How the Iran War undermines the nuclear nonproliferation regime

Bulletin, By George Perkovich | Analysis | April 2, 2026

When President Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018, he cracked the brittle foundation of the global nonproliferation regime based on the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This was not seen clearly at the time, so its implications could not be fully addressed. Now the ramifications are becoming clearer: The war on Iran raises doubt that the NPT can be a central pillar of international security. If not, will more countries seek nuclear weapons, including US allies or friends? And will China and Russia be emboldened to follow the US-Israeli example to forcibly try to stop them?

The US and Israeli leaders who pushed withdrawal from the JCPOA, including President Trump, did not know or care much about the NPT. Israel saw the Iranian nuclear program as an ipso facto direct threat, not as something that could be managed through the treaty’s core bargains. Those bargains posited that states that already had nuclear weapons as of 1967—the United States and Russia, most importantly—would reward states that forego such weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon states would gain security, cooperation in civil nuclear energy development, and progress toward the equity of global nuclear disarmament……………………………………………………………………..

Today it is clear that when the United States broke the JCPOA, Iran was condemned to a fate like Iraq’s in 2003. Objectives beyond nuclear proliferation became decisive for powerful actors in Washington, Israel, and the Gulf. Regime change. Reducing threats to the United States’ oil-exporting Arab friends and Israel. Countering terrorism. The JCPOA had “solved” the nuclear issue within the framework of the NPT bargains, but it did not address these other issues……………………………….

Now that Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump have attacked Iran without regard for international law or Iran’s rights under the NPT (and the UN-supported JCPOA), many commentators say nuclear weapon proliferation will be more likely. They say, the “lesson” of Iran today, like that of Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine—contrasted with North Korea—is that a country should acquire nuclear weapons if it doesn’t want to be attacked by a big nuclear power………………………………….

All of this highlights the shakiness of the NPT as an organizing construct for managing security, nuclear energy, and nonproliferation going forward. If nuclear-weapon states have clearly abandoned their commitments under Article VI of the NPT to cease arms racing and pursue nuclear disarmament, and nuclear-armed states have attacked other non-nuclear countries in violation of international law, why wouldn’t more countries feel justified to seek their own nuclear deterrents? If powerful countries have made trade and security accommodations for nuclear-armed India, how should others seek to apply limits on nuclear fuel-cycle activities?………………………………………..

More than threatening the NPT, the US-Israel war on Iran has removed bargaining from adversarial international relations more broadly. Washington and Tel Aviv demand that Iran stop all fuel-cycle activity, surrender all enriched uranium and ballistic missiles, end clerical rule, disarm the Revolutionary Guard, and cease supporting other regional actors that threaten Israel. The American and Israeli governments offer Iran no immediate or near-term benefits in response, except the possible end of military attacks and vague promises of Western corporate investment to help revive the Iranian economy. Essentially, the demand is for unconditional surrender. This is a different model of international affairs than the NPT was predicated on……………………………………https://thebulletin.org/2026/04/how-the-iran-war-undermines-the-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/