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How North Korea outsmarts US intelligence agencies—and what they should do to adapt

Bulletin, By Lauren Cho | October 27, 2025

In the summer of 2017, the United States learned a humbling lesson. For years, American intelligence agencies had assessed that North Korea would need several more years—until 2020 or even 2022—before it could field a missile capable of striking the continental United States. Then, on July 4, Pyongyang launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that reached deep space and re-entered at high velocity.

By that September, North Korea had detonated a hydrogen bomb more than 15 times stronger than the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima. The Central Intelligence Agency and its sister agencies had anticipated that this day would eventually come. But their inability to predict the rapid pace of advancement remains one of the starkest intelligence failures of recent decades. It was not simply a matter of bad luck or faulty technical analysis. It was the result of two forces that intersect again and again in the history of US assessments of North Korea’s nuclear program: Pyongyang’s deliberate use of strategic deception, and the institutional inertia of the US intelligence community.

From the first suspicions of a clandestine weapons program in the 1980s through the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the inconclusive Six-Party Talks, and the dramatic summits of 2018–2019, a familiar cycle has emerged: Washington enters negotiations determined to halt or roll back North Korea’s program. North Korea agrees on paper but continues developing weapons in secret, denying violations and then unveiling new capabilities with a missile test or nuclear detonation. The agreement collapses, and Washington returns to the negotiating table with hopes of restoring momentum toward denuclearization.

Each turn of this cycle reveals a recurring blind spot. American analysts focus on observable indicators and static assumptions, while North Korea manipulates visual evidence and creates ambiguity to gain time.

Defining intelligence. To the public and political leaders, any unpleasant surprise is an intelligence failure. Scholars define it more precisely. Richard K. Betts, an American political scientist who is one of the leading thinkers on this issue, has argued that failures are not rare anomalies but inevitable outcomes of systemic, cognitive, and organizational barriers. Intelligence agencies must operate under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguous evidence. The greater the ambiguity, the greater the influence of preexisting beliefs.

In the case of North Korea, ambiguity is not simply an accident involving limited information. It is a condition carefully constructed by the regime.

Strategic deception—deliberate manipulation of information to influence an adversary’s perceptions—has become a central component of North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy. American intelligence agencies have repeatedly struggled to adapt to this strategy, because they are weighed down by bureaucratic norms that prize continuity over change and reactivity over anticipation.

Strategic deception is most effective when the target already wants to believe a certain narrative……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Rethinking US intelligence on North Korea. What, then, is to be done? Absolute accuracy in intelligence is unattainable, but incremental improvement is possible. The patterns seen in previous US-North Korean relations suggest several possible reforms. First, intelligence organizations must build for adaptability, not stability. They must prioritize agility, encourage analysts to test assumptions, reward dissenting perspectives, and treat ambiguity as a strategic variable. Rather than forcing ambiguous evidence into existing frameworks, agencies must recognize that adversaries actively manipulate ambiguity.

Also, analysts need more than satellite imagery and signals intercepts. They need linguistic, cultural, and psychological expertise to decode the narratives that adversaries craft. Deception is a cognitive process, not just a technical one. Countering it requires cognitive tools. Intelligence that is accurate but ignored is still a failure.

Finally, agencies must improve communication with policy makers, making uncertainty clear and resisting the urge to present false precision. The goal is not to eliminate ambiguity but to help decision makers understand it and prepare for multiple scenarios……………………………. https://thebulletin.org/2025/10/how-north-korea-outsmarts-us-intelligence-agencies-and-what-they-should-do-to-adapt/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=How%20North%20Korea%20outsmarts%20US%20intelligence&utm_campaign=20251024%20Monday%20Newsletter%20%28Copy%29

October 31, 2025 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | North Korea, secrets,lies and civil liberties