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What does Chevron mean for nuclear? The USA courts can now supercede the safety role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

should we trust the courts to be better arbiters of how nuclear power plants should be regulated than the actual agency set up to regulate them?

In the worst-case scenario, rogue judges are now empowered to issue out-of-pocket decisions on highly technical matters they don’t actually understand.

The NRC was the undisputed final word in what goes for nuclear energy in the United States. Did the overturning of the longstanding Chevron decision now put the courts above the regulatory agency?

Elemental, ANGELICA OUNG, JUN 30, 2024

The US Supreme Court just overturned the longstanding “Chevron deference” This is a move so dramatic that Dahlia Lithwick, senior legal editor at Slate, described it as a “requiem” for the Administrative state.

According to Lithwick in the Slate Podcast on the issue, the Chevron doctrine said that when a statute is unclear, federal courts should defer to a reasonable interpretation by administrative agencies. No more. Courts can now decide from the get-go what a statute means, regardless of what the agency thinks.

Once upon a time, ironically, it was the conservative Justice Scalia who was the Chevron doctrine’s biggest fan. But as it becomes increasingly clear that the conservative justices are going to enjoy a generational hold on the Supreme Court while the party holding the Executive Branch flips and flops, it became an advantageous political project for the court to take out Chevron and transfer power from the “ABC agencies,” which of course includes the National Regulatory Commission (NRC) over to the courts.

“This fundamentally changes the way government governs,” said Lithwick.

So what now? If the court is now the final arbiter for whether, say, a bump stock makes a gun a machine gun, is it also going to become the final arbiter on whether a giant trampoline works as well as a reinforced containment dome for that purpose of protecting a nuclear reactor from the impact of a large commercial aircraft?

In fact, since the Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA) is a part of the NRC’s regulations, not explicitly mandated by law, the court can even opt to throw the regulation out entirely.

The undercutting of the NRC goes both ways: just as nuclear companies can now challenge what they see as unreasonably onerous NRC regulations in court, they are now also vulnerable to individuals or groups claiming harm, even if the companies followed all the regulatory guidelines, increasing their legal risk.

As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in his opinion in the landmark 6-3 ruling, “Agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do.”

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Elena Kagan warned that Congress does not have the ability to write perfectly complete regulatory statutes and it would be preferable for the gaps formed by inevitable ambiguities to be filled by the responsible agency, not a court. The decision “is likely to produce large-scale disruption.”………………………………………………………………………………………………

…….should we trust the courts to be better arbiters of how nuclear power plants should be regulated than the actual agency set up to regulate them?

In the worst-case scenario, rogue judges are now empowered to issue out-of-pocket decisions on highly technical matters they don’t actually understand.  https://elementalenergy.substack.com/p/what-does-chevron-mean-for-nuclear

July 1, 2024 Posted by | safety, USA | Leave a comment

Scary truths on civilian nuclear power are coming to the fore

Firstly, everyone agrees that climate breakdown will flip heretofore stable regions into unstable. Adding the reasons mentioned above, a proliferation of civilian nuclear power stations will give potential non-nuclear conflicts a new nuclear dimension. Add to that the cheaper, supposedly even sometimes mobile, small nuclear reactors that are seen as “dirtier” than existing NPPs.

It’s no surprise therefore that the civil nuclear lobby would rather not talk about it.

Bill Ramsay, The National 24 June 24

IT’S entirely natural that the UK civilian nuclear power lobby pitch is behind Labour.

Probably some who support Scottish independence think that the stance of the SNP on nuclear power is a marginal vote-loser. However, if looked at properly through a national security lens, it’s actually a vote-winner.

Occasionally, the threat of some limited non-state terrorist attack on a civilian nuclear facility gets an airing. The more important issue of the implication of the presence of civilian nuclear power stations in a war zone rarely does.

………………………………. the lack of discussion – in the public domain at least – of the implications of the presence of a civilian nuclear power station in a so-called non-nuclear conventional battlefield.

I did nothing more on the issue until my sort-of retirement from education as a senior official of the EIS aligned with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine hosts Europe’s largest nuclear power station and some others. More than half of Ukraine’s electricity is generated by its nuclear power stations.

My first attempt at a paper was rather “undercooked” – as the rejection from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) rightly pointed out – but the final effort – after helpful further consultation with Paul Rodgers, emeritus professor of peace studies at Bradford University – is now available on the Scottish CND website.

In Castle Zaporizhzhia: War Fighting Implications Linked To The Proliferation Of Nuclear Power As Part Solution To Climate Chaos, I unpack the dangers that the nuclear lobby would rather not discuss.

I argue that from a purely military perspective, the occupying Russian forces – whose current, if not future, capabilities are far from overwhelming – will militarily milk the Zaporizhzhia NPP for all its worth and more.

Militarily, the intimidatory potential of the Zaporizhzhia NPP of today and future Zaporizhzhias are huge. Zaporizhzhia NPP performs a similar role for the Russian invaders of Ukraine that the motte-and-bailey castle did for the Norman invaders of England after 1066. These castles of wood then stone were designed to intimidate the Saxon natives.

Zaporizhzhia NPP does the same. Russia can use it as a base of operations from which it can project its power in the full knowledge that the Ukrainians cannot attack it without the risk of another Chornobyl nuclear disaster.

If they wished, the Russians could fire long-range ordnance from it, in the full knowledge the Ukrainians dare not fire back. Indeed, although Zaporizhzhia NPP was discussed at the Ukrainian summit held in Switzerland a few days ago, the bigger global security risks associated with civilian nuclear power production was not. Why? Because the civil nuclear lobby sees nuclear power as a clean alternative to fossil fuels.

In my view, civil nuclear power as a climate chaos mitigator is triply flawed.

Firstly, everyone agrees that climate breakdown will flip heretofore stable regions into unstable. Adding the reasons mentioned above, a proliferation of civilian nuclear power stations will give potential non-nuclear conflicts a new nuclear dimension. Add to that the cheaper, supposedly even sometimes mobile, small nuclear reactors that are seen as “dirtier” than existing NPPs.

It’s no surprise therefore that the civil nuclear lobby would rather not talk about it. Though, to be fair to RUSI, soon after the publication of my report by Scottish CND, RUSI published another which was followed up by a seminar and more recently it has established an ongoing project on strategic and security aspects of civil nuclear power.

Despite all this, the security aspects of civil nuclear power remain very much an elite issue with very little reportage in the mainstream media.

It’s a similar strategy to that employed by John Cleese’s hotelier character Basil Fawlty when faced by an influx of a coach-load of elderly German tourists to his establishment. Paranoid that his staff would make reference to the Second World War, he threatened them with dismissal if they did.

We would all like the war in Ukraine to end, not least because of the death and destruction. The nuclear lobby’s motives are rather less altruistic as the longer the war goes on, the more likely their so-called solution to climate chaos will be exposed to a more searching critique.  https://www.thenational.scot/politics/24405095.scary-truths-civilian-nuclear-power-coming-fore/

June 25, 2024 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

‘Lax’ nuclear security leaving UK at risk of cyber attacks from hostile nations

Official figures show 20 per cent drop in nuclear inspections amid 45 per cent rise in security threats.

By Richard Vaughan, June 19, 2024 The i

The average number of inspections at UK nuclear facilities has plunged by a fifth in recent years despite a significant rise in the number of security incidents over the same period, official figures show.

The “unacceptable” numbers have prompted nuclear safety experts to warn that the Government has taken a “laissez-faire” approach to nuclear power inspection.

According to data from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), between 2015 and 2019 there were an average of 194 security inspections per year, a figure that dropped to 153 per year between 2020 and 2023 – a decline of 20 per cent.

This is despite a dramatic rise in the average number of major security incidents over the same period, with 531 such incidents per year between 2015 and 2019, rising to 771 between 2020 and 2023 – an increase of 45 per cent.

Security incidents reported to the ONR are both physical and cyber, with protesters and individuals gaining unauthorised access to the sites as well as hostile states targeting the UK’s nuclear infrastructure.

In December, it was revealed that cyber groups linked to Russia and China had hacked into the Sellafield site in Cumbria, prompting fears that sensitive information around how Sellafield moves radioactive waste may have been compromised.

It follows warnings from the National Cyber Security Centre of the heightened threat of “state-aligned groups against western critical national infrastructure” linked to Russia, including the UK’s nuclear power stations.

The National Risk Register, a government document which assesses “the most serious risks facing the UK”, recently highlighted the danger of both conventional and cyber attacks on UK civil nuclear infrastructure.

Nuclear safety experts said the drop in inspections coincided with the Covid pandemic that allowed for “at distance” virtual inspections, which have continued creating more “lax nuclear regulation”.

The overall number of inspections has fallen by 30 per cent since 2015, when there were 240 inspections, compared to 2023 when 153 checks were carried out.

Dr Paul Dorfman, the chair of the Nuclear Consulting Group and a former secretary of the government’s committee examining radiation risks of internal emitters (Cerrie), told i: “Covid allowed ONR to ramp ‘at-distance virtual inspection’. This is a problem because ONR needs to be in close, on-site touch with nuclear facilities to get a good view on what’s really going on – and they seem to be carrying on this ‘arms’-length’ inspection regime post-Covid.

“Basically, it looks like the ONR’s nuclear inspections are being hit by the current Govternment’s ‘laissez faire’ attitude – hence we seem to be seeing more lax nuclear regulation.”……………………………………… more https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/government-approach-nuclear-safety-drop-inspections-3120112

June 20, 2024 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

Proliferation warnings over enriched nuclear fuel for advanced reactors

BY JULIA ROBINSON, 13 JUNE 2024,  https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/proliferation-warnings-over-enriched-nuclear-fuel-for-advanced-reactors/4019621.article—

Governments and oth­ers promoting the use of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for nuclear power have not considered the po­tential terrorism risk that widespread adoption of this fuel creates, nuclear scientists have warned.

HALEU is a nuclear reactor fuel enriched with uranium-235 to between 5 and 20%. At 20% uranium-235 and above, the mix­ture is called highly-en­riched uranium (HEU) and it is internationally recognised that it can be employed in nuclear weapons.

Historically, HALEU use has been limited to research reactors, where it is used in small quantities, while commercial reactors typically use fuels with low enrichments, in the range of 3 to 5% uranium-235, which cannot sustain an explosive chain reaction.

However, new advanced reactors are being designed to run on HALEU – most favouring 19.75% uranium-235 HALEU – in the hope that these reactors will be smaller, more flexible and less expensive.

In the US, the Department of Energy (DOE) and US Department of Defense are providing funds for more than 10 reactor concepts, while the UK’s Civil Nuclear Roadmap, announced on 11 January, promised up to £300 million of investment specifically to develop HALEU fuel production.

However, in a policy forum in Science, experts in nuclear science and global security highlight that in many of the designs, the amount of HALEU needed is ‘hundreds to thousands of kilograms’, which may mean that a single reactor contains enough HALEU to make a nuclear weapon.

The authors said that estimates indicate that quantities ranging from several hundred kilograms to about a tonne of 19.75% HALEU could produce explosive yields similar to or greater than that of the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

If this is the case, they said, commercial­ising HALEU fuels without ensuring that the material is ‘appropriately protected against diversion by national governments or theft by terrorists would pose a serious threat to security’.

‘The time has come to review policies governing the use of this material,’ the authors write. ‘We recommend that the US Congress direct the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration to com­mission a fresh review of HALEU prolif­eration and security risks by US weapons laboratory experts.’

They also suggested that, according to the informa­tion available, a reasonable balance of the risks and benefits could be struck if enrichment of uranium-235 was restricted to 12% or less.

June 16, 2024 Posted by | safety, Uranium, USA | Leave a comment

Alarm over 174 security breaches at Clyde nuclear bases

Rob Edwards, June 10, 2024,  https://theferret.scot/security-breaches-clyde-nuclear-bases/—

Two nuclear bomb bases on the Clyde recorded 174 security breaches over five years, according to information released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

Between 2018 and 2022 there were 130 breaches reported at the Trident submarine base at Faslane, near Helensburgh, and a further 44 breaches at the nearby nuclear weapons store at Coulport.

The MoD has not given any details of the incidents, but suggested that some were “minor”. They could include lost identity cards, misplaced documents and data protection breaches, it said.

The MoD stressed that it investigated every incident “no matter how small” with the aim of continuously improving security.

Campaigners, however, warned there were “risks of major catastrophe” at Faslane and Coulport. They called on whoever wins the general election to “get to grips” with security problems.

The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats all support the UK’s nuclear weapons programme. The Scottish National Party and the Greens oppose it.

A freedom of information response released by the MoD in May revealed that the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport recorded the highest number of security breaches – 13 – in 2019. Since then, there were 11 in 2020, nine in 2021 and nine in 2022. 

Coulport is where around 200 of the UK’s arsenal of nuclear warheads are kept in underground bunkers. Spread across the slopes above Loch Long, the site is dotted with watchtowers and protected by a series of barbed wire fences.

The latest MoD release also confirmed a previous report that there were 60 security breaches at Faslane in 2022. Another report in 2022 said that there were 16 breaches at Faslane in 2021, and 18 in each of the previous three years.

Faslane, on the Gareloch, is the home port for the UK’s four Vanguard-class submarines that carry nuclear-armed Trident missiles. One submarine is meant to be continuously on patrol at sea, but in recent years the service has been stretched.

The numbers of security breaches in 2023 and so far in 2024 have not been published by the MoD. But it has previously released figures for nuclear safety incidents that have also plagued the Clyde bases.

The Ferret reported in April that Faslane and Coulport logged 843 “nuclear site events” from 2019 to April 2024. Twelve of them were classified by the MoD as having “actual or potential for radioactive release to the environment”.

We also revealed in August 2023 that the MoD’s Defence Nuclear Organisation, which oversees the UK nuclear weapons programme, had recorded 113 “security concerns” since 2017-18. Again, no details were given.

The Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament warned that security breaches should not be “shrugged off” as minor. “Faslane and Coulport combine nuclear bombs, nuclear reactors and missiles – radioactivity, explosives and highly flammable rocket fuel – always presenting potential targets and risks of major catastrophe,” said the campaign’s chair, Lynn Jamieson. 

“At these most dangerous places, regular breaches signal either a grossly-inappropriate casual culture or the impossibility of 100 per cent security. Incidents rising to 60, averaging more than one a week, is a warning and calls for public investigation.”

Jamieson also attacked the MoD failure to provide details of the breaches. “Secrecy cloaks the reality of the everyday risks in our own backyard,” she told The Ferret. 

“Secrecy is convenient for politicians who spout the myth that threatening to destroy half the planet with nuclear weapons keeps us safe.”

Some nuclear security breaches ‘serious’

The Nuclear Information Service, which researches and criticises nuclear weapons, argued that any security breaches were concerning. “If, as the MoD imply, some of these incidents were relatively minor, why have no further details been disclosed?” asked the service’s director, David Cullen.

“The obvious inference is that some of the incidents were much more serious. Whoever wins the election, I hope the incoming government will get to grips with this.”

The large increase in security breaches at Faslane between 2021 and 2022 was “especially worrying”, he said. A report by the London news broadcaster, LBC, in September 2023 suggested that this could be linked to Russian activity in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

According to the MoD, incidents “can include minor breaches”. They can also include “the mis-accounting of documentation, loss of identity cards, inadvertent use of personal electronic devices and breaches in general data protection,” it said.

A spokesperson for the Royal Navy added: “Security is of paramount importance and we investigate every incident, no matter how small, to ensure we learn from experience and continuously improve our security.”

June 13, 2024 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

Are the prospects for Small Modular Reactors being exaggerated? Five key characteristics examined

June 11, 2024 by Ed Lyman, Ed Lyman is Director, Nuclear Power Safety, at the Union of Concerned Scientists

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are being presented as the next generation of nuclear technology. While traditional plants face cost overruns and safety issues, SMRs are seen by their champions as cheaper, safer, and faster to deploy. But Ed Lyman at UCS cites evidence that cast these claims into doubt.

In five sections of this article, he lists the reasons why. SMRs are not more economical than large reactors. SMRs are not generally safer or more secure than traditional large light-water reactors. SMRs will not reduce the problem of disposal of radioactive waste. SMRs cannot be counted on to provide reliable and resilient off-the-grid power (for facilities like data centres, bitcoin mining, hydrogen or petrochemical production). SMRs do not use fuel more efficiently than large reactors.

And where problems might be ironed out over time, the learning cycle of such technology is measured in decades during which costs will remain very high. SMRs may have a role to play in our energy future, says Lyman, but only if they are sufficiently safe and secure, along with a realistic understanding of their costs and risks.

Even casual followers of energy and climate issues have probably heard about the alleged wonders of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). This is due in no small part to the “nuclear bros”: an active and seemingly tireless group of nuclear power advocates who dominate social media discussions on energy by promoting SMRs and other “advanced” nuclear technologies as the only real solution for the climate crisis. But as I showed in my 2013 and 2021 reports, the hype surrounding SMRs is way overblown, and my conclusions remain valid today.

Unfortunately, much of this SMR happy talk is rooted in misinformation, which always brings me back to the same question: if the nuclear bros have such a great SMR story to tell, why do they have to exaggerate so much?

What are SMRs?

SMRs are nuclear reactors that are “small” (defined as 300 megawatts of electrical power or less), can be largely assembled in a centralised facility, and would be installed in a modular fashion at power generation sites. Some proposed SMRs are so tiny (20 megawatts or less) that they are called “micro” reactors. SMRs are distinct from today’s conventional nuclear plants, which are typically around 1,000 megawatts and were largely custom-built. Some SMR designs, such as NuScale, are modified versions of operating water-cooled reactors, while others are radically different designs that use coolants other than water, such as liquid sodium, helium gas, or even molten salts.

To date, however, theoretical interest in SMRs has not translated into many actual reactor orders. The only SMR currently under construction is in China. And in the United States, only one company — TerraPower, founded by Microsoft’s Bill Gates — has applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a permit to build a power reactor (but at 345 megawatts, it technically isn’t even an SMR).

The nuclear industry has pinned its hopes on SMRs primarily because some recent large reactor projects, including Vogtle units 3 and 4 in the state of Georgia, have taken far longer to build and cost far more than originally projected. The failure of these projects to come in on time and under budget undermines arguments that modern nuclear power plants can overcome the problems that have plagued the nuclear industry in the past.

Developers in the industry and the US Department of Energy say that SMRs can be less costly and quicker to build than large reactors and that their modular nature makes it easier to balance power supply and demand. They also argue that reactors in a variety of sizes would be useful for a range of applications beyond grid-scale electrical power, including providing process heat to industrial plants and power to data centres, cryptocurrency mining operations, petrochemical production, and even electrical vehicle charging station

Here are five facts about SMRs that the nuclear industry and the “nuclear bros” who push its message don’t want you, the public, to know.

1. SMRs are not more economical than large reactors. 2. SMRs are not generally safer or more secure than large light-water reactors. 3. SMRs will not reduce the problem of what to do with radioactive waste. 4. SMRs cannot be counted on to provide reliable and resilient off-the-grid power for facilities, such as data centers, bitcoin mining, hydrogen or petrochemical production. 5. SMRs do not use fuel more efficiently than large reactors

Continue reading →

June 12, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, ENERGY, Reference, safety, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, wastes | Leave a comment

Will Port Adelaide, Fremantle or Port Kembla be the Australian Chernobyl?

By Douglas McCartyJul 21, 2023  https://johnmenadue.com/aukus-will-adelaide-fremantle-or-port-kembla-be-the-australian-chernobyl/
While most discussion of the AUKUS Agreement has focussed on the geopolitical implications for Australia’s standing in the world, the escalation of the risk of war and the crippling cost of the nuclear submarine purchases when less expensive and more sensible non-nuclear options are available, little has been said of the risk to the civilian population posed by these nuclear-powered submarines (or other nuclear-powered naval vessels) in Australia’s home ports.

Perhaps we citizens only enter the calculations as ‘collateral damage’. Any such necessarily technical discussion is hampered by military secrecy. Some information has been released officially, but most is from generalised inference, or conjecture, and so subject to uncertainty. However, in this important matter, it is worth attempting to join the dots….

News from the war in Ukraine includes, almost every other night, a report on the situation around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Though no longer continuing to generate power for Ukraine, it is always at risk of being shelled or bombed by one side or the other, and regularly just avoiding reactor cooling water pump failure from damaged power transmission lines or lack of diesel fuel for their backup generators for the pumps. How long this situation will continue remains to be seen. And now, after the breaching of the Kakhovka Dam, it is estimated just three months of water for cooling remains.

The consequences of the catastrophic failure of a nuclear reactor are well known to both the Ukrainians and the Russians. To the Northwest of Zaporizhzhia, and just 100 kilometres North of Kyiv, lies the Chernobyl Reactor No. 4, which, on 26 April 1986, underwent meltdown after a coolant and moderator failure, exploded, and caught fire. Radioactive material and fission products were ejected into the air, spreading across the immediate countryside and into Northern Europe. Radioactive rain was reported on the mountains of Wales and Scotland, in the Alps, and contamination in reindeer herds in Northern Sweden. The principal radiological contaminant of concern across this vast area was Caesium-137, one of many fission products and representing some 6% of fission reactor spent fuel.   Just 27 kg of Caesium-137, it is calculated, caused this contamination. Some 150,000 square kilometres of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were initially contaminated. Of course, at the time of the accident, all this was part of the Soviet Union. To this day, 2600 square kilometres around the plant are considered unsafe for human habitation, or agriculture, and will remain so for between 300 and 3000 years! The Reactor used 2% enriched Uranium fuel.

Although the loss of life at Chernobyl was a small fraction of the 100,000 deaths from one of the only two uses of nuclear weapons in war, on Hiroshima in 1945, Chernobyl created 400 times more radioactive pollution. The Hiroshima bomb, “Little Boy”, contained 64 kg of enriched Uranium, though less than 2% actually underwent nuclear fission. The bomb was detonated 500 metres above ground (‘airburst’), and the fatalities were the result of blast, heat, and irradiation, in a city centre. Chernobyl occurred at ground level and so ejected debris upwards initially, followed by smoke columns from subsequent fires. . The 31 deaths at Chernobyl were plant operators and, of course, firemen. The G7, the AUKUS Partners and the Quad just met at ‘ground zero’ in a rebuilt Hiroshima City, 78 years after the bombing.

The US Navy nuclear powered warships, including the ‘Virginia’ Class submarines that Australia would buy under the AUKUS Agreement, principally use Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) reactors. The Uranium is enriched to above 93% fissionable Uranium-235. It is weapons grade material and has in part been sourced from decommissioned nuclear weapons. The submarine reactors are intended to last for the ‘Life of Ship’ (LOS), up to 33 years, without needing refuelling. Low Enriched Uranium reactors need fuel replacement every 5 to 10 years, when, importantly, the containment pressure vessel around the reactor is physically inspected for flaws and deterioration. This is not done for the HEU, LOS reactors.

The US Navy nuclear powered warships, including the ‘Virginia’ Class submarines that Australia would buy under the AUKUS Agreement, principally use Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) reactors. The Uranium is enriched to above 93% fissionable Uranium-235. It is weapons grade material and has in part been sourced from decommissioned nuclear weapons. The submarine reactors are intended to last for the ‘Life of Ship’ (LOS), up to 33 years, without needing refuelling. Low Enriched Uranium reactors need fuel replacement every 5 to 10 years, when, importantly, the containment pressure vessel around the reactor is physically inspected for flaws and deterioration. This is not done for the HEU, LOS reactors.  In one year, at full power, (210 x 365 ÷ 940 =) 81.5 kg of U-235 would be required. Along with other decay products from the U-235 (Strontium-90, Iodine-131, Xenon-133 etc.), as noted earlier some 6% (or 4.9 kg) would be Caesium-137. The ‘neutron poisons’ also created are balanced out by ‘burnable’ neutron poisons incorporated into the core when new, to maintain reactor function over the years. So far, simple nuclear physics and thermodynamics.

Operationally, one surmises, the submarine reactor will infrequently run at full power. Actual annual production of Caesium-137 may lie between, say, 0.8 kg for 1/6th capacity operation on average for the whole year, and 2.45 kg at half capacity for the year. As the reactor is designed to not need refuelling for the ‘Life of the Ship’, the Cs-137 would continuously accumulate inside the reactor fuel elements. At the lower bound of 1/6th operation, there would be approaching 27 kg of Cs-137 in the core after 33 years, allowing for the decay of some of the Caesiun-137, given its half-life of 30.05 years. At the upper bound, it would take about 13 years for 27 kg of Caesium-137 to accumulate.

Visiting nuclear-powered submarines, from the US or UK, would be similar. Visiting US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, each with two A1B reactors each of 700MWt, may have 27 kg of Cs-137 in their reactor cores after just two years of operation.

Visiting ships may stay in Australian ports for days or even weeks. Australian submarines will be in port not only between deployments, but also for maintenance, for months and years. The US Navy appears to have about 40 Virginia Class Subs, with some 18 undergoing long-stay maintenance, or about half. We might expect the same. So, at any one time, the AUKUS plan would see naval nuclear reactors, US, or UK, or Australian, or all, in Adelaide, and/or Fremantle, and/or Port Kembla. While peacetime only presents the risk of a nuclear accident, wartime would see these important military assets easily detectable – and targetable – while in port. In the event of a nuclear war, this may be just one of our worries.

 In a conventional, non-nuclear conflict, the story may be very different. The situation of the Zaporizhzhia civilian reactors in Ukraine is most instructive. However, as legitimate military targets, would such restraint be shown towards the reactors in the submarines? What would be the impact of a conventional cruise or hypersonic or ballistic missile warhead on the pressure hull and reactor containment vessel (and plumbing) of a nuclear-powered submarine?

Should just 27 kg of the Caesium-137 in the naval reactor cores be released into the air through an explosion (as at Chernobyl) in an accident or deliberate attack, what would be the outcome? In Fremantle, especially if the ‘Fremantle Doctor’ was blowing, would sections of Fremantle and Perth become unsafe for human habitation? In Port Kembla, especially if a ‘Southery Buster’ came through, the Illawarra and, depending on the particular weather conditions, would parts of the South of Sydney become unsuitable for human habitation? For Port Adelaide, especially if a NW change came through, would the Adelaide coastal strip from Gawler to Aldinga become unsuitable for human habitation?

Imagine the number of “single mums doing it tough” who would have to be relocated to emergency accommodation – somewhere! Imagine all that social housing rendered uninhabitable! Even if we ‘won’ the war.

This is a real possibility if we have nuclear reactors in surface ships or submarines in our ports, or in our ship building and maintenance facilities.

June 8, 2024 Posted by | AUSTRALIA, safety | Leave a comment

Drone sightings reported over British nuclear facilities

UK Defence Journal, By George Allison, May 29, 202

Recent data acquired under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000) unveils a number of drone sightings over UK nuclear facilities from 2021 to 2023.

The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) has kept specific location details confidential, citing national security implications.…………………………………………………………………..

In the context of the UK, nuclear sites generally refer to a range of facilities associated with the nuclear energy industry and defence establishments. These can include:

  • Nuclear Power Stations: These are plants where nuclear energy is converted into electricity. Examples include Hinkley Point, Sizewell, and  Dungeness.
  • Nuclear Research Facilities: These are centres where nuclear research takes place, such as the Culham Centre for Fusion Energy or the Dalton Nuclear Institute.
  • Nuclear Reprocessing Plants: Sellafield in Cumbria is a prime example, where nuclear fuel is reprocessed.
  • Nuclear Submarine Bases: The UK operates a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and these vessels are based at certain naval docks, notably HM Naval Base Clyde (sometimes referred to as Faslane).
  • Defence Establishments: Some sites are associated with the development or storage of nuclear weapons, such as the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield.
  • Nuclear Waste Storage and Disposal Sites: Locations where nuclear waste is stored, treated, or disposed of.
  • Decommissioned Nuclear Sites: Former nuclear facilities which are no longer operational but might still have nuclear materials or be under decommissioning.

These sites are of strategic importance to the UK, both in terms of energy supply and national security. As such, they are heavily regulated, monitored, and protected. Any unauthorised activity, such as drone flights, in the vicinity of these sites is taken very seriously due to the potential security and safety risks involved.

What drives these flights near such sensitive areas? Are they a product of curiosity, deliberate reconnaissance, or mere coincidence? https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/drone-sightings-reported-over-british-nuclear-facilities/

June 1, 2024 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

2 aging central Japan nuclear reactors get 20-yr service extensions

May 29, 2024 (Mainichi Japan) TOKYO (Kyodo) — The aging No. 3 and 4 reactors at the Takahama nuclear plant in central Japan were approved Wednesday by the nuclear regulator to continue operating for 20 more years, as the government maintains support of the technology’s use in the resource-poor country’s energy mix.

The decision makes them the seventh and eighth reactors nationwide that the Nuclear Regulation Authority has green-lit for extensions after 40 years of operations. All four reactors at the facility in Fukui Prefecture have now been approved to run for 60 years…………………..

The regulator’s Chairman, Shinsuke Yamanaka, said at a meeting that nuclear reactor pressure vessels tend to become brittle due to radiation, but an official at the organization’s secretariat said the reactors had been evaluated carefully and that there was “no problem.”

The facility’s No. 1 and 2 reactors were approved in June 2016 to operate beyond 40 years from their start date. In 2023, both reactors were rebooted for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.

Following the nuclear accident, the government introduced rules mandating that nuclear units can operate for up to 40 years, with extensions to 60 years possible pending approval.

But in May 2023, the Japanese government enacted a bill to introduce a new system that will allow the country’s nuclear reactors to operate beyond the current 60-year limit…….  https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20240529/p2g/00m/0na/038000c

May 31, 2024 Posted by | safety | Leave a comment

Wildfire closes 20+ miles of highway across Hanford nuclear site Saturday night

 https://www.tri-cityherald.com/news/local/hanford/article288752490.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR08rMIiSJAlQPd4CfpPLrSOT8wTvfKpMh2iCBTCBbTWsZrZBoyB3FYq 24 May 24

ICHLAND, WA More than 20 miles of Highway 240 across the Hanford nuclear site and part of Highway 24 was closed by a wildfire for a few hours starting at 6 p.m. Saturday. Wind gusts of up to 26 mph in the area fanning the flames Saturday night.

The Hanford site alerted its employees that Highway 240, sometimes called the Hanford highway, was closed from Highway 225 north of Benton City to the intersection with Highway 24. The highway runs between the section of the nuclear reservation closed to the public and Hanford Reach National Monument land, including Rattlesnake Mountain, also closed to the public. Highway 24 was closed from the Vernita Bridge across the Columbia River to the Silver Dollar cafe, according to Hanford officials.

About 7 p.m. the Washington state Department of Transportation announced the Highway 24 closure but both roadways reopened a few hours later. No information about the specific location of the size of the fire was immediately available.

May 28, 2024 Posted by | incidents | 1 Comment

Officials set up road closures around Sunnyside Community Hospital for radiation concerns

Le’Ana Freeman NonStop Local Digital Journalist, May 26, 2024, SUNNYSIDE, Wash.   https://www.nbcrightnow.com/news/sunnyside-police-warn-public-to-avoid-sunnyside-hospital-for-radiation-concerns/article_f8308f6e-1ba9-11ef-98e3-af76c9eab7ef.html

Sunnyside Police have confirmed they are blocking off the Sunnyside Hospital area from Franklin Ave to East Edison Ave to continue decontamination efforts. 

Officials are asking the public to avoid the area. 

Officials have asked the public to avoid the Sunnyside Hospital area.

According to the Sunnyside Police Department, construction workers arrived at the Sunnyside Hospital and reported radiation exposure from a construction site out of town. The hospital is decontaminating the emergency room and patients. 

Police ask the public to divert from the hospital and avoid the area for safety. 

May 27, 2024 Posted by | safety, USA | Leave a comment

Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant’s main power line down for hours, no safety threat

 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-main-power-line-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-goes-down-no-safety-2024-05-23/

MOSCOW, May 23 (Reuters) – Russia said the main power line supplying the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) in Ukraine was down for more than three hours on Thursday, though there was no threat to safety.

The six reactors at the Zaporizhzhia plant, held by Russia and located close to the front line of the conflict in Ukraine, are not in operation but it relies on external power to keep its nuclear material cool and prevent a catastrophic accident.

The Russian management said on their official channel on the Telegram app that the reasons for the outage, which had not caused any change in radiation levels, were being investigated.

It had initially said the main 750 kilovolt (kV) “Dniprovska” power line went down at 1:31 p.m. local time (1031 GMT), while the 330 kV “Ferosplavnaya” line was supplying power to the plant now.

It later reported that the Dniprovska line was restored at 4:49 p.m. local. Power supply to ZNPP is possible via both lines, it added.

The Dniprovska power line also went down for almost five hours on March 22, highlighting what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said were “ever present dangers to nuclear safety and security” from the Russia-Ukraine war.

Russia and Ukraine have each accused the other at various times of shelling the Zaporizhzhia plant, which is Europe’s largest. Both deny such accusations.

The IAEA has said that the ZNPP has been experiencing major off-site power problems since the conflict began in early 2022, exacerbating the nuclear safety and security risks confronting the site.

May 25, 2024 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

UN watchdog warns on nuclear trafficking

 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/20/un-watchdog-warns-on-nuclear-trafficking

The IAEA reports thousands of pieces of nuclear materiel have gone missing over last three decades.

The United Nations’ nuclear watchdog has called for “vigilance” as it warned of thousands of instances of radioactive materials going missing.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking database reported on Monday that 31 countries reported 168 incidents in which nuclear or other radioactive material was lost, stolen, improperly disposed of or otherwise neglected last year, “in line with historical averages”. The watchdog has recorded more than 4,200 thefts or other incidents over the past 30 years.

The IAEA noted that six of last year’s incidents were “likely related to trafficking or malicious use”, also known as Group I, representing a slight increase from 2022 but a drop from 2021.

The trafficking database covers three types of incidents where nuclear or radioactive material escaped regulatory control, with Group I being the most serious.

Incidents where trafficking or malicious use is unlikely or can be ruled out are known as Group II and those where any connection is unclear fall into Group III.

The trafficking database was set up to track the illicit trafficking of nuclear material, such as uranium and plutonium, which can be used in atom bombs, and radioactive material, such as isotopes used in hospital equipment.

The IAEA released its latest finding as it opened its fourth international conference on nuclear security, which will run until Friday in the Austrian capital, Vienna.

Since 1993, the nuclear watchdog has recorded 4,243 incidents, 350 of them connected or likely to be connected to trafficking or malicious use.

“The reoccurrence of incidents confirms the need for vigilance and continuous improvement of the regulatory oversight to control, secure and properly dispose radioactive material,” said Elena Buglova, director of the IAEA’s nuclear security division.

The IAEA noted a decline in incidents involving nuclear material, such as uranium, plutonium and thorium.

May 22, 2024 Posted by | safety | Leave a comment

Military activities near Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

The International Atomic Energy Agency is continuing to monitor observance
of the five concrete principles aimed at protecting Ukraine’s
Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) during the military conflict, where
nuclear safety and security remain precarious, Director General Rafael
Mariano Grossi said on 9 May in the IAEA’s Update 227.

During the week of 1-8 May, the IAEA team stationed at the ZNPP have heard military activities
on most days, including artillery and rocket fire some distance away from
the plant, as well as small arms fire both near to and further away from
the site. On 8 May IAEA experts on site reported that there was an air raid
alarm with restrictions on movement outside of buildings for about 90
minutes, which the ZNPP informed the team was allegedly due to drones being
present in the area of the cooling pond. The experts did not hear any
explosion during the period of the restriction on movement. Earlier on 8
May however another air raid alarm was heard, again restricting outside
movement and resulting in the team’s planned walkdown within the site.

 Modern Power Systems 14th May 2024

https://www.modernpowersystems.com/news/newsrussian-military-steps-up-activity-at-znpp-11770581

May 17, 2024 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

MISTAKES THAT CAUSED THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER

BY S. FLANNAGAN/MAY 12, 2024  https://www.grunge.com/1562994/mistakes-that-caused-chernobyl-disaster/

The Chernobyl disaster remains one of the most chilling incidents of the nuclear age. The Chernobyl Power Complex was the name of a nuclear power plant in northern Ukraine just a few miles from the Belarus border near the city of Pripyat. At the time Ukraine was part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Chernobyl was constructed between 1970 and 1977 as part of the USSR’s nuclear expansion program. It had four reactors, each capable of generating colossal amounts of energy to enrich the Soviet bloc. On April 26, 1986, a series of errors caused reactor 4 to experience an unexpected surge of power that started a huge fire, which led to several explosions and the biggest release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in history.

Local areas such as Pripyat were evacuated, but a delayed emergency response saw the area transformed into an uninhabitable no-go zone. It has been reported that 31 people lost their lives in the immediate aftermath of the meltdown, including six firefighters who received double the fatal amount of radiation as they attempted to extinguish the blaze. But a delayed response saw the amount of material released into the environment and spread across Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and parts of Central Europe. Hundreds of thousands of people were involved in the clean-up, many of whom went on to develop health problems such as cancer as a consequence of the exposure. Here are some of the mistakes that led to the meltdown, and to the local area being largely uninhabited even today.

A FLAWED DESIGN

The World Nuclear Association notes that one of the key issues that led to the meltdown of Reactor 4 which resulted in the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 was the flawed design of the reactor itself. Each of Chernobyl’s four reactors was of a new Soviet design known as “reaktor bolshoy moshchnosty kanalny,” or RBMK. RBMK reactors were one of two reactor designs to emerge from the USSR in the 1970s. They employ a water-cooling system and graphite control rods that regulate fission, which creates nuclear energy.

On the night of the meltdown, operators were attempting to test whether residual steam pressure would be able to keep the reactor going in the event of a power cut long enough for the backup diesel generators to take over. However, in the course of the experiment, a huge and unexpected power surge hit the reactor, which was later found to have been caused by the RBMK’s enormous “void coefficient,” ultimately meaning that excess steam in the water cooling system would not be able to absorb neutrons in the system, resulting in the surge. After an investigation into these flaws, crews were tasked with upgrading other reactors in the Chernobyl Power Complex to make them safer, though over the years these other reactors have also eventually been decommissioned.

SAFETY ISSUES COVERED UP

But the flaws in the design of the RBMK-1000 reactor at Chernobyl that rendered it unsafe weren’t exactly a surprise to experts in the wake of the meltdown. In fact, the site had suffered several notable accidents and emergencies years before the shocking events of April 1986. But as we know now, those in charge of the Soviet nuclear program sought to cover up evidence that their reactors were unsafe, meaning that they continued to be operated despite such safety issues leading to the worst nuclear accident in history.

According to a 2021 report published by Reuters, it was revealed that the side had a radiation leak as early as 1982 and that numerous accidents occurred at the plant in 1984. The Soviet government was reportedly aware of the truth that Chernobyl was fundamentally unsafe as a power plant as early as 1983 but kept the matter a secret from the public.

The same instinct among the Soviet powers that be to cover their tracks led to their delayed order to evacuate the city of Pripyat until about Chernobyl 36 hours after the meltdown began, ultimately exposing thousands of locals to dangerous levels of radiation.

The nuclear operators on-site at the Chernobyl Power Complex were later identified as lacking in adequate training required to keep such a complicated and cutting-edge power station running effectively and safely. In the years following the devastating nuclear meltdown, the operators themselves were afforded a great deal of blame for the disaster in which many of them lost their lives.

Indeed, the experiment that the Chernobyl nuclear operators were performing on the night of the meltdown was flawed as a result of human error, which largely came down to the team’s lack of understanding of the reactor’s internal systems. None of them expected the surge of power that the experiment unleashed. The experiment itself was later reported to have been unauthorized, though plant director Viktor Bryukhanov, chief engineer Nikolai Fomin, and his deputy, Anatoly Dyatlov later received 10-year prison sentences for the disaster. Official Soviet government reports claimed that the operators, three more of whom were given prison sentences, had been negligent.

The lack of training that the operators were afforded resulted from what is now known to have been an almost complete lack of safety culture at the Chernobyl Power Complex, a characteristic of Soviet industry more generally at the time. No interest in maximum design accidents, hypothetical disasters that could then be mitigated against in design features, were of little interest to commissioners or designers of the RBMK-1000 reactor, who were also looking to reduce costs.

The safety of Chernobyl was further impacted by opacity within the Soviet hierarchy, which prevented subordinates from reporting issues and misgivings to their superiors, leading to a culture of silence in which errors were not course-corrected. Similarly, mistakes, including those around safety, were covered up, rather than treated as lessons to be learned from. “The attitude came from the race for the atomic bomb, “Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy writer Sehii Plokhy writer told The Guardian in 2018. “The sacrifice of health and life was almost expected. That culture was transferred to the nuclear power establishment.”

Further safety features were overlooked as director Viktor Bryukhanov, who was also in charge of the setting up of the reactors as well as providing accommodation for the operators, raced to keep the project on track. The science journal Nature reports that under his direction electric cables were installed without the required fire-resistant cladding, just one instance of the corners that were cut in the creation of the plant despite the potential calamity that might occur were something to go wrong with any of its reactors.

A lax attitude to safety continued even after the meltdown and the delayed evacuation of local people from the area around the site as it grew more and more radiated and became a danger to human life. In the aftermath, an international effort saw a concrete “sarcophagus” erected around the reactor intended to stop the spread of further radiation. However, the structure was only intended to be temporary and still requires a permanent solution to this day, with experts claiming that it and other stores of radioactive material from the world’s worst nuclear disaster constitute an ongoing risk to public safety if not adequately maintained.

May 14, 2024 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

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