nuclear-news

China’s openness about its latest nuclear missile test shows growing confidence vis-à-vis the United States

The rare public ICBM test seems to have been specifically aimed at dissuading Washington from using nuclear weapons in a potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait

Bulletin, By Hui Zhang | October 16, 2024

China’s Ministry of National Defense announced last month that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying a simulated warhead into the Pacific Ocean and that the missile accurately fell into the designated area. This was the first time since 1980 that China had test-fired an ICBM into international waters.

But the test launch was part of routine annual training, the ministry added, in line with international law and international practice, and not directed against any country or target.

Just as observers were vigorously speculating about the type of missile used in the test, China Junhao (China’s military media wing) cut short the discussions, releasing pictures of the launch site—a very rare step given that the Chinese army has not made public a photo of the launch of a new ICBM for decades.

China’s Ministry of National Defense announced last month that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying a simulated warhead into the Pacific Ocean and that the missile accurately fell into the designated area. This was the first time since 1980 that China had test-fired an ICBM into international waters.

But the test launch was part of routine annual training, the ministry added, in line with international law and international practice, and not directed against any country or target.

Just as observers were vigorously speculating about the type of missile used in the test, China Junhao (China’s military media wing) cut short the discussions, releasing pictures of the launch site—a very rare step given that the Chinese army has not made public a photo of the launch of a new ICBM for decades…………………

With this new launch test, China certainly wants to show a forceful response to suspicion about its nuclear deterrence capabilities in the wake of recent corruption scandals and command instability in its rocket force. The test shows that the rocket force has an operational and credible nuclear force that can help ensure China’s ability to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent—a key element of President Xi Jinping’s long-held military objectives and emphasis on strengthening China’s nuclear forces, an emphasis initiated in 2015.

The rare public ICBM test seems to have been specifically aimed at dissuading Washington from using nuclear weapons in a potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait. The unusual transparency surrounding the test shows how China is becoming increasingly confident vis-à-vis the United States. It also could offer a rare opportunity for engaging in risk reduction talks.

A new missile type. Unlike the United States, which usually tests its ICBMs in international waters, China has usually fired its ICBMs over its homeland, using a lofted or depressed trajectory to keep the missile inside Chinese territory. China’s last full-trajectory flight test of an ICBM (the DF-5) was conducted in May 1980………………………………….

Where the 1980 test was meant to be a trump card for deterring Moscow, today’s DF-31AG test is aimed at deterring Washington………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Changing target. China now perceives the United States as being its main threat, and the question of whether China has a credible and reliable deterrent against a US first nuclear strike has become more important in Chinese government circles. At least, this appears to be the strategic calculation that Xi currently pursues………………………………………….

Since 2012 and Xi’s presidential tenure, however, China has been substantially modernizing, expanding, and diversifying its nuclear forces to address perceived threats from the United States. …………………………..

China has expanded its nuclear arsenal at unprecedented speed and scale. It has increased its total warhead count from about 260 in 2016 to about 500 in 2024. Most of the increase has come in the shape of ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States—from about 65 in 2016 to about 240 in 2024. The US Defense Department projected that China would possess over 1,000 warheads by 2030.

The observable transformation of China’s nuclear posture and the projections for its expansion over the next decade raise the question of whether China has changed its nuclear strategy.^[8] Until recently, Chinese officials and government documents reaffirmed China’s commitment to a no-first-use policy and a self-defense nuclear strategy.^[9] Under this nuclear policy and strategy, China has always confirmed that it “keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.” The major question is how to interpret the “minimum” needs of a nuclear force for a secured second-strike capability.

Searching for a minimum and “effective” deterrent. China’s officials have never declared a specific number of weapons required for its minimum level. Such a level is never static. It depends on several factors, including estimates of survivability during a nuclear attack and a projected enemy’s missile defense systems. …………………….

………….. since 2000, the US missile defense plan has been a major driver of China’s nuclear modernization and buildup…………………………….

At this stage, it is not clear whether Xi Jinping has decided to empower the country’s nuclear force beyond assuring such a reliable second-strike capability. However, while there is little evidence to show that China has changed its long-standing nuclear strategy and no-first-use policy, recent qualitative and quantitative improvements in the nuclear forces demonstrate that Chinese leaders may now pursue a more ambitious nuclear strategy.

A more confident China—and the need to reduce risk. Without a clear understanding of China’s goals and motivations, a new arms race could be triggered with the United States, which would reverse China’s long-standing policy against such engagements. It is now the time for both countries to conduct dialogues to avoid a nuclear arms race and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. Both sides should undertake risk-reduction and military confidence-building measures to address security concerns, clarify strategic intentions, and increase transparency. They should also engage in “strategic stability” talks.

As a first step, China and the United States could negotiate a bilateral agreement on mutual notification for ballistic missile and space launches, which would significantly reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation……………………..https://thebulletin.org/2024/10/chinas-openness-about-its-latest-nuclear-missile-test-shows-growing-confidence-vis-a-vis-the-united-states/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=ThursdayNewsletter10172024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_ChinaNuclearMissileTest_10162024

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October 19, 2024 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, weapons and war