nuclear-news

What if Iran withdraws from the NPT?

Bulletin. By Mark Goodman, Mark Fitzpatrick | June 25, 2025

As the Iranian nuclear program saga plays out, one diplomatic action has been widely expected: Iran may declare its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).^[1] Such a withdrawal would eliminate the legal prohibition on Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and the requirement that Iran accept international safeguards monitoring. Over the past decade, Iran has threatened many times to play this card in retaliation for far less serious assaults.

NPT withdrawal is one of the few actions available to Iran that would have a significant effect. It would facilitate reconstitution of Iran’s bombed nuclear capabilities and enable Tehran to use them to develop nuclear weapons without international oversight.^[2] Even with the loss of the 14 nuclear scientists and engineers assassinated by Israel this month, Iran surely retains the knowledge on how to build centrifuges and assemble them into cascades, plus the expertise acquired during the secret work to date on weapons development. Iran may also have taken steps to remove equipment and material from its enrichment facilities before the US attacks against three Iranian nuclear facilities over the weekend.

Given these realities, Iran likely will be able to build and operate a secret underground enrichment plant capable of producing significant quantities of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). This process will be sped if Iran was able to protect from Israeli bombing the over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium 235 content the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says Iran had as of May^[3] and, until recently at least, stored in easily transportable cylinders. At a time when much of the world sees Iran as the victim of Israeli aggression, NPT withdrawal could be accomplished with less political blowback than if it were employed in response to economic sanctions.

Iran’s adversaries would see NPT withdrawal as tantamount to a declaration of nuclear weapons intent. There is no such legal connection, however, and the logical case is not airtight. It is conceivable that Iran could withdraw from the treaty and maintain a policy of nuclear hedging, even as it reconstituted its enrichment program in secret. A decision to actually build a nuclear weapon could be made down the road when the capabilities are again in place. Invoking the NPT’s withdrawal clause in the near term would risk military escalation with few immediate benefits, though ending IAEA inspections would reduce the transparency and vulnerability of a reconstituted nuclear program.

Iran’s NPT status. Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and became one of its original parties when the treaty entered into force in 1970. As a non-nuclear-weapon state, Iran is prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons and from seeking or receiving assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. As an NPT party, Iran is also required to accept IAEA safeguards—international monitoring and inspections—on all its peaceful nuclear activities. To that end, Iran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974…………………………………………………………………………………….

Implications of withdrawal. Article X of the NPT allows withdrawal from the treaty if a party “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” To do so, it must give three months’ advance notice to all other NPT Parties and to the UN Security Council, including a statement of those “extraordinary events.” After those three months, the obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept safeguards would cease.

…………………………………………………………………Some NPT parties have never accepted North Korea’s withdrawal as valid in meeting the requirements of Article X, questioning whether its notification cited “extraordinary events” that were “related to the subject matter of the [NPT].”^[13]

In Iran’s case, such questions are unlikely to be raised, since the “extraordinary events” are obvious.

…………………………………………………………… There is little prospect of effective multilateral responses to an Iranian withdrawal notification, aside from toothless requests for Iran to reconsider its decisions.  Such responses would require consensus at least among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

……………………………………………….There is little prospect of effective multilateral responses to an Iranian withdrawal notification, aside from toothless requests for Iran to reconsider its decisions.  Such responses would require consensus at least among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

……………………………….. The NPT-based nonproliferation regime has often worked best by slowing developments and giving countries time and incentives to reconsider fateful decisions. In Iran’s case, Israel’s war of choice is likely to have the opposite effect of speeding up a step off the cliff. If Iran announces formal withdrawal from the NPT, other members should do whatever they can during the three months’ notification period to persuade it not to follow through.
https://thebulletin.org/2025/06/what-if-iran-withdraws-from-the-npt/

June 29, 2025 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | Iran, politics international