nuclear-news

A game plan for dealing with the costly Sentinel missile and future nuclear challenges

Bulletin, By Stephen J. Cimbala, Lawrence J. Korb | August 9, 2024

Enormous cost overruns in the Sentinel program have engendered a debate about how or if to go forward with a US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) modernization program. We see five potential paths forward that might reduce costs and maintain or even improve the United States’ strategic posture. But to make the best military and financial choice, the United States government will have to consider how an updated missile force relates to evolving technology in the space and cyber realms and the implications of decisions about ICBM modernization for nuclear arms control.

Questions have been raised about the cost overruns for the Sentinel ICBM modernization program, which aims to replace the existing fleet of Minuteman III missiles beginning in the next decade. Sentinel is one part of a plan to replace all three legs of the U.S. nuclear strategic triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed on fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and bomber-delivered weapons. Columbia class SSBNs and upgraded Trident II D-5 missiles are intended for the next generation of sea-based strategic forces, and the B-21 Raider advanced stealth bomber is already on track to replace both remaining B-52 and B-2 bombers in conventional and nuclear roles.

Plans for modernization of the entire nuclear triad were approved in the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, albeit with some differences in emphasis with respect to the role of nuclear weapons in US deterrence, defense, and foreign policy. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States also recommended modernization and replacement of all US strategic nuclear delivery systems.

The sticker shock associated with rising cost estimates for the Sentinel program is understandable. Estimated program acquisition costs for a “reasonably modified” Sentinel have risen to about $140.9 billion. According to the Congressional Budget Office, Department of Defense and Department of Energy, budgetary requests for fiscal year 2023 related to nuclear forces total more than $576 billion for the period 2023-2032, averaging just above $75 billion per year. The history of nuclear modernization does not suggest that complete cancellation of Sentinel is the most probable outcome. The program has the support of the Air Force, members of Congress, and various defense contractors. Given the inertia of the Sentinel program, we believe questions about its cost should focus not on eliminating it, but on the implications of strategic land-based missile modernization for US national strategy, nuclear deterrence, and arms control. Going forward, what are the options for the ICBM leg of the nuclear triad from this perspective?^[1]

Alternatives for US ICBM modernization.^[2] The first option for dealing with Sentinel’s cost overruns would involve canceling the entire Sentinel program and continuing to modernize and upgrade the existing Minuteman ICBM force………………………………………………………

A second option would be to move to a nuclear strategic dyad instead of a triad and depend on a deterrent of submarine-based weapons and strategic bombers……………………………………………………………

In a third option, future ICBMs would be deployed on mobile platforms instead of in silos………………………………………………………….

Yet another option would be to deploy ICBMs in so-called deep underground basing…………………………………………….

A fifth option for the ICBM force would be “conventionalization” of strategic land-based missile launchers…………………………………………….

Domain challenges to strategic stability: space and cyber. Options for a future ICBM force will have to be considered within the larger context of evolving technology related to deterrence. The domains of space and cyber now form part of the context for military planners.^[3] ………………………………………………….

Hypersonic weapons cast another shadow of concern over deterrence and crisis stability.^[4] ………………………………………

Finally, there is the issue of strategic nuclear arms control and its potential demise under the pressures of US–Russian political disagreement, of China’s apparent ambition to become a nuclear superpower, of growing political and military alignments between Beijing and Moscow, and of the wobbly status of the last major Russian–American strategic nuclear arms control agreement (New START), originally signed in 2010 and now extended only until February 2026.^[5] ………………………………………………………………………………………more https://thebulletin.org/2024/08/a-game-plan-for-dealing-with-the-costly-sentinel-missile-and-future-nuclear-challenges/?utm_source=Newsletter+&utm_medium=Email+&utm_campaign=MondayNewsletter08122024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_CostlySentinelMissileAndFutureNuclearChallenges_080920247

August 13, 2024 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | USA, weapons and war