NATO-Russia Ukrainian War Ceasefire: To Be Or Not To Be?

RUSSIAN and EURASIAN POLITICS, by Gordonhahn, March 14, 2025

On March 13th Russian President Vladimir Putin stated Moscow is open to a ceasefire leading to peace treaty talks, generally speaking. However, he stressed tghat there are “nuances” that need to be addressed before any ceasefire agreement could be concluded. The ‘nuances’ were really counteroffers made for practical reasons but also having the effect of returning the ball to the US-Ukrainian court, paraphrasing US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s assertion after the Ukrainians’ agreement to a ceasefire that ‘the ball is now in Moscow’s court.’

Highlighting what is or was missing from the American proposal to his knowledge at the time he was speaking (before meeting with US envoy Steven Witkoff, Putin said the issues in need of resolution are: (1) the remaining Ukrainian troops in Kursk, Russia; (2) Ukraine’s military mobilization and training of those mobilized; (3) arms sales to Ukraine; and (4) verification of any ceasefire covering the long ‘line of contact’ or frontlines needed to be resolved (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76450). The first issue is being resolved by the Russian army which has re-taken Sudzha and probably will have killed, captured, or pushed all Ukrainian troops out of Kursk Oblast within a week or so.

…………………………………………………..Putin’s public statements probably reflect what were communicated to U.S. negotiator Steven Witkoff more as requirements or conditions before any Russian agreement to a ceasefire. Pressing Kiev to halt mobilization and training, puts Zelenskiy in a difficult position, and Washington and or Kiev will likely respond that if Kiev is required to halt these activities, then Moscow must halt them or something analagous. This will highlight the coercive, violent aspect of what Ukrainians call ‘Ze-mobilization’—‘Ze’ referring to Zelenskiy.

…………………………….At the same time, the U.S. weapons to be supplied to Kiev are numbered. The Ameerican-Ukrainian statement on the ceaefire agreement declares that the U.S. “will immediately lift the pause on intelligence sharing and resume security assistance to Ukraine” (www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-united-states-ukraine-meeting-in-jeddah/).

……………………..Trump has not and may not use PDA to support in Ukraine in future, perhaps depending on Kiev’s willingess to negotiate, despite the inherent contradiction in demanding peace talks while supplying weapons. For Ukraine, this is a contradiction with an opportunity: to drag out talks while it rearms its forces along the contact line.

Not surprisingly then, Russian officials have repeatedly stated they will not accept a ceasefire agreement and will continue fighting until a full-fledged peace agreement is reached. Their previous rejections of any ceasefire were precisely based on Russians’ suspicion that any pause in the fighting will be used to halt Russia’s mounting offensives, rearm Ukraine, and then resume the war with Kiev’s forces in a more robust state.

……………………… Putin may find his political position weakened in comparison with more hardline elements if seen as having fallen again for a another Western deception. This means he cannot accept continued arms supplies to Ukraine during a ceasefire.

……………………………………………………………………..Putin understands negotiating the details and mechanisms for implementing the ceasefire likely will take months. Meanwhile Russian troops can complete the process of expelling Ukrainian troops from the areas which the latter hold in at least two (Luhansk and Donetsk) of the four Donbass regions claimed by Russia and extending areas it holds in other Ukrainian regions. While these and Crimea are settled issues militarily and in terms of sovereignty—they are Russian; Kiev will not win them back for decades, a century, if ever.

The situation with regard to the other two Russia-annexed but still not fully taken regions – Kherson and Zaporozhe’ – is more fluid. Russian forces control less than half of each’s territory and will have an extraordinarly difficult time seizing their capitol cities of the same name. Thus, the negotiations on territories, which, accordoing to Trump was under discussion at Riyadh with the Ukrainians, is likely to center around a possible trade with Moscow withdrawing its troops from areas it occupies in regions outside the four regions it claims for the remainder of the territory of the claimed regions still not held by Russian troops most likely in Kherson and Zaporozhe. All of this will be incredibly difficult to navigate politically, particularly for Zelenskiy and Ukraine. Moreover, it is unlikely that Kiev has more than half a year before the collapse begins of one or more of the following: the entire front, army, oligarch-neofascist Maidan regime, and Ukrainian state.

Now we get to the most disconcerting fact hanging over the ceasefire endeavor. It was hinted at by Putin’s raising the vexing issue of verifying and monitoring the ceasefire……………………………………………………….. it will be a long, rocky road before any agreement is achieved, and failure could lead to an explosive doubling down on the disastrous NATO-Russia Ukrainian War and the destructive chaos of our new multipolar world. https://gordonhahn.com/2025/03/14/nato-russia-ukrainian-war-ceasefire-to-be-or-not-to-be/