The Script of Anxiety: Poland’s Nuclear Weapons Fascination

we can only assume that the desire to have massively lethal weapons on one’s own soil that would risk obliterating life, limb and everything else is but a sporting parlour game of misplaced assumptions.
March 17, 2025 Dr Binoy Kampmark , https://theaimn.net/the-script-of-anxiety-polands-nuclear-weapons-fascination/
With the Ukraine War and the retreat of the United States from what has routinely been called Europe’s security architecture, states are galloping to whatever point of presumed sanctuary is on offer. The general presumption is that the galloping is done in the same step and rhythm. But Europe, for all the heavy layers of union driven diplomacy, retains its salty differences.
Poland is particularly striking in this regard, having always positioned itself as a defender against the continent’s enemies, perceived or otherwise. This messianic purpose was well on show with the exploits of King John III Sobieski in his triumphant defence of Vienna against the Ottoman Empire in 1683. The seemingly endless wars against Russia, including the massacres and repressions, have also left their wounding marks on a fragile national psyche. These marks continue to script the approach of Warsaw’s anxiety to its traditional enemy, one that has become fixated with a nuclear option, in addition to a massive buildup of its armed forces and a defence budget that has reached 4.7% of its national income. While there is some disagreement among government officials on whether Poland should pursue its own arsenal, a general mood towards stationing the nuclear weapons of allies has taken hold. (As a matter of interest, a February 21 poll for Onet found that 52.9 percent of Poles favoured having nuclear weapons, with 27.9 percent opposed.)
This would mirror, albeit from the opposite side, the Cold War history of Poland, when its army was equipped with Soviet nuclear-capable 8K11 and 3R10 missiles. With sweet irony, those weapons were intended to be used against NATO member states.
The flirtatious offer of French President Emmanual Macron to potentially extend his country’s nuclear arsenal as an umbrella of reassurance to other European states did make an impression on Poland’s leadership. Prudence might have dictated a more reticent approach, but Prime Minister Donald Tusk would have none of that before the Polish parliament. In his words, “We must be aware that Poland must reach for the most modern capabilities also related to nuclear weapons and modern unconventional weapons.” According to the PM, “this is a race for security, not for war.”
The Polish President, Andrzej Duda, is also warm to the US option (he has been, over his time in office, profoundly pro-American), despite Tusk’s concerns about a “profound change in American geopolitics.” He was already ruminating over the idea in 2022 when he made the proposal to the Biden administration to host US nuclear weapons, one that was also repeated in June 2023 by then-Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. To have such weapons in Poland was a necessary “defensive tactic […] to Russia’s behaviour, relocating nuclear weapons to the NATO area,” he explained to the BBC. “Poland is ready to host this nuclear weapon.”
Duda then goes on to restate a familiar theme. Were US nuclear weapons stored on Polish soil, Washington would have little choice but to defend such territory against any threat. “Every kind of strategic infrastructure, American and NATO infrastructure, which we have on our soil is strengthening the inclination of the US and the North Atlantic Alliance to defend this territory.” To the Financial Times, Duda further reasoned that, as NATO’s borders had moved east in 1999, “so twenty-six years later there should also be a shift of the NATO infrastructure east.”
Much of this seems like theatrical, puffy nonsense, given Poland’s membership of the NATO alliance, which has, as its central point, Article 5. Whether it involves its protection by a fellow NATO ally using conventional or nuclear weapons, hosting such nuclear weapons is negated as a value. Poland would receive collective military aid in any case should it be attacked. But, as Jon Wolfsthal of the Federation of American Scientists reasons, an innate concern of being abandoned in the face of aggression continues to cause jitters. Tusk’s remarks were possibly “a signal of concern – maybe to motivate the United States, but clearly designed to play on the French and perhaps the British.”
The crippling paranoia of the current government in the face of any perceived Russian threat becomes even less justifiable given the presence of US troops on its soil. According to the government’s own information, a total of 10,000 troops are present on a rotational basis, with US Land Forces V Corps Forward Command based in Poznań. In February, Duda confirmed to reporters after meeting the US envoy to Ukraine Gen. Keith Kellogg that there were “no concerns that the US would reduce the level of its presence in our country, that the US would in any way withdraw from its responsibility or co-responsibility for the security of this part of Europe.”
Duda goes further, offering a sycophantic flourish. “I will say in my personal opinion,America has entered the game very strongly when it comes to ending the war in Ukraine. I know President Donald Trump, I know that he is an extremely decisive man and when he acts, he acts in a very determined and usually effective way.” With those remarks, we can only assume that the desire to have massively lethal weapons on one’s own soil that would risk obliterating life, limb and everything else is but a sporting parlour game of misplaced assumptions.
Most Scots disagree with Anas Sarwar about building new nuclear plants
The National 16th March 2025 https://www.thenational.scot/politics/25012201.scots-disagree-anas-sarwar-building-new-nuclear-plants/
DOESN’T the government wanting to build new nuclear plants in Scotland (Sunday National, Mar 16) betray why the UK subjugates Scotland as a vassal state to dump the nuclear garbage it doesn’t want polluting England onto we Scots? Like their dangerous weapons of mass destruction that Westminster doesn’t want located adjacent to the cossetted wealthy south-east; let’s just dump it on the Scots.
NO! NO! NO!
Not only don’t we want nuclear plants here in Scotland, we want England to bear the burden and risk of the obscenity that is nuclear weapons.
Anas Sarwar says it’s not the archaic planning rules that restrict development of nuclear plants, but the “intransigence of the ideologically rigid Scottish Government”. Sarwar fails to understand that this policy of the Scottish Government is widely supported by Scots; it is he who is out of step promoting a polluting, dangerous technology that is so 20th century. Here in the 21st century we’re already well served by hydro, wind and solar power with huge potential for further development. And there are hydrogen and tidal technologies among others to be developed, to build the broad mix of green energy without any need for nuclear power.
Isn’t Scottish Labour MPs changing their minds to accord with Starmer and Milliband’s diktat a clear case of them placing their own personal political careers before the wishes of the people they are supposed to represent and take instruction from? How is this democracy?
Who is surprised about anything emanating from this group of shape-shifting Labour MPs who lied to voters to get elected? Scots voted for them in desperation to rid us of the worst Tory government in history, sick fed up of being continually hammered by draconian policies that created financial hardship for those least well-off. Their reward for placing trust in Labour was to get a government that simply picked up the Tories’ baton of austerity hardship and is intent to press on and finish the race to bottom for ordinary folks, pensioners, those on fixed income and benefits, while ensuring that the wealthy who should and can afford to make a just contribution are left unscathed.
This desire of Starmer and his henchmen to dump nuclear plants on Scotland should prove to Scots that Westminster will never willingly allow us to secede from this iniquitous union that values Scotland only as a cash cow, somewhere to dump the dangerous stuff they don’t want in their back yard. If we want to live in a just land, won’t we have to prise ourselves from this UK union? We will have to take back our independence despite Westminster.
At the General Election, Scots voted in a poor electoral system for Labour. We received more tory; this time red-tory Labour.
If we are to benefit from real change, the Scottish Parliament elections in 2026 have got to be used as a concerted effort, with all pro-indy interests working together to demonstrate we’ve had enough of more than 300 years of failure and use the strength of feeling for indy to justify us taking back our independence.
One issue: independence. We vote SNP 1 with no SNP candidates on the list. Other indy-supporting parties under an umbrella group created for the election on the list, position by agreement, to achieve the supermajority that makes the case for indy irresistible.
Risk of Radiation Carcinogenesis

There is not currently thought to be a notable risk of a crewmember developing clinically detectable cancer during a mission due to spaceflight exposure.
Robert E. Lewis, NASA, 11 Mar 25, https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/esdmd/hhp/risk-of-radiation-carcinogenesis/
Increased radiation exposure in the spaceflight environment outside of low-Earth orbit may contribute to an increased risk of developing cancer later in an astronaut’s life. Shielding is effective against some radiation exposure, such as solar particle events (SPE) but does not mitigate Galactic Cosmic Radiation (GCR) exposure. Primary contributors to development of cancer later in life are dependent on mission parameters and duration, solar conditions, body structures present, individual radiosensitivity, and age at exposure. The effects of other sources of uncertainty that may modify radiation risk (e.g., secondary spaceflight hazards) are being characterized but cannot be estimated or integrated currently. Terrestrial cancer therapies continue to progress and may be able to mitigate cancer outcomes. There is not currently thought to be a notable risk of a crewmember developing clinically detectable cancer during a mission due to spaceflight exposure.
Canada to review the purchase of US-made F-35 fighter jets in light of Trump’s trade war
By ROB GILLIES, March 16, 2025
TORONTO (AP) — Canada’s new Prime Minister Mark Carney has asked Defense Minister Bill Blair to review the purchase of America’s F-35 fighter jet to see if there are other options “given the changing environment,” a spokesman for Blair said Saturday.
Defense ministry press secretary Laurent de Casanove said the contract to purchase U.S. military contractor Lockheed Martin’s F-35 currently remains in place and Canada has made a legal commitment of funds for the first 16 aircraft. Canada agreed to buy 88 F-35’s two years ago.
Carney, who was sworn in on Friday, has asked Blair to work with the military “to determine if the F-35 contract, as it stands, is the best investment for Canada, and if there are other options that could better meet Canada’s needs,” de Casanove said……………………………………………………………………………………………………..more https://apnews.com/article/f35-canada-trump-0d3bf192d3490d87570d48475ff2c3a6
Towards a Eurobomb: The Costs of Nuclear Sovereignty

it would be much better if the leaders of the EU spend as much time on diplomacy with Russia than in building up European defense.
Instead of investing in weapons of mass destruction, making EU defense more efficient should be the priority as well as integrating Russia into a larger collective security organization
Tom Sauer |11.03.2025 , https://www.aa.com.tr/en/opinion/opinion-towards-a-eurobomb-the-costs-of-nuclear-sovereignty/3505915
The author is a professor in International Politics at the University of Antwerp in Belgium.
- If American soldiers or the tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn, the odds are that the Europeanization of the French (and maybe British) nuclear weapons in one way or another may indeed become reality
ISTANBUL
The Trump administration’s recent isolationist statements, amid the talks of war in Europe, have revived discussions on Europeanizing French (and possibly British) nuclear weapons. After 75 years of NATO, concerns over US abandonment are increasingly shaping European foreign policy discussions. In the past, the French idea of a “dissuasion concertée (concerted deterrence) was mostly met with silence, especially in Germany. This time around the conservative leader Friedrich Merz seems in favor despite the fact that NATO is still alive and the US still has 100,000 soldiers and 100 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons are stationed in Türkiye, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. If the soldiers or the tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn, the odds are that the Europeanization of the French (and maybe British) nuclear weapons in one way or another may indeed become reality.
There are different scenarios imaginable. The first step is for European nuclear states to declare that their “national interests” align with “European interests,” a principle already reflected in the Lisbon Treaty. The latter, by the way, also contains a collective defense clause similar to NATO’s Article 5. Further steps could be imagined to make these statements more credible: information exchange, consultation, joint planning, joint exercises, and co-financing. Another step could involve deploying French dual-capable aircraft in Germany or Poland. A final step would be the creation of an EU nuclear bomb in a European Defense Union (EDU). It remains, however, still to be seen how the Ukraine war will accelerate the pace towards such an EDU.
What are the costs of Europeanization of nuclear weapons?
First of all, the assumption that nuclear deterrence works is uncertain. Advocates of nuclear weapons believe that it works. They forget that in history many nuclear weapon states (including Israel, India, the UK) have been attacked by non-nuclear weapon states. In theory, it is very hard to make it work as it assumes for instance a rational enemy. It also assumes that the possessor is really prepared to use them. However, if used on a massive scale, it means the annihilation of the planet. In the war in Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron for that reason stated that even if Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, France would not retaliate with nuclear weapons.
Secondly, emerging and disruptive technologies (like AI) and weapon systems (like hypersonic missiles) will further undermine the so-called nuclear stability. Ideally, conventional deterrence (using hypersonic missiles) could and should replace nuclear deterrence on the condition that all nuclear states agree.
Thirdly, extended nuclear deterrence, read the atomic umbrella, is even more incredible. As early as the 1970s, Henry Kissinger cautioned Europeans against assuming that the US would employ nuclear weapons for their defense. That is also the reason why France did not want to shelter under the US umbrella, and why it built its own nuclear arsenal in the 1950s. Ironically, France now offers its umbrella to its European partners.
Fourthly, as long as there is no EDU, the question will be whose finger will be on the button. Macron is very clear: it will be his finger. The question then becomes whether German taxpayers would be interested in co-financing a strategic weapon system that they cannot control in times of war.

Fifthly, by Europeanizing the French nuclear weapons, the EU legitimizes nuclear weapons. This complicates the fight against proliferation. How sustainable is it to ask Iran not to produce nuclear weapons when the EU itself is setting up a nuclear arsenal?
There are also concerns about whether Europeanization aligns with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly if Germany and Poland were to develop their own nuclear capabilities. Both ideas also go against the spirit and the letter of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017) that in the meantime has been signed by more or less 100 states.
Sixthly and lastly, it would be much better if the leaders of the EU spend as much time on diplomacy with Russia than in building up European defense. It is high time that the war in Ukraine ends, not only for humanitarian but also economic reasons. A peace agreement ideally includes a beginning of a restructuring of the European collective security architecture that includes both Russia and Ukraine, either in a transformed NATO or an upgraded Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). If such an agreement is reached, there would be little justification for further fragmenting European defense into over 25 separate, small-scale military forces. Nowadays already the European NATO member states spend $485 billion on defense, much more than Russia ($120 billion). The primary challenge for EU defense today is not the absence of a Eurobomb but the lack of coordination in pooling, sharing, and specialization. Instead of investing in weapons of mass destruction, making EU defense more efficient should be the priority as well as integrating Russia into a larger collective security organization.
Delusional, ruinous and obsolete -the ITER nuclear fusion project

The ITER fusion project is 18 years late and can do nothing about climate change, writes Antoine Calandra
https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2025/03/16/delirante-ruineuse-et-obsolete/
ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) is an international tokamak nuclear fusion research and engineering project, which has been significantly over budget and schedule, and is currently under construction next to the Cadarache nuclear facility in southern France.
India is one of the seven partner countries in the ITER project, along with the European Union, Russia, Japan, the United States, China, and South Korea. Macron may boast as much as he likes, but ITER is a complete fiasco, a delusional, ruinous, and obsolete project.
On November 14, 2024, the annual public meeting entitled: ITER, 15 years: what assessment? was held in Peyrolles.
I was expecting a big event and to get some recent information on the ITER construction site…But surprise, none of that!
A nondescript multipurpose room, no decor, no documents available, unpleasant white light, around forty people present, only interns (CEA ITER* employees, CLI members, local elected officials, a few union members)
For the event, the tables and chairs were arranged differently, “for a more convivial, cabaret-like atmosphere,” I heard. Oh!?
Pietro Barabaschi, Director General of ITER, was not there.
No agenda to announce the evening’s schedule with the names of the speakers, as in previous occasions. A very meager presentation of the ITER project (5 or 6 images) and that was it. And “time for questions from the audience.” Ah!
In short, the most pathetic ITER public meeting I have ever attended. A public meeting that reflects the ITER assessment.
ITER, what is the outcome?….a disaster!
We already wrote in 2005 with the MEDIANE association: “ITER, a dangerous, ruinous and doomed nuclear project”
The latest important news regarding ITER came on July 3, 2024, during the press conference of Pietro Barabaschi, the current ITER Director General, news that had been expected for a year.
A new calendar: 9 more years late!
The first plasma was originally scheduled for 2016, then postponed to 2025. It has been postponed to 2034. We are 18 years behind schedule.
And with the new calendar, an additional cost of €5 billion!
That’s at least €25 billion of public money to date, a cost multiplied by five. And in reality, more than €40 billion, including the in-kind contributions from the project’s partner countries.
The ITER Director acknowledged that “Fusion cannot come in time to solve the problems our planet faces today, and investments in other technologies, both known and unknown, are absolutely necessary.”
However, the speeches and commitments to get this nuclear fusion project accepted were completely different in 2006 at the time of this charade of public debate.
It was even possible to read that after ITER, DEMO, a pre-industrial demonstrator, was planned to “prove the industrial feasibility of this technology around 2040 and demonstrate that fusion can, by 2050, produce electricity on an industrial scale.”
Once again, the seven partner countries (the European Union, Russia, Japan, the United States, China, India, and South Korea) have agreed to pay more. But the ITER Director is now considering finding private actors to try to fill this financial gap.
Several private companies no longer expect anything from ITER, but they firmly believe in nuclear fusion and promise electricity production in a shorter timeframe.
Some even claim that ITER will be obsolete by the time it is commissioned.
I would add that ITER will probably not work and that there will never be industrial production of electricity through nuclear fusion.
Nuclear fusion will be neither “a revolution for humanity” nor “the energy of the future.”
It is not clean energy, nor even abundant energy. It is dangerous to human health and produces radioactive waste.
Its interest is above all military and to try to save the nuclear industry which has been in a bad state for several years.
ITER will probably never work and will end in total fiasco, worse than SuperPhénix*, which was supposed to be the flagship of the French nuclear industry.
But by squandering all these billions, the ITER monster will have succeeded in blocking any progress towards another energy model and imposing the continuation of the nuclear industry for years to come.
This myth of free and inexhaustible energy that allows for indefinite consumption and waste must be eradicated from people’s minds once and for all. It is also time to put an end to this gigantism and centralization of production in the hands of powerful, commanding states that serve the richest.
The solutions for the future have been known for a long time:
save energy, put an end to waste, develop and improve renewable energies (solar, wind, hydraulic) the only truly clean and future energies.
And not to develop them in an industrial and centralized manner, which is obviously and unfortunately the case.
The industrialization of the world must be fought. A new social project is a prerequisite for any energy project.
The future lies in small production units, local or regional, with technology accessible to the greatest number, low energy consumption, avoiding the cost of distribution.
Nuclear fusion, like fission, is a dangerous, dirty, and expensive energy source. It’s a complex, centralized technology reserved for wealthy countries, leading to proliferation, dependency, injustice, and war.
* CEA: Atomic Energy Commission
* CLI: Local information commission
* SuperPhénix, a former nuclear reactor, commissioned in 1986 and definitively shut down in 1997, is a prototype of a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor. A dangerous machine that consumed more than 60 billion francs while operating for only thirty months in its twelve years of existence.
Antoine Calandra is a former administrator of the “Sortir du nucléaire” network and a member of the Médiane association. This article was first published in French on Mediapart.
Australia’s Trump cards
by Rex Patrick | Mar 16, 2025, https://michaelwest.com.au/tariffs-australias-trump-cards/

Australia does have Trump cards; North West Cape, Pine Gap, US Marine Rotational forces in Darwin, AUKUS and/or critical minerals that the US needs. Perhaps it’s also time to cancel the traitorous quantum computing development contract given to a US company over Australian companies.
These are things that we can put on the table. But doing that requires a measure of boldness. Our problem is our Prime Minister doesn’t have the ticker. Neither does the opposition leader. They are with Trump internationally as they are with the gas cartel domestically; owned and weak.
Anthony Albanese has it all wrong, writes former senator and submariner Rex Patrick. He’s trying to bribe Trump with sweeteners in response to trade tariffs. Instead, he needs to tell Trump he’s prepared to take things away.
US nuclear deterrent
Deep beneath the Indian Ocean, USS Kentucky, a nuclear-powered Ohio Class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) ploughs its way through the water. Contained within its 18,750 tonne pressure hull structure are 24 Trident ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying eight nuclear warheads to targets up to 12,000 km away.
The launch of all of USS Kentucky’s missiles would, quite literally, change the world by exacting severe destruction on whole societies.
This ability to inflict damage on an exceptionally large scale is the basis of the SSBN’s deterrent capability. Unlike silo based missiles, which are vulnerable to a first strike, or aircraft delivered nuclear weapons, which can be pre-emptively hit or shot down, SSBNs are essentially invisible. They provide certainty of response.
SSBNs serve as the ultimate nuclear deterrent. They’re extremely important to the US, whose navy possesses 14 of them. At any one time six to eight will be at sea, with four of them always on deterrent patrol. They are spread about the globe giving the US President the ability to quickly deliver return-fire with nuclear warheads at any adversary.
24/7 Operation
The primary performance metric for an SSBN is to be able to deliver its nuclear weapons with reliability, timeliness and accuracy.
The Commanding Officer of USS Kentucky must be able to loiter undetected in a place suited for the launching of weapons, be able to receive an order to launch, have an understanding of the submarine’s exact navigational position to a high degree of accuracy and have the ability to launch the weapons quickly and reliably once that order arrives.
Loitering undetected and being able to receive an order to launch is challenging. When a submarine is near the surface, their hulls can be seen by aircraft, and raised periscopes and communications masts can be seen visually and on radar. Operating a submarine at shallow depth can also result in acoustic counter-detection.
The Commanding Officer of USS Kentucky knows that deep is the place to be.
But being deep frustrates a submarine’s ability to receive communications, particularly an ‘emergency action message’.
And that’s were Very Low Frequency (VLF) communications stations come into play. In conjunction with a submarine’s buoyant wire antenna – a long wire that sits just below the sea surface – they can receive a launch command from the President.
The US has a network of these VLF communication stations around the world including in Maine, Washington state and North West Cape, Australia.
North West Cape
The VLF Communication Facility at North West Cape (NAVCOMMSTA Harold E Holt) has been in operation since 1967. Born of secrecy, it was at first exclusively US operated until 1974 when the facility became joint and started communicating with Australian submarines. In 1991 it was agreed that Australia would take full command in 1992 and US Naval personnel subsequently left in 1993.
The facility’s deterrence support role now rests on a 2008 treaty which, ratified in 2011, is formally titled the “Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America relating to the Operation of and Access to an Australian Naval Communication Station at North West Cape in Western Australia”.
The station’s antenna is 360 meters high, with a number of supporting towers in a hexagon shape connected to it by wires. Considered to be the most powerful transmitter in the southern hemisphere, it transmits on 19.8 kHz at about 1 megawatt.
The station enables emergency action messages to be relayed to submerged SSBNs, like USS Kentucky, when operating in the Indian and Western Pacific oceans.
If the facility was taken out by a first strike nuclear attack, the US Air Force can temporarily deploy Hercules ‘TACAMO’ aircraft, with a long VLF wire they deploy while airborne. It’s a back-up measure with much lower transmission power capabilities.
A bedrock of certainty
After US steel and aluminium tariffs were put into play, the Australian Financial Review ran with a headline “How Australia was blindsided on the US tariffs”. The article opened with, “Australia pulled out all stops to avoid Donald Trump’s duties on steel and aluminium, but it’s impossible to negotiate with someone who doesn’t want anything”.
But the US does want something.
A fact not so well appreciated with respect to nuclear deterrence is it must be seen to be a robust and continuous capability. Onlookers must see a 24/7 capability including deployable submarines manned by well-trained crews, proven and reliable missile systems, an organised strategic command, a continuous communication system that reliably links that strategic command to the submarines with appropriate redundant communication pathways, training facilities and maintenance support.
Potential adversaries must know that they could be struck by an SSBN that could be lurking anywhere in the world’s major oceans.
Effective nuclear deterrence must be built on a bedrock of operational certainty.
Remove the transmitter keys
North West Cape forms part of that certainty.
Australia has the keys to take some certainty away. Without our cooperation the US can’t operate a certain global deterrent capability. Turning off transmissions at North West Cape reduces the effectiveness of the US nuclear deterrence while eliminating one Australian nuclear target
The North West Cape Treaty provides leverage. While the agreement has another decade to run, Article 12 provides that “either Government may terminate this Agreement upon one year’s written notice to the other Government.”
It’s open to Australia to signal or give actual notice of termination. That would focus up policy makers in Washington.
Would we do that to a mate? No, but the US is showing they are not a mate. They are not showing us the loyalty we have shown them. Other actions; abandoning Ukraine, threatening Greenland and Panama and a not so subtle push to annex Canada have also shown they are an unreliable ally who doesn’t share our values.
Trump cards
In negotiating with President Zelensky over the war in Ukraine, President Trump told him in no uncertain terms. “We’re going to feel very good and very strong. You’re, right now, not in a very good position. You’ve allowed yourself to be in a very bad position. You don’t have the cards right now with us.”
But Australia does have Trump cards; North West Cape, Pine Gap, US Marine Rotational forces in Darwin, AUKUS and/or critical minerals that the US needs. Perhaps it’s also time to cancel the traitorous quantum computing development contract given to a US company over Australian companies.
These are things that we can put on the table. But doing that requires a measure of boldness. Our problem is our Prime Minister doesn’t have the ticker. Neither does the opposition leader. They are with Trump internationally as they are with the gas cartel domestically; owned and weak.
Things have changed
Alliances are means to ends, not an end in themselves; and, as pointed out above, things have changed. We can pretend everything is okay, but that doesn’t make it so.
But the bureaucracy is unlikely to advise the Government of alternatives.
Our uniformed leaders are locked into AUKUS, a program that gives them relevance at the big table; something they wouldn’t otherwise have with the depleted Navy they’ve built out of their procurement incompetence. They’re clinging to that relevance, despite all signs showing the program is running aground.
Our spooks are in the same place. In response to calls to put Pine Gap on the table, former Home Affairs Secretary Mike Pezzullo (sacked for failing to safeguard sensitive government information) spoke out, putting the facility ahead of trade interests and Aussie jobs.
The bulk of the intelligence from Pine Gap is very usable for the US and rather less so for Australia. Senior spooks just want to maintain their own relevance in the Five Eyes club; but it’s a mistake to conflate their interest with our national interest.
We should be prepared to play our Trump cards and we should be prepared to face the national security consequences.
If that means an Australia that‘s more independent and more self-reliant, that would be a very good thing. If there’s a shock to the system, then all well and good, because in the changing world we find ourselves in, it might be the only thing that wakes the Canberra bubble from its stupor and pushes us to actually be prepared.
In these uncertain times, there are no hands more trustworthy than our own.
Rex Patrick is a former Senator for South Australia and earlier a submariner in the armed forces. Best known as an anti-corruption and transparency crusader, Rex is running for the Senate on the Lambie Network ticket next year – www.transparencywarrior.com.au.
Putin Signals He’s Open to Ceasefire as Witkoff Arrives for Talks.
An aide to Putin said the proposal would only help Ukraine regroup and that it would need to be adjusted to meet Moscow’s position
by Dave DeCamp March 13, 2025, https://news.antiwar.com/2025/03/13/us-envoy-arrives-in-russia-to-discuss-30-day-ceasefire-proposal-with-putin/
Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled that he’s open to a ceasefire in Ukraine but that he has “questions” about the 30-day US-Ukraine proposal that need to be discussed.
“The idea itself is the right one, and we definitely support it,” Putin said, according to The New York Times. “But there are questions that we need to discuss, and I think that we need to talk them through with our American colleagues and partners.”
The Russian leader listed potential conditions for a 30-day truce, including a guarantee that Ukraine wouldn’t be supplied with more weapons. “We also want guarantees that during the 30-day ceasefire, Ukraine will not conduct mobilization, will not train soldiers, and will not receive weapons,” he said, according to RT.
Putin also questioned who would monitor the ceasefire. “Who will determine where and who has violated a potential ceasefire agreement along a 2,000-kilometer line? Who will attribute blame for any violations? These are all questions that require thorough examination from both sides,” he said.
The Russian leader said any long-term peace deal needs to address the “root causes” of the war. He made the comments as US envoy Steve Witkoff arrived in Russia to discuss the proposal. Yuri Ushakov, a Kremlin official, said Witkoff would be holding a closed-door meeting with Putin.
Ushakov also said the US-Ukraine proposal would only give Ukraine a chance to regroup, and it would need to be adjusted to meet Moscow’s interests.
“As for the 30-day temporary ceasefire, what is it about? There is nothing in it for us. It will only provide the Ukrainians with the opportunity to regroup and gain strength to continue doing what they are doing,” he said, according to Russia’s TASS news agency.
“These are some hasty actions that do not benefit a long-term settlement … We will need to work on it, to think it over so that it reflects our position, too. It reflects only Ukraine’s stance at this point,” he added.
Ushakov said that Russia wanted a long-term peace deal and that the “official” Russian position on the US-Ukraine proposal would be formulated by Putin.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made similar comments opposing the idea of a temporary ceasefire, pointing to the Minsk Accords, which were first reached in 2014 for a truce in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Lavrov also mentioned the “Istanbul agreement,” referring to a peace deal that was on the table in March and April 2022, which was discouraged by the US and its allies.
“I’m talking about the Minsk Accords, the deal that was discarded after the 2014 coup, and the Istanbul agreements. All of those included a ceasefire. And every time, it turned out that they had lied to us. The Ukrainians lied with the support of their European partners,” Lavrov said.
A joint statement between the US and Ukraine that was released after talks in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday said that Ukraine had “expressed readiness to accept the US proposal to enact an immediate, interim 30-day ceasefire, which can be extended by mutual agreement of the parties, and which is subject to acceptance and concurrent implementation by the Russian Federation.”
The statement also said that the US had resumed military aid and intelligence sharing for Ukraine, which was briefly paused. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that if Russia doesn’t accept the 30-day proposal, the US would then know who the “impediment” to peace is, signaling he wants the proxy war will continue as usual if a deal isn’t reached.
China, Russia back Iran as Trump presses Tehran for nuclear talks

By Ryan Woo, Xiuhao Chen and Laurie Chen, March 14, 2025,
- Summary
- China, Russia, Iran say talks should be based on mutual respect
- They say ‘unlawful’ unilateral sanctions should be lifted
- China, Russia urge respect for Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy
BEIJING, March 14 (Reuters) – China and Russia stood by Iran on Friday after the United States demanded nuclear talks with Tehran, with senior Chinese and Russian diplomats saying dialogue should only resume based on “mutual respect” and all sanctions ought to be lifted.
In a joint statement issued after talks with Iran in Beijing, China and Russia also said they welcomed Iran’s reiteration that its nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that Tehran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be “fully” respected………………………………………………… https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-iran-russia-kick-off-talks-beijing-over-irans-nuclear-issues-2025-03-14/
An Unreliable America Means More Countries Want the Bomb
By Debak Das, an assistant professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, and Rachel A. Epstein, a professor of international relations at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.
Without credible U.S. security guarantees, nuclear proliferation is likely to increase
rapidly across Europe and Asia. U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent
foreign-policy moves have alienated the country’s traditional allies in
Europe while stirring glee in Moscow. While it’s a catastrophic
development for Ukrainian security and democracy, this paradigmatic shift
portends much larger risks for global security.
The most pressing is the
threat of rampant nuclear proliferation that the Trump administration’s
actions will elicit. While on the surface it might seem as though a warmer
relationship between two of the world’s largest nuclear powers could
reduce the risk of nuclear war, the opposite is true.
We are on the precipice of a global turn toward nuclear instability, in which many
countries will be newly incentivized to build their own arsenals,
increasing the risk of nuclear use, terrorist subversion, and accidental
launch. Countries like South Korea, Japan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are all
so-called nuclear latent states that could potentially build nuclear
weapons quickly—as are Germany, Belgium, Italy,
Foreign Policy 14th March 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/14/trump-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-nato-security-guarantees-korea-poland-germany-japan/
The Volunteer “Data Hoarders” Resisting Trump’s Purge
Can librarians and guerrilla archivists save the country’s files from DOGE?
New Yorker, By Julian Lucas, 15 Mar 25
The deletions began shortly after Donald Trump took office. C.D.C. web pages on vaccines, H.I.V. prevention, and reproductive health went missing. Findings on bird-flu transmission vanished minutes after they appeared. The Census Bureau’s public repository went offline, then returned without certain directories of geographic information. The Department of Justice expunged the January 6th insurrection from its website, and whitehouse.gov took down an explainer page about the Constitution. On February 7th, Trump sacked the head of the National Archives and Records Administration, the agency that maintains the official texts of the nation’s laws, and whose motto is “the written word endures.”
More than a hundred and ten thousand government pages have gone dark in a purge that one scientist likened to a “digital book burning,” and which has proved as frightening in its imprecision as in its malice……………………………………………………………………………………. (Subscribers only)
https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/the-data-hoarders-resisting-trumps-purge?utm_source=nl&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=TNY_Science_031525&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_medium=email&bxid=5be9d23d24c17c6adf3bf435&cndid=30183386&hasha=432fc0d0ad6543e820e2dfcd39f76c35&hashb=e1c24f6a6459c7d1d625eb2ea55d9dfbbb4633bf&hashc=ac5a1f5526e7292c73f49dfa8fb6d5d0cb87d8773cec3b9b03d38a4ce482d7c8&esrc=subscribe-page&mbid=CRMNYR012019&utm_term=TNY_Science_Tech
How multi-billion nuclear weapons facility aims to overcome challenge of limited supply chain
New Civil Engineer 14th March 2025, By Tom Pashby
The UK’s nuclear warhead manufacturing organisation is facing recruitment challenges as it attempts to attract civil engineering firms to work on its multi-billion pound Future Materials Campus (FMC) project.
What is AWE’s FMC?
AWE (the Atomic Weapons Establishment) is seeking construction and engineering partners to build a new manufacturing facility at its AWE Aldermaston site in Berkshire for its next generation ‘Astraea’ nuclear warhead.
AWE said: “[The FMC] is part of a wider, multi-year multi-billion-pound portfolio of infrastructure investment that will support us in our overall purpose to protect the UK through nuclear science and technology and enable nuclear science for generations to come.”
AWE recognises supply chain capacity is ‘one of the biggest challenges’
NCE spoke with AWE to learn about what the organisation is doing to address supply chain constraints as the civil nuclear sector – and infrastructure more broadly – gears up for expected increase in investment and demand.
“One of the biggest challenges we anticipate is ensuring sufficient supply chain capacity and capability to deliver a programme of this scale and complexity,” AWE said.
……………………………………….NCE recently spoke with University of Sussex principal research fellow Phil Johnstone, who said that the demand for more skills capacity in the wider UK nuclear sector is push factor for the demand for the FMC, in addition to its role in providing warheads. This aligns with AWE’s assertion that its FMC will “enable nuclear science for generations to come”……………………………………………………………………………………..
Civil engineering trade representative says all projects facing skills challenges………………………………………………………………………………. https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/how-multi-billion-nuclear-weapons-facility-aims-to-overcome-challenge-of-limited-supply-chain-14-03-2025/
Dialogue only viable option to solve Iranian nuclear issue

Diplomacy must remain the primary tool for resolving disputes and crises, and not be used only as a last resort after aggressive policies have failed
Xinhua, Editor: huaxia, 2025-03-15 more https://english.news.cn/20250315/0e246e2703d64d58a08113de887e3932/c.html
The Iranian nuclear issue is not just about Iran — it is a test of whether global governance will be defined by cooperation or coercion.
BEIJING, March 15 (Xinhua) — In a world fraught with geopolitical tensions, the Iranian nuclear issue is a critical test of the international community’s commitment to peace, diplomacy and multilateralism.
Whether diplomacy prevails or “maximum pressure” tactics take center stage will shape the region’s stability and set a precedent for global non-proliferation efforts.
The joint statement issued by China, Russia and Iran on Friday after a trilateral meeting in Beijing reaffirms a shared conviction: political and diplomatic engagement and dialogue are not merely preferable but the only viable and practical option to address this complex challenge.
At the heart of the discussions was a shared commitment to rejecting unilateral sanctions and coercive measures. Diplomacy must remain the primary tool for resolving disputes and crises, and not be used only as a last resort after aggressive policies have failed.
In an increasingly complex and fragile international environment, relying on sanctions and military posturing is not only counterproductive but also dangerously short-sighted, promoting instability rather than fostering meaningful engagement.
A sustainable resolution requires a holistic approach, one that balances nuclear non-proliferation with the legitimate right to peaceful nuclear energy. While Iran must continue to uphold its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, all parties must also fully respect its right to civilian nuclear programs, as recognized under international law.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) once demonstrated the power of dialogue, proving that even the most entrenched disputes can yield to diplomacy when all parties engage in good faith.
However, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the agreement and its subsequent “maximum pressure” campaign have left the JCPOA in jeopardy.
Xinhua Commentary: Dialogue only viable option to solve Iranian nuclear issue
Source: Xinhua
Editor: huaxia
2025-03-15 09:43:15
The Iranian nuclear issue is not just about Iran — it is a test of whether global governance will be defined by cooperation or coercion.
BEIJING, March 15 (Xinhua) — In a world fraught with geopolitical tensions, the Iranian nuclear issue is a critical test of the international community’s commitment to peace, diplomacy and multilateralism.
Whether diplomacy prevails or “maximum pressure” tactics take center stage will shape the region’s stability and set a precedent for global non-proliferation efforts.
The joint statement issued by China, Russia and Iran on Friday after a trilateral meeting in Beijing reaffirms a shared conviction: political and diplomatic engagement and dialogue are not merely preferable but the only viable and practical option to address this complex challenge.
At the heart of the discussions was a shared commitment to rejecting unilateral sanctions and coercive measures. Diplomacy must remain the primary tool for resolving disputes and crises, and not be used only as a last resort after aggressive policies have failed.
In an increasingly complex and fragile international environment, relying on sanctions and military posturing is not only counterproductive but also dangerously short-sighted, promoting instability rather than fostering meaningful engagement.
A sustainable resolution requires a holistic approach, one that balances nuclear non-proliferation with the legitimate right to peaceful nuclear energy. While Iran must continue to uphold its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, all parties must also fully respect its right to civilian nuclear programs, as recognized under international law.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) once demonstrated the power of dialogue, proving that even the most entrenched disputes can yield to diplomacy when all parties engage in good faith.
However, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the agreement and its subsequent “maximum pressure” campaign have left the JCPOA in jeopardy.
Against this backdrop, China’s call to uphold the JCPOA as the foundation for renewed consensus is both practical and visionary. The agreement remains a rare diplomatic achievement that balances Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy with non-proliferation imperatives — a balance that must guide future diplomatic efforts.
By advocating for a process rooted in respect rather than ultimatums, China seeks to bridge divides and restore the JCPOA’s original spirit.
The trilateral meeting came after six of the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s 15 members — the United States, France, Greece, Panama, South Korea and Britain — met behind closed doors on the Iranian nuclear issue.
This exclusive gathering raises concerns about the politicization of the issue. What is needed now is dialogue and cooperation, rather than an imposed intervention by the Security Council.
Under the current circumstances, a hasty intervention by the Security Council will not help build trust or bridge differences. Meanwhile, triggering a snap-back of sanctions would undo years of diplomatic efforts.
A step-by-step and reciprocal approach is urgently needed. Instead of escalating tensions through unilateral measures, major countries should focus on restoring trust and ensuring compliance through engagement.
The Iranian nuclear issue is not just about Iran — it is a test of whether global governance will be defined by cooperation or coercion.
Europe going nuclear would be a catastrophic mistake

Proposals for nuclear sharing as a form of deterrence risk bringing more insecurity to Europe.
Olamide Samuel, International security expert, 11 Mar 25 https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/3/11/europe-going-nuclear-would-be-a-catastrophic-mistake
The second administration of US President Donald Trump has brought about tectonic shifts in the European security calculus. Growing anxieties about American retrenchment and the collapse of post-World War II security arrangements have sent European leaders scrambling to put forward alternatives.
Ahead of the German elections last month, Friedrich Merz, the head of the Christian Democratic Union, who was already expected to become the next German chancellor, opined: “We need to have discussions with both the British and the French – the two European nuclear powers – about whether nuclear sharing, or at least nuclear security from the UK and France, could also apply to us”.
Last week, French President Emmanuel Macron said that in response to Merz, he has decided to “open the strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent through our [nuclear] deterrence”.
The proposal for some form of European nuclear sharing arrangement with France and the United Kingdom to protect against threats from Moscow is not new. Versions of it have been floated around for decades.
But today, resurfacing this proposal is not just a geopolitical miscalculation; it is a strategic dead end. It reflects a misreading of both the nuclear balance of power and the existential risks of fragmenting Europe’s security architecture further. Rather than bolstering deterrence, this gambit risks accelerating the very instability it seeks to avert.
Amid the growing unpredictability of United States-Russia relations under the second Trump administration, Europe must pivot from nuclear escapism to a bold agenda of diplomatic engagement on nuclear disarmament.
The fantasy of European nuclear sharing
The proposal for European nuclear sharing founders on arithmetic and strategic reality. Russia’s nuclear arsenal boasts 5,580 warheads, including hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles and Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This dwarfs the combined Anglo-French stockpile of 515 warheads.
This asymmetry isn’t merely quantitative; it is also doctrinal. Moscow’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy represents a calculated approach to conflict escalation designed to coerce adversaries into concessions. It is a strategy the British and French nuclear arsenals, optimised for minimal deterrence, cannot counter.
Data on defence spending reveals a deeper flaw: Europeans do not have the funds or the technological capabilities to carry it out while executing their ambitious rearmament plans.
Germany’s 90.6-billion euro ($98bn) military budget remains crippled by inefficiencies, with only 50 percent of army equipment meeting NATO readiness standards. Meanwhile, France and the UK lack the conventional force multipliers – global surveillance networks, intelligence capabilities, or even complete nuclear triads – that underpin US extended deterrence. Even if every euro cent of the European Union’s recently announced 800 billion-euro ($867 billion) defence boost were spent on nuclear weapons programmes, cold-starting the sort of production complexes required for a credible deterrent would still take decades.
Attempting to replicate NATO’s nuclear-coalition model at a European level ignores six decades of integrated command structures and fails to address hybrid threats now defining modern conflict.
What is more, replacing one dependency with another solves nothing. Proponents claim nuclear sharing offers protection, but the reality is that it can lead to strategic subjugation.
Neither France nor the UK is likely to give up control over its nuclear arsenals and transfer it to the EU. That means that a nuclear-sharing agreement would reduce Germany and other European countries participating in the arrangement to Franco-British warhead warehouses with no real agency. This Potemkin deterrence—all ceremony, no substance—would only further irritate Washington.
Trump has already shown that he has no qualms about abandoning allies if he sees no benefit for the US strategic interest. His recent moves to stop intelligence sharing and military aid for Ukraine and his conditioning mutual defence on military spending have exposed NATO’s fraying norms – the alliance is witnessing a collapse of shared purpose.
As experts note, Trump’s “MAGA Carta” foreign policy explicitly rejects strategic altruism. A European nuclear caucus would signal panic, validating Trump’s transactional world view while undermining NATO’s cohesion.
A European nuclear club would deepen fragmentation, emboldening revisionist actors like Russia and China while diverting resources from critical gaps in AI advancement, sustainable economic output, and energy resilience that define 21st-century power.
The economic argument compounds the folly. Pouring billions of euros from Europe’s finite resources into redundant warheads while neglecting practical gaps in conventional capability isn’t statecraft—it’s generational malpractice.
Disarmament and fiscal realpolitik
The EU’s opportunity lies not in nuclear posturing, but in revitalising arms control and mediation. The collapse of the US-Russia strategic dialogue since the invasion of Ukraine has left critical arms control frameworks in disarray.
The New START treaty, which limits deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each for Russia and the US, remains the last pillar of bilateral arms control. Its expiration in 2026 without a successor would mark the first time since 1972 that the world’s nuclear superpowers operate without mutually verified limits—a scenario that could trigger a new nuclear arms race.
Herein lies Europe’s opportunity. Rather than pursuing a European nuclear umbrella, it could lead efforts to revive nuclear disarmament dialogue.
Austria, an EU member, has already played a key role in nuclear talks between the West and Iran as well as the 2020 US-Russia-China trilateral arms control discussions. This positions it as an ideal venue for restarting negotiations on nuclear risk reduction issues, especially at a time when Washington is open to renewed dialogue with Moscow.
Taking a lead on nuclear disarmament would be the sort of leadership that would reflect a more mature interpretation of security policy, as opposed to seeking an impossible nuclear deterrence.
Some critics maintain that negotiating with Russia rewards aggression. Yet history shows even bitter adversaries can cooperate on arms control when interests align. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated 2,692 missiles, was finalised after years of heightened tensions between the USSR and the US in the early 1980s.
The treaty succeeded not because US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev trusted each other, but because dismantling missiles saved both sides a significant amount of funds that would have gone into continuing the arms race and maintaining the destroyed ordinance.
Today, with Russia’s economy faltering amid the war in Ukraine and Trump’s fixation with cost-cutting, there is an opportunity to pursue another deal if disarmament is framed not as idealism, but as fiscal pragmatism. Europe can help broker a deal that serves all parties’ wallets—and humanity’s survival.
The unintended consequences of Trump’s first-term nuclear gambits – escalated arms racing, eroded alliances, and emboldened adversaries – offer cautionary lessons. His second term, however, can offer an opportunity to shift the Doomsday Clock back from its position of 89 seconds to midnight.
Europe now faces a choice: to cling to Cold War relics while the planet burns, or to pioneer a security paradigm prioritising planetary survival over great-power vanity. The decision it makes will define not just Europe’s future—but all of humanity’s.

Olamide Samuel. International security expert
Dr Olamide Samuel is a renowned international security expert and Network Specialist at the Open Nuclear Network. Previously, he served as Special Envoy of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), established by the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba.
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