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Uncharted Nuclear Territory

Dr Paul Dorfman, Bennett Scholar, explores the question – ‘As a key nuclear weapons treaty falls away, is the world heading towards a new arms race?’

12 February 2026, https://bennettinstitutesussex.org/stories/uncharted-nuclear-territory/

Russia and the US control 87% of the world’s nuclear warheads. The US has 1,419 deployed strategic warheads, Russia has 1,549.

NewSTART (the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty) is built on the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) plus earlier agreements that drove large reductions in Cold War nuclear arsenals. Decades of negotiation have massively reduced warheads, with neither Russia or the US testing a nuclear bomb in more than 30 years.

Treaty compliance meant that each country received on-site access to each other’s nuclear weapons military sites, committed to not interfere with satellites and other intelligence collection about nuclear forces, regularly traded data, and committed to use a treaty dispute resolution mechanism – the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The verification measures in the treaty were robust. Each detail was carefully negotiated by experienced diplomats and military service members.[1]

However, on 4 February 2026, this key nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the US expired. With it, a new nuclear arms race seems set to begin, allowing the two states to significantly increase their deployed warheads within a matter of months. This is because, given their reserves, both have the capacity to increase the number of operational warheads on each of their missiles and bombers.[2] Inexplicably, Trump seems sanguine at the prospect – “if it expires, it expires”.

“It sounds like a good idea to me”

Following the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, Putin has placed his nuclear weapons on heightened alert, and plans to deploy warheads to Belarus. That said, Russia seems prepared to continue observing NewSTART deployed warhead numerical limits for one more year if the US does the same.[3] Correspondingly, on 11 Feb 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pledged to observe the expired treaty’s nuclear limits if the US also maintains compliance.[4] Unfortunately, at time of writing, besides an aside by Trump – “it sounds like a good idea to me” – the US hasn’t formally responded to the Russian offer. In this context, it’s perplexing to reflect that observers suggest that this worrying state of affairs may owe less to ideology than to the potentially limited capacity of the Trump administration. In other words, with career diplomats side-lined, it could be that remaining staff may not have either the bandwidth or the stamina to negotiate a complex nuclear arms agreement.[5] Meanwhile, China ‘regrets’ the expiration of the Treaty, urging the US to engage in talks with Russia.[6]

All in all, as the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres says, it’s a “grave moment for international peace and security. For the first time in more than half a century, we face a world without any binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of … the two states that possess the overwhelming majority of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. This dissolution of decades of achievement could not come at a worse time – the risk of a nuclear weapon being used is the highest in decades.”[7] 

Meanwhile, the disappearance of NewSTART is likely to have knock on effects, with UK and France facing increased pressure to expand their arsenals – so too, Pakistan and India, not forgetting Israel. Likewise, if South Korea begins nuclear weapons development, Japan seems likely to follow. Plus, with tensions continuing to rise in the Middle East and negotiations intensifying over curbing Iran’s nuclear weapons programme,[8] Saudi Arabia has made no secret of its nuclear weapons ambitions, emphasising the proliferation risks associated with new civil nuclear and weapons proliferation – quite literally, beating ploughshares into swords.[9]

Negotiation Spaces

Trump further complicates matters by insisting that negotiations on any future nuclear arms control agreements include China. However, China has, for the time being, rejected this,[10] suggesting that there’s no precedent for trilateral nuclear control or disarmament negotiations. Though substantive and growing (China is estimated to have 600 nuclear warheads) Xi Jinping’s arsenal is still considerably less than those of the US and Russia.

Negotiating a new treaty – whether bilateral or trilateral – would be a major undertaking even in a more stable political environment, requiring complex technical work on definitions, counting rules and verification. It also needs sustained diplomatic engagement and a degree of trust. None of these conditions are in place, and the idea that a workable new treaty could be concluded quickly seems deeply unrealistic.[11]

The unsettling reality is that, along with NewSTART, other key long-standing arms control treaties fall by the way, including: the Open Sky’s Treaty[12] (allowing unarmed reconnaissance over-flights); the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty[13] (limiting NATO and Russian tank, troop, and artillery deployment numbers in Europe); and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Agreement,[14]

Direction of travel

All things considered, we seem to be entering a new strategic nuclear and tactical conventional weapons phase – uncertain and uncharted. A new unconstrained nuclear and conventional arms race with more weapons, no verification, data transfer or dialogue, and an increased risk of miscalculation.

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February 15, 2026 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war