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Why Iran–US negotiations must move beyond a single-issue approach to the nuclear problem

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian | February 5, 2026, https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/why-iran-us-negotiations-must-move-beyond-a-single-issue-approach-to-the-nuclear-problem/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Iran-US%20negotiations&utm_campaign=20260209%20Monday%20Newsletter

Iran’s nuclear crisis has reached a point at which it can no longer be treated as a purely technical or legal dispute within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It has evolved into a deeply security-driven, geopolitical, and structural challenge whose outcome is directly tied to the future of the nonproliferation order in the Middle East and beyond. If the negotiations scheduled for Friday between Iran and the United States are to be effective and durable, they must move beyond single-issue approaches and toward a comprehensive, direct, and phased dialogue.

The format and venue of Iran–US negotiations. The first round of talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US envoy Steve Witkoff took place on April 12, 2025, in Muscat, Oman. At Iran’s insistence, these negotiations were defined as “indirect.” On April 8, 2025, I emphasized in a tweet that direct negotiations—particularly in Tehran—would significantly increase the chances of reaching a dignified, realistic, and timely agreement. “Wasting time is not in the interest of either country,” I insisted. Despite these warnings, nearly 10 months were lost, during which the region suffered heavy and regrettable losses.

It now appears that Tehran has agreed to direct talks among Witkoff, son-in-law and key adviser to President Trump Jared Kushner, and Araghchi, again in Oman. The most effective format going forward, however, would be to hold direct talks in Tehran and then in Washington. This formula would not only break long-standing political taboos but also enable deeper mutual understanding. A visit by Witkoff and Kushner to Tehran would allow them to engage not only with the foreign minister but also with other key decision-makers, including the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, members of parliament, and relevant institutions—engagement that is essential if any sustainable agreement is to be achieved. Araghchi should engage in Washington not only with US negotiators, but also with President Trump, officials from the Pentagon, and members of the US Congress, to gain a clearer understanding of the current political environment in Washington.

Why a single-issue agreement is not sustainable. In hundreds of articles and interviews since 2013, I have argued that a single-issue agreement—even if successful on the nuclear file—will be inherently unstable. Under current conditions, three core issues require reasonable, dignified, and lasting solutions.

The US demand for zero enrichment. Ahead of negotiations, the United States is demanding that Iran entirely stop all uranium enrichment and give up its stockpile of around 400-kilograms of highly enriched uranium, steps that would prevent Tehran from possible diversion toward weaponization. Since 2013, a group of prominent nuclear scientists from Princeton University and I have proposed a “joint nuclear and enrichment consortium” for the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East as a way for Iran to continue its peaceful nuclear program and for the United States and regional countries to be reassured that program will not be used as a cover for the production of nuclear weapons. This proposal was repeatedly articulated—up to 10 days before the 2025 Israeli and US attacks on Iran—but unfortunately failed to gain serious attention.

Today, the only realistic solution to the question of uranium enrichment remains the establishment of a joint nuclear and enrichment consortium involving Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and major global powers. This model would address nuclear proliferation concerns while safeguarding equal access to peaceful nuclear technology.

Iran’s missile and defensive capabilities. Defensive capabilities are the ultimate guarantor of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national security. Since 2013, I have repeatedly recommended two regional agreements: a conventional weapons treaty and a non-aggression pact among the states in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. A regional conventional weapons treaty would ensure a balance of defensive power, while a non-aggression pact would lay the foundation for collective security. Without these frameworks, expectations for unilateral limitations on Iran’s defensive capabilities are neither realistic nor sustainable.

Iran’s support for the “axis of resistance” and regional security order. My book, A New Structure for Security, Peace, and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf, presented a comprehensive framework for regional cooperation and collective security, including a nuclear and weapons of mass destruction free zone. This framework would enable progress on four major issues: the roles of non-state and semi-state actors; the Persian Gulf and energy security; the antagonism among Iran, the United States, and Israel; and a safe and orderly US withdrawal from the region.

If a sustainable agreement is to be reached, Iran and Israel must put an end to mutual existential, military, and security threats. “Despite major differences, the United States and China both worry about the conflict. China has close Iran relations, and Israel is a US strategic partner, making them qualified mediators serving as communication channels,” I suggested in 2023.

A warning to Washington: Iran’s nuclear file and the future of nonproliferation. The global non-proliferation order is undergoing a fundamental transition. The world is moving away from a system in which nuclear strategy is defined by possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons, and toward one defined by positioning, reversibility, and strategic optionality.

Nuclear-weapon states have not only failed to meet their NPT obligations to make good-faith efforts toward nuclear disarmament; they are also actively modernizing and expanding their arsenals. At the same time, some non-nuclear states that face threats to their security are seeking deterrence without formal weaponization, and political leverage without legal rupture.

The Iranian case demonstrated that full compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka the Iran nuclear deal) and unprecedented cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not produce security for Iran. The US withdrawal from the agreement, the imposition of sweeping sanctions, and subsequent military attacks conveyed a clear message to the Iranian government: Maximum restraint can create vulnerability. Meanwhile, Israel—outside the NPT and enjoying unwavering US support—remains the region’s sole nuclear-armed state.

For the first time in the history of nuclear non-proliferation, safeguarded nuclear facilities of a non-nuclear-weapon state were attacked, without meaningful condemnation from either the IAEA or the UN Security Council. This episode has fundamentally altered the meaning of non-proliferation commitments.

The conclusion is clear: If Iran’s nuclear crisis is treated as a narrowly defined, Iran-specific issue, it will not lead to a sustainable agreement. Instead, it will accelerate the spread of “nuclear ambiguity” across the Middle East as multiple countries seek the capability to build nuclear weapons, even if they do not immediately construct weapons. Any new nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States must therefore be firmly grounded in the principles and obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), applied in a balanced, non-discriminatory, and credible manner. The fate of Iran-US negotiations is inseparably linked to the future of non-proliferation in the region and around the world. Decisions made today will shape regional and international security for decades to come.

February 11, 2026 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | Iran, politics international, USA