocean, contradicting its initial assertions that the toxic water had been contained within the plant’s premises.
Also, in February 2015, TEPCO admitted that since April 2014, it had been aware of radioactive substances from a rainwater drainage ditch linked to one of its buildings being leaked into the sea when it rained.
Until meaningful reforms are enacted, the specter of Fukushima will continue to haunt Japan, serving as a sober reminder of the country’s failure to protect its citizens and the broader environment.
Nuclear regulator raps EDF over safety flaws
The nuclear industry regulator has demanded improvements are made in at Dungeness B power station after a maintenance worker suffered an electric shock.
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has served an improvement notice on Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDF Energy) following an incident at Dungeness B power station in Kent.
An employee suffered an electric shock from a portable heater while undertaking maintenance work at the site. The worker suffered injuries on 5th November 2023, which required medical treatment.
The ONR stressed that there was no risk to nuclear safety, the public or the environment as a result of the incident.
Mike Webb, ONR’s superintending inspector for operating reactors, said: “Our investigation found that EDF had failed to ensure the electrical systems involved in the incident were constructed and maintained in a way that prevented danger to their workers, so far as is reasonably practicable. We will engage with EDF during the period of the improvement notice to ensure positive progress is made to address the shortfall.”……………………………….
Construction Index 12th Feb 2024
https://www.theconstructionindex.co.uk/news/view/nuclear-regulator-raps-edf-over-safety-flaws
France’s Flamanville EPR has numerous technical problems which mean that its safety issues are not “now closed”
Response from GLOBAL CHANCE to the ASN consultation on the request for
authorization to commission the Flamanville EPR reactor.
Contrary to what the President of the ASN stated on January 30, 2024 in his conference press
and the presentation of one’s wishes, numerous technical subjects which are
as much potential problems for the proper functioning of the EPR and which
call into question the reactor safety, cannot be considered “now closed”.
The problems that hamper the operation and safety of the EPR are numerous.
Most serious are presented in the following chapters in two parts: severe
and persistent then severe and whose solutions are risky. They lead to
asking questions including the answers do not appear in any of the
documents which constitute the file released made available to the public
by the ASN
Global Chance 9th Feb 2024
France’s EDF shuts down two nuclear reactors after fire at Chinon plant
Reuters, February 11, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/frances-edf-shuts-down-two-nuclear-reactors-after-fire-chinon-plant-2024-02-10/
—
Nuclear energy operator EDF has shut down two reactors at Chinon in western France after a fire in a non-nuclear sector of the plant in the early hours of Saturday, the company said.
The fire has been extinguished, it said.
“Production unit number 3 at the Chinon nuclear power plant has shut down automatically, in accordance with the reactor’s safety and protection systems,” EDF said in a statement, adding it also shut down reactor number 4, which is coupled to number 3.
France’s nuclear safety watchdog said in a separate statement the fire had led to an electricity cut at the plant that triggered the automatic shutdown.
Chinon is one of France’s oldest nuclear plants.
Reporting by Tassilo Hummel; editing by Barbara L
5.5 tons of radioactive water leaked from Fukushima nuclear plant: media
China Daily, Xinhua 2024-02-07
TOKYO — Approximately 5.5 tons of water containing radioactive materials have leaked from an equipment at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, local media reported Wednesday.
At about 8:53 am local time on Wednesday, workers discovered water leaking from the outlet of a device used to purify nuclear-contaminated water during the inspection of the equipment, Fukushima Central Television reported, citing the plant’s operator Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).
TEPCO estimates that the amount of water that leaked was approximately 5.5 tons, which may contain 22 billion becquerels of radioactive materials such as cesium and strontium, the report said.
Most of the leaked water appeared to have seeped into the soil, but monitoring of a nearby drainage channel did not show any significant radiation level changes, it added.
TEPCO has made the area where the water was leaked a no-go area……………………………. more https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202402/07/WS65c35af9a3104efcbdaea423.html
The dangerous craze for SMRs
This is going too far in trivializing risk. And this is not limited to “acceptability” which seems to be ASN’s major concern, but to the risks of such “mixed” installations.
a serious accident situation (AZF, Lubrizol) could damage the SMR unit and transform the accident into a disaster.
Bernard Laponche, Doctor of Science in Nuclear Reactor Physics, President of the Global Chance association, Le Club Mediapart, 5th Feb 2024 https://blogs.mediapart.fr/bernard-laponche/blog/050224/le-dangereux-engouement-pour-les-smr
The development of small modular nuclear reactors (SMR) is the subject of spectacular announcements.Based on the declarations of the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) on this
subject, we launch an appeal for reason on the realities and difficulties of such projects, on the technical, safety and security levels .
During his press conference on January 31, 2024, the president of the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) addressed the issue of small modular nuclear reactors, known as SMRs, and answered some questions on this subject.
In his presentation, the president highlights the technical and societal questions posed by these new reactors, as well as the safety, security and non-proliferation issues “to be integrated upstream of the projects”.
These are the usual concerns when we are interested in nuclear reactors, which produce heat and possibly electricity from fission and chain reactions of fissile elements (uranium, plutonium), but also products fission and transuranium elements found in irradiated fuels currently intended for reprocessing, leading to the accumulation of radioactive waste in addition to that from the dismantling of reactors. These are the problems that will have to be analyzed for candidate SMR reactors, as for any nuclear reactor and with the same rigor as for conventional reactors.
In the same way that a conventional industrial installation cannot claim to be free from all risk of accident, no nuclear installation can claim to be free of any risk of accident. The declaration “a nuclear accident is possible in France” by successive ASN officials is valid for SMRs, even if, as its current president says, certain innovative SMRs “present potentially promising intrinsic safety characteristics” .
The first “prototype” examples of candidate reactors under the title of SMR, that is to say intended to be mass-produced in a factory before installation on site, will therefore have to be built on nuclear sites, probably those housing research reactors.
As ASN points out, the use of SMR in France would not be of great interest for the production of electricity given the importance of the current fleet of EDF power plants and the announced projects. But, on the other hand, SMRs could be very useful for the production of heat or steam for the process industries (paper, food, chemical industries, etc.) of which there are very many.
It would then be necessary to install the SMR reactor very close to the industrial installation or even, according to ASN, inside this installation.
This is going too far in trivializing risk. And this is not limited to “acceptability” which seems to be ASN’s major concern, but to the risks of such “mixed” installations.
Indeed, we cannot admit the presence of a basic nuclear installation, containing highly radioactive materials within a classic industrial installation, of the ICPE type in which a serious accident situation (AZF, Lubrizol) could damage the SMR unit and transform the accident into a disaster.
Furthermore, it is clear that each promoter of an SMR candidate aims for a large order in the number of copies (of the order of a hundred say some) which will allow the “modular” manufacturing of reactors in a dedicated factory, this allowing the supposed reduction in unit cost.
In this case, by eliminating the solution of an SMR in the plant itself, we would have the creation of a large number of INB-ICPE couples. Even if we admit that the probability of an accident on the SMR is lower than for a conventional reactor (which remains to be demonstrated for each case), this probability is multiplied by the number of reactors, all identical.
In examining the safety files for EDF’s large power reactors and nuclear fuel plants, ASN and IRSN pay very close attention to “external attacks” of natural or malicious origin. What happens to these concerns for SMS located almost everywhere on the territory, on locations which are those of the industrial installation which they must supply with heat and whose location was chosen without any concern for nuclear safety and security? ? How would specific protection be organized which, to be effective, would certainly be expensive, especially since the SMRs concerned would be of low power?
The profusion of candidate projects for SMR, some of which are financially supported by the Government, leads to each being examined by the IRSN and the ASN, as announced by the latter. This examination can be postponed over time depending on the maturity of the projects, all of which currently only exist on file, more or less elaborate.
If this examination is done correctly, that is to say with as much care as for a power reactor, the examination of the technical and safety files of each SMR prototype is a considerable task. We can fear that the “craze” for SMRs that ASN speaks of will exert dangerous pressure on the quality of studies and safety and security injunctions.
Finally, but this is not the problem of the IRSN and the ASN, we would still need to have serious information on the costs. Not only that of the construction of a prototype (the example of NuScale in the United States is edifying) but also that of its exploitation and especially that of the fuel, from its manufacture to its treatment after use, dismantling and management garbage.
When we examine in the light of what we know of the climatic upheavals which are already affecting our territory and will intensify considerably, we can really ask ourselves the question of the fragility and the risk of installing a little small nuclear reactors everywhere which will obviously be subject, depending on the period and their site, to floods, droughts, storms, tornadoes, earthquakes, etc.
All those who today say they want to welcome an SMR on their territory should really think about it seriously.
IAEA watchdog to visit nuclear plant in occupied Ukraine to assess safety of ageing fuel and low staffing.
UN nuclear watchdog chief Rafael Grossi said
he would visit the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Russian-occupied
Ukraine today to see if it can be run with a reduced number of staff and
whether its years-old uranium fuel is safe. Russia gained control of
Europe’s largest nuclear power plant after launching a full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, and its six nuclear reactors are now
idled.
Irish Independent 7th Feb 2024
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is falling apart, and the world is ignoring the danger
Leaks, power outages, low staffing, and no maintenance plan. Europe’s largest nuke plant is falling apart.
Malcontent, February 3, 2024, By David Obelcz
[WBHG 24 News] – The latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has had a team of international inspectors at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant for 16 months, painted an alarming picture of leaking steam generation circuits and safety systems, inadequate staff, and no 2024 maintenance plan.
Europe’s largest nuclear power plant is located in occupied Enerhodar. Previously located on the banks of the Kakhovka Reservoir, the primary source of cooling water for ZNPP drained away in June 2023 after the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed. Russian forces captured the plant on March 3, 2022, during the opening days of the expanded war of aggression against Ukraine. Webcams showed Russian tanks firing on the power plant and shooting into administrative buildings during the brief siege.
After pictures, videos, and satellite images proved that Russian forces had militarized the plant in violation of international humanitarian law and the pillars of nuclear safety, the IAEA, backed by the United Nations, pressured Russia to establish an international group of permanent monitors. On September 1, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and a team of experts, accompanied by Russian state media, arrived at the plant. There have been 15 rotations of monitors since.
Three reactors have various leaks, and Russia doesn’t plan to fix them
Currently, five of the six reactors at ZNPP are in cold shutdown, with Reactor 4 in hot shutdown to provide steam for plant operations and heat for the nearby town of Enerhodar.
On November 17, IAEA inspectors were told by Russian occupiers that boron had been detected in the secondary cooling circuit of Reactor 4, which was in hot shutdown at the time. Boron is added to the primary cooling and steam circuits of modern nuclear reactors as an extra safety measure. Boron isn’t supposed to be the secondary cooling system, but trace amounts are acceptable.
Four days later, the reactor was shut down, with Russia declaring the boron leak was within acceptable levels and would not be repaired. This was the second unscheduled shutdown of 2023. On August 10, Reactor 4 had to be shut down after a water leak was discovered in one of its steam generators. Plant technicians also found that the heat exchangers needed to be cleaned and did regular maintenance on the reactor’s transformers and emergency diesel generators.
On December 22, inspectors found boric acid deposits on valves, a pump, and on the floors of several rooms in the containment building of Reactor 6. Russian occupation officials said the leak was coming from a cracked boric acid storage tank and it would not be repaired. After IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi published the finding in a January 3 update, inspectors were barred from accessing parts of Reactor 6 for almost two weeks.
On February 1, the IAEA reported that boric acid leaks were also discovered in Reactor 1.
Unreliable external power connections
Although power plants generate electricity, power to run a power plant is provided by external sources. This provides a layer of safety by assuring that there is always electricity to support normal operations in the event of a facility shutdown. Although a nuclear reactor can be “shut down,” it still needs external power to continuously circulate cooling water in the reactors and on-site spent fuel storage. In the event of a total power failure, backup generators running on diesel fuel become the last line of defense. ZNPP has 20 generators and keeps enough diesel for a minimum of ten days of operation.
It’s estimated that if a ZNPP reactor is in cold shutdown, it can go more than three weeks without water circulation. But in hot shutdown, a meltdown can start 27 hours after the loss of all external power. In the worst-case scenario, the absolute last line of defense is when a nuclear plant operates in “island mode.” That’s when a reactor or reactors are used to generate onsite power to maintain plant operations. It’s inherently dangerous because it requires bringing a reactor online, leaving no margin for error if there are any additional failures. None of ZNPP’s reactors have produced electricity in the last 18 months…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… https://malcontentment.com/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-is-falling-apart/
Japan’s Nuclear Follies
Nuclear energy may make sense in places where reactors can be operated safely, but Japan is a seismically active archipelago.
By Jeff Kingston, February 03, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/japans-nuclear-follies/
A nuclear energy love fest surfaced at COP28 in the United Arab Emirates, where nuclear power was touted as the only option to save the planet from climate change. Yet, the 7.6 magnitude Noto earthquake on January 1 provided a stark reminder that operating nuclear power plants is risky business, especially in Japan. The powerful quake shook the idled Shika nuclear plant on the Noto Peninsula beyond design specifications. Fortunately, there was no major damage reported, but two of the back-up generators failed and there was temporary loss of power in one of the cooling pools.
Japan has been celebrating its recent moon landing, but it took a month to restore electricity on the quake-stricken Noto Peninsula and thousands will not have water until mid-March. Meanwhile, at the end of January some 14,000 residents remain displaced in evacuation shelters where conditions are grim.
Shika has been shut down since the Fukushima disaster in 2011, but electricity is essential for cooling the spent fuel rod pools; if cooling is interrupted the water evaporates and the rods could explode, releasing plumes of radiation into the windy skies. In such a scenario, Kanazawa – population 465,000, just over 60 km away – would have to be evacuated. This would not only devastate the regional economy but also put the brakes on incoming tourism, just as it ground to a halt nationwide following the three meltdowns at Fukushima 13 years ago.
Plans to build another reactor on the Noto Peninsula are now shelved, but it was always a puzzling site given major quakes and tsunami in 1964, 1983, and 1993. The area has experienced an earthquake swarm over the past three years. The 2024 peak ground acceleration was almost the same as during the 2011 Tohoku quake that triggered the the Fukushima disaster.
Problematically, the utility initially reported that there were no changes in water levels at coastal intake valves but later corrected this to a rise of 3 meters, the height of the tsunami that devastated coastal towns on the peninsula. Apparently, this was a communication glitch rather than a gauge fault, but the snafu prompted the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) to admonish the utility for not learning key lessons from the Fukushima accident.
The NRA should look in the mirror.
According to NHK, the NRA acknowledged that its disaster response guidelines failed to anticipate a complex disaster as happened in Fukushima. In a nuclear accident, the NRA calls on residents to shelter in place, but that is not an option for those in Noto whose homes were destroyed by the combination of the earthquake, tsunami, and related fires. The 2011 triple disaster in Tohoku should have ensured that a cascading disaster is integrated into the emergency response plan. NHK also reported that most radiation monitoring devices on the peninsula failed to function, leaving authorities in the dark about radiation levels and dispersal. This would make it difficult to manage evacuation of the 150,000 residents within the 30 km evacuation zone around the plant.
The current disruptions to Noto’s transport and communication networks have slowed emergency relief efforts and would be further compromised in the event of a radiation release or one of the region’s epic snowfalls.
The NRA guidelines require towns in that zone to conduct evacuation drills because the Fukushima experience demonstrated that improvising an exodus can be catastrophic. Yet, over the past decade there have been no comprehensive evacuation drills anywhere and only nine staged exercises in the nation’s 15 nuclear plant zones.
One of these limited exercises was conducted in the Shika zone, but it was a fiasco. There is nothing more disconcerting than watching a botched evacuation drill aimed at reassuring residents. Authorities assumed the road leading to the plant would be impassable and planned to evacuate local residents by ship, but waves were too high, so they reverted to a time consuming and embarrassing bus evacuation by the road.
The implications for TEPCO, Japan’s biggest utility, are huge as it hoped to restart the world’s largest nuclear complex in neighboring Niigata, but anxieties and opposition have spiked and delayed that plan. Back in 2007 a major quake there jammed the emergency control room door, forcing the plant manager to manage the six reactors in the parking lot using whiteboards and mobile phones. Due to extensive revelations about a culture of lax safety practices and its shambolic disaster response in 2011, TEPCO has since discovered that trust is not a renewable resource.
At Fukushima the backup generators were inundated in the 2011 tsunami and failed to function, a key factor in the three meltdowns. Regulators had urged TEPCO to relocate the generators to higher, safer, ground behind the plant, but they were left in the lower vulnerable location between the plant and the ocean. This is an example of regulatory capture in which regulators kowtow to the regulated. Thirteen years ago, the Fukushima meltdowns displaced more than 450,000 people in the vicinity and even now there are still nearly 30,000 nuclear refugees and many people remain barred from returning to their homes due to radiation. Once vibrant communities have become ghost towns. Subsequently, across the nation everyone understands that in a nuclear disaster the government and utilities can’t be relied on.
Despite this stark situation, in December 2022, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced plans to restart Japan’s aging fleet of nuclear reactors, extend their operating licenses from 40 years to 60 years and build new reactors.
Back in 2012, The Economist determined that nuclear energy is not financially viable and that remains true. But generating costs can be reduced if corners are cut on safety in operating and maintaining nuclear reactors. The energy crisis triggered by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of the Ukraine created a window of opportunity for Kishida to overturn the safety regime established in the wake of Fukushima. In light of Japan’s backsliding on safety issues, China’s and Russia’s ambitious nuclear energy plans further cautions against the COP28’s nuclear exuberance, especially given these nations’ track records on transparency.
Japan’s nuclear renaissance confronts the lack of a permanent storage site for its nuclear waste. There is also no evidence that mothballed reactors approaching the 40-year operating limit are now safer, but without the benefit of stress tests the government has yet again wished risk away. By ignoring the lessons of Fukushima, the government is shortchanging public safety. Nuclear energy may make sense in places where reactors can be operated safely, but Japan is a seismically active archipelago and as we learned from Fukushima, human error in operating safety systems amplifies such risks. It is time for Japan to retire its nuclear reactors and invest more in renewable energy and smart grids.
Residents ask for full examination of damage to nuclear plant caused by quake
Japan Today, By MARI YAMAGUCHI, TOKYO, 3 Feb 24
A group of residents of towns near Japanese nuclear plants submitted a petition on Friday asking regulators to halt safety screening for the restart of idled reactors until damage to a plant that partially lost external power and spilled radioactive water during a recent powerful earthquake is fully examined.
The magnitude 7.6 quake on New Year’s Day and dozens of strong aftershocks in north-central Ishikawa prefecture left 240 people dead and 15 unaccounted for and triggered a small tsunami.
Two idled reactors at Shika nuclear power plant on the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa suffered power outages because of damage to transformers. Radioactive water spilled from spent fuel cooling pools and cracks appeared on the ground, but no radiation leaked outside, operator Hokuriku Electric Power Co. said.
The damage rekindled safety concerns and residents are asking whether they could have evacuated safely if it had been more severe. The earthquake badly damaged roads and houses in the region.
All Japanese nuclear power plants were temporarily shut down after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster for safety checks under stricter standards. The government is pushing for them to be restarted but the process has been slow, in part because of lingering anti-nuclear sentiment among the public. Twelve of the 33 workable reactors have since restarted.
Residents of Ishikawa and other towns with nuclear plants gathered in Tokyo on Friday and handed their petition to officials at the Nuclear Regulation Authority. They are asking officials to freeze the screening process while damage at the Shika nuclear plant is fully examined and safety measures are implemented.
Susumu Kitano, a Noto Peninsula resident, said there would be no way to escape from his town in case of a major accident at the plant.
Nuclear safety officials have noted that the extensive damage suffered by houses and roads in the area of the Shika plant make current evacuation plans largely unworkable. The damage, including landslides, made many places inaccessible, trapping thousands of people on the narrow peninsula.
Experts say current nuclear emergency response plans often fail to consider the effects of damage from compounded disasters and need to be revised to take into account more possible scenarios.
Takako Nakagaki, a resident of Kanazawa, about 60 kilometers (35 miles) south of the Shika plant, said the current evacuation plan is “pie in the sky.” Under the plan, residents closer to the plant are advised to stay indoors in case of a radiation leak, but that would be impossible if houses are damaged in an earthquake.
The Noto quake also sparked fear in neighboring Fukui prefecture, where seven reactors at three plants have restarted, and in Niigata prefecture, where the operator of the tsunami-hit Fukushima nuclear plant is preparing to restart its only workable nuclear plant, the world’s largest seven-reactor Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant.
Hundreds of other residents of towns hosting nuclear plants submitted similar requests to regulators and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida earlier this week……………………. more https://japantoday.com/category/national/residents-ask-for-a-full-examination-of-damage-to-a-japanese-nuclear-plant-caused-by-a-recent-quake
Britain plans ‘robocop’ force to protect nuclear sites with paint bombs
AI-powered drones are being designed to cut labour costs and boost
security at Sellafield. Britain’s nuclear sites could soon be protected
by a “robocop” style police force made up of AI-powered drones equipped
with paint bombs and smoke guns.
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
(NDA), which runs high-security nuclear sites such as Sellafield and
Dounreay, wants to build a robotic police force to cut costs and boost
security across sites containing radioactive waste. It has offered £1.5m
to security and defence companies for initial designs of a robotic defence
system, with a view to commissioning a fully-fledged version in the future.
The NDA’s document for the project says that a key aim is to cut labour
costs by reducing the number of armed police. Currently, the Civil Nuclear
Constabulary employs nearly 1,600 people, with its cost bill rising to
£130m in 2022/23 – up from £110m in 2018.
The procurement document
said: “The NDA covers 17 nuclear sites, 1,000 hectares of land and over
800 buildings. We are interested in innovative ways to ensure our sites
remain safe and secure in a resource-constrained environment.” A
spokesman for the NDA confirmed the “roboforce” plans, claiming that
police officers will be able to control the technology without being
exposed to danger. “They will be able to override the system, or
investigate and deal with intruders from a control room,” the spokesman
said.
Telegraph 1st Feb 2024
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