Back to Great Power Rivalry and Nuclear Risk as Russia Quits US Plutonium Pact.

8 Oct, 2025 – Defense News Army 2025

Russia’s State Duma on Oct. 8, 2025 approved withdrawing from the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which required the U.S. and Russia to each dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. The move deepens the unraveling of U.S.-Russia arms control as New START’s limits on deployed warheads and delivery systems face expiration in early 2026.

According to Reuters on 8 October 2025, the Duma approved Russia’s withdrawal from the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, signed in 2000 and in force since 2011, which required Washington and Moscow to dispose of 34 metric tons each of weapons-grade plutonium, enough for thousands of Cold War-era warheads. The decision, taken in Moscow by the lower house of parliament, ends a key pillar of managing military-plutonium stockpiles, with the Kremlin citing the deterioration of the arms-control framework with the United States. This break comes as New START approaches its early-2026 expiry, a treaty that caps forces at 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems, and as Moscow “suspended” inspections in 2023 while stating it would observe the ceilings. In September 2025, the Kremlin also pledged to remain close to those limits if Washington did the same.

The announcement lands while New START remains the last strategic-arms-limitation accord still in effect. It sets identical caps for both sides with well-defined counting rules, even though routine inspections have been suspended by Russia since 2023 and the outlook for any extension is uncertain. Practitioners of deterrence know these parameters and the compliance mechanics; what matters here is the dynamic they create, less verification means greater distrust and more room for edge-gaming…………………………………………………………………………………..

Finally, nuclear risks are rising across the board, driven by the rapid modernization of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean arsenals, joint patrols, and questions over the perceived credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in several regions. Washington and its allies face a clear, if costly, set of tasks. Hold the line in Ukraine, step up counter-proliferation measures that target dual-use parts and component networks, and reopen, wherever feasible, risk-reduction channels with Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang, including areas not covered by classic treaties. In the absence of a treaty, some experts advocate transparency gestures and minimal operational constraints to shrink uncertainty. The hard problem now is competition with two nuclear peers, China growing its warhead count and Russia preserving upload margins plus out-of-framework systems from Avangard to Poseidon. In this landscape, leaving the PMDA is not a technical footnote, it is a stitch in the safety net coming undone. https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/back-to-great-power-rivalry-and-nuclear-risk-as-russia-quits-us-plutonium-pact