When UK leaves European Union how will disputes on the new UK-Belgium energy interconnector be resolved?
energy interconnector (“Funding Nemo: £600m power cable now links UK to Belgium,” overlooks one crucial matter: how will any disputes arising from the joint facility be resolved once the UK has left the EU and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice?
months ago ( “Staying Connected: Key Elements for UK–EU27 Energy Cooperation After Brexit”, 10 May 2017
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/staying-connected-key-elements-uk-eu27-energy-cooperation-after-brexit,
authored by Antony Froggatt, Senior Research Fellow on Energy, Environment and Resources at CH, (and his colleagues from CH Europe Programme plus the Energy Policy Group at University of Exeter). Their research paper proposed that energy – particularly electricity – should be treated as a special case in the UK’s future relationship with the EU27. They argue that “strong UK–EU27 energy cooperation could help ensure that existing and future interconnectors – physical pipes and cables that transfer energy across borders – between the UK, Ireland and the continent are used as efficiently as possible.”
http://drdavidlowry.blogspot.com/2018/12/future-regulation-of-uk-eu-energy.html
UK govt allowing Chinese nuclear technology for Bradwell reactor?

Times 9th Dec 2018 Something that would once have been unthinkable took another step towards
becoming reality last month just 40 miles east of London on the Essex
coast.
Britain’s nuclear watchdog nudged a Chinese reactor a step closer
to being allowed to operate in the UK, sending it through the “initial
high-level scrutiny” phase. It will eventually be built at
Bradwell-on-Sea. Much tougher hurdles lie ahead, but regulators have so far
been able to find no reason to block China General Nuclear’s HPR1000.
This is the dilemma facing Britain — one that has been thrown into stark
relief by the events of the past week. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the
chief financial officer of telecoms giant Huawei, means all that must be
seen through a different lens. The daughter of Huawei’s founder was
arrested in Canada at the behest of the US authorities and faces charges of
fraud and breaching US sanctions on Iran.
However, the tone on Chinese investment in Britain has now changed and recalls the words of Theresa
May’s former adviser Nick Timothy in 2015, when he said the government was
“selling our national security to China”. A deep-seated suspicion of
Huawei at GCHQ has finally surfaced as open hostility, while,
coincidentally, BT is removing Huawei technology from its 4G mobile
network. Yet all this looks remarkably like shutting the stable door after
the horse has bolted. If there was a time to reject Chinese investment, it
was 20 years ago.
Now, with ministers reliant on Chinese cash to fund a
significant slice of our future power needs, do they dare bite the hand
that feeds? Plus, in a post-Brexit world, a trade deal with China is meant
to top the priority list. For all the braggadocio, I suspect there will be
much soothing talk between London and Beijing in the months ahead. Does the
government really think it can put the Chinese dragon back in the bottle?
And can it afford to?
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/6cfdbf12-fafc-11e8-9a07-72ebead02362
If USA does not lift sanctions, North Korea could revive nuclear weapons development
North Korea warns it could revive nuclear development if U.S. does not lift sanctions, Global News, The Associated Press, 3 Nov 18
The statement released by the Foreign Ministry on Friday evening said North Korea could bring back its “pyongjin” policy of simultaneously advancing its nuclear force and economic development if the United States doesn’t change its stance. The North stopped short of threatening to abandon ongoing nuclear negotiations with Washington.
Still, it accused Washington of derailing commitments made by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump at their June summit in Singapore to work toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. It was the first time the North said it could potentially resume weapons tests and other development activities since Kim signalled a new state policy in April.
In an interview with Fox News’ Sean Hannity on Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said he plans to talk next week with his North Korean counterpart, apparently referring to senior North Korean official Kim Yong Chol. Pompeo did not provide the location and date for the meeting, which will likely be focused on persuading North Korea to take firmer steps toward denuclearization and setting up a second summit between their leaders……https://globalnews.ca/news/4626862/north-korea-revive-nuclear-sanctions/
UK must explain its plans for civil nuclear power security under ‘no deal’ Brexit scenario
Reeves calls for clarity for nuclear in ‘no deal’ Brexit scenario https://utilityweek.co.uk/reeves-calls-clarity-nuclear-no-deal-brexit-scenario/ David Blackman , 7 Dec 18 Rachel Reeves has urged the government to provide greater clarity about its plans for civil nuclear power if the UK leaves the EU without a withdrawal deal.
The chair of the House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy committee has written to Richard Harrington, who has responsibility for the nuclear industry in his portfolio as minister for busiUK
In the letter, Reeves acknowledges indications of progress on the civil nuclear relationship between the EU and the UK regarding issues like safeguards and trading arrangements.
The government passed a bill last year outlining plans to create a new safeguarding regime for nuclear material and labour once the UK has to leave its existing arrangements under the Euratom treaty.
The letter seeks more detail on the plans that the government is making to ensure that the civil nuclear sector can continue to function after next March if parliament has been unable to secure a broader separation agreement and whether a side-deal with Euratom is being pursued.
She also quizzes Harrington on whether the UK has received any signals from Euratom about whether it will be possible to maintain the “close association” that the government has said it wanted with the EU-wide nuclear co-operation arrangement.
Reeves also asks whether the government has made any arrangements to overcome possible hitches in the nuclear new build programme if the upcoming migration white paper inhibits the inflow of the migrant labour which has been “essential” for such projects.
Reeves said: “In the event of no deal and no transition period, the ongoing operation of the UK’s nuclear power stations could be put at risk. The government needs to spell out what it is doing to ensure that nuclear power stations continue to function from 29 March 2019 and whether it will seek a separate deal with Euratom in these circumstances.
“The government also needs to be clearer about its plans to facilitate the building of construction of major facilities such as Hinkley Point C if restrictions on migrant labour are introduced in the future.”
U.S. preparing to wreck the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)?
U.S. Preparing Grounds to Scrap Key Nuclear Treaty, Lavrov Says, Bloomberg, By Stepan Kravchenko, December 7, 2018, NATO rejected Russian offer to discuss INF accord, Lavrov says. Huawei official’s arrest shows U.S. ‘arrogance,’ minister says
The U.S. is preparing to wreck the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), a key accord with Russia on limiting nuclear weapons, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.
“I have the impression that they are preparing the ground to destroy this document as well,” following the U.S. decision to withdraw from another nuclear accord, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Lavrov told a televised press conference in Milan on Friday after a meeting of OSCE foreign ministers. Russia has repeatedly sent proposals to the U.S. to begin talks on extending the START agreement but has received no response so far, he said.
The New START treaty signed in 2010, which followed on from a 1991 agreement, is due to expire in 2021. Under the accord, Russian and U.S. arsenals are restricted to no more than 1,550 strategic warheads on no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton said during a visit to Moscow in October that Washington “does not have a position that we’re prepared to negotiate” on a new START treaty, adding that there’s “plenty of time” before the deal expires…….https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-07/u-s-preparing-grounds-to-scrap-key-nuclear-treaty-lavrov-says
Coal lobby is prominent at COP24 U.N climate change conference
COP24 President defends participation of coal companies at climate talks, ABC, The World By Erin Handley 7 Dec 18, COP24 President Michal Kurtyka has defended displays of coal soap and jewellery at key climate change talks in Poland, saying “it’s good to have everybody on board”.
Key points:
- The climate talks drew some ridicule for putting coal on display in the foyer
- New Zealand has named climate change as its biggest security threat
- Pacific nations are facing an existential threat, Michal Kurtyka said
Conference attendees were confronted with coal displays in the foyer and greeted by a performance from the Polish Coal Miners Band during the talks designed to bring about global action on climate change.
Polish President Andrzej Duda said using coal was not in conflict with climate protection, and with the climate change talks taking place in the city of Katowice — a coal mining stronghold — some observers said the setting undermined the purpose of the talks.
Mr Kurtyka, who is also a secretary of state in the Ministry of Environment, denied that coal companies “sponsored” the event, which he said was publicly funded by Poland — but said there were several partners, including Ikea and energy companies. …….
Richie Merzian, director of the Australia Institute’s Climate and Energy Program, said the coal-heavy setting left “a sour taste in the mouths of those who are committed to climate action”.
“But at the same time it is symbolic of trying to deal with the vested interests and the long history of reliance on fossil fuels in many of these cities and countries.”
Mr Merzian added that coal companies were not on the same page as delegates seeking an ambitious plan to combat climate change.
“Their core business is directly in contrast to … the goal of the Paris Agreement, which is to transition completely away from reliance on fossil fuels,” he said, adding that the influence of coal companies on governments ran deep.
“Stopping that outright, in-your-face sponsorship would definitely help in terms of optics, but a lot of the influence is just strongly embedded into the positions that the countries bring forward.”………
Yesterday New Zealand released a defence policy statement naming climate change as its biggest security threat and stressing the impact of climate change on the Pacific.
“It identifies climate change as one of the most significant security threats of our time, and one that is already having adverse impacts both at home and in New Zealand’s neighbourhood,” said Defence Minister Ron Mark in an emailed statement to Reuters.
Australia, however, has turned its back on its Pacific neighbours in terms of climate change, Mr Merzian said.
“The Pacific are getting desperate, and instead of their friends helping, they’re hurting,” he said.
“Poland is the Australia of the EU — the largest coal user, the largest coal producer — but unlike Australia that can operate in its own bubble, Poland has to marry up its position with its EU colleagues as a bloc, and that’s why they help drag Poland to be better than what it would otherwise be.” https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-07/coal-company-participation-at-climate-talks-defended/10592146
If USA dumps the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) – Putin threatens arms race
Putin threatens arms race if US dumps nuclear treaty https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/05/putin-threatens-arms-race-if-us-dumps-nuclear-treaty – Andrew Roth in Moscow
Russia would also build new medium-range missiles if the US were to do so, says president
Vladimir Putin has threatened that Russia will develop new missiles banned by the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty if the US exits the pact and pursues an arms buildup of its own.
The Russian president’s remarks came one day after the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, said Moscow was in “material breach” of the cold war-era treaty and issued a 60-day ultimatum for Russia to correct the alleged violations. Otherwise, he said, the US would quit the 1987 accord, considered a milestone in reducing the threat of a nuclear war in Europe.
In Moscow on Wednesday, Putin told journalists the US had provided “no evidence” of Russian violations, and threatened an arms race if the US sought to develop new medium-range missiles after exiting the treaty.
“Apparently, our American partners believe that the situation has changed so drastically that the US should also have such weapons,” Putin said in remarks carried by the Interfax news service. “What response is our side to give? A simple one: then we’ll do the same.”
The arms treaty, signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, banned ground-launched missiles with a range between 500-5,500km. The US and Nato have said that tests of a new Russian cruise missile, designated 9M729, violate the treaty.
The US effort to exit the treaty was spearheaded by John Bolton, Donald Trump’s hawkish national security adviser.
According to a leaked memo published by the Washington Post, Bolton has ordered the Pentagon to “develop and deploy ground-launched missiles at the earliest possible date”.
While it would take a substantial length of time to develop an entirely new missile, existing medium-range weapons in the US arsenal, such as sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, could be adapted for ground launch more quickly, arms experts said.
However, Nato allies would have to agree unanimously to have any new missile deployed in Europe.
The standoff comes amid a buildup of Russian and Nato forces in Europe, including nuclear forces. Nato claims that Russia has deployed nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad, and on Wednesday the Russian military confirmed it had deployed powerful new anti-ship missiles to Crimea following last month’s maritime clash with Ukraine.
Taiwan Votes to Maintain Import Ban on Fukushima Food Imports
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Why France must shut down many nuclear reactors
Backstory: Macron To Close Multiple Nuclear Reactors, But Why Now? https://cleantechnica.com/2018/11/30/backstory-macron-to-close-multiple-nuclear-reactors-but-why-now/?fbclid=IwAR0tO9BXT4FaNEuhnwexaC6cf4V6jj6cJLnQeiZPdA91t7SrrmL5n7xtRHg November 30th, 2018 by Michael Barnard
President Emmanuel Macron of France depressed nuclear executives globally in late November 2018, announcing the planned retirement of 14 of 58 reactors by 2035. This was still less than was promised in his election campaign, but represents a major internal political battle, as well as a major change of France’s circumstances.
This has been an emerging story for several years.
France did a better job than most of building nuclear plants. They picked a single design and built a bunch of them over a relatively concentrated 20 years from about 1978 onward. It was a massive, state-funded, state-managed energy infrastructure initiative at a scale rarely seen. They dodged a bunch of the mistakes of other geographies somewhat by accident. They aren’t subject to earthquakes or tsunamis. They kept the technology highly standard. They developed a skilled workforce for building them and rewarded them well.
But the last nuclear reactor went live almost 20 years ago, the oldest ones are at end-of-life, and the skilled workforce only knows how to maintain and operate existing reactors now, not build new ones. The current President of France, Macron, used to be the Minister of Industry. He’s stated publicly that even he couldn’t find out how much the build-out actually cost, with the clear assertion that a bunch of actual costs were hidden.
“Nobody knows the total cost for nuclear energy,” he said. “I was minister for industry and I could not tell you.”
And France had to build nuclear to be load-following due to its over-reliance on a more usually inflexible form of generation. Nuclear is good for baseload up to 30–40%, but when it has to be turned on and off it gets a lot more expensive very quickly. France has the good fortune to have been able to export a lot of electricity to the rest of the EU for several years, but the energy mix on the continent is strongly favoring more flexible forms of generation.
And now, a few things have changed in the decades since France made its huge bet on nuclear generation in the Messmer Plan in 1974.
Renewables are dirt cheap, with Lazard’s latest figures bringing them in at 3–6 times cheaper than new nuclear. (Amusingly, Lazard still labels wind and solar as ‘alternative energy‘.) Europe is a leading geography for wind and solar, so skilled trades and supply chains all exist. Europe’s grid has strengthened and expanded over the past 30 years, so the need for a country to go it alone has diminished substantially.
The EU was founded in 1993 and France is an integral part of it, and that has two impacts. The first is that France’s energy independence policy that was part of the impetus for a massive nuclear fleet looks archaic in context of modern politics and economics. The second is that EU regulations forbid destabilizingly large governmental subsidies for energy, something which the Hinkley plant in the EU had to fight through. As Macron’s experience shows, it’s actually impossible for anyone to figure out how much any nuclear plant actually cost due to budget fudging. This last is true globally, by the way.
French attempts to build next-generation reactors are failing in multiple locations in France and elsewhere. The cost and budget overruns and construction failures are staggering.
And Chernobyl and Fukushima both happened since the French nuclear build-out began. Public support diminished substantially after those events, one on the same continent and one a world away.
France receives a greater percentage of its electricity from nuclear than any country in the world, at 72% close to 50% more than its nearest ‘competitor’, Slovakia. And it will diminish over the coming decades. Its last-built reactor will reach end-of-life in 2040 or so. It’s unlikely that it will be replaced. And it’s unlikely that more than a fraction of the aging reactors will be refurbished at all.
Wind, solar, a continent-scale grid, and open economic borders all contributed to the death of the French nuclear dream. It’s time for France to wake up and join the future, and it has. It voted in Macron, a politician who promised to reduce France’s nuclear fleet. He fought the entrenched bureaucracy and EDF, and while the new plans are slower than the promised ones, they are the right plans on a pragmatic timeline.
UN Climate Conference faces the daunting need for the world to quit coal
An October report from the United Nations’ scientific panel on global warming found that avoiding the worst devastation would require a radical transformation of the world economy in just a few years.
Central to that transformation: Getting out of coal, and fast………
Vietnam says it is on track to meet its emissions reductions targets under the Paris accord. So, too, China and India, with far bigger carbon footprints. But those targets were set by the countries themselves, and they will not be enough to keep global temperatures from rising to calamitous levels. The United States has said it will exit the Paris climate pact.
Those sobering facts loom over the next round of international climate negotiations, starting Dec. 3 in the heart of Poland’s coal country. The American delegation plans to promote coal at the event, just as it did at last year’s talks in Bonn, Germany. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/24/climate/coal-global-warming.html
The danger of nuclear war through irrational decision-making by Donald Trump
America’s greatest danger: Nuclear war decision-making by Donald Trump https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/418509-americas-greatest-danger-nuclear-war-decision-making-by-donald-trump
BY LOUIS RENÉ BERES, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR — 11/28/18 An inappropriate or irrational nuclear command decision by President Donald Trump is plainly conceivable. Nothing accurate can ever be said about the true probability of such a scenario, but it is not an unfounded worry.
Might this American president become subject to various forms of psychological debility? On 14 March 1976, in response to my specific query, I received a letter from General (USA/ret.) Maxwell Taylor, a former Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerning nuclear risks of U.S. presidential decisional irrationality. Most noteworthy, in this handwritten response, is the straightforward warning contained in the closing paragraph. Ideally, cautioned Taylor, presidential irrationality is a problem that should be dealt with during an election, and not later on: “As to dangers arising from an irrational American president, the best protection is not to elect one.” There are assorted structural protections built into any presidential order to use nuclear weapons, including substantial redundancy. Nonetheless, virtually all of these reassuring and mutually reinforcing safeguards could become operative only at the lower or sub-presidential nuclear command levels. The safeguards do not apply to the Commander-in-Chief. This means there likely exist no permissible legal grounds to disobey any presidential order to use nuclear weapons. In principle, certain very senior individuals in the designated military chain of command could sometime choose to invoke applicable “Nuremberg Obligations,” but any such last-minute invocation would almost surely need to yield to considerations of U.S. domestic law. Should an American president operating within a bewildering chaos of his own making issue an irrational or seemingly irrational nuclear command, the only way for the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Adviser, and several possible others to effectively obstruct this order would be illegal “on its face.” Under the very best of circumstances, such informal safeguards might somehow manage to work for a time, but accepting the unrealistic assumption of “best case scenario” is hardly a rational or sensible path to nuclear security. It follows that we Americans ought to ask for more predictable and promising institutional impediments to any debilitated president. The United States is already navigating in uncharted waters. While President Kennedy did engage in personal nuclear brinkmanship with the Soviet Union back in October 1962, he had calculated his own odds of a consequent nuclear war as “between one out of three and even.” This seemingly precise calculation, corroborated both by JFK biographer Theodore Sorensen, and by my own later private conversations with former JCS Chair Admiral Arleigh Burke (my colleague and roommate at the Naval Academy’s Foreign Affairs Conference of 1977) suggests that President Kennedy was either irrational in imposing his Cuban “quarantine” or that he was wittingly acting out certain untested principles of “pretended irrationality.” JFK operated with serious and manifestly capable strategic advisors. The most urgent threat of a mistaken or irrational presidential order to use nuclear weapons flows not from any “bolt-from-the-blue” nuclear attack – whether Russian, North Korean, or American – but from an uncontrollable escalatory process. Back in 1962, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev “blinked” early on in the “game,” thereby preventing mutual and irrecoverable nuclear harms. Now, however, any escalatory initiatives undertaken by President Trump could express very unstable decision-making processes. Donald Trump should understand the unprecedented risks of being locked into an escalatory dynamic. Although this president might be well advised to seek escalation dominance in selected crisis negotiations with determined adversaries, he would also need to avoid catastrophic miscalculations. Whether we like it or not, and at one time or another, nuclear strategy is a bewildering game that President Donald Trump will have to play. To best ensure that this easily-distracted president’s strategic moves will be rational, thoughtful, and cumulatively cost-effective, it will first be necessary to enhance the formal decisional authority of his most senior military and defense subordinates. At a minimum, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Advisor, and one or two others in appropriate nuclear command positions should immediately prepare to assume more broadly collaborative and secure judgments in extremis atomicum. The only time for clarifying such indispensable preparations is now. Louis René Beres, Ph.D. Princeton, is emeritus professor of international law at Purdue University. He is the author of 12 books and several hundred articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war. His newest book is “Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy” (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed. 2018) |
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Political connections in Holtec’s plans for boosting nuclear power in India
Holtec’s Singh plans to build $680 million factory to boost nuclear power in India, The Inquirer, by Joseph N. DiStefano, On a flower-decked table in Mumbai, India, last week, a Holtec International delegation led by Krishna P. Singh, the India native and triple-degree Penn grad, joined with a group headed by Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, of Maharashtra, India’s second-most populous state, to sign a memo of understanding allowing Holtec to build a factory the company says will “give India autonomous capability” to make systems and parts for “the country’s planned expansion of nuclear generation.”……….
Belgium re-authorised nuclear power without having an environmental assessment – EU Magistrate critices.
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Nuclear Machinations Needed Enviro Study, Says EU Magistrate https://www.courthousenews.com/nuclear-machinations-needed-enviro-study-says-eu-magistrate/
In 2015 the Doel 1 nuclear reactor on the Scheldt river, near Antwerp and Belgium’s border with the Netherlands, was set to shutter in mid-February, and the nearby nuclear reactor Doel 2 would follow later that year. Come June 2015, however, the country passed legislation that reauthorized electricity production at Doel 1 until Feb. 15, 2025. The law also postponed the decommissioning of Doel 2 until Dec. 2, 2025. In exchange for keeping the reactors online, plant operator Electrabel agreed to invest approximately 700 million euros in security. Belgium officials did not deem an environmental impact assessment necessary, however, because they determined that the modifications would not cause any negative radiological effects or otherwise change existing radiological environmental effects significantly.
The extensions have spurred a challenge before the Belgian Constitutional Court, but that case is on holding pending input from the European Court of Justice on what EU law requires. In a nonbinding advisory opinion to that Luxembourg-based court, Advocate General Juliane Kokott agreed with the challengers Thursday that the extensions appear to have been granted without the necessary environmental studies. “Faits accomplis weaken the effectiveness of an environmental assessment that is carried out retrospectively,” Kokott wrote. “The main function of the assessment, when used in good time, is to influence the decision concerning the project such that environmental damage is minimised as far as possible. For this reason, it is to be undertaken, under Article 6(4) of the Aarhus Convention and Article 6(4) of the EIA Directive, as early as possible, when all options are open. If it is merely carried out retrospectively, it can perform this function only to a very limited extent because many decisions have already been taken. Modifying those decisions in the light of the retrospective assessment is even less attractive when they have actually already been implemented.” The Belgian government reached a new energy pact earlier this year to phase out atomic power between 2022 and 2025. Compared to the 58 nuclear reactors operated in France, Belgium is in a distant fourth place when it comes to highest share of nuclear power in national energy grids. The country sources about 40 percent of its power from atomic energy, and the Doe and Tihange power plants together provide more than 50 percent of the country’s electricity. Though it supposed to meet a renewable energy target of 13 percent by 2020, recent Eurostat data shows that only 8.7 percent of Belgium’s energy needs are sourced from renewable sources like solar and wind. When Belgium reauthorized the two Doel reactors in 2015, they had been offline for two years so that officials could carry out extensive safety checks on newly emerged micro-cracks. |
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A mistake to expect Kim Jong Un to give a full renunciation of nuclear weapons in advance
Why Insisting on a North Korean Nuclear Declaration Up Front is a Big Mistake, 38 NORTH BY: SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, NOVEMBER 28, 2018, My reply to the frequently asked question if Kim Jong Un will ever give up North Korea’s nuclear weapons is, “I don’t know, and most likely he doesn’t know either. But it is time to find out.” However, insisting that Kim Jong Un give a full declaration of his nuclear program up front will not work. It will breed more suspicion instead of building the trust necessary for the North to denuclearize, a process that will extend beyond the 2020 US presidential election.
However, the time it will take to get to the endpoint should not obscure the progress that has already been made. Since this spring, Kim Jong Un has taken significant steps to reduce the nuclear threat North Korea poses. He has declared an end to nuclear testing and closed the nuclear test tunnels by setting off explosive charges inside the test tunnel complex. He also declared an end to testing intermediate- and long-range missiles including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). I consider these as two of the most important steps toward reducing the threat North Korea poses and as significant steps on the path to denuclearization.
Whereas the North still poses a nuclear threat to Japan and South Korea as well as US military forces and citizens in the region, the threat to the United States has been markedly reduced. In my opinion, North Korea needs more nuclear and ICBM tests to be able to reach the United States with a nuclear-tipped missile. Freezing the sophistication of the program is a necessary precursor to rolling it back in a step-by-step process.
At the September 2018 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, Kim also told President Moon that he would commit to dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex if the US takes commensurate measures—unspecified, at least in public. The Yongbyon complex is the heart of North Korea’s nuclear program. Shutting it down and dismantling it would be a very big deal because it would stop plutonium and tritium production (for hydrogen bombs) and significantly disrupt highly enriched uranium production.
Yet, Kim’s actions have been widely dismissed as insignificant or insincere by both the left and the right of the American political spectrum. In many of these quarters, the sincerity of Kim’s denuclearization promise is judged by whether or not he is willing to provide a full and complete declaration and to agree on adequate verification measures. But Kim’s willingness to provide a full declaration at this early stage tells us little about his willingness to denuclearize. Moreover, I maintain that insisting on this approach is a dead end, certainly as long as Washington continues to apply “maximum pressure” instead of moving to implement the steps on normalizing relations that President Trump agreed to in the June Singapore statement.
A full declaration is a dead end because it is tantamount to surrender, and Kim has not surrendered, nor will he. A complete account of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities would, in Kim’s view, likely be far too risky in that it would essentially provide a targeting list for US military planners and seal the inevitable end of the nuclear program and possibly his regime.
Furthermore, a declaration must be accompanied by a robust verification protocol. That, in turn, must allow inspections and a full accounting of all past activities such as production and procurement records as well as export activities. And, once all these activities are complete, an inspection protocol must provide assurances that activities that could support a weapons program are not being reconstituted. This would be a contentious and drawn-out affair.
It is inconceivable that the North would declare all of its nuclear weapons, their location, and allow inspections of the weapons or of their disassembly up front. But in addition to the weapons themselves, a nuclear weapon program consists of three interlocking elements: 1) the nuclear bomb fuel, which depending on the type of bomb includes plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and forms of heavy hydrogen—deuterium and tritium; 2) weaponization—that is, designing, building and testing weapons, and; 3) delivery systems, which in the case of North Korea appear to be missiles, although airplane or ship delivery cannot be ruled out. Each of these elements involves dozens of sites, hundreds of buildings, and several thousand people.
Let me give an example of what is involved just for verification of plutonium inventories and means of production. ………..
It should be apparent that the declaration plus commensurate verification of the amount of plutonium North Korea possesses, which I believe is only between 20 and 40 kilograms, will be an enormous job. I cannot see it being accomplished in the current adversarial environment and certainly not within the timeframe that has been specified by the US government.
A similar sequence of declarations, inspections, and verification measures would have to be developed for the other bomb fuels, namely HEU and the hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium. Verification of HEU inventories and means of production will be particularly contentious because very little is known about the centrifuge facility at the Yongbyon site. As far as we know, my Stanford colleagues and I are the only foreigners to have seen that facility, and then only in a hurried walk-through in 2010. In addition, there exists at least one other covert centrifuge site.
The situation is even more problematic for the second element of the North’s nuclear program, that of weaponization, which includes bomb design, production, and testing because we know nothing about these activities or where they are performed. Although we have some information regarding the nuclear test site at which six nuclear tests were conducted, we do not know if there are other tunnel complexes that have been prepared for testing.
The third element includes all of the North’s missiles and its production, storage and launch sites and complexes. These will also represent a major challenge for complete and correct declarations, inspections and verification.
Once all of the elements have been declared and the dismantling begins, then the focus will have to change to verifying the dismantlement and assessing the potential reversibility of these actions—a challenge that is not only difficult, but one that must be ongoing. ………
At this time, the level of trust between Pyongyang and Washington required for North Korea to agree to a full, verifiable declaration up front does not exist. Hence, my colleagues Robert Carlin and Elliot Serbin and I have suggested a different approach. Negotiations should begin with an agreed end state: North Korea without nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapon program. Civilian nuclear and space programs would remain open for negotiation and possible cooperation. But all facilities and activities that have direct nuclear weapons applicability must eventually be eliminated.
Rather than insisting on a full declaration up front, the two sides should first agree to have the North take significant steps that reduce the nuclear threat it poses in return for commensurate movements toward normalization—the details of which would have to be worked out during negotiations. …………
The Trump team claims progress is being made but insists on maintaining maximum pressure. The North’s Foreign Ministry has pointed outthat the “improvement of relations and sanctions are incompatible.” Also, most US North Korea watchers are either wedded to old think that you can’t negotiate with Pyongyang or they are determined to prove President Trump’s claims on North Korea wrong.
With nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula dramatically reduced, it is time to find out if Kim’s drive to improve the economy will eventually lead to denuclearization. He may determine that his nuclear arsenal poses a significant hindrance to economic development that outweighs the putative benefits it confers. Washington and Seoul should work together to encourage rather than inhibit this potential shift. https://www.38north.org/2018/11/shecker112818/
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