Alarm over 174 security breaches at Clyde nuclear bases
Rob Edwards, June 10, 2024, https://theferret.scot/security-breaches-clyde-nuclear-bases/—
Two nuclear bomb bases on the Clyde recorded 174 security breaches over five years, according to information released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
Between 2018 and 2022 there were 130 breaches reported at the Trident submarine base at Faslane, near Helensburgh, and a further 44 breaches at the nearby nuclear weapons store at Coulport.
The MoD has not given any details of the incidents, but suggested that some were “minor”. They could include lost identity cards, misplaced documents and data protection breaches, it said.
The MoD stressed that it investigated every incident “no matter how small” with the aim of continuously improving security.
Campaigners, however, warned there were “risks of major catastrophe” at Faslane and Coulport. They called on whoever wins the general election to “get to grips” with security problems.
The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats all support the UK’s nuclear weapons programme. The Scottish National Party and the Greens oppose it.
A freedom of information response released by the MoD in May revealed that the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport recorded the highest number of security breaches – 13 – in 2019. Since then, there were 11 in 2020, nine in 2021 and nine in 2022.
Coulport is where around 200 of the UK’s arsenal of nuclear warheads are kept in underground bunkers. Spread across the slopes above Loch Long, the site is dotted with watchtowers and protected by a series of barbed wire fences.
The latest MoD release also confirmed a previous report that there were 60 security breaches at Faslane in 2022. Another report in 2022 said that there were 16 breaches at Faslane in 2021, and 18 in each of the previous three years.
Faslane, on the Gareloch, is the home port for the UK’s four Vanguard-class submarines that carry nuclear-armed Trident missiles. One submarine is meant to be continuously on patrol at sea, but in recent years the service has been stretched.
The numbers of security breaches in 2023 and so far in 2024 have not been published by the MoD. But it has previously released figures for nuclear safety incidents that have also plagued the Clyde bases.
The Ferret reported in April that Faslane and Coulport logged 843 “nuclear site events” from 2019 to April 2024. Twelve of them were classified by the MoD as having “actual or potential for radioactive release to the environment”.
We also revealed in August 2023 that the MoD’s Defence Nuclear Organisation, which oversees the UK nuclear weapons programme, had recorded 113 “security concerns” since 2017-18. Again, no details were given.
The Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament warned that security breaches should not be “shrugged off” as minor. “Faslane and Coulport combine nuclear bombs, nuclear reactors and missiles – radioactivity, explosives and highly flammable rocket fuel – always presenting potential targets and risks of major catastrophe,” said the campaign’s chair, Lynn Jamieson.
“At these most dangerous places, regular breaches signal either a grossly-inappropriate casual culture or the impossibility of 100 per cent security. Incidents rising to 60, averaging more than one a week, is a warning and calls for public investigation.”
Jamieson also attacked the MoD failure to provide details of the breaches. “Secrecy cloaks the reality of the everyday risks in our own backyard,” she told The Ferret.
“Secrecy is convenient for politicians who spout the myth that threatening to destroy half the planet with nuclear weapons keeps us safe.”
Some nuclear security breaches ‘serious’
The Nuclear Information Service, which researches and criticises nuclear weapons, argued that any security breaches were concerning. “If, as the MoD imply, some of these incidents were relatively minor, why have no further details been disclosed?” asked the service’s director, David Cullen.
“The obvious inference is that some of the incidents were much more serious. Whoever wins the election, I hope the incoming government will get to grips with this.”
The large increase in security breaches at Faslane between 2021 and 2022 was “especially worrying”, he said. A report by the London news broadcaster, LBC, in September 2023 suggested that this could be linked to Russian activity in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
According to the MoD, incidents “can include minor breaches”. They can also include “the mis-accounting of documentation, loss of identity cards, inadvertent use of personal electronic devices and breaches in general data protection,” it said.
A spokesperson for the Royal Navy added: “Security is of paramount importance and we investigate every incident, no matter how small, to ensure we learn from experience and continuously improve our security.”
Are the prospects for Small Modular Reactors being exaggerated? Five key characteristics examined
June 11, 2024 by Ed Lyman, Ed Lyman is Director, Nuclear Power Safety, at the Union of Concerned Scientists
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are being presented as the next generation of nuclear technology. While traditional plants face cost overruns and safety issues, SMRs are seen by their champions as cheaper, safer, and faster to deploy. But Ed Lyman at UCS cites evidence that cast these claims into doubt.
In five sections of this article, he lists the reasons why. SMRs are not more economical than large reactors. SMRs are not generally safer or more secure than traditional large light-water reactors. SMRs will not reduce the problem of disposal of radioactive waste. SMRs cannot be counted on to provide reliable and resilient off-the-grid power (for facilities like data centres, bitcoin mining, hydrogen or petrochemical production). SMRs do not use fuel more efficiently than large reactors.
And where problems might be ironed out over time, the learning cycle of such technology is measured in decades during which costs will remain very high. SMRs may have a role to play in our energy future, says Lyman, but only if they are sufficiently safe and secure, along with a realistic understanding of their costs and risks.
Even casual followers of energy and climate issues have probably heard about the alleged wonders of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). This is due in no small part to the “nuclear bros”: an active and seemingly tireless group of nuclear power advocates who dominate social media discussions on energy by promoting SMRs and other “advanced” nuclear technologies as the only real solution for the climate crisis. But as I showed in my 2013 and 2021 reports, the hype surrounding SMRs is way overblown, and my conclusions remain valid today.
Unfortunately, much of this SMR happy talk is rooted in misinformation, which always brings me back to the same question: if the nuclear bros have such a great SMR story to tell, why do they have to exaggerate so much?
What are SMRs?
SMRs are nuclear reactors that are “small” (defined as 300 megawatts of electrical power or less), can be largely assembled in a centralised facility, and would be installed in a modular fashion at power generation sites. Some proposed SMRs are so tiny (20 megawatts or less) that they are called “micro” reactors. SMRs are distinct from today’s conventional nuclear plants, which are typically around 1,000 megawatts and were largely custom-built. Some SMR designs, such as NuScale, are modified versions of operating water-cooled reactors, while others are radically different designs that use coolants other than water, such as liquid sodium, helium gas, or even molten salts.
To date, however, theoretical interest in SMRs has not translated into many actual reactor orders. The only SMR currently under construction is in China. And in the United States, only one company — TerraPower, founded by Microsoft’s Bill Gates — has applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a permit to build a power reactor (but at 345 megawatts, it technically isn’t even an SMR).
The nuclear industry has pinned its hopes on SMRs primarily because some recent large reactor projects, including Vogtle units 3 and 4 in the state of Georgia, have taken far longer to build and cost far more than originally projected. The failure of these projects to come in on time and under budget undermines arguments that modern nuclear power plants can overcome the problems that have plagued the nuclear industry in the past.
Developers in the industry and the US Department of Energy say that SMRs can be less costly and quicker to build than large reactors and that their modular nature makes it easier to balance power supply and demand. They also argue that reactors in a variety of sizes would be useful for a range of applications beyond grid-scale electrical power, including providing process heat to industrial plants and power to data centres, cryptocurrency mining operations, petrochemical production, and even electrical vehicle charging station
Here are five facts about SMRs that the nuclear industry and the “nuclear bros” who push its message don’t want you, the public, to know.
1. SMRs are not more economical than large reactors. 2. SMRs are not generally safer or more secure than large light-water reactors. 3. SMRs will not reduce the problem of what to do with radioactive waste. 4. SMRs cannot be counted on to provide reliable and resilient off-the-grid power for facilities, such as data centers, bitcoin mining, hydrogen or petrochemical production. 5. SMRs do not use fuel more efficiently than large reactors
Continue readingWill Port Adelaide, Fremantle or Port Kembla be the Australian Chernobyl?
By Douglas McCartyJul 21, 2023 https://johnmenadue.com/aukus-will-adelaide-fremantle-or-port-kembla-be-the-australian-chernobyl/
While most discussion of the AUKUS Agreement has focussed on the geopolitical implications for Australia’s standing in the world, the escalation of the risk of war and the crippling cost of the nuclear submarine purchases when less expensive and more sensible non-nuclear options are available, little has been said of the risk to the civilian population posed by these nuclear-powered submarines (or other nuclear-powered naval vessels) in Australia’s home ports.
Perhaps we citizens only enter the calculations as ‘collateral damage’. Any such necessarily technical discussion is hampered by military secrecy. Some information has been released officially, but most is from generalised inference, or conjecture, and so subject to uncertainty. However, in this important matter, it is worth attempting to join the dots….
News from the war in Ukraine includes, almost every other night, a report on the situation around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Though no longer continuing to generate power for Ukraine, it is always at risk of being shelled or bombed by one side or the other, and regularly just avoiding reactor cooling water pump failure from damaged power transmission lines or lack of diesel fuel for their backup generators for the pumps. How long this situation will continue remains to be seen. And now, after the breaching of the Kakhovka Dam, it is estimated just three months of water for cooling remains.
The consequences of the catastrophic failure of a nuclear reactor are well known to both the Ukrainians and the Russians. To the Northwest of Zaporizhzhia, and just 100 kilometres North of Kyiv, lies the Chernobyl Reactor No. 4, which, on 26 April 1986, underwent meltdown after a coolant and moderator failure, exploded, and caught fire. Radioactive material and fission products were ejected into the air, spreading across the immediate countryside and into Northern Europe. Radioactive rain was reported on the mountains of Wales and Scotland, in the Alps, and contamination in reindeer herds in Northern Sweden. The principal radiological contaminant of concern across this vast area was Caesium-137, one of many fission products and representing some 6% of fission reactor spent fuel. Just 27 kg of Caesium-137, it is calculated, caused this contamination. Some 150,000 square kilometres of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were initially contaminated. Of course, at the time of the accident, all this was part of the Soviet Union. To this day, 2600 square kilometres around the plant are considered unsafe for human habitation, or agriculture, and will remain so for between 300 and 3000 years! The Reactor used 2% enriched Uranium fuel.
Although the loss of life at Chernobyl was a small fraction of the 100,000 deaths from one of the only two uses of nuclear weapons in war, on Hiroshima in 1945, Chernobyl created 400 times more radioactive pollution. The Hiroshima bomb, “Little Boy”, contained 64 kg of enriched Uranium, though less than 2% actually underwent nuclear fission. The bomb was detonated 500 metres above ground (‘airburst’), and the fatalities were the result of blast, heat, and irradiation, in a city centre. Chernobyl occurred at ground level and so ejected debris upwards initially, followed by smoke columns from subsequent fires. . The 31 deaths at Chernobyl were plant operators and, of course, firemen. The G7, the AUKUS Partners and the Quad just met at ‘ground zero’ in a rebuilt Hiroshima City, 78 years after the bombing.
The US Navy nuclear powered warships, including the ‘Virginia’ Class submarines that Australia would buy under the AUKUS Agreement, principally use Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) reactors. The Uranium is enriched to above 93% fissionable Uranium-235. It is weapons grade material and has in part been sourced from decommissioned nuclear weapons. The submarine reactors are intended to last for the ‘Life of Ship’ (LOS), up to 33 years, without needing refuelling. Low Enriched Uranium reactors need fuel replacement every 5 to 10 years, when, importantly, the containment pressure vessel around the reactor is physically inspected for flaws and deterioration. This is not done for the HEU, LOS reactors.
The US Navy nuclear powered warships, including the ‘Virginia’ Class submarines that Australia would buy under the AUKUS Agreement, principally use Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) reactors. The Uranium is enriched to above 93% fissionable Uranium-235. It is weapons grade material and has in part been sourced from decommissioned nuclear weapons. The submarine reactors are intended to last for the ‘Life of Ship’ (LOS), up to 33 years, without needing refuelling. Low Enriched Uranium reactors need fuel replacement every 5 to 10 years, when, importantly, the containment pressure vessel around the reactor is physically inspected for flaws and deterioration. This is not done for the HEU, LOS reactors. In one year, at full power, (210 x 365 ÷ 940 =) 81.5 kg of U-235 would be required. Along with other decay products from the U-235 (Strontium-90, Iodine-131, Xenon-133 etc.), as noted earlier some 6% (or 4.9 kg) would be Caesium-137. The ‘neutron poisons’ also created are balanced out by ‘burnable’ neutron poisons incorporated into the core when new, to maintain reactor function over the years. So far, simple nuclear physics and thermodynamics.
Operationally, one surmises, the submarine reactor will infrequently run at full power. Actual annual production of Caesium-137 may lie between, say, 0.8 kg for 1/6th capacity operation on average for the whole year, and 2.45 kg at half capacity for the year. As the reactor is designed to not need refuelling for the ‘Life of the Ship’, the Cs-137 would continuously accumulate inside the reactor fuel elements. At the lower bound of 1/6th operation, there would be approaching 27 kg of Cs-137 in the core after 33 years, allowing for the decay of some of the Caesiun-137, given its half-life of 30.05 years. At the upper bound, it would take about 13 years for 27 kg of Caesium-137 to accumulate.
Visiting nuclear-powered submarines, from the US or UK, would be similar. Visiting US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, each with two A1B reactors each of 700MWt, may have 27 kg of Cs-137 in their reactor cores after just two years of operation.
Visiting ships may stay in Australian ports for days or even weeks. Australian submarines will be in port not only between deployments, but also for maintenance, for months and years. The US Navy appears to have about 40 Virginia Class Subs, with some 18 undergoing long-stay maintenance, or about half. We might expect the same. So, at any one time, the AUKUS plan would see naval nuclear reactors, US, or UK, or Australian, or all, in Adelaide, and/or Fremantle, and/or Port Kembla. While peacetime only presents the risk of a nuclear accident, wartime would see these important military assets easily detectable – and targetable – while in port. In the event of a nuclear war, this may be just one of our worries.
In a conventional, non-nuclear conflict, the story may be very different. The situation of the Zaporizhzhia civilian reactors in Ukraine is most instructive. However, as legitimate military targets, would such restraint be shown towards the reactors in the submarines? What would be the impact of a conventional cruise or hypersonic or ballistic missile warhead on the pressure hull and reactor containment vessel (and plumbing) of a nuclear-powered submarine?
Should just 27 kg of the Caesium-137 in the naval reactor cores be released into the air through an explosion (as at Chernobyl) in an accident or deliberate attack, what would be the outcome? In Fremantle, especially if the ‘Fremantle Doctor’ was blowing, would sections of Fremantle and Perth become unsafe for human habitation? In Port Kembla, especially if a ‘Southery Buster’ came through, the Illawarra and, depending on the particular weather conditions, would parts of the South of Sydney become unsuitable for human habitation? For Port Adelaide, especially if a NW change came through, would the Adelaide coastal strip from Gawler to Aldinga become unsuitable for human habitation?
Imagine the number of “single mums doing it tough” who would have to be relocated to emergency accommodation – somewhere! Imagine all that social housing rendered uninhabitable! Even if we ‘won’ the war.
This is a real possibility if we have nuclear reactors in surface ships or submarines in our ports, or in our ship building and maintenance facilities.
Drone sightings reported over British nuclear facilities
UK Defence Journal, By George Allison, May 29, 202
Recent data acquired under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000) unveils a number of drone sightings over UK nuclear facilities from 2021 to 2023.
The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) has kept specific location details confidential, citing national security implications.…………………………………………………………………..
In the context of the UK, nuclear sites generally refer to a range of facilities associated with the nuclear energy industry and defence establishments. These can include:
- Nuclear Power Stations: These are plants where nuclear energy is converted into electricity. Examples include Hinkley Point, Sizewell, and Dungeness.
- Nuclear Research Facilities: These are centres where nuclear research takes place, such as the Culham Centre for Fusion Energy or the Dalton Nuclear Institute.
- Nuclear Reprocessing Plants: Sellafield in Cumbria is a prime example, where nuclear fuel is reprocessed.
- Nuclear Submarine Bases: The UK operates a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and these vessels are based at certain naval docks, notably HM Naval Base Clyde (sometimes referred to as Faslane).
- Defence Establishments: Some sites are associated with the development or storage of nuclear weapons, such as the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield.
- Nuclear Waste Storage and Disposal Sites: Locations where nuclear waste is stored, treated, or disposed of.
- Decommissioned Nuclear Sites: Former nuclear facilities which are no longer operational but might still have nuclear materials or be under decommissioning.
These sites are of strategic importance to the UK, both in terms of energy supply and national security. As such, they are heavily regulated, monitored, and protected. Any unauthorised activity, such as drone flights, in the vicinity of these sites is taken very seriously due to the potential security and safety risks involved.
What drives these flights near such sensitive areas? Are they a product of curiosity, deliberate reconnaissance, or mere coincidence? https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/drone-sightings-reported-over-british-nuclear-facilities/
2 aging central Japan nuclear reactors get 20-yr service extensions
May 29, 2024 (Mainichi Japan) TOKYO (Kyodo) — The aging No. 3 and 4 reactors at the Takahama nuclear plant in central Japan were approved Wednesday by the nuclear regulator to continue operating for 20 more years, as the government maintains support of the technology’s use in the resource-poor country’s energy mix.
The decision makes them the seventh and eighth reactors nationwide that the Nuclear Regulation Authority has green-lit for extensions after 40 years of operations. All four reactors at the facility in Fukui Prefecture have now been approved to run for 60 years…………………..
The regulator’s Chairman, Shinsuke Yamanaka, said at a meeting that nuclear reactor pressure vessels tend to become brittle due to radiation, but an official at the organization’s secretariat said the reactors had been evaluated carefully and that there was “no problem.”
The facility’s No. 1 and 2 reactors were approved in June 2016 to operate beyond 40 years from their start date. In 2023, both reactors were rebooted for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
Following the nuclear accident, the government introduced rules mandating that nuclear units can operate for up to 40 years, with extensions to 60 years possible pending approval.
But in May 2023, the Japanese government enacted a bill to introduce a new system that will allow the country’s nuclear reactors to operate beyond the current 60-year limit……. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20240529/p2g/00m/0na/038000c
Wildfire closes 20+ miles of highway across Hanford nuclear site Saturday night
ICHLAND, WA More than 20 miles of Highway 240 across the Hanford nuclear site and part of Highway 24 was closed by a wildfire for a few hours starting at 6 p.m. Saturday. Wind gusts of up to 26 mph in the area fanning the flames Saturday night.
The Hanford site alerted its employees that Highway 240, sometimes called the Hanford highway, was closed from Highway 225 north of Benton City to the intersection with Highway 24. The highway runs between the section of the nuclear reservation closed to the public and Hanford Reach National Monument land, including Rattlesnake Mountain, also closed to the public. Highway 24 was closed from the Vernita Bridge across the Columbia River to the Silver Dollar cafe, according to Hanford officials.
About 7 p.m. the Washington state Department of Transportation announced the Highway 24 closure but both roadways reopened a few hours later. No information about the specific location of the size of the fire was immediately available.
Officials set up road closures around Sunnyside Community Hospital for radiation concerns
Le’Ana Freeman NonStop Local Digital Journalist, May 26, 2024, SUNNYSIDE, Wash. https://www.nbcrightnow.com/news/sunnyside-police-warn-public-to-avoid-sunnyside-hospital-for-radiation-concerns/article_f8308f6e-1ba9-11ef-98e3-af76c9eab7ef.html
Sunnyside Police have confirmed they are blocking off the Sunnyside Hospital area from Franklin Ave to East Edison Ave to continue decontamination efforts.
Officials are asking the public to avoid the area.
Officials have asked the public to avoid the Sunnyside Hospital area.
According to the Sunnyside Police Department, construction workers arrived at the Sunnyside Hospital and reported radiation exposure from a construction site out of town. The hospital is decontaminating the emergency room and patients.
Police ask the public to divert from the hospital and avoid the area for safety.
Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant’s main power line down for hours, no safety threat
MOSCOW, May 23 (Reuters) – Russia said the main power line supplying the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) in Ukraine was down for more than three hours on Thursday, though there was no threat to safety.
The six reactors at the Zaporizhzhia plant, held by Russia and located close to the front line of the conflict in Ukraine, are not in operation but it relies on external power to keep its nuclear material cool and prevent a catastrophic accident.
The Russian management said on their official channel on the Telegram app that the reasons for the outage, which had not caused any change in radiation levels, were being investigated.
It had initially said the main 750 kilovolt (kV) “Dniprovska” power line went down at 1:31 p.m. local time (1031 GMT), while the 330 kV “Ferosplavnaya” line was supplying power to the plant now.
It later reported that the Dniprovska line was restored at 4:49 p.m. local. Power supply to ZNPP is possible via both lines, it added.
The Dniprovska power line also went down for almost five hours on March 22, highlighting what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said were “ever present dangers to nuclear safety and security” from the Russia-Ukraine war.
Russia and Ukraine have each accused the other at various times of shelling the Zaporizhzhia plant, which is Europe’s largest. Both deny such accusations.
The IAEA has said that the ZNPP has been experiencing major off-site power problems since the conflict began in early 2022, exacerbating the nuclear safety and security risks confronting the site.
UN watchdog warns on nuclear trafficking
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/20/un-watchdog-warns-on-nuclear-trafficking
The IAEA reports thousands of pieces of nuclear materiel have gone missing over last three decades.
The United Nations’ nuclear watchdog has called for “vigilance” as it warned of thousands of instances of radioactive materials going missing.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking database reported on Monday that 31 countries reported 168 incidents in which nuclear or other radioactive material was lost, stolen, improperly disposed of or otherwise neglected last year, “in line with historical averages”. The watchdog has recorded more than 4,200 thefts or other incidents over the past 30 years.
The IAEA noted that six of last year’s incidents were “likely related to trafficking or malicious use”, also known as Group I, representing a slight increase from 2022 but a drop from 2021.
The trafficking database covers three types of incidents where nuclear or radioactive material escaped regulatory control, with Group I being the most serious.
Incidents where trafficking or malicious use is unlikely or can be ruled out are known as Group II and those where any connection is unclear fall into Group III.
The trafficking database was set up to track the illicit trafficking of nuclear material, such as uranium and plutonium, which can be used in atom bombs, and radioactive material, such as isotopes used in hospital equipment.
The IAEA released its latest finding as it opened its fourth international conference on nuclear security, which will run until Friday in the Austrian capital, Vienna.
Since 1993, the nuclear watchdog has recorded 4,243 incidents, 350 of them connected or likely to be connected to trafficking or malicious use.
“The reoccurrence of incidents confirms the need for vigilance and continuous improvement of the regulatory oversight to control, secure and properly dispose radioactive material,” said Elena Buglova, director of the IAEA’s nuclear security division.
The IAEA noted a decline in incidents involving nuclear material, such as uranium, plutonium and thorium.
Military activities near Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
The International Atomic Energy Agency is continuing to monitor observance
of the five concrete principles aimed at protecting Ukraine’s
Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) during the military conflict, where
nuclear safety and security remain precarious, Director General Rafael
Mariano Grossi said on 9 May in the IAEA’s Update 227.
During the week of 1-8 May, the IAEA team stationed at the ZNPP have heard military activities
on most days, including artillery and rocket fire some distance away from
the plant, as well as small arms fire both near to and further away from
the site. On 8 May IAEA experts on site reported that there was an air raid
alarm with restrictions on movement outside of buildings for about 90
minutes, which the ZNPP informed the team was allegedly due to drones being
present in the area of the cooling pond. The experts did not hear any
explosion during the period of the restriction on movement. Earlier on 8
May however another air raid alarm was heard, again restricting outside
movement and resulting in the team’s planned walkdown within the site.
Modern Power Systems 14th May 2024
https://www.modernpowersystems.com/news/newsrussian-military-steps-up-activity-at-znpp-11770581
MISTAKES THAT CAUSED THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER
BY S. FLANNAGAN/MAY 12, 2024 https://www.grunge.com/1562994/mistakes-that-caused-chernobyl-disaster/
The Chernobyl disaster remains one of the most chilling incidents of the nuclear age. The Chernobyl Power Complex was the name of a nuclear power plant in northern Ukraine just a few miles from the Belarus border near the city of Pripyat. At the time Ukraine was part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Chernobyl was constructed between 1970 and 1977 as part of the USSR’s nuclear expansion program. It had four reactors, each capable of generating colossal amounts of energy to enrich the Soviet bloc. On April 26, 1986, a series of errors caused reactor 4 to experience an unexpected surge of power that started a huge fire, which led to several explosions and the biggest release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in history.
Local areas such as Pripyat were evacuated, but a delayed emergency response saw the area transformed into an uninhabitable no-go zone. It has been reported that 31 people lost their lives in the immediate aftermath of the meltdown, including six firefighters who received double the fatal amount of radiation as they attempted to extinguish the blaze. But a delayed response saw the amount of material released into the environment and spread across Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and parts of Central Europe. Hundreds of thousands of people were involved in the clean-up, many of whom went on to develop health problems such as cancer as a consequence of the exposure. Here are some of the mistakes that led to the meltdown, and to the local area being largely uninhabited even today.
A FLAWED DESIGN
The World Nuclear Association notes that one of the key issues that led to the meltdown of Reactor 4 which resulted in the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 was the flawed design of the reactor itself. Each of Chernobyl’s four reactors was of a new Soviet design known as “reaktor bolshoy moshchnosty kanalny,” or RBMK. RBMK reactors were one of two reactor designs to emerge from the USSR in the 1970s. They employ a water-cooling system and graphite control rods that regulate fission, which creates nuclear energy.
On the night of the meltdown, operators were attempting to test whether residual steam pressure would be able to keep the reactor going in the event of a power cut long enough for the backup diesel generators to take over. However, in the course of the experiment, a huge and unexpected power surge hit the reactor, which was later found to have been caused by the RBMK’s enormous “void coefficient,” ultimately meaning that excess steam in the water cooling system would not be able to absorb neutrons in the system, resulting in the surge. After an investigation into these flaws, crews were tasked with upgrading other reactors in the Chernobyl Power Complex to make them safer, though over the years these other reactors have also eventually been decommissioned.
SAFETY ISSUES COVERED UP
But the flaws in the design of the RBMK-1000 reactor at Chernobyl that rendered it unsafe weren’t exactly a surprise to experts in the wake of the meltdown. In fact, the site had suffered several notable accidents and emergencies years before the shocking events of April 1986. But as we know now, those in charge of the Soviet nuclear program sought to cover up evidence that their reactors were unsafe, meaning that they continued to be operated despite such safety issues leading to the worst nuclear accident in history.
According to a 2021 report published by Reuters, it was revealed that the side had a radiation leak as early as 1982 and that numerous accidents occurred at the plant in 1984. The Soviet government was reportedly aware of the truth that Chernobyl was fundamentally unsafe as a power plant as early as 1983 but kept the matter a secret from the public.
The same instinct among the Soviet powers that be to cover their tracks led to their delayed order to evacuate the city of Pripyat until about Chernobyl 36 hours after the meltdown began, ultimately exposing thousands of locals to dangerous levels of radiation.
The nuclear operators on-site at the Chernobyl Power Complex were later identified as lacking in adequate training required to keep such a complicated and cutting-edge power station running effectively and safely. In the years following the devastating nuclear meltdown, the operators themselves were afforded a great deal of blame for the disaster in which many of them lost their lives.
Indeed, the experiment that the Chernobyl nuclear operators were performing on the night of the meltdown was flawed as a result of human error, which largely came down to the team’s lack of understanding of the reactor’s internal systems. None of them expected the surge of power that the experiment unleashed. The experiment itself was later reported to have been unauthorized, though plant director Viktor Bryukhanov, chief engineer Nikolai Fomin, and his deputy, Anatoly Dyatlov later received 10-year prison sentences for the disaster. Official Soviet government reports claimed that the operators, three more of whom were given prison sentences, had been negligent.
The lack of training that the operators were afforded resulted from what is now known to have been an almost complete lack of safety culture at the Chernobyl Power Complex, a characteristic of Soviet industry more generally at the time. No interest in maximum design accidents, hypothetical disasters that could then be mitigated against in design features, were of little interest to commissioners or designers of the RBMK-1000 reactor, who were also looking to reduce costs.
The safety of Chernobyl was further impacted by opacity within the Soviet hierarchy, which prevented subordinates from reporting issues and misgivings to their superiors, leading to a culture of silence in which errors were not course-corrected. Similarly, mistakes, including those around safety, were covered up, rather than treated as lessons to be learned from. “The attitude came from the race for the atomic bomb, “Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy writer Sehii Plokhy writer told The Guardian in 2018. “The sacrifice of health and life was almost expected. That culture was transferred to the nuclear power establishment.”
Further safety features were overlooked as director Viktor Bryukhanov, who was also in charge of the setting up of the reactors as well as providing accommodation for the operators, raced to keep the project on track. The science journal Nature reports that under his direction electric cables were installed without the required fire-resistant cladding, just one instance of the corners that were cut in the creation of the plant despite the potential calamity that might occur were something to go wrong with any of its reactors.
A lax attitude to safety continued even after the meltdown and the delayed evacuation of local people from the area around the site as it grew more and more radiated and became a danger to human life. In the aftermath, an international effort saw a concrete “sarcophagus” erected around the reactor intended to stop the spread of further radiation. However, the structure was only intended to be temporary and still requires a permanent solution to this day, with experts claiming that it and other stores of radioactive material from the world’s worst nuclear disaster constitute an ongoing risk to public safety if not adequately maintained.
Sizewell C in Suffolk granted nuclear site licence
Campaigners ‘appalled’ as French energy company EDF gets go-ahead for next stage of project
Jillian Ambrose, 8 May 24, https://www.theguardian.com/business/article/2024/may/07/sizewell-c-suffolk-granted-nuclear-site-licence-edf
A planned nuclear power station at Sizewell in Suffolk has been granted the first site licence in more than a decade as investors and government officials race to finalise a deal for the multibillion-pound project this year.
The licence from the nuclear regulator is considered a milestone for EDF, which plans to build Sizewell C as a replica of its Hinkley Point C project in Somerset, which has been dogged by delays and cost overruns.
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has granted only two site licences to build new nuclear plants in more than 35 years: the first for Hinkley Point C in 2012, and the second for Sizewell.
It was granted as EDF works to reach a final investment decision on the Sizewell C project by the end of this year, depending on a government framework to finance the project and fresh investment to cover its construction costs.
EDF holds just under 50% stake in the project, while the UK government holds just over 50%. They are searching for further investment after EDF’s partner at Hinkley Point, China’s CGN, was barred from the successor project over security concerns.
Mina Golshan, a director at Sizewell C, said the licence was a “show of confidence” from the UK’s nuclear regulator that the company had a suitable site and was ready to begin large-scale construction work on a safe design replicated from Hinkley Point C.
“It’s a huge milestone and demonstrates that this project is firmly on track,” Golshan said.
EDF has blamed inflation, Covid and Brexit for a four-year delay and cost overruns at the Hinkley Point C site. It believes that by learning the lessons from Hinkley it will be able to build Sizewell C in about nine years.
Mark Foy, the ONR chief nuclear inspector and its chief executive, said the licence was granted after “extensive engagement and review” by the ONR team and would allow the regulator to take greater regulatory oversight and challenge the company as it progressed its plans.
“The licensing process is fundamental in confirming that operators of a nuclear site are ready and able to meet their obligations under the nuclear site licence, to protect their workforce and the public,” Foy said.
A group campaigning against the nuclear plant, Stop Sizewell C, said it was “appalled that a nuclear site licence has been issued when matters critical to the future safety of the site remain unresolved.
“There isn’t even a final design of the sea defences, which will be necessary to keep this vulnerable site safe for the next century and a half, at the very least. This seems to us like kicking the can down the road, on the assumption that some future generation will be able to clear up the mess,” the group said.
12 years behind schedule, EDF’s Flamanville 3 nuclear plant gets regulatory approval for trial period
Electricite de France SA got regulatory approval to start up its new
nuclear reactor 12 years behind schedule after the utility faced
construction problems ranging from concrete weakness to faulty pipe welds.
The green light for commissioning of the Flamanville 3 nuclear plant
located in Northwestern France allows EDF to load the fuel in the reactor,
proceed with trials, then begin operations, the Autorite de Surete
Nucleaire said in a statement on Tuesday.
Further approvals will be
required when reaching key milestones during the trial phase, the regulator
added said. Once connected to the grid, the 1.6-gigawatt plant called a
European Pressurized Reactor will join EDF’s fleet of 56 reactors in
France, which accounted for about two-thirds of the country’s power
production last year.
Bloomberg 7th May 2024
Fears raised over Wales accident risk involving aircraft carrying nuclear materials
An air crash involving an RAF aircraft carrying US nuclear materials over South Wales may be the stuff of nightmares, but the Chair of the Welsh Nuclear Free Local Authorities has just written to the First Minister of Wales asking him to contemplate just that possibility.
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Nukewatch have just published a disturbing briefing titled ‘Special nuclear flights between the UK and US: the dangers involved’. The briefing references the transport of nuclear materials made by RAF C-17 Globemaster flying between RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire and airbases in the United States. Around ten such round-trips are made every year to transport nuclear materials utilised for the maintenance of Britain’s nuclear arsenal.
The report says of the route taken by these flights: ‘Aircraft fly from Brize Norton out into the Atlantic, overflying the Cotswolds and then the northern edges of Bristol and Cardiff to reach the Bristol Channel, flying south of Ireland to cross the Atlantic. A variation of this route takes the plane further to the north where it overflies Gloucestershire and the South Wales valleys, heading out to sea over Swansea and the Gower, and, again, South of Ireland.’
Although the C-17 Globemasters involved in these flights are four-engine aircraft, and are subject to an enhanced maintenance regime, so catastrophic mechanical failure is less likely, Welsh Forum Chair Councillor Sue Lent wants Welsh emergency planning authorities to properly consider the likely impact of any accident involving nuclear materials. Cllr Lent serves on Cardiff City Council, one of the municipalities flown over, and one of several South Wales local authorities who are members of the NFLAs.
The First Minister acts as Chair of the Wales Resilience Forum. The Forum ‘supports good communication and improves emergency planning across agencies and services’ acting as a coordinating body for local resilience forums across Wales. These ‘bring together all responder organisations that have a duty to co-operate under the Civil Contingencies Act. The groups also include other organisations who would respond to an emergency. Together, they ensure they prepare for emergencies by working in a coordinated and effective way.’[i]
The Minister of Defence hosts annual Astral Bend exercises ‘to practice and test the emergency response to an accident involving an RAF aircraft transporting special nuclear materials’, but investigative reporter Rob Edwards uncovered evidence that such an exercise held in February 2011 at the Caerwent military base in South Wales identified several failures in the actions of first responders which would have led to ‘“avoidable deaths” in a real-life situation’. The MoD has refused to release details of recent exercises held after 2012 in response to Freedom of Information requests; nonetheless the NFLA Secretary has just submitted one.
Councillor Lent asks First Minister Gething to ‘seek a reassurance from the MoD / RAF that such flights will be diverted out to sea, well away from our South Wales municipalities, and revisit emergency planning arrangements should an accident involving these special nuclear materials occur’ and suggests that as the last exercise conducted at Caerwent appears to be that held in 2011 a follow-up exercise to test the preparedness of Welsh emergency service agencies is ‘long overdue.’
IAEA’s top nuclear salesman-cum-watchdog to visit Iran
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that its Director-General, Rafael Grossi, will travel to Iran on May 6 to engage with high-ranking officials.
He will attend the International Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology during the visit, taking place in Isfahan, just months after officials in Iran claimed to be within reach of nuclear weapons. Grossi just days ago also claimed Iran was “weeks not months” from a nuclear weapon.
Im February Grossi admitted a “drifting apart” in relations between the agency and an increasingly defiant Iran.
Grossi noted in the same month that although the rate of uranium enrichment in Iran had decreased slightly since the previous year’s end, Iran continued to enrich uranium at a significant rate of approximately 7 kg per month to 60 percent purity, near weapons grade.
Under the terms of a 2015 agreement with world powers, Iran was only permitted to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent.
However, after former President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement in 2018 and reinstated sanctions, Iran exceeded the limits. As a result, the IAEA has stated that the 2015 nuclear deal has “all but disintegrated”.
1 This Month
of the week– Nuclear Reactor Information Task Force
14 May – online event From Bombs to Data Centres: the Face of Nuclear Colonialism
To see nuclear-related stories in greater depth and intensity – go to https://nuclearinformation.wordpress.com
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