The 1.5C Climate Goal Is Dead. Why Is COP29 Still Talking About It?

The battle to keep global warming within 1.5 degrees Celsius has been a
rallying cry for climate action for nearly a decade. Now, with the planet
almost certain to blow past the target, diplomats and campaigners at the
COP29 summit have found themselves awkwardly clinging to a goal that no
longer makes sense.
The evidence has become harder and harder to ignore.
This year will once again be the hottest on record as greenhouse gas
emissions continue to soar and Earth will likely register an average
reading of 1.5C above pre-industrial levels for the first time.
A study released this month using a new technique for measuring the rise in
temperatures suggests the world was already 1.49C hotter at the end of
2023.
“1.5C has been deader than a doornail” for a while now, said Zeke
Hausfather, a climate scientist at Berkeley Earth. Many of his peers agree.
The United Nations has concluded that the world is on track to warm roughly
3.1C before the end of the century if nothing changes. That report was
released just before representatives from nearly 200 countries gathered in
Baku, Azerbaijan for the UN’s annual global climate conference, where
they have been mired in bitter negotiations over how to raise money to help
developing nations combat global warming.
Bloomberg 18th Nov 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-11-18/cop29-what-does-1-5c-s-failure-mean-for-climate-negotiations
Beyond one million years: The intrinsic radiation hazard of high-level nuclear wastes

This paper highlights the absence of quantitative estimates
regarding the intrinsic radiation hazard of high-level nuclear wastes,
namely, spent fuel (SF) and vitrified high-level wastes (VHLW), for periods
exceeding one million years.
Using available data, conducting scoping
calculations of radiation doses, and comparing the results to radiation
protection guidelines and natural background radiation, this paper shows
that high-level wastes cannot be safely handled or left unprotected
essentially indefinitely.
By quantitatively evaluating the dose rates of
unshielded SF and VHLW, this study identifies critical new insights, such
as the roles of the Np-237 decay chain; the eventual, long-term dominance
of the U-238 decay chain; and the interplay of three actinide decay chains,
including the significant role of Bi-214.
These findings fill a gap in the literature and emphasize the need for more detailed investigations in this as-yet-unexplored research area, which has a direct bearing on technical and societal decision-making for both waste disposal safety and the choice
of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Nukleonik 24th Sept 2024 http://www.nukleonika.pl/www/back/full/vol69_2024/v69n4p215f.pdf
High-Precision, Long-Range NATO Missiles Against Russia: Why Now?

Joe Quinn, Sott.net, Wed, 20 Nov 2024, https://www.sott.net/article/496207-High-Precision-Long-Range-NATO-Missiles-Against-Russia-Why-Now
Russia announced a change to its nuclear doctrine several months ago, where it can now respond with nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear attack on Russia by an enemy, either directly from enemy territory or from the territory of a third party. A notable caveat however is that such a response would only occur in the event that the attack “threatened the very existence of the Russian state”.
The changes were officially signed into law yesterday with the wording relevant to the conflict in Ukraine being “where the aggression creates a critical threat for the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity [of Belarus or the Russian Federation].
In this context, the Russians have also said that the use of nuclear weapons would also be permissible if an enemy attacked Russian forces in the context of the SMO in a way that definitively threatened the achievement of the objectives of the SMO.
In Sept. Putin said that NATO’s plan to allow Ukraine to use longer range Western precision weapons against Russian targets inside Russia would be evidence of direct NATO involvement in a war against Russia. And that Russia would respond appropriately.
Three days ago, “Biden” approved the use of longer range Western precision weapons against Russian targets inside Russia.
Two days ago, Ukraine fired 5 US-made longer range Western precision weapons (supersonic ATACMS ballistic missiles) at a military base 130kms into Southern Russia. According to the Russians, all 5 missiles were shot down, with one falling on the periphery of the missile base, starting a fire but doing no material or personnel damage.
While many have interpreted this attack as fulfilling the requirements for a Russian nuclear response, that is obviously not the case, for four reasons:
1) The attack did not, in any way, threaten the very existence of the Russian state
2) The attack did not, in any way, threaten the achievement of the objectives of the SMO.
3) The Biden admin has less than 2 months left in power.
4) Trump and his incoming team have made no secret of their intention to negotiate a near-future settlement to end the war in Ukraine.
What then, at this late stage, was the point in the ‘Biden’ admin authorizing the use of long range precision weapons against Russia and why do EU leaders continue to make repeated reference to EU citizens needing to prepare for a potential “war with Russia” and sending EU/NATO military forces to Ukraine, if there’s a reasonable chance of a peaceful settlement of the conflict under the Trump admin?
The problem is how any ‘settlement’ would play out.
First (see map) Russia will not settle for anything less than the four regions it has already incorporated into its territory (including the “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine”). In addition, a demilitarized buffer zone (of some distance) would be necessary extending out from these regions and away from the Russian and Belarusian borders to the North.
NATO and EU nations would, undoubtedly, insist on militarily occupying (“peacekeepers”) the rest of Ukraine beyond these zones, but such a presence would create an uneasy, and potentially dangerous, peace for some time to come. Hence the talk of sending their military forces to Ukraine and possible/eventual ‘war with Russia’.
Of note in this respect is yesterday’s announcement that the ‘Biden’ admin will begin sending anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine to “blunt the advancement of Russian troops”. Interestingly, the mines are said to be “nonpersistent” design, meaning they become inactive within weeks of deployment. Why now? Russian troops have been advancing, in one form or another, for most of the war. Why would NATO/Ukraine want to deploy anti-personnel mines that last for only a few weeks?
Much like the use of precision long-range weapons, the use of “non-persistent” anti-personnel mines now is more likely to be part of a strategy for a negotiation settlement, than to effect any significant change on the current battlefield.
The point of authorizing (and using) both NATO long range precision weapons against Russia and anti-personnel mines now is in preparation for expected negotiations after Jan 6th.
By using these weapons and calling Russia’s ‘nuclear bluff’, (while also being careful not to push too far) NATO expects that Russia will be forced to accept them as a de facto (rather than theoretical) part of Ukraine/NATO’s arsenal against Russia, and thereby provide NATO with a more favorable basis for negotiations.
Seeds of Resistance – Reviving the Peace Movement in the Age of Trump
William Hartung, 17 Nov 24, https://tomdispatch.com/seeds-of-resistance/
—
When the election results came in on November 5th, I felt a pain in the pit of my stomach, similar to what I experienced when Ronald Reagan rode to power in 1980, or with George W. Bush’s tainted victory over Al Gore in 2000. After some grieving, the first question that came to my mind was: What will a Trump presidency mean for the movements for peace and social justice? I offer what follows as just one person’s view, knowing that a genuine strategy for coping in this new era will have to be a distinctly collective process.
As a start, history offers some inspiration. On issues of war and peace, the trajectory of the Reagan administration suggests how surprising hope can prove to be. The man who joked that “we begin bombing [Russia] in five minutes,” and hired a Pentagon official who told journalist Robert Scheer that America would survive a nuclear war if it had “enough shovels” to build makeshift shelters, ended up claiming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” He even came tantalizingly close to an agreement with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to abolish nuclear weapons altogether.
To his credit, Reagan developed a visceral opposition to such weaponry, while his wife, Nancy, urged him to reduce nuclear weapons as a way to burnish his legacy. A Washington Post account of her role noted that “[s]he made no secret of her dream that a man once branded as a cowboy and a jingoist might even win the Nobel Peace Prize.” Such personal factors did come into play, but the primary driver of Reagan’s change of heart was the same thing that undergirds so many significant changes in public policy — dedicated organizing and public pressure.
Reagan’s presidency coincided with the rise of the largest, most mainstream anti-nuclear movement in American history, the nuclear freeze campaign.
Along the way, in June 1982, one million people rallied for disarmament in New York’s Central Park. And that movement had an impact. As Reagan National Security Advisor Robert MacFarlane pointed out at the time, “We took it [the freeze campaign] as a serious movement that could undermine congressional support for the [nuclear] modernization program, and potentially… a serious partisan political threat that could affect the election in `84.”
Reagan’s response was twofold. He proposed a technical solution, pledging to build an impenetrable shield against incoming missiles called the Strategic Defense Initiative (more popularly known as the Star Wars program). That impenetrable shield never came to be, but the quest to develop it deposited tens of billions of dollars in the coffers of major weapons contractors like Lockheed and Raytheon.
The second prong of Reagan’s response was a series of nuclear arms control proposals, welcomed by reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, including a discussion of the possibility of eliminating the two sides’ nuclear arsenals altogether. The idea of abolishing nuclear weapons didn’t come to fruition, but the Reagan administration and its successor, that of George H.W. Bush, did at least end up implementing substantial cuts to the American nuclear arsenal.
So, in a few short years, Reagan, the nuclear hawk, was transformed into Reagan, the arms-control-supporter, largely due to concerted public pressure. All of which goes to show that organizing does matter and that, given enough political will and public engagement, dark times can be turned around.
Trump at Peace (and War)
Donald Trump is nothing if not a top-flight marketeer — a walking, talking brand. And his brand is as a tough guy and a deal maker, even if the only time he’s truly lived up to that image was as an imaginary businessman on television.
But because Trump, lacking a fixed ideology — unless you count narcissism — is largely transactional, his positions on war and peace remain remarkably unpredictable. His first run for office was marked by his relentless criticism of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a rhetorical weapon he deployed with great skill against both Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton. That he failed to oppose the war when it mattered — during the conflict — didn’t change the fact that many of his supporters thought of him as the anti-interventionist candidate.
To his credit, Trump didn’t add any major boots-on-the-ground conflicts to the conflicts he inherited. But he did serious damage as an arms dealer, staunchly supporting Saudi Arabia’s brutal war in Yemen, even after that regime murdered U.S.-resident and Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In a statement after the murder, Trump bluntly said that he didn’t want to cut off arms to the Saudi regime because it would take business away from “Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and many other great U.S. defense contractors.”
Trump also did great damage to the architecture of international arms control by withdrawing from a treaty with Russia on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the Iran nuclear deal, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. If those agreements were still in place, the risks posed by the current conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East would be lower, and they might have served as building blocks in efforts to step back from such conflicts and return to a world of greater cooperation.
But there is another side to Trump, too. There’s the figure who periodically trashes the big weapons makers and their allies as greedy predators trying to line their own pockets at taxpayer expense. For example, in a September speech in Wisconsin, after a long rant about how he was being unfairly treated by the legal system, Trump announced that “I will expel warmongers. We have these people, they want to go to war all the time. You know why? Missiles are $2 million apiece. That’s why. They love to drop missiles all over the place.” And then he added, referring to his previous presidency, “I had no wars.” If past practice is any indication, Trump will not follow through on such a pledge. But the fact that he felt compelled to say it is at least instructive. There is clearly a portion of Trump’s base that’s tired of endless wars and skeptical of the machinations of the nation’s major defense contractors.
Trump has also said that he will end the war in Ukraine on day one. If so, it may be the peace of the graveyard, in the sense that he’ll cut off all U.S. support for Ukraine and let Russia roll over them. But his support for peace in Ukraine, if one can call it that, is not replicated in his other strategic views, which include a confrontational stance towards China, a pledge to further militarize the U.S.-Mexican border, and a call for Benjamin Netanyahu to “finish the job” in Gaza.
The last thing to consider in assessing what Trump’s military policies might look like is his administration’s close association with the most unhinged representatives of Silicon Valley’s military tech surge. For instance, Peter Thiel, founder of the emerging military tech firm Palantir, gave J.D. Vance, Trump’s vice president, a job at one of his companies and later donated large sums to his successful run for the Senate from Ohio. The new-age militarists of Silicon Valley loudly applauded the choice of Vance, whom they see as their man in the White House.
All of this adds up to what might be thought of as the Trump conundrum when it comes to war and peace and, to deal with it, a peace movement is truly needed.
Peace Resistance
For any peace movement, figuring out how to approach Trump will be like shadow boxing — trying to imagine what position he’s likely to take next.
The biggest problem in working for peace under a Trump presidency may involve whether groups are even allowed to organize without facing systematic government repression. After all, in the past, Trump has labeled his opponents with the Hitlerian-style insult “vermin” and threatened to jail any number of those he’s designated as his enemies.
Of course, the first job of any future peace movement (which would have applied as well had the Democrats taken the White House) will simply be to grow into a viable political force in such a difficult political climate.
The best way forward would undoubtedly be to knit together a coalition of organizations already opposing some aspect of American militarism — from the Gaza ceasefire movement and antinuclear groups to unions seeking to reduce the roles their members play in arms production, progressive veterans, big-tent organizations like the Poor People’s Campaign, groups opposed to the militarization of the Mexican border, organizations against the further militarization of the police, and climate activists concerned with the Pentagon’s striking role in pouring greenhouse gasses into our atmosphere. A coordinated effort by such movements could generate real political clout, even if it didn’t involve forming a new mega-organization. Rather, it could be a flexible, resilient network capable of focusing its power on issues of mutual concern at key moments. Such a network would, however, require a deeper kind of relationship-building among individuals and organizations than currently exists, based on truly listening to one another’s perspectives and respecting differences on what end state we’re ultimately aiming for.
Even as peace and justice organizations paint a picture of what a better world might look like, they may be able to win some short-term reforms, including some that could even garner bipartisan mainstream support. One thing that the American roles in the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza and plans to arm up for a potential conflict with China have demonstrated is that the American system for developing and purchasing weapons is, at the very least, broken. The weapons are far too costly, take too long to produce, are too complex to maintain, and are often so loaded with unnecessary bells and whistles that they never work as advertised.
A revival of something along the lines of the bipartisan military reform caucus of the 1980s, a group that included powerful Republicans like former Georgia representative Newt Gingrich, is in order. The goal would be to produce cheaper, simpler weapons that can be turned out quickly and maintained effectively. Add to that the kinds of measures for curbing price gouging, holding contractors responsible for cost overruns, and preventing arms makers from bidding up their own stock prices (as advocated relentlessly by Senator Elizabeth Warren), and a left-right coalition might be conceivable even in today’s bitterly divided Congress and the Trump era.
After all, the most hawkish of hawks shouldn’t be in favor of wasting increasingly scarce tax dollars on weapons of little value to troops in the field. And even the Pentagon has tired of the practice of letting the military services submit “wish lists” to Congress for items that didn’t make it into the department’s official budget submission. Such measures, of course, would hardly end war in our time, but they could start a necessary process of reducing the increasingly unchecked power of the Lockheed Martins and Raytheons of our world.
There are also issues that impact all progressive movements like voter suppression, money in politics, political corruption, crackdowns on free speech and the right of political assembly, and so much more that will have to be addressed for groups to work on virtually any issue of importance. So, an all-hands-on-deck approach to the coming world of Donald Trump and crew is distinctly in order.
An invigorated network for peace, justice, and human rights writ large will also need a new approach to leadership. Old-guard, largely white leaders (like me) need to make room for and elevate voices that have either been vilified or ignored in mainstream discourse all these years. Groups fighting on the front lines against oppression have already faced and survived the kinds of crackdowns that some of us fear but have yet to experience ourselves. Their knowledge will be crucial going forward. In addition, in keeping with the old adage that one should work locally but think globally, it will be important to honor and support local organizing. Groups like the Poor People’s Campaign and the progressive feminist outfit Madre have been working along such lines and can offer crucial lessons in how to link strategies of basic survival with demands for fundamental change.
Last, but not least, while such organizing activities will undoubtedly involve real risks, there must be joy in the struggle, too. I’m reminded of civil rights activists singing freedom songs in jail. My favorite of that era isn’t “We Shall Overcome” — although overcome we must — but “Ain’t Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Round,” which includes the lyric “gonna keep on walkin’, keep on talkin’, gonna build a brand-new world.” That may seem like a distant dream in the wake of the recent elections, but it’s all the more necessary because of that.
Victory is by no means assured, but what alternative do we have other than to continue to fight for a better, more just world? To do so will call for a broad-based, courageous, creative, and committed movement of the kind that has achieved other great transformations in American history, from securing the end of slavery to a woman’s right to vote to beginning the process of giving LGBTQ people full citizenship rights.
Time is short, when it comes to the state of this planet and war, but success is still possible if we act with what Martin Luther King, Jr., once called “the fierce urgency of now.”
Britain’s Nuclear Bomb Scandal: Our Story review – how the UK’s atomic testing programme devastated lives

Trauma, terror and potential medical effects that last for generations – those who experienced the fallout of nukes in Australia and the Pacific tell their horrifying tale
Jack Seale, Thu 21 Nov 2024 https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2024/nov/20/britain-nuclear-bomb-scandal-our-story-review
Grenfell, the Post Office, infected blood, Hillsborough … Britain has witnessed a long series of injustices where walls of silence and lies have stopped the powerless inconveniencing the powerful by telling their whole truths. To that list, in the section where further disclosure is still urgently required, we should add the UK’s nuclear testing scandal. This calmly scathing documentary sets out the case.
Post-second world war, the US and the USSR engaged in a nuclear arms race, and Britain – desperate to cling to its place at the world’s top table – felt obliged to join them. As it tried to keep up with developments in atomic and hydrogen bombs, nuclear tests were desired, but letting off nukes anywhere near regular British citizens was politically unviable, so distant lands were sought and human guinea pigs identified.
The locations chosen were Pacific atolls and the Australian outback and coast; the unwitting human test subjects were, as well as the local people, around 39,000 British and Commonwealth servicemen and scientists. Between 1952 and 1963, they witnessed 45 atomic and hydrogen bombs being detonated, along with hundreds of other radioactive experiments. Many of those affected, who had been stationed at the blast sites so the effects on humans could be monitored, are interviewed in this film.
Leading the talking heads are British veterans who, as young men in the 1950s and 60s, were offered the chance to sail halfway around the world to serve their country. Initially, when they arrived at, say, Christmas Island or the Monte Bello archipelago off the coast of north-western Australia, they were in paradise, living a life of sunshine, beer, seafood and beach football with, as one says, “no idea what we were letting ourselves in for”. Now, they live with cancers and other health problems they are convinced are linked to what they experienced – or with the traumatic memories of coming face to face with humanity’s most powerful, awful creation.
Not every study has backed the men’s claims about the negative health impacts of the nuclear tests, but plenty have and, in any case, the problem is that the picture is incomplete. Court cases and dogged freedom of information requests have been required to access records from the Ministry of Defence, the existence of which the MoD had previously denied. But the veterans still wouldn’t have enough to claim for compensation, even if Britain had an equivalent to the nuclear-testing compensation schemes that exist in other countries.
Here and now, we have the men’s own testimony, which is frightening. Their recollection of sitting on a beach with their bare hands over their eyes, waiting for an unholy explosion to go off in the sea behind them, is eerie and nightmarish. One man’s memory of being flown in a plane through a mushroom cloud, looking down at a crimson inferno below before being flipped upside down by the force of the explosion, is hard to even comprehend.
Almost more upsetting are the tales of what came next, particularly among the men’s offspring. Children were born with disabilities and disfigurements; grandchildren show signs of genetic defects. The official line remains that there is no correlation between this and the tests, and that “no information is withheld from veterans”. The veterans, bitterly and tearfully, disagree.
Then there is the small matter of the Indigenous Australians whose ancestral homelands were deemed to be uninhabited before British nuclear tests were carried out. At Emu Field in south Australia in 1953, warnings about the prevailing wind were ignored, and the radioactive cloud was blown towards an Indigenous community that included the late Yami Lester, who was blinded by radiation exposure and became an anti-nuclear campaigner. We hear his famous description, given in 1999, of “this black mist coming over and quietly rolling through the mulga trees, black and shiny, oily looking”. Community members reported unusual, serious health issues within hours.
There is also an interview with Australian air force veteran and whistleblower Avon Hudson, who risked imprisonment to draw attention to the effects of the tests at Maralinga, a little south of Emu Field. Hudson, a resolute but deeply sad man, leads the film-makers to the programme’s starkest image: the cemetery in the small military town of Woomera, with its rows of tiny graves. The surge in infant deaths and stillbirths was never satisfactorily explained.
Hudson fought for a royal commission, which convened in 1984 and went some way to healing the damage done in Australia, but the surviving Brits – now grandfathers, sharp of mind but with faces etched by worry, and with their time running out – are still waiting for a public inquiry, for compensation, and for the release of their own full medical records. Answering their questions honestly looks like the least we can do.
Britain’s Nuclear Bomb Scandal: Our Story aired on BBC Two and is on iPlayer.
Why EDF’s Hinkley C nuclear power plant will probably not be running before 2035

David Toke. Nov 20, 2024, https://davidtoke.substack.com/p/why-edfs-hinkley-c-nuclear-power
There is a broad relationship between the time it takes to build nuclear power stations and their cost. That is apparent from looking at what has happened in the past, with nuclear costs escalating as construction times have increased. A study of this relationship leads to the conclusion that the commercial operation of Hinkley Point C (HPC) will almost certainly not happen before 2035.
The model being built at Hinkley C is the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR). The only two EPRs to have been (more or less) completed in the West have involved major cost overruns. They have taken much longer to build than expected. In Finland, the plant at Olkiluoto took nearly 17 years to come into commercial operation from its construction start in 2005. The EPR at Flamanville in France has so far taken 17 years to (not quite as yet) come into commercial operation since the concrete for the reactor was first poured in 2007.
When I was writing a book about nuclear power, safety, and costs I did an (anonymised) interview with a British-based nuclear industry consultant who commented:
‘the point at which you do the first concrete pour, the organisation starts hemorrhaging money. That is when you have to build as rapidly as possible with minimum delays and commission as quickly as you can’. (anonymous interview with nuclear consultant, 01/06/2018) (page 133 see book link HERE ). It’s a simple relationship really. The longer the construction period is, then the longer you have to employ staff to do the job. Hence costs increase almost as night follows day.
You can see the relationship between costs and construction time in Figure 1 below [on original]. Please note these are so-called ‘overnight’ costs and do not include interest payments to debtors or equity holders. This, in reality, pushes up costs greatly, which is why these ‘overnight’ costs greatly understate nuclear costs. However, I use the overnight costs for comparison purposes, and also because their interpretation is much more transparent and unarguable compared to making assumptions about the cost of capital.
In a post earlier this year I explained how Flamanville 3’s construction time had been part of a trend towards increasing nuclear construction times in France. This is shown in Figure 2 below [on original]. The bar on the right represents Flamanville 3 whose construction began in 2007.
Both the power plant compared in Figure 1 (Flamanville 3 and Olkiluoto 3) cost much more than expected. However the alarming thing about the British nuclear programme is that they are still only about half as expensive as the projected costs of Hinkley C. Whereas Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3 have overnight costs of around 8.7 to 8.1 billion euros per GW, Hinkley C has projected costs, according to EDF, of around double this amount (ie over 16 billion euros per GW) when EDF’s median projected costs are translated into 2024 euro prices. (See HERE for costs in 2015 £s, as reported by ‘World Nuclear News’).
This does imply that Hinkley C is going to take even longer to come online than these power plants in Finland and France did. Hinkley C’s reactor construction began at the end of 2018, and the cost estimates made then were broadly in line with the sort of costs we have seen in the cases of Fimamanville and Olkiluoto. However, projections of cost overruns for HPC have escalated since then.
Even if EDF ‘only’ took as long to build as Flamanaville and Olkiluoto, HPC will not be online until 2035. But the costs of HPC are much higher, around double, compared to either of these other EPRs. Of course, we cannot say, for definite, now how long for sure completion of HPC will take. But we can do an estimate by working backward from the cost. That is if there is a simple linear relationship between construction time and cost then we could say that if HPC is going to cost twice as much as Flamanville 3 or Olkiluoto 3 then HPC will take twice as long as these plants – that is well over 30 years. On that basis, HPC would not be finished until around 2050. You can see this calculation in Figure 3. [on original] HPC is in the third set of columns.
Maybe it will not take quite as long as 2050 to finish HPC – I cannot say – but what these simple calculations do suggest that EDF’s (most recently) projected completion dates of 2029-2031 look hopelessly optimistic. Even if HPC ‘only’ takes as long as Flamanville 3, we shall still be looking at a start no earlier than 2035. The CEO of EDF is famously quoted as saying that people would be cooking their turkeys by the xmas of 2017. We could be lucky to be cooking our turkeys using HPC power by 2037!
The prospect of HPC not being online in 2029 automatically triggers penalty clauses in the contract that was agreed between the UK Government and EDF in 2013. If EDF does not meet this deadline then it loses a year of its premium price guarantee for every year that it fails to start generating. The premium price of £92.50 per MWh in 2012 prices which equates to £129 per MWh in 2024 prices. No doubt pressure will grow on the UK Government to relax the penalty clause.
All of this does not bode well for Sizewell C. This is a carbon copy of the design of HPC, we are told. Except that it is not, It is on a different site with its own, different, challenges. There can be no confidence that the costs will be much less than HPC – as Amory Lovins puts it, nuclear power seems to have an ‘unlearning curve’ – ie it gets more expensive over time in a given country. It is unlikely that EDF will have much capacity to do much on Sizewell C until HPC is more or less completed, and as Sizewell C is likely to take at least 15 years to build (based on experience with EPRs) it seems unlikely that Sizewell C will be generating this side of 2050. I have one good reason to hope to see the day when Sizewell C is generating. It means that I shall live a very long time and be very old indeed!
Otherwise, it would not be wise to persevere with Sizewell C. Sizewell C is likely to come online when it is even more technologically uncompetitive than it is now with other green energy sources and techniques. Indeed the approach of the Government has altered dramatically since the Hinkley Point C contract was signed. Then there were penalty clauses imposed on EDF to encourage good performance. Now, with Sizewell C, EDF will be able to rely on the consumer to pay the tens of billions of pounds of cost overruns that will inevitably occur. A sort of reverse logic has been applied. It has been realized that nuclear power is too uneconomic to be built by offering a long-term contract to buy electricity. But instead of walking away from the technology, we will now take on a massive uncapped financial obligation for the next project.
Big batteries and EVs to the rescue again as faults with new nuclear plant cause chaos on Nordic grids

Giles Parkinson, Nov 19, 2024 https://reneweconomy.com.au/big-batteries-and-evs-to-the-rescue-again-as-faults-with-new-nuclear-plant-cause-chaos-on-nordic-grids/?fbclid=IwY2xjawGqC8xleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHadLKvCjeIJudeDt86k27LkV53Q1FcfYmtcRSA_HGcWU1b1TmW7voTgIOA_aem_wwFpyxMordh4V_FbOJ3lfw
The newest and most powerful nuclear reactor in Europe that was delivered more than a decade late and nearly four times over budget is also proving to be a headache for grid operators now that it is finally up and running.
On Sunday, the 1,600 megawatt Olkiluoto 3 nuclear reactor tripped again, the latest in a series of faults and outages that have plagued the new facility and caused the market to reach out for back-up power to fill the gap.
Olkiluoto owner TVO says the reactor tripped on Sunday due to a turbine malfunction in the generator’s seal oil system. “The repair is taking longer than expected, and based on the current information, the plant is estimated to return to electricity production in approximately two days,” it said in a statement.
It’s not the first time the unit has failed. In October, it was forced to reduce power suddenly when one of the reactor’s control rods unexpectedly dropped into the reactor.
Its sister reactor, Olkiluoto 2, was off line for three weeks due to a faulty water-cooled rotor that had to be replaced and will run for months at reduced output because of the fear of failure.
But on Sunday, when the entire 1,600 MW capacity of Olkiluoto 3 was taken out of the system with no notice, it had a big impact on the grid, sending frequency plunging to 49.55 Hz, well outside the normal band.
“Olkiluoto is starting to compete with the Swedish nuclear power plant, Forsmark, for being the leading cause of major (loss of generation) disturbances in the Nordic power system,” writes Andreas Barnekov Thingvad, a Denmark-based trading systems director at battery company Hybrid Greentech.
He says his company contributed to the market response to stabilise frequency (see graph on original ) and the grid with its portfolio of batteries and virtual power plants, including electric vehicles.
Olkiluoto was finally connected to the grid last year, at an estimated cost of €11 billion ($18 billion) compared to the original budget of €3 billion. That cost blowout forced its developer, the French company Areva, to be bailed out by the French government.
When it did come online, nuclear boosters in Australia hailed it as being responsible for a steep fall in electricity prices. They failed to mention the fact that the reactor was more than a decade late, and Finland was forced to turn to highly expensive Russian gas in the interim to make up the shortfall.
Indeed, TVO, the reactor owner, says now that the new reactor has been commissioned, there is often too much production on the Finnish grid, and the reactor has to be dialled down, or curtailed, in much the same way that renewables often are. It is still not allowed to run at full capacity.
“The electricity system in Finland faces on an increasingly frequent basis a situation where more down-regulating production capacity is needed because there is too much production,” TVO notes.
The new reactor has also spent large periods off line (see the graph above from TVO’s most recent interim report). Its annual outage was supposed to last 37 days, but stretched to double that, to 74 days. TVO blamed “defect repairs and technical problems with inspection equipment took more time than had been planned.”
The point of this story is to highlight another bit of nonsense from the nuclear lobby, who like to claim that renewable sources such as wind and solar require back up, while nuclear does not.
That is simply not true, and the world’s big investment in pumped hydro in the 1970s and 1980s was principally designed to provide back up to nuclear reactors then in vogue. Ontario has ordered some of the world’s biggest batteries to support its nuclear fleet, most of which will be offline for several years for upgrades and maintenance.
Thingvad noted the multiple recent outages that had occurred in both the Finnish and Swedish nuclear reactors over the last few months:
- – On November 17th, at 15:25:51, Olkiluoto 3 had another turbine failure, tripping all 1600 MW of generation and causing the Nordic system frequency to drop to 49.59 Hz. The failure is expected to last several days.
- – On September 3rd, Olkiluoto 3 experienced a fault that caused it to drop 640 MW, leading the Nordic frequency to fall to 49.77 Hz.
- – On June 10th, Forsmark Block 3 experienced a reactor trip of 1172 MW, causing the Nordic system frequency to drop to 49.61 Hz.
- – On June 3rd, 2024, Olkiluoto 3, with 1600 MW, suddenly tripped due to a turbine malfunction. The Nordic system frequency dropped to 49.58 Hz.
- – On May 13, 2024, the Forsmark Block 1 nuclear power plant in Sweden, which has a capacity of 1 GW, tripped due to a grid failure. Forsmark experienced multiple outages – each of at least a gigawatt – in 2023.
- The scale of such outages would be significant in a grid like Australia, where the biggest single unit – at the Kogan Creek coal fired generator in Queensland – is 750 MW.
If, as the federal Coalition proposes, it wants to put in units sized at a gigawatt or more, then the market operator will have to invest in more standby capacity in case of the inevitable trips and outages.
The bigger the unit, the more back up power that is required. Wind and solar may be variable, but those variations are easily and reliably predicted. The sudden loss of a 1,600 MW facility is not.
The Australian Energy Market Operator has already made clear that its biggest headache is managing the unexpected outages of big generators, such as the ageing and increasingly unreliable coal fired power stations that the federal Coalition wants to keep open while it waits for nuclear to be rolled out and commercial SMRs to be invented.
“The repeated outages at Olkiluoto and Forsmark nuclear plants are a stark reminder of the critical need for grid resilience and diversification in our energy systems,” noted Eric Scheithauer-Hartmann, a German-based energy executive.
“It’s encouraging to see companies like Hybrid Greentech stepping up to support the Nordic power grid with advanced battery storage and intelligent energy solutions.
“As we continue to face challenges with traditional power generation, investing in smart grid technologies and renewable integration isn’t just beneficial—it’s essential for maintaining stability and meeting future energy demands.”
New Book. The Scientists Who Alerted Us To The Dangers of Radiation.

The Scientists Who Alerted us to Radiation’s Dangers by Ian Fairlie, PhD
and Beyond Nuclear’s Cindy Folkers, MS, published by The Ethics Press, is
now available in paperback and ebook.
The book profiles 23 radiation scientists over the previous half-century or so, who revealed that radiation risks were higher than thought, but who were victimized by
governments and the nuclear establishments for doing so.
What this book reveals is that the harmful effects of radiation exposure especially from
the nuclear sector, and especially to children, are more pervasive and
worse than thought. These have been known for decades but suppressed by
politically-motivated censorship and overt disparagement/persecution. A big
problem is the exclusion of independent voices and members of the public.
The hegemony of the nuclear elite, backed by their governments, has kept
radiation’s dangers an “inside game”, leaving the public in the dark
and thereby violating their human rights, especially the rights of the
child. “It’s a timely and rewarding book. It’s timely because several
governments are pushing hard for more public exposures to radiation via
nuclear power.
And it’s rewarding as it explains radiation in
easy-to-grasp language which clarifies its dangers and risks. Anyone who
has ever wondered about radiation or its first cousin, radioactivity,
should read it.”
In addition to the profiles of radiation scientists, the
book includes hundreds of references, 14 scientific Appendices, 5 Annexes,
a glossary and an extensive bibliography. “This galaxy of information
will serve to help activists and students counter the misrepresentations,
incorrect assertions, and plain untruths about radiation often disseminated
by the nuclear establishments on both sides of the Atlantic. It will also
serve as a useful up-to-date reference book for academics on the dangers
and risks of radiation and radioactivity.
Ethics Press 19th Nov 2024
https://ethicspress.com/products/the-scientists-who-alerted-us-to-the-dangers-of-radiation
Nuclear hype ignores high cost, long timelines

November 18, 2024, Dennis Wamsted and David Schlissel, https://ieefa.org/articles/nuclear-hype-ignores-high-cost-long-timelines?fbclid=IwY2xjawGqDMZleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHa4pEgK_ocKG9gTiE0qK663dfc6SmO8F381Rlg6kefl44j9IUxx51qLUkg_aem_lYNxB1cdtOXGZOwGA6HDYQ
Nuclear options are years away, while solar, wind, storage and geothermal are clean, cost-effective options ready now
Key Takeaways:
Nuclear power is being touted as a solution to meeting electricity demand spurred by the growth of artificial intelligence and data centers.
Announcements of new SMR plans have one thing in common: They’ve been very short on details.
Solar and geothermal plants are being built for less money and in much less time than even the most optimistic SMR designs.
Increasingly, nuclear power is being touted as a solution to meet growing electricity demand, but a new briefing note from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) shows that the hype is ignoring the fact that nuclear projects are expensive and take too long to get online.
The growth of artificial intelligence (AI) and data centers is creating increased demand for electricity, and announcements that the need will be met with nuclear—specifically, small modular reactors (SMRs)—have been coming quickly. The nuclear announcements are not only short on details, but also gloss over the fact that SMRs will not come online soon enough to meet the growing demand.
“It is time for companies and investors to stop and take a deep breath,” said Dennis Wamsted, IEEFA energy analyst and co-author of the report. “Restarting a limited number of recently closed conventional reactors is entirely different than building unproven and unlicensed SMRs. While some SMRs might bring additional power down the road, the reality is that solar and geothermal plants are being built for less money and faster than even the most optimistic SMR designs.”
The rush for electricity to power rising AI and data center demand is an issue that needs addressing now. SMRs are a next-decade resource, at best. Clean, cost-effective power options are available today for big tech and additional electricity needs. Utilities, developers, and large power users need to focus there and stop betting on expensive, unproven nuclear technologies that will not generate meaningful amounts of power for years to come.
Reading road sees suspected nuclear warhead convoy
A military convoy believed to be carrying nuclear warheads has been
spotted moving along a road in Reading. The convoy was made up a large
police presence and umarked trucks – typical of nuclear material
transportation operations – moving along the Bath Road towards the Atomic
Weapons Establishment in Burghfield.
Reading Chronicle 18th Nov 2024 https://www.readingchronicle.co.uk/news/24731286.reading-road-sees-suspected-nuclear-warhead-convoy/
Regulators update guidance on contamination of ground and water on nuclear licensed sites
by Practical Law Environment 18 Nov 24
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), Environment Agency (EA), Natural
Resources Wales (NRW) and Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)
published updated guidance on expectations on the prevention and management
of radioactive and non-radioactive contamination of the ground and water on
nuclear licensed sites, on 14 November 2024.
Practical Law 18th Nov 2024
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/I8b889a97a5a011efb5eab7c3554138a0/View/FullText.html
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