If China can’t scale nuclear, Australia’s got Buckley’s

Dutton’s proposal has seven nuclear power plants, including five large-scale reactors and two SMRs. This isn’t critical mass for a nuclear program. As of February 2025, the United States operates 94 nuclear reactors, France has 57, and South Korea maintains 26 reactors. Those are sufficient numbers of GW-scale reactors to achieve program economies of scale. Australia’s peak electricity demand of 38.6 GW isn’t sufficient to provide an opportunity for sufficient numbers of reactors of a single design to be built.

Michael Barnard, Feb 25, 2025,  https://reneweconomy.com.au/if-china-cant-scale-nuclear-australias-got-buckleys/

The platypus of energy in Australia has reared its duckbill and stamped its webbed feet again in recent years.

A fractious group of bedfellows is advocating for nuclear generation, primarily driven by the Liberal-National Coalition under Peter Dutton, who has proposed repurposing decommissioned coal-fired stations for nuclear power, with the remarkable claim that reactors could be operational between 2035 and 2037.

Other political supporters include the Libertarian Party and One Nation. Unsurprising advocacy organisations such as the Australian Nuclear Association, Nuclear for Australia, the Minerals Council of Australia, and the South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy are calling for legislative changes to allow nuclear development, citing its reliability and low emissions.

Notable figures like opposition energy spokesperson Ted O’Brien, who has chaired parliamentary inquiries into nuclear energy, and Indigenous leader Warren Mundine, who sees nuclear as an economic and climate solution, have also voiced strong support.

But nuclear energy, like the platypus, is an oddly shaped beast, and needs a very specific hole to fit into the energy jigsaw puzzle.

Successful nuclear programs share several key conditions, drawn from historical examples in the United States, France, South Korea, and the UK. These countries achieved large-scale nuclear deployment first by making it a top-priority national goal, tied to military strategy or energy security.

Bipartisan support ensured long-term stability, while military involvement helped enforce cost discipline and continuity over decades. Australia clearly doesn’t have bipartisan support for nuclear energy.

Previous countries found political consensus in the face of serious geopolitical threats from nuclear armed enemies such as the Soviet Union and North Korea. Australia isn’t threatened by invasion or nuclear war by any country, and the major political parties are clearly on opposite sides of the fence on the subject.

Teal MPs, supported by Climate 200 and a major new force, are in general not supportive of nuclear energy either.

Australia’s federal laws prohibit nuclear power development through the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), which explicitly bans the approval of nuclear power plants.

The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (ARPANS Act) restricts certain nuclear activities, reinforcing the ban. Both laws would have to be repealed or substantially altered, requiring draft legislation to start with. No draft legislation has been in evidence from the Liberal-National Coalition, which appears par for the course for a campaign plank which is very light on details.

If the Liberal-National Coalition were to regain power, they would first have to draft a bill, and then shepherd it through the extensive legislative process, something that with contentious bills can take up to two years. That’s just the beginning.

Australia’s status as a signatory to international nuclear non-proliferation treaties adds a layer of complexity to any move toward nuclear power. Compliance with agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would require strict oversight of uranium handling, enrichment, and waste disposal.

Any shift to nuclear energy could trigger lengthy negotiations with global regulatory bodies to ensure Australia remains within its non-proliferation commitments, delaying and complicating the development of a civilian nuclear program.

The duration for individual countries to negotiate and implement these protocols has ranged from a few months to several years, influenced by national legislative processes and political considerations.

Strong central control is another common factor in successful nuclear programs. National governments directly managed nuclear projects, maintaining tight oversight of construction schedules and decision-making. This approach prevented fragmentation and ensured that experienced leadership remained in place throughout the deployment.

In Australia, power systems are largely under state control, meaning any attempt to build nuclear power plants would require approval from individual state governments. While the federal government sets national energy policies and regulates nuclear safety, states have the authority over planning and construction approvals.

Several states, including Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia, have explicit bans on nuclear power, adding another layer of legislative hurdles. Even if the federal ban were lifted, nuclear development would still depend on state cooperation, making a nationwide rollout politically and legally complex.

Building a skilled workforce was essential to scaling nuclear generation. Successful programs invested in national education and certification systems, training engineers, construction workers, and technicians specifically for nuclear projects. Strict security measures were also necessary to vet personnel and prevent risks.

That’s challenging for Australia. The Australian National Training Authority (ANTA) was abolished on July 1, 2005, with all its functions transferred to the Department of Education, Science and Training. This move aimed to centralize vocational education and training (VET) oversight at the federal level, streamlining operations and reducing administrative complexities associated with the previous federal-state arrangements.

Despite this degree of centralisation, the administration and delivery of VET programs remain primarily under state and territory control, with public technical and further education institutes and private providers delivering courses under regional oversight.

While the coordination and policy aspects of ANTA’s functions persist at the national level, the execution and management of training programs continue to be managed by individual states and territories.

That’s not a good basis for a nationally run and managed nuclear workforce education, certification and security clearance program that would need to persist for thirty to forty years. A nuclear ANTA would have to be established, taking time in and of itself, and then it would take time to attract and create a critical mass of skilled nuclear engineering, construction, operation and security human resources.

Speaking of security, Australia’s nuclear ambitions come with an often overlooked cost: an immense, multilayered security burden that taxpayers will likely shoulder.

In the US, nuclear power requires an extensive web of international, national, state, and local security measures, yet much of this expense is not covered by reactor operators.

The US government funds $1.1 billion annually in international nuclear security, including protecting supply chains and waste management through agencies like the IAEA, the Department of Defense, and the CIA. These costs translate to $8 million per reactor per year, with a full lifecycle cost of $1.2 billion per reactor—expenses that remain largely hidden from public scrutiny.

Domestically, the security footprint is even larger. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, Homeland Security, and law enforcement agencies provide a $26 million per reactor per year security umbrella, ensuring compliance, protecting fuel transport, and defending against threats.

On-site security measures – including armed patrols, cyber protection, and emergency response teams – add another $18 million annually per reactor. In total, US taxpayers effectively subsidise $34 million per reactor per year, or $4 billion over a nuclear site’s lifespan, a cost that is rarely included in nuclear energy debates.

For Australia, these figures should serve as a stark warning. If nuclear reactors are built, the country will need to establish entirely new layers of security infrastructure, from federal oversight and emergency response teams to military-style site defenses.

The financial burden won’t fall on private operators alone – it will land squarely on the Australian taxpayer. As policymakers debate nuclear’s role in the country’s energy future, they must ask: are Australians ready to take on a security commitment of this scale?

A single, GW-scale, standardised reactor design was crucial to keeping costs under control. Countries that succeeded in nuclear deployment avoided excessive customization and focused on repeating a proven design, allowing for efficiency gains and predictable outcomes.

At present, there are various proposed reactor designs under consideration. Dutton’s proposal includes evaluating various reactor technologies, with a focus on South Korea’s APR1000 and APR1400 pressurized water reactors.

O’Brien has led a delegation to South Korea to study its nuclear power industry and assess the suitability of these reactor models for Australia.

It’s worth noting that while South Korea was successful in scaling nuclear generation, it did so with corruption that included substandard parts in reactors that led to a political scandal that resulted in the jailing of politicians and energy company executives.

Small modular nuclear reactors (SMR) have been proposed as part of the mix. They aren’t GW-scale and they don’t actually exist. As the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE) accurately pointed out in mid-2024, SMR technology remains in developmental stages globally, with no operational units in OECD countries.

The ATSE suggests that a mature market for SMRs may not emerge until the late 2040s, while I think it’s unlikely to emerge at all. Small reactors were tried in the 1960s and 1970s and were too expensive, leading to reactors being scaled up to around the GW scale in successful programs. There is nothing to indicate that anything has changed since then that will make SMRs successful and inexpensive the second time around.

Scale and speed mattered. Effective programs built between 24 and 100 reactors of very similar designs within a 20-to-40-year timeframe, ensuring that expertise remained within the workforce. Spreading projects over longer periods led to skill erosion and inefficiencies.

Dutton’s proposal has seven nuclear power plants, including five large-scale reactors and two SMRs. This isn’t critical mass for a nuclear program. As of February 2025, the United States operates 94 nuclear reactors, France has 57, and South Korea maintains 26 reactors. Those are sufficient numbers of GW-scale reactors to achieve program economies of scale. Australia’s peak electricity demand of 38.6 GW isn’t sufficient to provide an opportunity for sufficient numbers of reactors of a single design to be built.

Finally, strict adherence to design was non-negotiable. Countries that allowed constant innovation or design changes saw costs balloon and timelines slip. The lesson from history is clear: nuclear success depends on disciplined execution, a committed national strategy, and a workforce dedicated to repeating a single proven approach.

Australia’s strong engineering culture, known for innovation and adaptation, could pose challenges to a strictly controlled nuclear deployment program. Unlike industries where iterative improvements drive progress, nuclear power requires rigid standardization to control costs, ensure safety, and meet regulatory demands.

Australia’s history of engineering-led modifications – seen in mining, renewables, and infrastructure – could lead to pressures for design changes mid-project, a factor that has contributed to cost overruns and delays in nuclear projects overseas.

While flexibility has been a strength in other sectors, in nuclear energy, deviation from a single, proven reactor design undermines efficiency and drives up costs, making strict oversight and discipline crucial to success.

February 27, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | AUSTRALIA, technology | Leave a comment