nuclear-news

The Nobel that wasn’t Trump’s: Why Oslo chose a Venezuelan rebel over a peacemaker.

What Oslo calls a “peaceful transition” others might see as a strategy of regime change.

Machado in many ways stands on the same side as Trump. She’s seen positively by figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and all of them share a goal of opposing Nicolás Maduro’s regime. So this may not have been a snub to Trump – it’s more of a balancing act.”

Rt.com 10 Oct 25

By honoring an opposition leader wanted in Caracas, the Nobel Committee reignited a debate over who gets to define “peace”.

The 2025 Nobel Peace Prize has gone to María Corina Machado, one of the most prominent faces of Venezuela’s opposition. The committee’s language is familiar – ”rights,” “peaceful transition” – but the story behind it isn’t. Machado’s record blends volunteer election networks with long-running fights over foreign funding; her name has appeared in cases tied to efforts to unseat the government – charges she rejects; and a country remains split over where legitimate politics ends and regime change begins.

The award lifts a domestic struggle onto a global stage and drops it into a fresh context: for much of the year, chatter about a “Nobel for Trump” hung in the air, and the very idea of what counts as peacemaking is once again up for debate far beyond Caracas.

From steel dynasty to political underground

María Corina Machado is an engineer by training and one of the most recognizable figures in Venezuela’s opposition over the past two decades. Born in Caracas to a family linked to the industrial group SIVENSA, she studied at the Andrés Bello Catholic University and later at IESA, Venezuela’s leading management school. Early exposure to the family business and an affinity for market-friendly ideas shaped her public profile: an emphasis on entrepreneurship, privatization, and integration with global markets

In 2002, Machado co-founded Súmate, a civic platform that built volunteer networks to train election observers and run parallel vote counts. That is when the first major controversy took hold: authorities alleged the group received funding from US-based organizations; her supporters countered that the money supported legitimate civic initiatives. From then on, every move she made in politics was viewed through the lens of where to draw the line on outside assistance.

That same year brought Venezuela’s most dramatic recent upheaval – the brief ouster of President Hugo Chávez and the “Carmona decree,” which proclaimed a provisional government. Machado’s name surfaced in debates over who backed the decree; she denied participating. The legal and historical arguments never fully settled, but the episode fixed an image of Machado as a politician whom opponents associate with the idea of “regime change.”

A long stretch of investigations and restrictions followed. Between 2003 and 2005, prosecutors examined alleged “illegal foreign funding” for NGOs; travel bans appeared periodically. In 2014, amid street protests, Machado became one of the most prominent voices criticizing the government and, in official rhetoric, was linked to cases alleging a plot and even an attempt on President Nicolás Maduro’s life. Machado rejected the accusations as politically motivated. The upshot was a prolonged ban on holding public office…………………………………………………….

After the 2024 vote, Machado largely disappeared from public events. Her statements came via video, with her whereabouts undisclosed. The phrase “underground network” took hold in media shorthand: supporters saw a movement operating under pressure; opponents argued it was a continuation of street-level tactics and external lobbying against the authorities. Against that backdrop, the Nobel Peace Prize elevates Machado’s biography to the international stage – and carries a long-running national argument over the limits of political struggle to a much wider audience.

Why Oslo chose her

In announcing its decision, the Nobel Committee said it was honoring María Corina Machado “for her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.”

The language was familiar — rights, democracy, peaceful transition — but the context was not. Machado’s record blends civic mobilization and volunteer networks with long-running controversies over foreign funding. Her name has appeared in cases tied to efforts to unseat the government — allegations she has consistently rejected — and Venezuela remains deeply divided over what counts as legitimate political struggle.

Those contradictions make the award particularly charged. Within Venezuela, the same actions that Oslo calls “peaceful resistance” have been framed by officials as destabilization efforts supported from abroad. For Machado and her allies, the prize validates years of activism under pressure; for the government, it confirms a long-held view that Western institutions reward political opposition disguised as democracy promotion.

The decision also fits a larger pattern. By awarding Machado, the Nobel Committee effectively reintroduced Venezuela into the global political conversation – not as an energy supplier or a sanctions case, but as a test of how the world now interprets democracy itself. What Oslo calls a “peaceful transition” others might see as a strategy of regime change. That tension is what makes this year’s prize less about peace – and more about the politics of defining it.

The Nobel announcement also landed amid one of the most charged moments in US–Venezuela relations in years. Since early 2025, Washington has tightened its posture toward Caracas – reviving energy sanctions that had been partially lifted after the 2023 Barbados agreements and signaling a renewed focus on “transnational crime networks” in the Caribbean. In practice, that meant more joint naval patrols, renewed intelligence activity, and a sharper tone linking Venezuela to the regional drug trade – an accusation Caracas dismissed as a pretext for pressure.

At the same time, the Biden-era approach of limited engagement had given way to a more assertive line under Trump’s second administration. The new White House framed its strategy as a “war on narcotics” and a push to restore regional stability; in Venezuela and across Latin America, many viewed it as an attempt to reassert US influence in a region increasingly connected to Russia, China, and Iran.

Notably, María Corina Machado publicly voiced support for Washington’s decision to combat Venezuelan drug cartels through military means. Her statement drew wide attention, as it aligned her stance with the US administration’s tougher regional policy and blurred the boundary between domestic opposition and foreign strategy………..

The Nobel that got away

For much of the year, Washington buzzed with talk of a “Nobel for Trump.” The president himself didn’t hide his ambition: he wanted to go down in history as a peacemaker. After returning to the White House, he made foreign policy the centerpiece of his second term – launching a flurry of initiatives aimed at cooling global flashpoints and projecting a renewed American presence abroad.

Supporters pointed to a record few modern leaders could match. The Abraham Accords, signed during his first term, had already redefined Israel’s ties with its neighbors – and served as the basis for his 2024 nomination by congresswoman Claudia Tenney.

By late 2025, Trump’s team listed seven cases where US diplomacy had helped halt or de-escalate conflicts:………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Anastasia Gafarova, deputy director of the Center for Political Information, described the Nobel Committee’s choice as “an attempt at compromise rather than confrontation.”

“Despite tensions between Washington and Caracas, Machado in many ways stands on the same side as Trump. She’s seen positively by figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and all of them share a goal of opposing Nicolás Maduro’s regime. So this may not have been a snub to Trump – it’s more of a balancing act.”……………………………………………

What ‘peace’ means now

For the Nobel Committee, María Corina Machado’s name will likely stand beside those of activists and reformers who defied authoritarian systems. For Washington and Caracas, however, the meaning of her award reaches far beyond that frame………………….

To her critics, it is yet another example of Western institutions rewarding political alignment under the banner of human rights……………

Trump’s shadow still looms over the story. His claim to the title of “peacemaker” has turned the Peace Prize itself into a political mirror: a reflection of who gets to define peace, and on whose terms.

According to Fyodor Lukyanov, Trump’s prospects may not be gone for good:

“The door isn’t completely closed. For his achievements – real or perceived – he could very well be nominated again next year, and the Nobel Committee will have a chance to weigh everything once more.”…………..

October 13, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment

The Gaza ceasefire deal could be a ‘strangle contract’, with Israel holding all the cards

Marika Sosnowski, Senior research fellow, The University of Melbourne: October 10, 2025 , https://theconversation.com/the-gaza-ceasefire-deal-could-be-a-strangle-contract-with-israel-holding-all-the-cards-267208?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The%20Weekender%20-%203545436146&utm_content=The%20Weekender%20-%203545436146+CID_9b06daa16329ec78ac380b964d55ad0a&utm_source=campaign_monitor&utm_term=The%20Gaza%20ceasefire%20deal%20could%20be%20a%20strangle%20contract%20with%20Israel%20holding%20all%20the%20cards

There are jubilant scenes in both Gaza and Israel after both sides in the war have agreed to another ceasefire. If all goes well, this will be only the third ceasefire to be implemented by Israel and Hamas, despite there being numerous other agreements to try to stop the violence.

There is a lot to be happy about here. Most notably, this ceasefire will bring a halt to what has now been established as a genocidal campaign of violence against Palestinians in Gaza, the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and the resumption of aid into Gaza to alleviate the famine conditions there.

However, a lot of unknowns remain. While the terms of the “first phase” of this ceasefire have been rehearsed in previous ceasefires in November 2023 and January 2025, many other terms remain vague. This makes their implementation difficult and likely contested.

After this phase is complete, a lot will depend on domestic Israeli politics and the Trump administration’s willingness to follow through on its guarantor responsibilities.

Immediate positives for both sides

The ceasefire agreement appears to be based on the 20-point plan US President Donald Trump unveiled in the White House alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29.

What will be implemented in what is being called the “first phase” are the practical, more detailed and immediate terms of the ceasefire.

In the text of the peace plan released to the public, these terms are stipulated in:

• 
  Point 3 – an “immediate” end to the war and Israeli troop withdrawal to an “agreed upon line”.
• Points 4 and 5 – the release of all living and deceased hostages by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.
• Point 7 – full aid to flow into the strip, consistent with the January ceasefire agreement terms.

While these steps are positive, they are the bare minimum you would expect both sides to acquiesce to as part of a ceasefire deal.

Over the past two years, Gaza has been virtually demolished by Israel’s military and the population of the strip is starving. There is also great domestic pressure on the Israeli government to bring the hostages home, while Hamas has no cards left to play besides their release.

The text of these particular terms has been drafted in a way that means both Israel and Hamas know what to do and when. This makes it more likely they will abide by the terms.

Both sides also have a vested interest in these terms happening. Further, both parties have taken these exact steps before during the November 2023 and January 2025 Gaza ceasefires.

Given this, I expect these terms will be implemented in the coming days. It is less clear what will happen after that.

What comes next: the great unknown

After the first phase of the ceasefire has been implemented, Hamas will find itself in a situation very similar to ceasefire agreements that occurred during the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 and only recently ended with the downfall of the Assad regime in late 2024. I call these strangle contracts.

These type of ceasefire agreements are not like bargains or contracts negotiated between two equal parties. Instead, they are highly coercive agreements that enable the more powerful party to force the weaker party into agreeing to anything in order for them to survive.

Once the hostages are released, Hamas will go back to having negligible bargaining power of its own. And the group, along with the people of Gaza themselves, will once again be at the mercy of Israeli military might and domestic and international politics.

Other terms of the Trump peace plan relating to Hamas’ demilitarisation (Points 1 and 13), the future governance of Gaza (Points 9 and 13) and Gaza’s redevelopment (Points 2, 10 and 11) are also extremely vague and offer little guidance on what exactly should occur, when or how.

Under such a strangle contract, Hamas will have no leverage after it releases the hostages. This, together with the vague terms of the ceasefire agreement, will offer Israel a great deal of manoeuvrability and political cover.

For example, the Israeli government could claim Hamas is not abiding by the terms of the agreement and then recommence bombardment, curtail aid or further displace the Palestinians in Gaza.

While Point 12 rightly stipulates that “no one will be forced to leave Gaza”, Israel could make conditions there so inhospitable and offer enough incentives to Gazans, they might have little choice other than to leave if they want to survive.

Points 15 and 16 stipulate that the United States (along with Arab and other international partners) will develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force to deploy to Gaza to act as guarantors for the agreement. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) will also withdraw “based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization”.

But these “standards, milestones and timeframes” have been left unspecified and will be hard for the parties to agree on.

It is also possible Israel could use the vagueness of these terms to its advantage by arguing Hamas has failed to meet certain conditions in order to justify restarting the war.

Knowing it has no leverage after the first phase, Hamas has explicitly said it is expecting the US to fulfil its guarantor role. It is certainly a good sign the US has pledged 200 troops to help support and monitor the ceasefire, but at this stage, Hamas has little choice other than to pray the US’ deeds reflect its words.

While the ceasefire has now been passed by a majority of the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), five far-right ministers voted against the deal. These include Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who said the ceasefire is akin to “a deal with Adolf Hitler”.

This opposition bloc will no doubt be making more threats – and could potentially act – to bring down Netanyahu’s government after the first phase is implemented.

The problem with ceasefires

The first phase of this ceasefire will offer Hamas and Israel key items – a hostage-prisoner swap, a halt to violence and humanitarian aid.

After that, rather than a bargaining process with trade-offs between negotiating partners operating on a relatively even playing field, without US opprobrium, the ceasefire could easily devolve into an excuse for further Israeli domination of Gaza.

A ceasefire was always going to be a very small step forward in a long road towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Without meaningful engagement with Palestinians in their self-determination, we can only hope the future for Gazans will not get any worse.

As a Palestinian leader from Yarmouk camp in Syria told me back in 2018: “If there is a ceasefire, people know the devil is coming.”

October 12, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international | Leave a comment