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Grand Gulf nuclear plant in Mississippi raises concerns about nuclear power 

Miss. plant raises concerns about nuclear power   EE News, Edward Klump and Kristi E. Swartz, E&E News reportersPublished: Wednesday, January 6, 2021  Chronic downtime at the largest single-unit U.S. nuclear power station is raising questions about the electric industry’s argument that aging reactors provide critical reliability and help decarbonize the grid.The Grand Gulf plant in Mississippi was at reduced or zero power about 74% of the time in 2020, daily reactor status reports show. The reasons included refueling, maintenance and unplanned outages at the aging 35-year-old plant.

That means Entergy Corp., which is the plant’s main owner, and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, which operates the regional grid, often have to rely on other generation to fill the gap — possibly costing more and boosting greenhouse gas emissions if fossil fuel sources are tapped.

“The same rule applies to Grand Gulf as applies to coal, to gas, to any resource that we know we’re paying more for than we’re getting from,” said Logan Atkinson Burke, executive director of the New Orleans-based Alliance for Affordable Energy. “And the question is, who’s profiting from that, and who is being burdened by it?”

Experience at Grand Gulf suggests regulators and plant operators may need to consider new approaches and closer oversight of aging reactors, which face an uncertain future if they become too expensive to repair and maintain, observers say. This could have national implications as the electricity industry tries to transition away from fossil fuels and aims to rely more heavily on carbon emissions-free nuclear power.

The industry says nuclear plants are performing well broadly and companies are making investments to keep them operating. But Grand Gulf shows that a reactor that often goes offline can be expensive and undermine climate goals. An examination of New Orleans, for example, provided a snapshot in the past, estimating that a multiday unplanned outage at Grand Gulf in late 2018 resulted in higher costs of more than $1 million for New Orleans ratepayers, according to data from the city.

Aging and troubled nuclear reactors in competitive markets also occupy shaky ground because cheaper options like renewables have been able to undercut them economically, and there isn’t always a customer base to prop them up. Grand Gulf operates in a regulated territory, so it has protection, said Paul Patterson, a utility analyst with Glenrock Associates LLC. But he added that keeping plants alive isn’t a given.

“If the stars aren’t aligned politically to support these plants, it’s not going to happen,” he said………

Grand Gulf finished last among U.S. reactors at 68.8% capacity…….

At the same time, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently questioned the site’s operators about mislabeling of waste tied to the plant. And the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has been reviewing complaints around Grand Gulf’s financial structure that could lead to a refund for customers……..

Nuclear reactors are designed to act as baseload power plants, which means they aren’t usually turned on and off frequently. It also takes time to take a nuclear plant offline, unless there’s an emergency that automatically trips the reactor for safety reasons.

But downtime at Grand Gulf has plagued the plant for years, as E&E News reported in 2018 (Energywire, Dec. 4, 2018). …….  its performance tanked in 2020, as it was at zero on about 39% of the days. This stemmed largely from the refueling and upgrades Entergy undertook — and issues that followed.

Safety concerns could lead to more time that Grand Gulf is not operating, according to observers.   Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists ticked off a list of statistics for Grand Gulf that he said concern him. The reactor is in Column 2 of the NRC’s so-called Action Matrix, meaning its performance has declined. It has a number of “green” or low-level safety issues that may trigger additional inspections and reviews, and it has a “white” finding, which is more severe.

“That’s showing a troubling trend in management and safety control,” said Lyman, nuclear power safety director at UCS…..

Lyman questioned whether there is stringent oversight by federal regulators of basic procedures such as replacing and maintaining equipment, following guidelines and continuing education. Management needs to follow through on overseeing maintenance activities, he said.

“All of these seem to be challenging the safety of the plant,” he said.

The NRC looks for so-called cross-cutting issues, which are something that affects most or all safety cornerstones. This is as broad as having a “safety conscious work environment” and can be as specific as human behavior and identifying and solving problems. But the agency has been under pressure to weaken its oversight, which means such patterns may be missed, Lyman said…….

Colby Cook, a spokesperson for the Louisiana Public Service Commission, said a directive last year authorized LPSC staff to initiate a complaint at FERC regarding Grand Gulf’s operations. He said the complaint hasn’t been filed yet. But it could involve other jurisdictions that have an interest in how the plant performs.

And regulators in various states are watching federal agencies for potential decisions related to Grand Gulf………

Lyman of USC acknowledged bipartisan support in Congress for nuclear power. He said it’s up to the Energy Department to promote nuclear as a climate solution, but said the reactors need to be running safely if that’s the case. This is where the NRC comes in.

“The people who you need to depend on to make sure the plants are running safely are not doing their jobs now,” Lyman said…….

Lyman called for a more detailed grading system at the NRC so the public has a better sense of safety problems. That could lead to public pressure on the staff and management at certain plants, which also are dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

“I’m concerned generation with the operating reactor fleet especially when they are under economic pressure, especially now with COVID,” Lyman said……

Burke of the Alliance for Affordable Energy in Louisiana said she has no reason to be confident that Grand Gulf will have a great future performance. When the plant is offline, she said, Entergy and MISO likely depend on gas-fueled generation in the region. Burke also worried that new natural gas-fired units could be proposed to replace Grand Gulf at some point….

Burke said utilities and regulators need to plan with credible data.

“If we’re honest about what this plant is costing us all, then this plant shuts down and we finally get to plan for the future,” she said.  https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063721867

January 7, 2021 Posted by | business and costs, politics, USA | Leave a comment

Canada vocal about nuclear disarmament, but silent about the Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

January 7, 2021 Posted by | Canada, politics, weapons and war | Leave a comment

France’s declining nuclear production

Les Echos 4th Jan 2021, Nuclear: EDF production at its lowest for nearly thirty years. The year
2020 was marked by extremely low nuclear production, very slightly above
335 TWh. The impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the maintenance of power
plants and the extent of the work already in progress explain this
situation, which should continue in 2021 and 2022.

https://www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/energie-environnement/nucleaire-la-production-dedf-au-plus-bas-depuis-pres-de-30-ans-1278018

January 7, 2021 Posted by | France, politics | Leave a comment

Nuclear Command and Control: Session 3 of the Congressional Study Group

Nuclear Command and Control

Session 3 of the Congressional Study Group,   Wednesday, December 30, 2020  https://www.brookings.edu/research/nuclear-command-and-control/

Editor’s Note:The following is a summary of the third session of the Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security, a program for congressional staff focused on critically engaging the legal and policy factors that define the role that Congress plays in various aspects of U.S. foreign relations and national security policy.

On May 7, 2020, the Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security convened online to discuss the question of the command and control of U.S. nuclear weapons. At present, the president has the unilateral authority to choose to use nuclear weapons, and many assume that this is a result of his Article II powers under the Constitution. But is this assumption correct? Are there ways Congress can limit when and how the president uses nuclear weapons?

To discuss this topic, the working group was joined by three outside experts Professor Mary DeRosa of Georgetown University Law Center, a former legal advisor to the National Security Council; Chris Fonzone, a partner at Sidley Austin and another former legal advisor to the National Security Council; and Professor Matt Waxman of Columbia Law School, who is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and has previously held senior positions in the National Security Council and U.S. Department of State. Prior to the session, the study group received several written pieces as background reading, including:

In addition, the study group coordinator Scott R. Anderson also circulated a handout (download here) on relevant legal authorities for the attendees to reference.
DeRosa began the conversation with a discussion of the constitutional authorities behind the use of nuclear weapons. While there is some debate about the exact line between congressional and presidential authority, she noted that most scholars agree that Congress could choose to exclude or limit the availability of nuclear weapons and perhaps even set some limits on how nuclear weapons are used. Moreover, congressional authorization is arguably constitutionally required for uses of nuclear weapons that are not in self-defense, particularly where outside the context of an existing armed conflict. Nuclear weapons–and particularly the first use of them–also implicate the United States’s international legal obligations, as their use necessarily raises questions about compliance with principles of distinction and proportionality. That said, while there are strong arguments in support of the conclusion that Congress can set some limits on the use of nuclear weapons–including first use–these limitations are more likely to face  constitutional issues the more they try to micromanage the president’s strategic and tactical decisions regarding the use of the armed forces.

Waxman then shifted focus to ways that Congress might be able to shape the executive branch process for deciding when and how nuclear weapons are used. While few are likely to argue with the president’s ability to use nuclear force in response to a nuclear attack, Waxman identified three problematic scenarios that might emerge in a case of nuclear first use: that the president would pursue such an action without due deliberation; that a president might give such an order, but that it is not obeyed by military personnel who believe it to be unlawful or unwise; and that a third party might try to interfere with the system to inhibit a response or trigger an unauthorized launch.

A better defined process–for example, one that requires that an order to use nuclear weapons be certified as valid by the Secretary of Defense and lawful by the Attorney General–could reduce all three of these risks by putting some limits on the president’s unilateral authority, encouraging a more deliberative and justified process that is less likely to trigger reservations, and creating a process with multiple safeguards less subject to external manipulation. Such a process could be implemented by the president by executive order or by Congress, though the latter may raise constitutional objections in some corners and runs the risk of being disregarded by administrations who maintain it is constitutional. That said, by leaving the decision-making within the executive branch, such approaches are less likely to incur constitutional objections than outright statutory prohibitions, which may make them more effective in the long run.

 

Finally, Fonzone stepped in to discuss the military chain of command, specifically in reference to the oft-discussed possibility that military personnel might disregard an impetuous order to use nuclear weapons as unlawful. The operational chain of command, he noted, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense down to the military ranks, and is defined in substantial part by statute in addition to executive branch guidelines. While the Secretary of Defense might be removed from office for disobeying a presidential order, members of the military can face criminal sanctions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That said, this duty of obedience does not extend to “patently” or “manifestly” illegal orders, which military personnel are obligated not to follow. This bar, however, is extremely high and requires clear knowledge on the part of the servicemember. As many major policy decisions, including the use of nuclear weapons, occur on contested and complex constitutional and legal terrain, even unlawful orders are not likely to be seen as “patently” or “manifestly” illegal. Hence, one should not rely on the lawfulness exceptions to the chain of command alone as a meaningful safeguard against such conduct.

From there, the study group went into open discussion, where they raised issues and addressed questions relating to: the civilian control of nuclear technology and weapons development; international legal and policy restraints on the use of nuclear weapons; and in what circumstances the use of nuclear weapons should properly be left to the president’s unilateral authority (e.g., self-defense).

 

Visit the Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security landing page to access notes and information on other sessions.

January 4, 2021 Posted by | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Bechtel, Westinghouse and Southern Company’s hopeless case to save shambolic Wylfa nuclear project

People Against Wylfa B 31st Dec 2020,  On the last day of troubled 2020, the Westminster Government has deferred a decision on a Development Consent Order for a nuclear power station at Wylfa until the end of April 2021. This is the fourth time this has happened, and the second time in a row for Duncan Hawthorne, chief executive Horizon, to ask for a deferral.
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The attempt to build Wylfa B has been shambolic from the start. It’s high time to abandon the foolish dream that has paralyzed Anglesey’s development since 2006. As we approach the 10th anniversary of the Fukushima disaster, the latest to be mentioned as
‘saviours’ of the radioactive poisoning project that would threaten the health of everyone on the island and beyond are three US companies.
                                                                                              ****
Here they are: Bechtel Corporation, Westinghouse and Southern Company. Here are some of the trio’s transgressions: Bechtel – recently fined nearly $58million for financial fraud with another company over a 10-year period at Hanford Nuclear Reservation, the most radioactively contaminated site in the United States. This followed a fine of $125million for low quality work on the same site in 2016.
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Much more could be said about Bechtel. Westinghhouse and Southern Company – Westinghouse went bankrupt while trying to build Vogtle Power Station in the state of Georgia. The two AP1000 reactors of the type destined for Wylfa are five years behind Schedule, have doubled in cost to $25billion, and there is no guarantee that the power station will ever be completed. Another of their projects
was the V C Summer nuclear plant in South Carolina. It was abandoned
unfinished in 2017, and is still being paid for by taxpayers.   https://www.stop-wylfa.org/news/

January 4, 2021 Posted by | business and costs, politics, UK | Leave a comment

With all the costs and delays – why not scrap the Wylfa nuclear project right now?

January 4, 2021 Posted by | politics, UK | Leave a comment

New delay in planning decision for £16bn Wylfa nuclear development on Anglesey

Business Live 31st Dec 2020, A planning decision on Wylfa Newydd has been delayed for another four
months for talks with potential new investors to continue. Japanese
multi-national Hitachi announced in September they were pulling out of
funding the £16bn nuclear development on Anglesey. At that point BEIS
Secretary of State Alok Sharma delayed the Development Consent Order (DCO)
decision for the application to December 31. Now following a letter from
Duncan Hawthorne, chief executive of Wylfa developer Horizon Nuclear Power,
that date has been extended to April 30.

https://www.business-live.co.uk/economic-development/wylfa-newydd-planning-decision-delayed-19543446.amp

January 2, 2021 Posted by | politics, UK | Leave a comment

Cover-up! how consumers will be forced to pay for cost-overruns for Sizewell C nuclear construction

December 31, 2020 Posted by | business and costs, politics, secrets,lies and civil liberties, UK | Leave a comment

Avril Haines is unfit for Director of National Intelligence, with her history of coverup of tortures.

December 31, 2020 Posted by | politics, secrets,lies and civil liberties, USA | Leave a comment

Scotland wants no part in the Tories’ latest nuclear energy folly

December 31, 2020 Posted by | politics, UK | Leave a comment

In so many ways, Sizewell C nuclear plan is a bad deal for Britain, and especially for climate action

Why Sizewell C is a bad deal for the UK public and our net zero goals
https://bhesco.co.uk/blog/stop-sizewell-c-nuclear-power by Dan Curtis on 21/12/2020   It has been a tumultuous few weeks for the UK’s energy policy, with the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for achieving Net Zero by 2050 followed swiftly by the Government’s long overdue Energy White Paper.

Then, the news broke that the UK Government has begun discussions with French utility EDF for the development of a new nuclear reactor at Sizewell, “C” in Suffolk, basically scrapping their 10 year policy that “there will be no levy, direct payment or market support for electricity supplied or capacity provided by a private sector new nuclear operator, unless similar support is also made available more widely to other types of generation”.

The site at Sizewell contains two existing nuclear power facilities, Sizewell A (decommissioning and site restoration until 2098 at taxpayers’ cost) and Sizewell B (still active). The new proposals are to build an extension to the site, implementing the same reactor design as that Hinkley Point “C” in Somerset.

Defenders of the project invariably claim that expanding the UK’s nuclear fleet will contribute to the decarbonisation of the energy supply, ensure energy security, while providing consumers with long-term affordable electricity – all arguments which fail to stand up to scrutiny, as we shall demonstrate.

Nuclear power does not provide good value for money

It takes a phenomenal amount of money to develop new nuclear power stations, before we even begin to consider the additional cost of storing and managing the radioactive waste material.

Hinkley C was originally estimated to cost £18 billion but the project has been mired in delays and is now vastly over-budget, predicted to cost up to £3 billion more than initially forecast – a quite remarkable overspend.

 

To address this vulnerability to financial losses for the project developers EDF and Chinese firm CGN, who are considering withdrawing their investment, the UK Government are considering investing directly in Sizewell C, shifting risk and cost to the British taxpayer.

This is in addition to a suggestion of implementing a “regulated asset base” financing model which would enable EDF to charge energy customers for the cost of construction as well as the cost of electricity generation (thereby exposing both customers and taxpayers to the risk of project cost overruns).

Adding to the financial nonsense of new nuclear power is the sky-high cost of the electricity that is produced to the end user. The government has granted a guaranteed, inflation linked price of £92.50 per megawatt hour for the electricity to be produced by Hinkley Point C.

Compare this to the cost of offshore wind, which under a 2019 contract for difference auction, saw prices come in at £39.65 per megawatt hour – less than half the cost of energy from Hinkley.

In contrast to the ever-increasing costs of nuclear (Sizewell C has an estimated starting price tag of £20 billion, which will no doubt balloon), the cost of solar and wind power continue to fall year on year, with solar costs having declined by an astonishing 87% since 2010.

A primary motivation for nuclear power is its value for military applications

The astronomical construction and decommissioning costs of nuclear power does not make financial sense when looking at it from a UK taxpayer/ consumer viewpoint.  It is only when considering the wider potential applications of a nuclear programme that we can begin to understand why successive UK governments have been so supportive of the industry.

 

Researchers at the University of Sussex found compelling evidence that the UK’s domestic nuclear power programme is only supported by the Government because of its value in contributing towards the military nuclear weapons programme, which would otherwise be financially unviable without such subsidised support from domestic energy customers.

Prof Andrew Stirling of the university’s Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) said:

”The exclusion of these issues from the consultation remit reflects a serious military-driven bias in UK Government attachments to nuclear power. This is not only making carbon emissions reductions slower and more expensive, but also impeding possibilities for the UK post-COVID economic recovery”.

We believe that the arguments in favour of nuclear power are disingenuous. Backers of nuclear power should be honest that they want to build more nuclear plants not because they will provide energy security or a good deal for customers, but because they are necessary for maintaining the UK’s fleet of nuclear submarines, and all of the sabre rattling ‘seat at the table’ geo-political bravado that goes along with retaining our position as a nuclear power.

New nuclear power takes too long to build to have any meaningful role in tackling the urgent climate crisis

Wherever new nuclear power stations are being built we see long delays and broken promises.

Hinkley Point C has suffered setbacks and complications ever since development began in 2017 and it is not expected to come online until 2025. It’s the same story at other locations where this type of reactor is being built, such as in Flamanville in France which is seven years overdue and the Olkiluoto plant in Finland which is ten years late!  There is only one EPR nuclear reactor operational in the world. This is the Taishun plant in China, built on the same sea where Fukishima exploded in 2011.

Clearly, new nuclear power plants will not address the issue of urgent and radical carbon emissions reductions needed to be achieved by 2030 if we are to avoid irreversible climate breakdown.

It is also worth noting the gigantic carbon footprint that would result from the construction of Sizewell C. When considering the pros and cons of nuclear power, it is vital to honestly account for the enormous quantities of cement (which has a huge carbon footprint) and other hazardous materials required to build the facility in the first place.

Adding insult to the assertion that Sizewell C will be a long-term benefit to the environment is the fact that the site is to be located adjacent to an RSPB nature reserve Minsmere, a AONB site that EDF has already started demolishing.

Nuclear power produces nuclear waste which lasts for thousands of years

The by-product of nuclear fission is hazardous nuclear waste which remains radioactive for thousands of years. This presents an extraordinary liability and storage risk to future UK taxpayers and residents.

The current liability cost of decommissioning and safely storing our existing nuclear waste is estimated to be in the region of £232 billion – a truly eye-watering sum, and one that will only continue to increase as more nuclear reactors such as Hinkley and Sizewell contribute additional toxic waste materials for every year that they are operational.

 

The UK already has the largest stockpile of radioactive plutonium in the world, estimated to be between 112 and 140 tons, stored in an area of outstanding natural beauty in Cumbria. Future generations will not think kindly of us if we continue to add to this dangerous legacy with more hazardous nuclear waste that costs billions each year to manage to avert disaster.

The UK does not need Sizewell C or any other nuclear power stations – we can meet our energy needs with 100% clean renewable energy

We already have the means at our disposal to meet our heat and power needs through a combination of renewable energy and energy storage technologies.

Combine this with a comprehensive programme to reduce demand through energy efficiency improvements and we can conclude with confidence that there is no reason to develop new nuclear power stations in the UK.  In fact, the alternatives will deliver lower energy prices for the consumer and better taxpayer value over the long term.

A common defence for nuclear power is the need for a steady supply of ‘base load’ power in the event that intermittant renewables cannot meet demand.

But this way of thinking is obsolete. Our future energy supply in the UK will be based on dynamism and flexibility, where consumers adapt their behaviour in sync with variable generation output. As Steve Holliday, former CEO of National Grid said in 2015:

“The idea of baseload power is already outdated. I think you should look at this the other way around. From a consumer’s point of view, baseload is what I am producing myself. The solar on my rooftop, my heat pump – that’s the baseload.”

The Government’s recent announcement that it is entering into talks with EDF regarding Sizewell C is, we are told, the beginning of a long consultation process which will consider the long-term costs and benefits of such a project before reaching a conclusion on whether to give it the go ahead.

These talks are by no means a ‘green-light’ to the project. We hope that it is not naïve to believe that due diligence will be done, that the information will be honest and transparent, and that logical, rational thinking for the benefit of all residents of our small island will prevail.

But this way of thinking is obsolete. Our future energy supply in the UK will be based on dynamism and flexibility, where consumers adapt their behaviour in sync with variable generation output. As Steve Holliday, former CEO of National Grid said in 2015:

“The idea of baseload power is already outdated. I think you should look at this the other way around. From a consumer’s point of view, baseload is what I am producing myself. The solar on my rooftop, my heat pump – that’s the baseload.”

The Government’s recent announcement that it is entering into talks with EDF regarding Sizewell C is, we are told, the beginning of a long consultation process which will consider the long-term costs and benefits of such a project before reaching a conclusion on whether to give it the go ahead.

These talks are by no means a ‘green-light’ to the project. We hope that it is not naïve to believe that due diligence will be done, that the information will be honest and transparent, and that logical, rational thinking for the benefit of all residents of our small island will prevail.’

Sources ……

December 31, 2020 Posted by | politics, UK | Leave a comment

South Korean government to cut nuclear power generation

9th National Power Supply Plan Finalized
Government to Cut Coal-fired and Nuclear Power Generation,
Business Korea, By Jung Suk-yee,  December 29, 2020The South Korean government finalized its ninth national power supply plan on Dec. 28. According to it, half of coal-fired power plants in South Korea will be shut down within 15 years for the purpose of carbon reduction, 11 old nuclear power plants will be shut down at the ends of their service lives without any service life extension, and LNG- and renewable energy-based power generation will be expanded to offset the resultant decrease in power supply. ……
When it comes to nuclear power plants, the government is planning to increase the number from 24 to 26 from this year to 2024 and then decrease it to 17 by 2034. The capacity of the plants will be reduced from 23.3 GW to 19.4 GW from this year to 2034……..http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=57559

December 31, 2020 Posted by | politics, South Korea | Leave a comment

Joe Biden reported to be considering cuts to America’s $1.2trillion nuclear modernization program

December 31, 2020 Posted by | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

How the marketing of American weapons determines U.S. foreign policy on China

Key Pentagon Official Turned China Policy Over to Arms Industry & Taiwan Supporters  October 28, 2020,  The triumph of corporate and foreign interests over one of the most consequential decisions regarding China is likely to bedevil U.S. foreign policy for years to come, writes Gareth Porter. https://consortiumnews.com/2020/10/28/key-pentagon-official-turned-china-policy-over-to-arms-industry-taiwan-supporters/   By Gareth Porter
The Grayzone   

When the United States finalized a set of seven arms sales packages to Taiwan in August, including 66 upgraded F-16 fighter planes and longer-range air-to-ground missiles that could hit sensitive targets on mainland China, it shifted U.S. policy sharply toward a much more aggressive stance on the geo-strategic island at the heart of military tensions between the United States and China.

Branded “Fortress Taiwan” by the Pentagon, the ambitious arms deal was engineered by Randall Schriver, a veteran pro-Taiwan activist and anti-China hardliner whose think tank had been financed by America’s biggest arms contractors and by the Taiwan government itself.  

Since assuming the post of assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs in early 2018, Schriver has focused primarily on granting his major arms company patrons the vaunted arms deals they had sought for years.

The arms sales Schriver has overseen represent the most dangerous U.S. escalation against China in years. The weapons systems will give Taiwan the capability to strike Chinese military and civilian targets far inland, thus emboldening those determined to push for independence from China.

Although no U.S. administration has committed to defending Taiwan since Washington normalized relations with China, the Pentagon is developing the weapons systems and military strategy it would need for a full-scale war. If a conflict breaks out, Taiwan is likely to be at its center.

Returning Favors

Schriver is a longtime advocate of massive, highly provocative arms sales to Taiwan who has advanced the demand that the territory be treated more like a sovereign, independent state. His lobbying has been propelled by financial support from major arms contractors and Taiwan through two institutional bases: a consulting business and a “think tank” that also led the charge for arms sales to U.S. allies in East Asia.

The first of these outfits was a consulting firm called Armitage International, which Schriver founded in 2005 with Richard Armitage, a senior Pentagon and State Department official in the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations.

Schriver had served as Armitage’s chief of staff in the State Department and then as deputy sssistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. (Armitage, a lifelong Republican, recently released a video endorsement of Joseph Biden for president).

As a partner in Armitage International, Schriver was paid consulting fees by two major arms contractors — Boeing and Raytheon — both of which hoped to obtain arms sales to Taiwan and other East Asian allies to compensate for declining profits from Pentagon contracts.

Schriver started a second national-security venture in 2008 as president and CEO of a new lobbying front called The Project 2049 Institute, where Armitage served as chairman of the board. The name of the new institution referred to the date by which some anti-China hawks believed China intended to achieve global domination.

From its inception, The Project 2049 Institute focused primarily on U.S. military cooperation with Northeast Asian allies — and Taiwan in particular — with an emphasis on selling them more and better U.S. arms.

Schriver, known as the Taiwan government’s main ally in Washington, became the key interlocutor for major U.S. arms makers looking to cash in potential markets in Taiwan. He was able to solicit financial support for the institute from Lockheed Martin, General Atomics, BAE and Raytheon, according to Project 2049’s internet site, which provides no figures on the amounts given by each prior to 2017.

Equally important, however, is The Project 2049 Institute’s heavy dependence on grants from the government of Taiwan. The most recent annual report of the institute shows that more than a third of its funding in 2017 came either directly from the Taiwan government or a quasi-official organization representing its national security institutions.

Project 2049 received a total of $280,000 from the Taiwan Ministry of Defense and Taiwan’s unofficial diplomatic office in Washington (TECRO) as well as $60,000 from the “Prospect Foundation,” whose officers are all former top national-security officials of Taiwan.  In 2017, another $252,000 in support for Schriver’s institute came from the State Department, at a time when it was taking an especially aggressive public anti-China line.

By creating a non-profit “think tank,” Schriver and Armitage had found a way to skirt rules aimed at minimizing conflicts of interest in the executive branch.

The Executive Order 13770 issued by President Donald Trump in early 2017 that was supposed to tighten restrictions on conflicts of interest barred Schriver from participation for a period of two years “in any particular matter that is directly and substantially related to my former employer or former clients….”

 

However, the financial support for Project 2049 from Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, General Atomics, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, and from Taiwanese official and quasi-official bodies were considered as outside that prohibition, because they were not technically “clients.”

Big Wins for Supporters

Brought into the Pentagon at the beginning 2018 to push China policy toward a more confrontational stance, Schriver spent 2018 and the first half of 2019 moving proposals for several major arms sales to Taiwan — including the new F-16s and the air-to-ground missiles capable of hitting sensitive targets in China — through inter-agency consultations.

He secured White House approval for the arms packages and Congress was informally notified in August 2019, however, Congress was not notified of the decision until August 2020. That was because Trump was engaged in serious trade negotiations with China and wanted to avoid unnecessary provocation to Beijing.

Lockheed Martin was the biggest corporate winner in the huge and expensive suite of arms sales to Taiwan. It reaped the largest single package of the series: a 10-year, $8 billion deal for which it was the “principal contractor” to provide 66 of its own F-16 fighters to Taiwan, along with the accompanying engines, radars and other electronic warfare equipment.

The seven major arms sales packages included big wins for other corporate supporters as well: Boeing’s AGM-84E Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM), which could be fired by the F-16s and hit sensitive military and even economic targets in China’s Nanjing region, and sea-surveillance drones from General Atomics.

In February 2020, shortly after Schriver left the Pentagon, the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen received the lobbyist in her office in Taipei and publicly thanked him for having “facilitated the sale of F-16V fighter jets to Taiwan and attached great importance to the role and status of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific region.” It was an extraordinary expression of a foreign government’s gratitude for a U.S. official’s service to its interests.

Having delivered the goods for the big military contractors and the Taiwan government, Schriver returned to The Project 2049 Institute, replacing Armitage as chairman of the board.

Neocon Vision

The arms sales to Taiwan represented a signal victory for those who still hoping to reverse the official U.S. acceptance the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government of all of China.

Ever since the 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique, in which the United States vowed that it had “no intention of interfering in China’s internal affairs or pursuing a policy of “two China’s” or “one China, one Taiwan,” anti-China hardliners who opposed that concession have insisted on making the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which called for the United States to sell Taiwan such arms “as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” as keystone of U.S. Taiwan policy.

The neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) led by William Kristol and Robert Kagan wanted to go even further; it pushed for the United States to restore its early Cold War commitment to defend Taiwan from any Chinese military assault.

Thus a 1999 PNAC statement called on the United States to “declare unambiguously that it will come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan, including against the offshore islands of Matsu and Kinmen.”

After leaving the World Bank in 2008 amidst a scandal involving his girlfriend, Paul Wolfowitz – the author of that 1999 statement on East Asia – turned his attention to protecting Taiwan.

Despite the absence of any business interest he was known to have in Taiwan, Wolfowitz was chairman of the board of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council from 2008 to 2018. The Project 2049 Institute was a key member of the council, along with all the major arms companies hoping to make sales to Taiwan.

During the first days of Wolfowitz’s chairmanship, the U.S.-China Business Council published a lengthy study warning of a deteriorating air power balance between China and Taiwan.  The study was obviously written under the auspices of one or more of the major arms companies who were members, but it was attributed only to “the Council’s membership” and to “several outside experts” whom it did not name.

The study criticized both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations for refusing to provide the latest F-16 models to Taiwan, warning that U.S. forces would be forced to defend the island directly if the jets were not immediately supplied.  It also called for providing Taiwan with land-attack cruise missiles capable of hitting some of the most sensitive military and civilian targets in the Nanjing province that lay opposite Taiwan.

The delicacy of the political-diplomatic situation regarding Taiwan’s status, and the reality of China’s ability to reunify the country if it chooses to do so has deterred every administration since George H.W. Bush sold 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan. That was, until Shriver’s provocative “Fortress Taiwan” sale went through.

The triumph of corporate and foreign interests in determining one of the most consequential U.S. decisions regarding China is likely to bedevil U.S. policy for years to come.  At a moment when the Pentagon is pushing a rearmament program based mainly on preparation for war with China, an influential former official backed by arms industry and Taiwanese money has helped set the stage for a potentially catastrophic confrontation.

Gareth Porter is an independent investigative journalist who has covered national security policy since 2005 and was the recipient of Gellhorn Prize for Journalism in 2012.  His most recent book is The CIA Insider’s Guide to the Iran Crisis, co-authored with John Kiriakou, just published in February.

This article is from The Grayzone

December 29, 2020 Posted by | investigative journalism, marketing of nuclear, politics, politics international, Reference, secrets,lies and civil liberties, USA, weapons and war | 4 Comments

Small Nuclear Reactors – the Big New Way – to get the public to fund the nuclear weapons industry

so-called “small nuclear reactors”

Downing Street told the Financial Times, which it faithfully reported, that it was “considering” £2 billion of taxpayers’ money to support “small nuclear reactors”

They are not small

The first thing to know about these beasts is that they are not small. 440MW? The plant at Wylfa (Anglesey, north Wales) was 460MW (it’s closed now). 440MW is bigger than all the Magnox type reactors except Wylfa and comparable to an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor.

Only if military needs are driving this decision is it explicable.

”Clearly, the military need to maintain both reactor construction and operation skills and access to fissile materials will remain. I can well see the temptation for Defence Ministers to try to transfer this cost to civilian budgets,” 

Any nation’s defence budget in this day and age cannot afford a new generation of nuclear weapons. So it needs to pass the costs onto the energy sector.

How the UK’s secret defence policy is driving energy policy – with the public kept in the darkhttps://www.thefifthestate.com.au/energy-lead/how-the-uks-secret-defence-policy-is-driving-energy-policy-with-the-public-kept-in-the-dark/  BY DAVID THORPE / 13 OCTOBER 2020

 The UK government has for 15 years persistently backed the need for new nuclear power. Given its many problems, most informed observers can’t understand why. The answer lies in its commitment to being a nuclear military force. Continue reading

December 29, 2020 Posted by | politics, Reference, secrets,lies and civil liberties, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, UK, weapons and war | Leave a comment