nuclear-news

WAS RUSSIA’S SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION “UNPROVOKED”?

AI is a tool that many use to research the historical facts behind contentious issues. What does it say about Russia’s claims it was endlessly provoked into its conflict with the Ukrainian regime?

Aearnur, Jan 03, 2026, https://aearnur.substack.com/p/was-russias-special-military-operation?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=312403&post_id=183250361&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=ln98x&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

AI Overview.

Archival material declassified by the US National Security Archive and other Western institutions has established that multiple Western leaders gave Mikhail Gorbachev a “cascade of assurances” in 1990 and 1991 that NATO would not expand eastward beyond a reunified Germany.

The declassified records, which include contemporaneous memoranda of conversation (memcons) and telegrams (telcons), show that these discussions were not limited to East Germany but addressed Central and Eastern European security as a whole.

Key Documents and Assurances

Secretary James Baker’s “Not One Inch” (Feb 1990): US archival transcripts confirm that on February 9, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker told Gorbachev that if the US maintained a presence in a unified Germany within NATO, there would be “no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east”. Baker repeated this formula three times during the meeting.

The Bush-Gorbachev Malta Summit (Dec 1989): Records show President George H.W. Bush assured Gorbachev that the US would not seek “unilateral advantage” from the rapid changes in Eastern Europe.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Feb 1990): Declassified West German records show Chancellor Kohl told Gorbachev on February 10, 1990, that “NATO should not enlarge the sphere of its activity”.
British and French Leaders: Declassified documents show British Prime Minister John Major told Soviet Defense Minister Yazov in March 1991 that he did not foresee circumstances where Eastern European countries would join NATO. French President François Mitterrand also expressed support for dismantling military blocs and ensuring Soviet security.

AI Overview.

The original stated purpose of the Minsk process (Minsk I in 2014 and Minsk II in 2015) was to secure an immediate ceasefire and provide a roadmap for a permanent political resolution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

According to the official 12-point and 13-point “packages of measures,” the primary goals included:

Military De-escalation: An unconditional ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry to create a security zone, and the pullout of all foreign armed formations and mercenaries.

Political Reintegration: Decentralization of power in Ukraine through constitutional reform, granting a “special status” to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and holding local elections under Ukrainian law.

Sovereignty Restoration: The return of full control over the state border to the Ukrainian government, contingent upon the completion of the political settlement.

The Russian Understanding of the Process

For Russia, the Minsk process was understood as a vehicle to achieve several strategic objectives that differed from Ukraine’s interpretation of sovereignty:

Institutional Influence (the “Trojan Horse”): Russia understood “special status” as granting the Donbas regions comprehensive autonomy, including their own legal systems and the right to cross-border cooperation with Russia. This was intended to give these regions a de facto veto over Ukraine’s national foreign policy, specifically to prevent Ukraine fromjoining NATO or the EU.

Legitimacy for Proxies: Russia insisted on the inclusion of the self-proclaimed “People’s Republics” (DPR/LPR) in the negotiations. Moscow viewed this as a step toward their formal recognition and a way to frame the conflict as a “civil war” rather than a Russo-Ukrainian war.

Sequencing of Control: A fundamental part of Russia’s understanding was that political concessions (elections and autonomy) must occur before Ukraine regained control of its border with Russia, effectively securing the separatist enclaves while they were still under Russian influence.

“Freezing” the Conflict: Western analysts noted that for Russia, the accords served to consolidate control over captured territories and “freeze” the conflict at a level that favored Moscow’s interests while avoiding further international sanctions.

Following the 2022 invasion, Russian officials asserted that the true purpose of the West was to use the accords as a “ruse” to buy time for Ukraine to rearm, while they maintain their original stated goal was a genuine political settlement for the Donbas.

---

AI Overview.

In a series of interviews following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel clarified that the primary purpose of the

Minsk Accords (2014–2015) was to buy time for Ukraine to strengthen itself against future Russian aggression.

In a December 2022 interview with The Kyiv Independent, former French President François Hollande stated that the Minsk Accords were successful in providing Ukraine with the “precious time” needed to strengthen its military.

His comments corroborated earlier revelations by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, confirming that the agreements served as a temporary respite to prevent further Russian territorial gains while the Ukrainian army underwent a total transformation.

Key Revelations by Hollande

Buying Time for Rearmament: Hollande agreed with Merkel’s assessment that the primary merit of the Minsk agreements was giving the Ukrainian army the opportunity to become “completely different” from what it was in 2014. He noted that by 2022, the army was better trained and equipped, which he directly attributed to the diplomatic respite provided by the accords.

---

In 2022 and 2023, former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko made several public statements revealing that the primary purpose of the Minsk Accords from his perspective was to buy time for Ukraine to rebuild its military and avoid a total collapse of the state.

His detailed revelations include:

Read more: WAS RUSSIA’S SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION “UNPROVOKED”?

Buying Time for Rearmament: Poroshenko stated that when he signed the agreements in 2014 and 2015, Ukraine effectively “did not have armed forces at all”. He revealed that the truce provided a “precious” window of several years to invite NATO instructors, purchase weapons, and transform the Ukrainian military into a modern fighting force capable of resisting a large-scale invasion.

Strategic Deception: Poroshenko described the agreements as a “forced position” but a “success for diplomats”. He admitted that the goal was to “buy time” and “slow down Russia’s advance” while stalling on the most unacceptable political obligations of the deal, such as granting constitutional autonomy to the Donbas republics.

Preventing Immediate Defeat: He recalled that the 2015 Minsk II agreement was signed under extreme duress, specifically when thousands of Ukrainian soldiers were surrounded by regular Russian forces at the battle of Debaltseve. The primary goal at that moment was to stop the Russian offensive and prevent the “annihilation” of his forces.

International Legitimacy: Poroshenko revealed that another goal of the accords was to demonstrate to the world that Russia was the aggressor. By signing a peace plan, Ukraine gained the international solidarity needed to implement and maintain Western sanctions against Russia for its non-compliance with the deal.

These admissions, similar to those made by Angela Merkel and François Hollande, have been used by the Russian government to argue that the West and Ukraine negotiated the peace process in bad faith to prepare for eventual war.

AI Overview.

As of January 2, 2026, Russia continues to frame its invasion of Ukraine as a defensive and corrective measure necessitated by Western aggression and humanitarian crises. These justifications have evolved throughout the conflict, combining long-standing grievances with recent allegations of “state terrorism” by the Ukrainian government.

1. Security Architecture and NATO Expansion

Russia’s primary long-term justification is the perceived threat from NATO’s eastward expansion.

“Red Lines” and Broken Promises: Russian officials cite declassified 1990 archival records as proof that Western leaders promised NATO would not move “one inch eastward.” Russia argues that by 2021, Ukraine’s “de facto” integration into NATO through military training and infrastructure had reached an existential threat level.

The 2021 Security Proposals: In December 2021, Russia requested formal treaties with NATO and the US to halt expansion and return to 1997 troop positions. The Kremlin justifies the 2022 invasion as a result of the West’s dismissal of these proposals.

Buffer Zones (2026 Update): In early 2026, the Kremlin emphasized the need for an expanded “buffer zone” in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions to protect Russian territory from cross-border shelling and drone strikes.

2. Humanitarian Protection and “Genocide”

Russia claims its intervention was a legal necessity to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.

Protecting the Donbas: Putin asserted that the 2022 “Special Military Operation” was launched to end eight years of “humiliation and genocide” by the “Kyiv regime” against people in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Independence Recognition: Russia argues that because it recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as independent states just before the invasion, its military action was a lawful request for assistance under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

3. “Denazification” and “Demilitarization”

The Kremlin uses these terms to frame the Ukrainian government as illegitimate and a threat to European peace.

Regime Change: Russia claims the 2014 Euromaidan revolution was a Western-backed “unconstitutional coup” that installed a “neo-Nazi” leadership.

Sovereignty Denial: Putin has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine is an “artificial state” created by the Soviet Union and that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people,” suggesting the current government is a foreign-imposed anomaly.

4. Recent Allegations of “State Terrorism” (Late 2025–2026)

Since December 2025, Russia has introduced new justifications to harden its stance in potential peace talks:

Attack on Putin’s Residence: In late December 2025, Russia accused Ukraine of launching a drone strike targeting President Putin’s residence in the Novgorod region. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov characterized this as “state terrorism,” using it to justify retaliatory strikes and a “more rigorous” negotiating position.

For official updates and historical documents, the National Security Archive provides records of 1990 assurances, while current statements are often published by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

---

AI Overview.

In January and February 2022, the Donbas region in south-eastern Ukraine experienced a massive and rapid escalation in shelling and ceasefire violations. Reports from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) indicated that after a period of relatively low activity in early January, violations surged by over 340% in the week leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24.

January 4, 2026 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war