nuclear-news

The News That Matters about the Nuclear Industry Fukushima Chernobyl Mayak Three Mile Island Atomic Testing Radiation Isotope

Case for Military Proportionality: Disabling Nuclear Plants.

If a reactor’s spent fuel pond storage system was hit, the likely radiological releases could force millions of people to evacuate……………… In an attack against a spent fuel storage facility, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff conservatively estimate the radiological release could be 100 times greater than that of the Fukushima accident.20

Today, nuclear plants can be disabled in many ways without risking harmful releases of radiation. The Russians, in the Russia-Ukraine War, have demonstrated several disabling techniques

 Russia’s attacks afford a clear example of disabling critical civilian objects (reactors) to its military advantage without releasing hazardous radiation

By: Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, September 16, 2025 

For nearly a decade, protecting civilians and civil objects from disproportionate military assaults has been a top priority of the Pentagon. Two Department of Defense secretaries from the first Donald Trump administration championed quantifying and reducing harm to civilians and civil objects. Under the Joe Biden administration, the Pentagon further focused on protecting civilians and civil objects, and, in 2023, Congress created a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence within the Department of Defense. This center, consisting of a staff of 30 people with an annual budget of $7 million, helped military commands execute their missions while minimizing collateral damage.1

In early 2025, however, the Pentagon cut the funding and eliminated almost all the staff in the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response office and the Center and asked Congress to eliminate the legal requirement for its continued operation. Rattled, some wondered if the Department of War was rescinding its previous guidance on limiting civilian harm. The answer to the question was unclear.2

Trump administration officials stated the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence jeopardized war fighters’ abilities to do their jobs. But those officials did not discuss a deeper set of developments: Hamas’s October 7 attack against Israeli citizens; Israel’s crushing response, which killed thousands of noncombatants; and Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian civilians and civil infrastructure. Each development challenged many experts’ previous beliefs about what proportionality should prohibit.

Both Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu insist their military operations are proportionate. These claims, in turn, rely on an American view of proportionality Abraham Lincoln’s top military and legal adviser, Francis Lieber, promulgated in the 1860s. The Lieber Code (General Orders No. 100) championed avoiding attacks on civilians and civilian objects. But the code also allowed, if a compelling military objective emerged whose achievement incidentally entailed harming civilian people and objects, that attacks were permissible. Commanders on the front lines should decide what actions are militarily justified or not, according to the code.3

Some have argued Lieber’s view renders proportionality hopelessly subjective. If commanders were free to determine what actions are justified, proportionality would seem to be little more than a standard of behavior the weak may demand of the strong, but the strong can effectively ignore. Victorious nations rarely litigate against their own officials or officers for disproportionate military actions (that is, for ignoring or violating the requirements of proportionality).4

Therefore, enforcing proportionality against defeated foreign nations might be attractive, but demanding one’s own military enforce proportionality is less realistic or practical. At best, realists argue, limiting harm to civil persons and objects is advisory; institutionalizing or promoting proportionality by creating Pentagon centers goes too far.

This line of thinking is intuitive and appealing. But it ignores a critical point: Sparing civilians and civilian objects unnecessary harm is often essential to achieving military victory.

Carl von Clausewitz, known for championing the necessity of violence in battle, was just as emphatic that wars could only be won by reaching political solutions the enemy’s military and leadership—and the enemy’s population—could accept. Needlessly killing civilians and destroying infrastructure critical to their welfare only complicates reaching lasting political solutions. For Clausewitz, the need to inflict violence in war had to be measured against the war’s ultimate objective, which is always political. Violence against civilians is self-defeating if it undermines the achievement of the war’s ultimate political objective.5

Thus, Winston Churchill and Dwight D. Eisenhower resisted calls in 1944 for the indiscriminate bombing of French cities and infrastructure during World War II because though such bombings would weaken German defenses, they would also dramatically undermine French political support of the Allied powers and the Allies’ resistance to the Nazis. Indiscriminate bombing would also complicate the reconstruction of the French economy after the Allies won the war.6

For similar reasons, President Harry S. Truman rejected the advice of his commander in the field, General Douglas MacArthur, who wanted to use nuclear weapons on North Korea and China. Truman feared attacking these states with nuclear weapons would escalate the conflict, cause unnecessary destruction, and turn international public opinion against the United States. Truman understood maintaining international support was essential to containing China and deterring Russia’s use of nuclear weapons after the end of the Korean War.7

One of Adolf Hitler’s best generals—Erwin Rommel—also refrained from using excessive force against civilians to protect his communications and supply lines from local disruption. Rommel understood that, in some cases, good military discipline and order required restraint, as did pacific relations with the local population (for example, in Northern Africa). Rommel’s attention to these points helped secure supply lines and reduced local resistance to his forces’ operations.8

Nazi troops terrorized enemy populations, but General Walther Wever, who served as the Luftwaffe’s chief of staff in the mid-1930s, argued such actions. Responsible for formulating Germany’s military air doctrine, Wever rejected the idea of bombing cities to break the will of the people. Wever believed such attacks were, at best, distractions from the Luftwaffe’s main mission: destroying the enemy’s armed forces. Wever also believed terror bombing was militarily self-defeating because it increased, rather than reduced, local resistance, jeopardizing the achievement of the Luftwaffe’s prime military missions.9

Besides these arguments, there are additional reasons for not hitting certain civilian facilities. Attacking chemical plants and nuclear facilities can poison the theater of operations with dangerous contaminants and hamper military operations (for example, if a dam is attacked, flooding the terrain). Such attacks can also prompt major evacuations which, in turn, retard military movements.

However, another advantage of avoiding conducting military assaults on civilian objects relates to military cohesion. As I noted in a previous Parameters article, Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions specifically discourages nations from attacking civilian objects, especially if doing so would risk releasing “hazardous forces” that could inflict “severe harm” on innocent civilians. Although the United States has signed the protocol, 174 nations took the additional step of ratifying it. The United States chose not to do so. As such, the United States is at odds with most of its NATO Allies.10

Thus, in 2022, foreign and military ministers in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Germany declared Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant were prosecutable war crimes. The United States took no position. In a war game conducted in 2022, close US Allies that have ratified Protocol I were at odds with Washington regarding how to respond to Russian attacks on Allied reactors. The United States’ Allies wanted to respond strongly to what they saw as a war crime, whereas the United States did not. In the game, the other NATO members were concerned NATO would be drawn into a larger conflict if Poland and Ukraine jointly attacked Russia. These concerns held up war operations and resulted in the United States using Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to keep Poland from participating in a Ukrainian strike against Russia.11

Finally, temporarily disabling civilian infrastructure (for example, water, gas, and oil pumps; energy pipelines; telecommunications lines; and electrical-supply systems) can afford clear military advantages over physically obliterating civilian infrastructure, even if no hazardous forces are released. The temporary disablement of civilian infrastructure deprives one’s enemy of the ability to use infrastructure facilities, facilitates their subsequent use by one’s own forces in war, and allows for their speedy repatriation once the war is over.12

All of these points recommend fostering effective military applications of proportionality against civilian objects. The question is how.

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….If a reactor’s spent fuel pond storage system was hit, the likely radiological releases could force millions of people to evacuate, as confirmed by US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, government-sponsored, and private studies. The areas rendered uninhabitable could also be quite large: from 30,000 to 100,000 square kilometers (the latter area is larger than the entire state of New Jersey). In an attack against a spent fuel storage facility, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff conservatively estimate the radiological release could be 100 times greater than that of the Fukushima accident.20

The case of an attack against a spent fuel storage facility is extreme. A less dramatic scenario is the radiological release attendant to a loss of coolant induced by a military assault. Still, a wholesale, indiscriminate attack against Iran’s Bushehr power reactor could release significant radiation and force the evacuation of hundreds of thousands to millions of nearby civilians.21

Wholesale, indiscriminate attacks are precisely the kind of assault diplomats and lawyers aimed to prevent when they crafted Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions a half century ago. This international framework has several provisions that focus on the most likely type of military assault against nuclear power plants at the time: wholesale aerial attacks, which were almost certain to trigger massive releases of radioactivity. Today, things are different. With precision targeting and tailored munitions, nuclear power plants can be disabled in many ways without releasing radiation.22

Oddly, this transition to precision is still not fully reflected in the Pentagon’s legal guidance on targeting nuclear plants. …………………………………………………………………………………

Today, median miss distances for precision weapons are measured in meters or in smaller units. As a result, nuclear plants can be disabled in many ways without risking harmful releases of radiation. The Russians, in the Russia-Ukraine War, have demonstrated several disabling techniques……………

Through repeated strikes on these nonnuclear components, Russia has succeeded in shutting down Europe’s largest nuclear power plant—the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. In addition, Putin can now collapse Ukraine’s entire electrical-supply system at a time of his choosing. Meanwhile, Russia says it could restart the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant to supply electricity to territories occupied by Russia in a matter of months.

More could be said about Russia’s studied targeting of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and electrical-power systems. But Russia’s attacks afford a clear example of disabling critical civilian objects (reactors) to its military advantage without releasing hazardous radiation.26

Of course, other nuclear examples should be considered. Some states use portions of their civilian nuclear programs to make nuclear-weapons materials—for example, China, India, and North Korea. Disabling the facilities used to make nuclear-weapons materials would be a worthy military objective. Physically, obliterating those facilities and risking the widespread dispersal of harmful radiation, however, could be militarily counterproductive.median miss distances for precision weapons are measured in meters or in smaller units. As a result, nuclear plants can be disabled in many ways without risking harmful releases of radiation. The Russians, in the Russia-Ukraine War, have demonstrated several disabling techniques. These techniques exploited the nuclear-safety requirement for irradiated reactor fuel to be cooled continuously to prevent it from overheating, failing, and releasing dangerous, radioactive by-products.24

Rather than prompting such failures, analysis suggests Russia has been careful to target the electrical power–supply systems needed to keep the nuclear plants’ cooling and safety systems running. Russia’s aim is twofold: first, to force the plants’ operators to shut them down for safety reasons, and second, to increase the credibility of making follow-on strikes that might risk a significant release of radiation.25

The power-system components Russia has targeted include on- and off-site electrical transformers; high-voltage lines running in and out of the plants; cooling water supply systems; a major dam critical to supplying water to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant; and major, off-site electrical power–generating plants needed to stabilize the electrical-supply grid supporting the nuclear plant’s safe operation…………………………

Recommendations

What steps can the US military take to update its plans and operations for targeting and protecting civil infrastructure?

First, the Pentagon should publicly share much more information about its thinking than it has to date, which would allow for greater civilian oversight, sharpen military planning, and increase the clarity of current policy and legal guidance.

Second, the Pentagon should work with private industry and other government departments focused on civil-infrastructure protection—the US Department of Homeland Security and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission—to produce convincing public narratives about why and how civil objects should be protected and to improve existing protection schemes. Planning to protect this infrastructure has long been underway, but under the protection of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Critical Energy / Electric Infrastructure Information, which keeps these plans from the public. What’s needed is a sensible tear sheet for public consumption.27

Third, the Department of War should offer Congress routine public reports about matters related to protecting civil infrastructure. The US government must prepare the public for a future in which the United States’ electrical-supply systems, energy pipelines, biological research facilities, potentially dangerous petrochemical plants, telecommunications systems, and civil nuclear facilities may come under attack. Setting the public’s expectations about what can and should be done, actively and passively, to defend these systems should not wait until an attack occurs.

Finally, training is critical. The Department of War’s military education training institutions should offer dedicated, unclassified courses that provide technical and historical instruction on the targeting and defense of civil objects. The instruction should be fortified by unclassified government simulations for civilians and military officials, which play out alternative targeting plans against civil objects that could release hazardous forces.

How will the US government accomplish these objectives? The first step is to make mastering these matters a requirement for military promotion. This step could be done quietly, without top-down scolding, legal hectoring, or creating centers. The best US military operators and planners already know civil objects and nuclear facilities are becoming increasingly significant military targets. The Pentagon should reward and support efforts to clarify what should be done to disable and protect civil objects and nuclear facilities.

Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Caitlyn Collett for providing essential assistance in the production and editing of this special commentary.

To read the full piece, click here.

September 22, 2025 Posted by | Russia, safety | Leave a comment

Iran, allies submit draft IAEA resolution to ban attacks on nuclear sites

Sep 16, 2025, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202509162278
Iran and five other countries have submitted a draft resolution to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s annual general conference calling for a ban on any attack or threat of attack against nuclear sites under UN safeguards, Iran’s foreign ministry said on Tuesday.

Foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said on X that the text, backed by China, Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Belarus, was intended “to defend the integrity of the NPT” and reaffirmed the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

“All states must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack peaceful nuclear facilities in other countries,” Baghaei wrote. “These principles must be upheld; it is high time that the international community acted firmly to prevent the normalization of lawlessness.”

Draft resolution

The draft resolution condemns “the deliberate and unlawful attacks carried out in June 2025 against nuclear sites and facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” calling them clear violations of the UN Charter and the IAEA Statute.

It says nuclear sites under IAEA safeguards “shall not be subject to any kind of attack or threat of attack,” adding that such actions pose serious risks to international peace and security, human health, the environment, and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

The document also recalls UN Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981, which condemned Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor, and reaffirms previous IAEA decisions prohibiting attacks on safeguarded facilities.

It further stressed that all questions regarding nuclear programs should be resolved “exclusively through dialogue and diplomacy, as the only viable path.”

Israel launched a surprise military campaign on June 13 targeting Iranian nuclear and military sites, including senior commanders and nuclear officials in a conflict that lasted 12 days. On June 22, the United States joined the campaign, striking nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. Washington brokered a ceasefire on June 24.

Iran’s nuclear chief Mohammad Eslami told the conference on Monday that Tehran’s atomic program “cannot be eliminated through military action,” accusing Israel and the United States of launching illegal strikes on Iranian sites in June.

“Despite our formal request, the agency did not condemn the attacks by the United States and Israel on the nuclear centers of the Islamic Republic,” Eslami said, calling the IAEA’s silence “a stain on the Agency’s history.”

Eslami said Tehran would use the conference to highlight what he called unlawful measures against its nuclear industry and to push for adoption of the draft.

The debate comes as Iran’s recent cooperation deal with IAEA chief Rafael Grossi awaits implementation and European powers press ahead with the UN “snapback” mechanism that could reinstate sanctions on Tehran by late September.

September 21, 2025 Posted by | Iran, politics international, safety | Leave a comment

Chernobyl shelter repairs: ‘Difficult choices’ lie ahead

 The arch-shaped New Safe Confinement structure built over the remains of
Chernobyl’s destroyed unit 4 suffered such extensive damage in a drone
strike in February that it may not be possible to restore it to its full
original design purposes and life-span of 100 years, a side event at the
International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference heard.

 World Nuclear News 18th Sept 2025, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/chernobyls-giant-shelter-may-never-return-to-original-state

September 21, 2025 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Can the UK fast-track nuclear power without cutting corners on safety?

The UK’s nuclear regulator is being asked to consider radically
different designs on a scale and pace never before seen. That’s partly
why, as part of the deal, the two countries have agreed to accept each
other’s safety checks. The government claims this will “halve the time
for a nuclear project to be licensed”. The question is whether this can
be done as safely.

The US and UK take fundamentally different approaches to
nuclear regulation. The US’s Nuclear Regulation Commission (NRC) takes a
“prescriptive” approach. It sets detailed rules based on its own
research and enforces them directly. Like police setting speed limits, the
regulator decides the standards and then ensures nuclear operators meet
them. If an accident happens, operators can point to meeting every
requirement as evidence they followed the rules. They could even
legitimately blame the regulator.

The UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation
(ONR) takes a “descriptive” approach. It sets broad standards but
leaves operators to prove how they will meet them. In road terms, the US
sets the speed limit and checks drivers obey it. The UK simply says cars
must stay on the road, leaving drivers to decide their own limits, prove
they’re safe, and take full responsibility if they crash. These two
approaches are driven to a large extent by the two country’s history and
make up of their nuclear industries. So while UK-US collaboration could
boost Britain’s nuclear industry and accelerate the path to low-carbon
energy, independence and transparency will be essential. Any perception of
corner cutting or transatlantic political interference could undermine
public trust and derail Britain’s nuclear ambitions.

 The Conversation 18th Sept 2025, https://theconversation.com/can-the-uk-fast-track-nuclear-power-without-cutting-corners-on-safety-265614

September 21, 2025 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

UK hands over its nuclear safety conditions to Trump’s administration?

It is both ironic and worrying to read that the
government is proposing to blindly accept assessments by US safety
regulators in its panic to build new nuclear reactors (“Deal with US to
fast-track mini nuclear reactors”, news, Sep 15).

The public voted in
2016 to leave the European Union in order to increase sovereignty over
important decisions for this country, and to enable government decisions to
be made more accountably and closer to home. The irony is that less than
ten years later the government has decided to hand over crucial nuclear
safety decisions to the Trump administration.

The worry is that the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission has conflicting roles as both a regulator and
a sales organisation promoting US nuclear technology. Its approval process
has been described as rubber-stamping, and it has widely been criticised
for the influence that the nuclear industry has in its decisions.

The organisation is facing cuts in its workforce from the Trump government, and the president will be appointing new commissioners to the NRC who share his own views on safety and environmental protections. It is hard to comprehend how this proposal will maintain safety standards or encourage communities that suddenly face having a new nuclear reactor built in their locality to welcome such development. The move is purely a leg-up for the US nuclear industry, and has nothing to do with the interests of the British public.

 The Times 16th Sept 2025. https://www.thetimes.com/comment/letters-to-editor/article/times-letters-public-disapproval-trump-state-visit-7rs33trdn

September 20, 2025 Posted by | safety, USA | Leave a comment

UK Ministry of Defence dismiss MP’ s call for inquiry into trident bases nuclear leaks.

 THE Ministry of Defence (MoD) has dismissed calls from an SNP MSP for a
public inquiry into nuclear leaks at Trident bases, claiming it is
“factually incorrect” to suggest they posed a safety risk.

Earlier this week Bill Kidd, the Glasgow Anniesland MSP, held a debate on reported nuclear safety incidents at Faslane and Coulport, where Britain’s nuclear fleet and arsenal are stored.

Kidd secured the backing of 28 MSPs from the
SNP, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, Alba, and one independent. However,
the motion was not voted on as it was debated as member’s business after
decision time.

It comes after The Ferret revealed that nuclear waste leaked
into Loch Long, in Argyll and Bute. The outlet reported that pipe bursts
were recorded in 2010, two in 2019, and two more in 2021. After an FOI
battle that lasted six years, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency
(Sepa) – the environment watchdog – stated the Royal Navy failed to
properly maintain a network of 1500 pipes at the Coulport armaments depot,
on the banks of Loch Long.

 The National 19th Sept 2025, https://www.thenational.scot/news/25481047.mod-dismiss-snp-msp-call-inquiry-trident-bases-nuclear-leaks/

September 20, 2025 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

IAEA reports “serious safety risks” at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi
has reported that six of the seven power transmission lines of the
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) have been compromised, leaving only
one functioning off-site line, which poses serious safety risks.

 Ukrainska Pravada 9th Sept 2025, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/09/9/7529932/

September 11, 2025 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Nuclear Sites Dotted Across Ukraine Pose Threat of Radiation Disaster

Each day of war risks a strike on sites that could scatter radioactive material. Officials say one laboratory near the front has been hit dozens of times.

New York Times 9th Sept 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/09/world/europe/nuclear-sites-ukraine-russia-war.html

September 11, 2025 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Ukraine drones hit training centre at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, Russian management says

By Reuters, September 7, 2025 https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-drones-hit-training-centre-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-russian-management-2025-09-06/

Sept 7 (Reuters) – Ukrainian drones hit the roof of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant training centre, causing no major damage and no increase in radiation levels, the Russian-installed administration of the Russia-held plant in Ukraine said on Saturday.

The strike occurred about 300 meters (984 ft) from a reactor unit, the administration said in a statement on the Telegram messaging app.

“This centre is unique — it houses the world’s only full-scale simulator of a reactor hall, which is critically important for staff training,” the statement said.

The station, Europe’s biggest nuclear power plant with six reactors, is not operating but still requires power to keep its nuclear fuel cool.

The attack caused no disruptions to the plant’s operation, the administration said.

“Operational safety limits were not violated and radiation levels remain normal,” the administration said.

There was no immediate comment from Ukraine. Reuters could not independently verify the Russian report.

Russian forces seized the Zaporizhzhia plant in the first weeks of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Each side regularly accuses the other of firing or taking other actions that could trigger a nuclear accident.

Reporting by Lidia Kelly in Melbourne

September 8, 2025 Posted by | incidents, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Jellyfish Force another French Nuclear Reactor to Shut Down

By Charles Kennedy – Sep 04, 2025,
https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Jellyfish-Force-another-French-Nuclear-Reactor-to-Shut-Down.html

For a second time in three weeks, a swarm of jellyfish has forced the closure of a nuclear reactor in France in another curious incident in which jellyfish entered the filters of the water cooling systems.

The Paluel nuclear power plant in Normandy, northern France, saw its electricity generation nearly halve by 2.4 gigawatts (GW) out of a total 5.2-GW capacity, due to the presence of jellyfish that have entered the filtering system, French operator EDF said on Thursday, as carried by Reuters.

One of four reactors at Paluel was shut down while power output at another reactor was curtailed to prevent further disruption due to the jellyfish swarm.

oday’s incident at Paluel occurred just over three weeks after a jellyfish swarm clogged the cooling system of the Gravelines nuclear power plant near Dunkerque and Calais. As a result, four of six units at one of France’s largest nuclear power plants automatically switched off, while the remaining two units were already shut down for planned maintenance. Gravelines has six reactors, each with a capacity of 900 megawatts (MW).

At the time, France’s EDF said there was “no impact on the safety of the facilities, the safety of personnel, or the environment.”

Reactors at the Gravelines power plant are cooled from a canal linked to the North Sea, where jellyfish are swarming near the coast during hot weather and warm waters.

Global warming can worsen the jellyfish problem in waters cooling reactors close to seas, scientists have warned.

In recent years, heatwaves and too hot waters in rivers have disrupted France’s nuclear power generation, too.

France’s nuclear power generation accounts for around 70% of its electricity mix, and when its reactors are fully operational, it is a net exporter of electricity to other European countries.

But in 2022 and 2023, EDF was forced to curb power generation at some nuclear plants as heatwaves raised the temperatures of rivers. The power plant operator had to limit electricity output because of environmental regulations for using river water for cooling nuclear reactors.

September 7, 2025 Posted by | France, safety | Leave a comment

It’s past time to start protecting U.S. nuclear power reactors from drones.

September 3, 2025 

In January, I shared a Bulletin of Atomic Scientists piece with you in which I recommended President Trump protect our nuclear power plants from drone strikes.

In the attached piece, “It’s past time to start protecting U.S. nuclear power reactors from drones,” I return to this topic. Over the last eight months, more drones have overflown American nuclear power plants. Meanwhile, the House Armed Services Committee has proposed legislation authorizing the Secretary of Energy to defend Energy Department-operated nuclear plants against drone attacks.

What’s missing is authority for civilian nuclear power plant operators to protect their plants against such threats. These reactors produce 19 percent of America’s electricity. 

In the piece below, I recommend that the congressional committees with jurisdiction over these civilian plants—the energy and homeland security committees—grant the operators similar authority to destroy or disable threatening drones. 

I also propose that the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration launch a “Nuclear Security Initiative” to ensure American reactors don’t become attractive military targets.

NPEC 3rd Sept 2025, https://npolicy.org/its-past-time-to-start-protecting-u-s-nuclear-power-reactors-from-drones/

September 7, 2025 Posted by | safety, USA | Leave a comment

Attacks on nuclear plants are being normalised – and the consequences could be disastrous

Nuclear power plants have become significant pawns in the Russia-Ukraine war

Molly Blackall, Global Affairs Correspondent, iNews 29th Aug 2025

Attacks on and around nuclear sites have become increasingly normalised during the war in Ukraine and the consequences could be disastrous, military watchers have warned.

Russia accused Ukraine this week of launching a drone attack which damaged Kursk nuclear power plant, which sits around 37 miles from the Ukrainian border, on Sunday.

The power plant authorities said that air defences shot down a drone that detonated near by just after midnight.

The incident damaged an auxiliary transformer and caused the plant capacity to drop by 50 per cent, they said.

The incident came on the day that Ukraine marked its 34th anniversary of independence from the Soviet Union.

Ukraine has not commented on the incident, but one Ukrainian military insider told The i Paper that troops had been ordered not to attack the plant during previous operations near by.

Another insider indicated it may have been accidental, saying that drone pilots work seven days a week and that unexpected outcomes sometimes cropped up.

There have long been fears of a nuclear incident as a result of the Russian invasion, with fighting taking place close to two major plants: Kursk and Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia, which is the largest nuclear plant in Europe.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, reported that radiation was at normal levels around the Kursk plant following the attack.

‘Previously shocking acts’ are now normal

Military experts said that fighting in and around nuclear plants was becoming increasingly normalised……………..

Dr Marina Miron, a war studies expert at King’s College London, said that attacks on nuclear plants “may becoming somewhat normalised, which is in itself disconcerting”.

“When it happens the first time everyone is shocked and you see all the headlines. Then the IAEA reports that there was no rise in radiation levels and then things calm down and after an nth time this becomes sort of normal.”

The plants have become significant pawns in the war.

“When Ukraine counter-invaded Russia last year, the idea was to take the Kursk power plant and probably exchange it for Zaporizhzhia power plant, so that they could then say, we’ll trade you; give us that one, and we’ll give you yours back,” Miron said.

Darya Dolzikova​, a nuclear expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, previously warned that military activity around nuclear sites “should not be normalised” but that such attacks may become more common.

“The expected growth of the importance of nuclear power in the global energy mix in the coming decades may increase the likelihood that future armed conflict will see greater targeting of nuclear energy infrastructure,” she said.

As well as causing infrastructural damage to an adversary or sending strong military signals, the “psychological salience” of nuclear sites mean they may be used for “escalatory, deterrent or coercive purposes”.

It may also be a deliberate tactic to release radioactive material to make an area into a no-go zone, but could inadvertently expand to “friendly” areas or escalate the conflict it it seeps into a third country.

Attacks on nuclear sites ‘increasing danger’ of radiological accident

Lukasz Kulesa, director of nuclear policy at RUSI, said that while most nuclear reactors were relatively “well protected against attacks and accidents through their reinforced structures, this is not always the case”.

“Some reactors in Russia, including at the Kursk nuclear power plant, lack such a protective concrete dome, which makes them more vulnerable and dangerous in case of an attack,” he said.

“Artillery or drone attacks and other military activities can also threaten staff and personnel working at the site, and damage or destroy support infrastructure crucial for the functioning of the power plant, such as water supply and power grid connections and generators, or spent nuclear fuel storage sites.

“All such attacks disturb the operations of nuclear power plants and increase the danger, and the most serious ones can cause a direct threat of a radiological incident.”

Kulesa warned that “the fact that previous incidents related to the nuclear security of Zaporizhzhia power plant had not resulted in a nuclear accident should not be a reason for complacency”.

“There remains a danger that international norms with regards to the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear power plants, and the efforts by the IAEA to clarify and strengthen nuclear safety and security norms during armed conflicts would be ignored in other conflicts.”

However, Bollfrass said that these attacks were “unlikely to bring about the next Chernobyl”.

“The most serious damage has been to facilities themselves and their ability to deliver electricity, and the integrity of Ukraine’s energy grid as a whole,” he said.

“Something like a missile hitting stored spent fuel or an operating reactor would create a serious radiological hazard, but neither side has shown any interest in doing so. Most hits on or near nuclear power plants have been inflicted by drones with much less powerful warheads.”
https://inews.co.uk/news/world/attacks-nuclear-plants-normalised-consequences-disastrous-3878805

September 5, 2025 Posted by | safety | Leave a comment

US nuclear safety regulators say their jobs could be at risk under Trump

By Timothy Gardner, September 4, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-nuclear-safety-regulators-say-their-jobs-could-be-risk-under-trump-2025-09-03/

  • Summary
  • Pressure high on nuclear regulators after Trump orders
  • Trump wants to quadruple nuclear power capacity by 2050
  • Commissioner: hard to make safety calls if more staff leave

WASHINGTON, Sept 3 (Reuters) – Two of the three remaining commissioners at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. nuclear safety watchdog, told a Senate hearing on Wednesday they feel President Donald Trump could fire them if they obstruct his goal to approve reactors faster.

Trump signed executive orders in May that set goals of fast-tracking new reactor licenses and quadrupling U.S. nuclear energy capacity by 2050 to boost the power grid, while also reducing staffing at the NRC.

Trump later fired Commissioner Chris Hanson, a Democrat, while Commissioner Annie Caputo, a Republican, left in July, saying she wanted to more fully focus on her family. That brought the traditionally five-member panel down to three.

Commissioner Matthew Marzano, a Democrat, told the hearing he felt he could be fired by the administration if he decides a new reactor design is unsafe and declines to license it.

Commissioner Bradley Crowell, also a Democrat, said he felt on “any given day I could be fired by the administration for reasons unknown.”

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

NRC Chairman David Wright, a Republican, said the agency has five applications from so-called advanced nuclear reactors that it is reviewing and it expects another 25 to 30 soon.

Wright declined to say whether he felt he could be fired, saying it would be “speculation.”

But he said NRC should not approve incomplete applications from companies looking to build new nuclear plants, even if it means missing an 18-month approval deadline set in Trump’s executive orders.

Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, a Democrat who supports nuclear energy for its potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, said about a dozen senior level managers at the NRC have left or announced they will leave since January, and that 143 staff departed between January and June.

“It’s a personnel bloodbath,” Whitehouse said. “The industry stands or falls on the NRC’s gold-standard reputation for nuclear safety. It’s now in jeopardy.”

Crowell said if the agency lost any more staff, it would be tough to credibly make safety cases on the timeline in Trump’s orders.

September 4, 2025 Posted by | safety, USA | Leave a comment

EDF’s Heysham 1 and Hartlepool nuclear plants to operate for further 12 months

New Civil Engineer, 02 Sep, 2025 By Tom Pashby

The operational lives of the Heysham 1 and Hartlepool nuclear power plants have been extended by 12 months by their operator EDF………………

Hartlepool, Heysham 1, Heysham 2 and Torness all underwent reviews by EDF in December 2024 to assess how long they can continue to generate electricity. Heysham 1 and Hartlepool were scheduled to stop producing power in March 2027.

At the time, an EDF spokesperson explained to NCE that the best-case scenario for the Heysham 1 and Hartlepool power stations was that they could justify a one-year extension. However, that was caveated with a need to await the outcomes of “important inspection and safety case milestones”, which were due to be completed in 2025.

Those milestones have now passed and the results were positive for the power stations. When EDF’s executive and licensee boards met yesterday, 1 September, they gave approval to extend the lives of the nuclear stations, so Heysham 1 and Hartlepool will now likely operate through to at least March 2028.

A statement from EDF on 2 September said: “Heysham 2 and Torness, which are both scheduled to generate until March 2030, were not in scope for this review after a two-year extension was granted last year.”

EDF still hopes to see all four AGRs continue producing electricity for as long as possible, so it can be expected to conduct further reviews down the line, but these reviews do not have set dates for completion, the spokesperson told NCE……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

AGRs now well past their sell-by date’ – anti-nuclear campaigner


Nuclear Free Local Authorities secretary Richard Outram told NCE that the extension of the plants’ operating lives raises concerns about the possibility of graphite cracking.

“The EDF announcement is unsurprising. Although company bosses may crow a lot about the preservation of local jobs, the NFLAs suspect this is actually about the preservation of EDF’s bottom line,” he said.

“Given the parlous state of the French parent company’s finances, the intermittent output of the domestic fleet, and the vast overspend on Hinkley Point C, EDF has a clear incentive to keep open for as long as possible any nuclear plant in the portfolio which actually operates and generates profits.

“The NFLAs have previously expressed our concerns with the Office for Nuclear Regulation that these ageing AGRs are now well past their sell-by date, with graphite cracking being a real worry, as seen recently at the sister AGR plant at Torness.

“We shall continue to monitor the situation and ask challenging questions of regulators and the industry because public safety and environmental harm must never be compromised in favour of company profit.”………………………………………………. https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/edfs-heysham-1-and-hartlepool-nuclear-plants-to-operate-for-further-12-months-02-09-2025/

September 4, 2025 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

What will happen if the Ukrainian Armed Forces attempt to strike the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant?

A drone of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was shot down near the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. Metro learned what such an attack would entail if it hit the station

5 Oct 2024, https://www.gazetametro.ru/articles/chem-obernetsja-popytka-vsu-udarit-po-kurskoj-atomnoj-elektrostantsii-04-10-2024

On Thursday, Kursk Region Governor Alexey Smirnov reported the destruction of a Ukrainian drone 5 kilometers from the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. According to official information, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attempted to hit the nuclear power plant, but the drone was destroyed on approach.

As Andrey Ozharovsky, an engineer-physicist and expert on the Radioactive Waste Safety program, told Metro , the Kursk NPP is extremely vulnerable to external influences.

— The Kursk nuclear power plant has a serious feature that makes it extremely vulnerable to a military or terrorist attack. These are RBMK-100 reactors of the Chernobyl type. At this station, as at the Ukrainian one, there is no protective shell for the reactors. That is, the “cap” that usually covers the reactor itself at nuclear power plants and thus protects it from external influences, — the expert explained.

He noted that due to such a technical solution, any shelling poses a very serious danger to the station. According to the scientist, it is especially dangerous that the reactors at the Kursk NPP are located in non-specialized buildings. 

“Of course, these Chernobyl-type reactors have been modernized and a literal repeat of Chernobyl is impossible. But in the event of a shelling at the station, a graphite fire and the release of a huge amount of radioactive substances into the environment with contamination of territories hundreds of kilometers away from the reactor cannot be ruled out,” the nuclear physicist emphasized.

He added that the recent attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces could have been not on the station, but on another facility in Kurchatov.

August 31, 2025 Posted by | Russia, safety | Leave a comment

« Previous Entries     Next Entries »