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Grave Nation: Ukrainian Cemetery Mega-Project Reveals Dimming Military Hopes

a shroud of occlusion wears heavy over the outcome of the war is because the West has done their utmost in hiding Ukrainian losses.

The right question is not whether Ukraine has lost the war – that seems all too obvious to me – but how far it will lose it.

the Ukrainian deputies who still have some brain left understand that with the current state of affairs in Ukraine, the country will soon cease to exist. All the Ukrainian “partners” who were verbally ready to fight for Zelensky’s regime have now completely “frozen” and don’t even want to contribute money.

Simplicius, Jul 22, 2025, https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/grave-nation-ukrainian-cemetery-mega?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=168791044&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=ln98x&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

A new Le Monde article sends spider cracks through the facade of Ukrainian losses:

Right off the bat, they reveal that cemeteries throughout Ukraine are full, requiring a national project of building a large-scale network of new military burial sites:

The squares reserved for the soldiers are full. Everywhere, teams of architects are working on memorials that tell us as much about the scale of the slaughter as they do about the ongoing reflection on the idea of nationhood.

They visit one of the first under construction, which already has a main square of plots for 10,000, eventually to be expanded to 160,000 graves:

In the village, only a brand-new brown sign, the color reserved for national sites, currently marks the road leading the trucks to the construction site. It reads: “National Military Memorial Cemetery”. A first square of 10,000 graves, already partially dotted with wide, light-colored granite paths lined with benches and lime trees, will welcome the first “heroes” this summer. Eventually, however, “130,000 or even 160,000” deceased will be laid to rest on this future mortuary site, explains architect Serhi Derbin, wearing khaki linen pants and a straw panama, in the bright Saturday sunshine of July.

Rightly, the Le Monde staff turn to the issue of “official” Ukrainian casualty statistics. In a growing Western trend, they admit that the number of dead is likely “much higher” than Zelensky gives credit for. Of course, pro-UA zealots will ignore the fact that there is no such project in Russia, no inordinately exceptional outgrowth of military cemeteries anywhere. They’ll make excuses, pointing to the cliche of “Russia’s size” as somehow ‘concealing’ such markers of losses, ignoring that Ukraine itself is the largest country in Europe and remains oddly unable to ‘conceal losses’ in the same way.

In the same circles, there are increased talks of Ukrainian collapse by end of year. Le Figaro’s new article making the rounds offers such a prediction. The writers spoke to French military officers who believe the situation is turning dire:

A French military source:

Moscow’s “thousand cuts” strategy is intensifying. The front is not set in stone. Offensives are localized in a multitude of small battles fought over a few kilometers. The cuts are getting deeper, even though the Ukrainian army is already weakened. It is stretched over a front of more than 1,000 km. Lacking sufficiently frequent replacements and human resources, the units are becoming exhausted.

“The Russians are multiplying offensive sectors to disperse enemy reserves,” explains a French military source. Russia has deployed nearly 700,000 soldiers in Ukraine, more than the Ukrainian army. Patiently, it continues to nibble away at territory, at the cost of colossal human losses: up to a hundred dead a day; some 40,000 casualties (dead and wounded) a month. The Russian army has adapted its tactics, preferring to launch assaults with small infantry units or units mounted on motorcycles, in order to advance faster and more lightly.

They slip in the usual sop about the “costs” Russia is incurring, but then critically add:

But the army, the Ukrainian, it also lost some of the material she had received from Western for the past three years. Time plays against it with the risk of a break in a part of the front. “Forces of Ukraine are in [dire straits]… Can they last six months? A year? In reality, the war is already lost“, continued in the military source. In this war of attrition, the time changes everything.

And in another even more erudite offering, Figaro interviews French historian Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, who is particularly a leading expert on the First World War.

Utilizing his expertise on the Great War, he makes some fascinating parallels to the current Ukrainian conflict that are worth a deeper look.

First, he notes that in his opinion the Ukrainian war is only the third war of its particular type in recent history—the type being ‘siege warfare, but in the open country’:

You note another similarity between the First World War and the Ukraine, as both were wars of position…

There are few historical examples of this very recent form of warfare, as it requires armaments that only became available at the end of the 19th century. Structurally, it is siege warfare, but fought in open country over hundreds of kilometers. There have only been three conflicts of this type: the Great War (from late 1914 to spring 1918, not beyond); the Iran-Iraq war (from 1980 to 1988); the Ukraine war (from April 2022, not before).

He goes on to draw further parallels:

What are the invariants of such a war?

The main point is the superiority of the defensive over the offensive. Had this not been the case, Ukraine would have been beaten long ago. Already during the First World War, it was necessary to cross a “no man’s land” saturated with barbed wire, one of the most effective weapons of the early 20th century. Then there were the minefields we saw in Iran-Iraq and now in Ukraine. They are an extraordinarily compact barrier. The Ukrainians came up against it in the summer of 2023 during their failed counter-offensive, and the Russians since 2024. As a result, it’s impossible to break through dozens of kilometers wide and break the enemy’s front line.

He notes that due to these peculiarities, there is a kind of obligatory “regression” in each conflict, where previous means are no longer workable:

There is a kind of regression in all three conflicts. In Ukraine, helicopters and airplanes fly very little above and beyond the front line. Nor are there any major armored offensives. We’ve never seen anything like the Battle of Kursk in 1943. As a result, the battle is heavily infantry-based.

And at the same time, firepower…

Yes, that’s another invariant of this type of warfare. Initially, this firepower was linked to artillery, with the cannon dominating the battlefield during the First World War. This overwhelming dominance of the cannon can be seen again in Ukraine, until 2024. Unfortunately, Russia has always had very good artillery and, unlike the Ukrainians, has had the means to supply it, where the latter ran out of ammunition well into 2024.

But the point in setting the stage above, is that by analyzing these parallels, this preeminent historian has reached a final decisive conclusion: that Ukraine has already lost the war:

It was by considering these invariants that you came to a radical conclusion, set out at a Senate hearing in April: in your view, Ukraine has already lost the war…

Indeed, as we speak, Ukraine unfortunately seems to have lost the war, probably as early as the summer of 2023, when it became clear that its long-awaited counter-offensive had failed. One could imagine a spectacular turnaround, but it’s not clear how. Of course, when you say this, people are shocked because it’s unbearable to think that Ukraine has lost the war. It’s unbearable for me too.

He adds to the list of peculiarities of the war the fact that even Ukraine’s now-certain loss is not overtly visible:

But here’s the thing: there’s no point in remaining incantatory, we have to get out of a new denial, that of defeat, after that of the possibility of war itself. For I would add another characteristic of the war of position: defeat is not immediately discernible when it looms. It takes a long time to appear. It’s not like Stalingrad, where the vanquished leave the battlefield and the victor occupies it. It’s not like the blitzkrieg of May-June 1940. In a war of position, it’s two bodies in battle, slowly wearing each other down. Only in the end does it become clear that one has worn out faster than the other.

He hits the nail on the head, but likely in a way even he doesn’t fully understand—or at least not in a way he’s ready to admit. You see, the reason such a shroud of occlusion wears heavy over the outcome of the war is because the West has done their utmost in hiding Ukrainian losses. His final pithy admonition that only in the end does it become clear who lost the war of attrition inadvertently bears testament to this: only those of us who truly care about facts and uncovering the truth—not dogmatic reasoning and propaganda—are able to demystify the more-than-obvious signals that Ukraine is taking ungodly and unsustainable losses comparative to Russia.

He goes on to demonstrate his cause with an example:

Let’s do a little thought experiment. Let’s imagine that in early October 1918, a group of military experts, journalists and historians were gathered in a neutral country to ask their opinion on the situation. And now suppose someone had then suggested that Germany had already lost the war. Well, everyone would have cried out! At that time, the Reich was still occupying immense territories in the east at the expense of Russia, since the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It occupied the whole of Belgium and large parts of France. It’s true that the German army has been retreating since the summer, but nowhere has the front given way. The Germans are inflicting heavy losses on the Allies, since it is the Allies who are on the offensive and therefore taking the greatest risks. So where is the German defeat?

In reality, German defeat has been certain since July-August 1918. It has happened, but it is not yet apparent. Since the summer, the German General Staff has been well aware of this, and has called for negotiations to be launched. Except that the political powers don’t understand it, nor does German public opinion, and never will. This failure to understand the defeat of 1918 was one of the reasons for the rise of Nazism.

The interviewer lightly pushes back, stating that the Ukrainians are not yet visibly collapsing despite Russia’s slow-moving gains:

Here again, let’s think back to the First World War. When the Allies launched their counter-offensive in July 1918, it was a general one, but apart from the Americans, the soldiers were no longer capable of attacking. They were so used to throwing themselves on the ground at the first danger that everyone was extremely cautious. But we could have imagined that part of the front would be breached, in which case… Germany had no more reserves to plug the holes. That’s why I’m worried about the risk of a Russian offensive in Ukraine this summer: given the disproportion of forces, could it break through the front? We would then be entering a different configuration, as any break in the front would risk producing a powerful moral effect on the Ukrainian armed forces, on political power and on public opinion.

He concludes by stating that the right question is no longer whether Ukraine has lost—which is rhetorical at this point—but how far Ukraine will lose:

The right question is not whether Ukraine has lost the war – that seems all too obvious to me – but how far it will lose it. On the basis of the current balance of power, or on that of an even more unfavorable balance of power? This will determine whether or not the Ukrainian defeat represents a strategic victory for Russia.

On that note, Russia again launched one of the largest attacks of the war last night—at least according to frenetic Ukrainian commentators who, admittedly, could be playing things up for dramatic effect to curry sympathy:

There has been a surge of such attacks the last few weeks, particularly ones targeting Ukrainian recruitment centers operated by the notorious TCK (Territorial Recruitment Center). Farsighted Ukrainian officials have ‘brilliantly’ concluded this is a Russian effort to cripple Ukraine’s ability to round up meat for Zelensky’s conveyor belt of horror.

Likewise, Russian strikes have been completely erasing Ukrainian weapons industries. Many people watch the endless parade of explosions in a detached manner—at this point it has become passé to the point that people assume these strikes do little, or are just carrying out some vague ‘background work’. In reality, they have been neutering Ukrainian industries, halting many of the farfetched Ukrainian weapons ambitions which were at one point widely talked about.

For instance, a recent hit was said to have destroyed the Grom-2 production line, a big Ukrainian ballistic missile that was meant to be their answer to Russia’s Iskander. There’s a reason you don’t see much of the weaponry constantly talked about and billed as the next “wunderwaffen”: it’s because these ongoing, systematic Russian strikes are wiping out their industries, leaving Ukraine with no ability to produce anything other than small quadcopter drones in tiny boutique workshops which can be hidden anywhere. The larger facilities which were meant to produce more prestige-level systems, from mobile artillery, to various analogues of Russian air-to-ground and ballistic missiles, to artillery shell production lines, etc., have all been extirpated by these relentless systematic strikes.

More and more, top Ukrainian figures are panicking over this and concluding that if it continues on this way, Ukraine will have nothing left. Listen to the Ukrainian officer below, who states that “at this rate, Ukraine will be returned to the stone age”:

🇺🇦The chair under Zelensky is starting to shake more and more. After all, allowing such statements on the air of pro-Kyiv media was previously unimaginable👍

➖Apparently, the recent report about the production of Geran-2 drones and their quantity, along with massive attacks on Ukrainian military infrastructure, really forced the top officials of Zelensky’s office to activate the “brown” alert.

➖Because the Ukrainian deputies who still have some brain left understand that with the current state of affairs in Ukraine, the country will soon cease to exist. All the Ukrainian “partners” who were verbally ready to fight for Zelensky’s regime have now completely “frozen” and don’t even want to contribute money. Support is dwindling, and stealing is becoming difficult. The people fully realize that Zelensky will shout about VICTORY from his bunker or Europe until he is hoarse, while Ukrainians rejoice at the Geran-2 strikes on the TCC.

He’s referring in particular to the new videos showcasing Russia’s Geran (Shahed) drone production at the Alabuga factory in Tatarstan where hundreds of the drones are produced each day around the clock:

The full episode where the above excerpt is from, which deals with many other drone types being used in the Russian Army, can be viewed here.

One of the reasons, by the way, that the French historian, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, saw Russia winning the war despite parallels to ‘stalemated’ conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war, is because in previous examples he believes the industrial capacities and general capabilities of the combatants were likewise roughly static. But in the case of the Russo-Ukrainian war, he admits that Russian capabilities are growing each year, far out-pacing Ukrainian ones. This goes toward things like the previously-talked-about manpower gains of 100k per year—while Ukraine’s manpower shrinks—as well as the industrial growth of the arms industry.

That being said, there’s one last important point to be made. Many point to Russia’s “growing economic problems” as a counter-argument for why Russia could begin “losing” in the future, despite its seeming present dominance. I even saw one Western publication spin Putin’s announcement that Russia would be reducing its military budget next year as an “act of desperation” which means Russian military capability is finally “weakening”.

On the contrary, the signals here are the complete opposite: Putin’s plan to begin slowly reining in Russia’s military spending is the acknowledgement that Russia has finally reached a total equilibrium in the war, where current production levels are stable and sustainable indefinitely in relation to the losses. That means further inordinate military expansion is unnecessary, and Russia sees a successful path in defeating Ukraine at current levels.

This is obviously in conjunction with the fact that Russia has now attritioned the AFU to such an extent that it no longer requires the same disparity levels in military spending—as Ukrainian capabilities shrink, Russia likewise settles its war-making into a manageable level by taking things from overdrive to simply ‘autopilot’—if the analogy makes sense. Once again, dogmatic Western analysts incapable of impartial reasoning fail to pick up on this obvious cue, which totally spoils their analyses.

To leave off, here’s a typically comical new “threat” issued by beltway bugger Lindsey Graham against Putin. He boasts that Trump will “put a whoopin’ on your ass”, but then veers to say Trump will “punish” not Russia, but countries buying Russian oil:

This again proves the US has no cards against Russia, and must desperately punch Russia’s friends on the arm as a substitute threat. The problem is, this hurts the US and its relations with key foreign powers more than it does anything to Russia.

More and more Ukrainian commentators and political figures are cottoning on to the fact that “sanctions” were always nothing more than a desperate and hollow performative act:

The West, with its illusory economies, fraudulent GDPs based on hyper-financialized and leveraged debt, and miserably deteriorated industrial capacities has worn out its ‘sanctions’ cudgel—at least for anything more than performative ‘punishments’.

July 23, 2025 Posted by | Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

MAGA Going to Israel for Propaganda Training

The Israeli government is paying to have 16 MAGA social media influencers, with millions of followers, brought to Israel to learn how to stop American youth from turning against Tel Aviv over Gaza, writes Joe Lauria.

BJoe Lauria, Consortium News, https://consortiumnews.com/2025/07/20/maga-going-to-israel-for-propaganda-training/

The Israel foreign ministry will spend $86,000 to finance a tour of Israel for 16 Americans to get them to use their vast online influence to craft more positive images of a nation openly engaged in genocide. 

The effort is being made as Israel reacts to a significant turn in public opinion against it, especially by Western youth. Tel Aviv realizes its usual methods of propaganda — and apparently its own inhouse troll army — are no longer working as they once did. 

The daily Haaretz reported

“Foreign Ministry officials say the tour delivers significant media, advocacy, and diplomatic benefits – and represents a strategic shift, as traditional outreach is no longer sufficient to shape public opinion. They aim to leverage the massive followings of young social media influencers to bolster Israel’s standing in the U.S.” 

The Americans, whose names have not been divulged, belong to the MAGA and America First movements, the newspaper said. They are all younger than 30 and each have hundreds of thousands or millions of followers, a vast, target-rich environment for propaganda.  Israel intends to bring more than 500 “influencer delegations” to Israel this year, the ministry said.

It is paying an organization called Israel365 to organize the first American tour because it is in a “unique position to convey a pro-Israel stance that aligns entirely with the MAGA and America First agenda.” 

Israel365’s website says the group “stands unapologetically for the Jewish people’s God-given right to the entire Land of Israel,” calls the two-state solution a “delusion,” and says it’s defending “Western civilization against threats from both Progressive Left extremism and global jihad.” 

Israeli officials justified the no-bid contract with the organization because of its “experience and know-how in creating awareness, engagement, and mobilization of Christian audiences regarding their support for the Jewish people and the State of Israel,” Haaretz reported. 

Ministry officials told the newspaper that “while older Republicans and American conservatives still hold pro-Israel views, positive perspectives towards Israel are falling across all younger age groups.”

News of the tour comes after the U.S. national teachers union voted to ditch the Zionist curriculum of the Ant-Defamation League, which was influencing young American minds.

Western youth, including conservatives, have become increasingly aware of the history of Israel’s expulsion of Palestinian people from their land and of Israel’s stated genocidal intent and actions in Gaza today. It is a wave of understanding Israel needs to contain.

A ministry source said: “We’re working with influencers, sometimes with delegations of influencers. Their networks have huge followings, and their messages are more effective than if they came directly from the ministry.”

Haaretz reported:

“The strategy appears to be paying off. During the 12-day conflict last month with Iran, Israeli digital messaging garnered roughly 1.8 billion online views, boosted in part by social media influencers with millions of followers. The Foreign Ministry has set a goal of bringing 550 influencer delegations to Israel by the end of 2025 to continue this outreach.”

The Foreign Ministry chose Israel365 because “with the rise of the America First movement and MAGA in American politics, it’s essential for Israel that the movement adopt a pro-Israel position.” A Foreign Ministry document said Israel365 “has the ability to smoothly link the spiritual/biblical and geopolitical aspects of support for Israel.” 

Joe Lauria is editor-in-chief of Consortium News and a former U.N. correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, and other newspapers, including The Montreal Gazette, the London Daily Mail and The Star of Johannesburg. He was an investigative reporter for the Sunday Times of London, a financial reporter for Bloomberg News and began his professional work as a 19-year old stringer for The New York Times. He is the author of two books, A Political Odyssey, with Sen. Mike Gravel, foreword by Daniel Ellsberg; and How I Lost By Hillary Clinton, foreword by Julian Assange. 

July 23, 2025 Posted by | Israel, spinbuster, USA | Leave a comment

Sizewell’s Exploding Budget Exposes Europe’s Nuclear Blindspot

Michael Barnard, 20 July 25,
https://cleantechnica.com/2025/07/20/sizewells-exploding-budget-exposes-europes-nuclear-blindspot/

The recent announcement that the UK’s Sizewell C nuclear generation construction’s projected cost has doubled from £20 billion in 2020 to nearly £38 billion today is shocking but predictable. For anyone following Europe’s nuclear power saga, such an escalation is not an anomaly but rather a continuation of a deeply entrenched pattern. This project, part of Europe’s broader push for nuclear power to meet climate goals, is again raising fundamental questions about whether European governments and utilities have truly laid the groundwork for successful nuclear power scaling, or if they continue to underestimate the scale of the task.

To assess what has gone wrong, we can turn to a clear set of criteria for successful nuclear programs that history provides. These criteria are based on the best available evidence from nuclear build-outs globally, and importantly, are grounded in repeated successes and failures documented by energy historians and experts. Seven specific factors emerge as crucial: first, nuclear power programs require a strategic national priority with consistent government oversight and support. Second, successful nuclear programs historically have close alignment with military nuclear objectives, benefiting from established skill sets, infrastructure, and strategic imperatives. Third, reactor programs thrive only when standardized around a single, fully proven reactor design. Fourth, large-scale reactors in the gigawatt range provide significant economies of scale. Fifth, there must be a comprehensive, government-supported training and human resources program. Sixth, deployment should be rapid, continuous, and sustained over two to three decades to leverage learning effects. Finally, successful nuclear deployments involve constructing dozens of reactors, not just a few isolated units, to benefit from economies of scale and accumulated knowledge.

Evaluating Europe’s EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) program against these criteria provides a sobering picture. The strategic national priority criterion has only partially been met. European governments have indeed supported nuclear in principle, yet actual oversight has varied considerably, often shifting responsibilities between private entities, state regulators, and multinational utilities, diluting accountability. There has been no consistent, comprehensive governmental stewardship. Each reactor site faces a new web of bureaucratic complexity rather than benefiting from streamlined regulatory oversight.

The second criterion, integration with military objectives, is entirely absent in the European context. Historically, successful nuclear programs like those in France, the United States, or Russia have been intertwined with military nuclear efforts. The absence of military nuclear integration in contemporary European programs removes a critical element of strategic urgency, funding, and workforce stability. Europe’s nuclear effort remains civilian-only, losing these historical advantages.

Standardization of reactor design has also fallen short. Although the EPR was intended to be Europe’s standardized reactor, actual implementations have seen multiple design modifications, extensive site-specific customizations, and evolving regulatory requirements. Each new European EPR has effectively become another first-of-a-kind construction project, losing almost all potential learning curve benefits. The changes between Flamanville in France, Olkiluoto in Finland, and Hinkley Point C in the United Kingdom illustrate starkly how the promise of standardization has not materialized.

While the fourth criterion of large-scale reactors in the gigawatt class is technically met, this alone has not guaranteed success. Indeed, the EPR’s massive scale of around 1.6 GW per reactor, designed specifically to capture economies of vertical scaling, has perversely contributed to complexity and cost overruns due to an insufficiently mature supply chain, workforce, and management capability. Size alone cannot substitute for weaknesses elsewhere in the development ecosystem.

A major factor missing from Europe’s nuclear plans has been a centralized, government-led workforce training and human resource strategy. Nuclear construction is complex and requires extremely well-trained, specialized and security-cleared personnel who work effectively in teams. Europe’s nuclear workforce remains fragmented, project-based, and heavily reliant on temporary contractors. This workforce structure prevents accumulation of essential expertise and institutional memory. By contrast, successful nuclear builds historically, such as France’s 1970s and 1980s fleet or South Korea’s more recent nuclear expansions, relied explicitly on stable, state-backed workforces built over decades.

The sixth factor, rapid and sustained deployment over a defined two- or three-decade timeframe, has been consistently unmet in Europe. Instead, construction schedules stretch over a decade or longer for individual projects, with significant gaps between reactor starts. Olkiluoto took nearly 18 years from groundbreaking to full commercial operation, while Flamanville has similarly ballooned from a five-year schedule to more than 17 years. Such prolonged and intermittent build-outs destroy continuity, erase institutional memory, and eliminate any hope of learning-based improvements.

Finally, the criterion of dozens of reactors to benefit from learning economies and consistent improvements has not even been approached. The small number of participating European nations have each built just one or two reactors each, without sustained replication. Instead of dozens, Europe’s EPR build-out has delivered exactly two completed reactors outside of China, one each in Finland and France, both massively over budget and delayed. The United Kingdom’s ongoing struggles with Hinkley Point C and now Sizewell underscore the near-complete failure to leverage scale and experience across multiple similar projects.

Bent Flyvbjerg’s extensive research on megaprojects offers important context here. His data demonstrate consistently that nuclear projects routinely underestimate complexity, overestimate potential cost savings, and ignore historical evidence of prior overruns. Flyvbjerg’s findings indicate average overruns for nuclear reactors often range from 120 to 200% above initial estimates. Europe’s EPR experiences align closely with his analysis, underscoring that the fundamental issue is systemic rather than isolated mismanagement or technical miscalculations. The repeated pattern of underestimated costs and schedules aligns precisely with Flyvbjerg’s warnings.

Taking Sizewell C specifically, the now nearly doubled budget and uncertainty about its schedule mirror previous European EPR outcomes. Although the UK government adopted the regulated asset base model to theoretically reduce investor risk, the reality is consumers bear the brunt of these overruns, undermining the economic and political rationale for nuclear. This situation further confirms that without fundamental changes in approach, future EPR projects across Europe will likely replicate these troubling patterns.

The essential takeaway is clear. Unless European governments and industry stakeholders directly address and fulfill the criteria outlined above, nuclear power development in Europe will continue to repeat these costly cycles. Establishing clear national priorities, enforcing rigid reactor standardization, implementing centralized workforce training, committing to sustained rapid deployment, and genuinely standardizing the regulatory environment are non-negotiable if nuclear is to play a significant, reliable, and economically sensible role in Europe’s energy future.

In stark contrast to Europe’s nuclear struggles, renewable energy growth on the continent has significantly exceeded expectations during the same period. Between the mid-2000s, when the first EPR reactors entered construction, and today, Europe’s wind and solar capacity has expanded rapidly, consistently outperforming deployment targets and experiencing steady cost declines. Wind power, both onshore and offshore, has grown by more than tenfold, with major projects routinely delivered within budget and schedule.

Solar power installations have seen even more impressive expansion, driven by sharp decreases in module prices and efficient scaling of supply chains. Unlike nuclear, renewable projects benefit from short construction cycles, standardized designs, and continuous incremental improvements, underscoring Europe’s missed opportunity with nuclear and emphasizing the practical effectiveness of the renewables approach. These advantages show clearly in Flyvbjerg’s data, with wind and solar projects, along with transmission, being the three megaproject categories most likely to come in within initial budgets and schedules.

The stark doubling of Sizewell’s budget is not just a financial shock, it should be a wake-up call. The EPR reactor story in Europe does not have to remain one of perpetual disappointment, but without a realistic recognition of what successful nuclear scale requires, these overruns and delays will continue indefinitely, destroying the business cases that led to their approval in the first place. Europe must either meet these demanding but historically validated conditions for nuclear success or shift decisively toward alternatives capable of meeting its climate and energy goals without the drama and expense that have defined the European nuclear experience to date.

July 23, 2025 Posted by | EUROPE, technology | Leave a comment

Trump threatens to bomb Iran again if it builds new nuclear plants.

 US president claims it would take ‘years’ to bring sites at Fordow, Natanz
and Isfahan back into service. In a post on his Truth Social site sent from
his golf club near Washington, he claimed all three of Tehran’s nuclear
sites had been destroyed after the US dropped 14 30,000lb GBU-57 “bunker
buster” bombs on them. “It would take years to bring them back into
service and, if Iran wanted to do so, they would be much better off
starting anew, in three different locations, prior to those sites being
obliterated, should they decide to do so,” he said before ending with his
trademark signoff. “Thank you for your attention to this matter!”

Telegraph 19th July 2025. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/07/19/trump-threatens-to-bomb-iran-again-if-it-builds-new-nuclear/

July 23, 2025 Posted by | Iran, USA | Leave a comment

The Militarization and Weaponization of Media Literacy-NATO Invades the Classroom

July 10, 2025, Nolan Higdon and Sydney Sullivan, https://www.projectcensored.org/military-weaponization-media-literacy/

This Dispatch is informed by our forthcoming 2025 article, “Media Literacy in the Crosshairs: NATO’s Strategic Goals and the Revival of Protectionist Pedagogy,” from the Journal of Media Literacy Education, Volume 17, Issue 2.

During President Donald Trump’s second term, education has remained a central battleground in American politics. Republicans claim that classrooms have become hotbeds of “woke” indoctrination, accusing educators of promoting progressive agendas and tolerating antisemitism. In contrast, Democrats argue that conservatives are systematically defunding and dismantling public and higher education precisely because it teaches values like diversity, equity, and inclusion. While these partisan skirmishes dominate headlines, they obscure a much deeper and more enduring issue that encompasses all of these issues and more: the influence of corporate and military power on public education.

For decades, scholars have warned that corporations have steadily infiltrated the classroom—not to promote critical thinking or democratic values, but to cultivate ideologies that reinforce capitalism, nationalism, and militarism. Critical media literacy educators, in particular, have called attention to the convergence of tech firms and military entities in education, offering so-called “free” digital tools that double as Trojan horses for data collection and ideological control.

One striking example is the rise of programs like NewsGuard, which uses public fears over fake news to justify increased surveillance of students’ online activity. Relatedly, in 2018, the Atlantic Council partnered with Meta to perform “fact-checking” on platforms such as Facebook.  In 2022, the US Marine Corps discussed developing media literacy trainings. It remains to be seen what training, if any, they will develop. However, what is known is that a large global player has entered the media literacy arena: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While NATO presents its initiatives as supportive of media literacy and democratic education, these efforts appear to be oriented more toward reinforcing alignment with its strategic and political priorities than to fostering critical civic engagement.

NATO was created in 1949, during the Cold War, as a military alliance to contain communism. Although the war officially ended in 1991, NATO has expanded both its mission and membership. Today, it encompasses more than thirty member nations and continues to frame itself as a global force for peace, democracy, and security. But this self-image masks real conflicts of interest.

NATO is deeply intertwined with powerful nation-states and corporate actors. It routinely partners with defense contractors, tech firms, think tanks, and Western governments—all of which have a vested interest in maintaining specific political and economic systems. These relationships raise concerns when NATO extends its reach into education. Can a military alliance—closely linked to the defense industry and state propaganda—credibly serve as a neutral force in media education?

In 2022, NATO associates collaborated with the US-based Center for Media Literacy (CML) to launch a media literacy initiative framed as a strategic defense against misinformation. The initiative included a report titled Building Resiliency: Media Literacy as a Strategic Defense Strategy for the Transatlantic, authored by CML’s Tessa Jolls. It was accompanied by a series of webinars featuring military personnel, policy experts, and academics.

On the surface, the initiative appeared to promote digital literacy and civic engagement. But a closer look reveals a clear ideological agenda. Funded and organized by NATO, the initiative positioned media literacy not as a means of empowering students to think critically about how power shapes media, but as a defense strategy to protect NATO member states from so-called “hostile actors.” The curriculum emphasized surveillance, resilience, and behavior modification over reflection, analysis, and democratic dialogue.

Throughout their webinars, NATO representatives described the media environment as a battlefield, frequently using other war metaphors such as “hostile information activities” and “cognitive warfare.” Panelists argued that citizens in NATO countries were targets of foreign disinformation campaigns—and that media literacy could serve as a tool to inoculate them against ideological threats.

A critical review of NATO’s media literacy initiative reveals several troubling themes. First, it frames media literacy as a protectionist project rather than an educational one. Students are portrayed less as thinkers to be empowered and more as civilians to be monitored, molded, and managed. In this model, education becomes a form of top-down, preemptive defense, relying on expert guidance and military oversight rather than democratic participation.

Second, the initiative advances a distinctly neoliberal worldview. It emphasizes individual responsibility over structural analysis. In other words, misinformation is treated as a user error, rather than the result of flawed systems, corporate algorithms, or media consolidation. This framing conveniently absolves powerful actors, including NATO and Big Tech, , of their role in producing or amplifying disinformation.

Third, the initiative promotes a contradictory definition of empowerment. While the report and webinars often use the language of “citizen empowerment,” they ultimately advocate for surveillance, censorship, and ideological conformity. Panelists call for NATO to “dominate” the information space, and some even propose systems to monitor students’ attitudes and online behaviors. Rather than encouraging students to question power—including NATO itself—this approach rewards obedience and penalizes dissent.

Finally, the initiative erases the influence of corporate power. Although it criticizes authoritarian regimes and “hostile actors,” it fails to examine the role that Western corporations, particularly tech companies, play in shaping media environments. This oversight is especially problematic given that many of these corporations are NATO’s partners. By ignoring the political economy of media, the initiative offers an incomplete and ideologically skewed version of media literacy.

NATO’s foray into media literacy education represents a new frontier in militarized pedagogy. While claiming to promote democracy and resilience, its initiative advances a narrow, protectionist, and neoliberal approach that prioritizes NATO’s geopolitical goals over student empowerment.

This should raise red flags for educators, policymakers, and advocates. Media literacy is not a neutral practice. The organizations that design and fund media literacy programs inevitably shape those programs’ goals and methods. When a military alliance like NATO promotes media education, it brings with it a strategic interest in ideological control.

Educators must ask: What kind of media literacy are we teaching—and whose interests does it serve? If the goal is to produce informed, critically thinking citizens capable of questioning power in all its forms, then NATO’s approach falls short. Instead of inviting students to explore complex media systems, it simplifies them into a binary struggle between “us” and “them,” encouraging loyalty over literacy.

True media literacy must begin with transparency about who and what is behind the curriculum. It must empower students to question all forms of influence—governmental, corporate, and military alike. And it must resist the creeping presence of militarism in our classrooms. As educators, we must defend the right to question, not just the messages we see, but the institutions that shape them.


Nolan Higdon is a political analyst, author, host of The Disinfo Detox Podcast, lecturer at Merrill College and the Education Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Project Censored Judge. Higdon’s popular Substack includes the bi-weekly Gaslight Gazette, which chronicles important and well-researched examples of disinformation, character assassination, and censorship in the United States.

Sydney Sullivan is an educator, author, and researcher specializing in critical media literacy, student well-being, and digital culture. She is a lecturer in the Rhetoric and Writing Studies department at San Diego State University and a co-host of Disinfo Detox. Her popular Substack series @sydneysullivanphd explores how digital habits shape student mental health, media literacy, and classroom culture.

July 23, 2025 Posted by | Education, EUROPE | Leave a comment

Iran to hold nuclear talks with European powers on Friday

 Iran, Britain, France and Germany will hold nuclear talks in Istanbul on
Friday, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said early on Monday,
following warnings by the three European countries that failure to resume
negotiations would lead to international sanctions being reimposed on Iran.
“The meeting between Iran, Britain, France and Germany will take place at
the deputy foreign minister level,” Esmaeil Baghaei was quoted by Iranian
state media as saying.

 Reuters 20th July 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-hold-nuclear-talks-with-european-powers-friday-2025-07-20/

July 23, 2025 Posted by | Iran, politics international | Leave a comment