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Aukus will cost Australia $368bn. What if there was a better, cheaper defence strategy?

Jonathan Barrett and Patrick Commins, Guardian, 15 June 25

As questions swirl around the nuclear submarine deal, some strategists are pushing for an alternative, ‘echidna’ policy that focuses less on offensive capability

As Australia’s nuclear submarine-led defence strategy threatens to fray, strategists say it’s time to evaluate whether the military and economic case of the tripartite deal still stacks up.

The defence tie-up with the US and UK, called Aukus, is estimated to cost up to $368bn over 30 years, although the deal could become even more costly should Donald Trump renegotiate terms to meet his “America first” agenda.

The current deal, struck in 2021, includes the purchase of three American-made nuclear-powered submarines, the construction of five Australian-made ones, as well as sustaining the vessels and associated infrastructure.

Such a price tag naturally comes with an opportunity cost paid by other parts of the defence force and leaves less money to address societal priorities, such as investing in regional diplomacy and accelerating the renewable energy transition.

This choice is often described as one between “guns and butter”, referring to the trade-off between spending on defence and social programs.

Luke Gosling, Labor’s special envoy for defence and veterans’ affairs, last year described Aukus as “Australia’s very own moonshot” – neatly capturing both the risks and the potential benefits.

Opportunity cost

Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute’s international security program, says there are cheaper ways to replicate submarine capabilities, which are ultimately designed to sink ships and destroy other submarines.

These include investing in airborne capabilities, more missiles, maritime patrol aircraft and naval mines, he says.

“If you imagine a world without Aukus, it does suddenly free up a massive portion of the defence budget,” says Roggeveen.

“That would relieve a lot of pressure, and would actually be a good thing for Australia.”

Roggeveen coined the term “echidna strategy” to argue for an alternative, and cheaper, defence policy for Australia that does not include nuclear-powered submarines.

Like the quill-covered mammal, the strategy is designed to build defensive capabilities that make an attack unpalatable for an adversary. The strategy is meant to radiate strength but not aggression.

“The uncertainty that Aukus introduces is that we are buying submarines that actually have the capabilities to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles on to an enemy land mass,” says Roggeveen.

“That is an offensive capability that’s ultimately destabilising. We should be focusing on defensive capabilities only.”

Those advocating for a more defensive approach, including Albert Palazzo from the University of New South Wales, point out that it is more costly to capture ground than it is to hold it…………………..

Social cost

…………………..Saul Eslake, an independent economist, says higher defence spending is coming at a time of substantially higher demands on the public purse across a range of areas, from aged care, to disability services and childcare………………………..

Political cost

While expert opinion divides over whether nuclear-powered submarines are the best strategic option for Australia’s long-term defence strategy, there’s a separate question over whether the submarines will be delivered……………………………….. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/15/aukus-will-cost-australia-368bn-what-if-there-was-a-better-cheaper-defence-strategy?fbclid=IwY2xjawLHNQpleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETFyMEl3YVlwYXlzdE5HaUFzAR7t2VVyRqzmPs-WhsC_dhvz9susqUAqTdxsascsmPSKfkWBQ93MS4DJ24z_9Q_aem_lR5byRgSjQDcUUkIsx-k0w

June 27, 2025 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA, weapons and war