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America’s Nuclear Weapons Quagmire

what are the American people really getting for all of this new nuclear weapons spending?

The United States is locked in a strategic and ideological battle with itself over the purpose and future of its nuclear arsenal

STIMSON, By  Geoff Wilson, Defense Policy & Posture, August 7, 2024

The United States is on track to spend the equivalent of more than two Manhattan projects per year in one of the most expensive nuclear arms races in history. Yet, all of the systems being developed are all significantly over budget and behind schedule, and several might be actively eroding America’s national security by destabilizing global strategic stability and legitimizing the idea of “limited” nuclear use. How did we get here and might there be better alternatives?

Over the past decade, the United States has launched one of the most expensive nuclear arms races in history. As it stands now, this new nuclear modernization comes with a price tag of approximately $1.7 trillion over 30 years.¹ To put this in perspective, adjusted for inflation to 2023 dollars, the four years of the Manhattan Project cost approximately $30 billion.²

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the United States is set to spend some $756 billion on nuclear weapons modernization programs between fiscal 2023-2032,³ which averages out to $75 billion a year on nuclear weapons. That is more than two Manhattan projects every year for the next eight years.

Put in other terms, it is nearly all the money the United States spent on nuclear weapons and delivery systems for World War II, spent every year, for the next eight years. When combined with the Department of Defense’s conventional weapons portfolio over the same period, nuclear modernization will drive annual peacetime Pentagon budgets to unprecedented levels.

If you compare the technical obstacles faced by the United States during the nuclear development of the 1940s, to the higher costs for the relatively marginal benefits of the current American nuclear modernization program, it begs the question: what are the American people really getting for all of this new nuclear weapons spending?

Nuclear weapons proponents have framed these expenses as part of a modernization effort to update and refurbish aging systems developed in the 1970’s and 80’s or as a necessity to maintain U.S. global nuclear dominance.⁴ But this branding masks a serious escalation in disruptive nuclear posture changes, one that includes new weapons and missions that were eliminated by former presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush after being identified as  unnecessary and destabilizing to both strategic stability and nuclear deterrence.

Set against this backdrop, it appears that the United States is in a new global nuclear arms race, a new Cold War 2.0, with the United States set firmly in the driver’s seat. But amidst increased global nuclear risks, the United States is inflicting unnecessary self-harm by expending resources on systems that may actually erode strategic stability and drawing resources away from other critical national security priorities – with very little real future security benefit to show for it.

The Problem

Fundamentally, the problem with rapid new nuclear weapons development is that it is strategically destabilizing. If one nation learns that a rival is rapidly developing systems that could overwhelm or defeat its defenses, a realist response dictates that that nation must do the same to offset any strategic advantage its rival might gain to maintain deterrent parity.

The alternatives are to consider attacking that rival before they have produced new weapons that can defeat your existing forces, or to find a way to negotiate with those rivals to produce verifiable diplomatic agreements to limit the production and deployment of new and destabilizing forces.

History provides many examples of this dynamic. The United Kingdom and Germany engaged in a serious naval arms race that contributed to the tensions preceding World War I…………………………………………….

 nuclear modernization plan has now grown from just updating older systems, to the development of entirely new ones as well.

………………………………………………………….. other nuclear powers have taken notice.

Challenges of a New Global Nuclear Arms Race

Since the launch of the new modernization plan, every single nuclear-armed nation has begun redeveloping or expanding their nuclear arsenals.¹⁹

………………………………………………… Even more concerning for global strategic stability are growing calls in the United States for entirely new nuclear missions and systems. Already, the United States is in the process of developing, producing, or deploying at least three new weapons systems that can be alternatively called: less-than-deterrent, non-strategic, tactical, or battlefield nuclear weapons. These are weapons that are not meant to reinforce the deterrence-first approach that many Americans have come to believe the U.S. nuclear arsenal is based around today. Instead, they are part of a murkier Cold War-style nuclear warfighting strategy meant to fight and “win” a limited nuclear war at the theater level.

…………………………………………… This class of weapons is incredibly dangerous considering they are viewed as being smaller and less destructive and have been argued as being more usable. Add to that the fact they are traditionally meant to be deployed alongside conventional forces, and their mere possession can be seen as increasing the likelihood of their use under pressure or in crisis situations.²⁵

They also pose a significant discrimination problem to enemy leaders, by building uncertainty into U.S. missile launches, forcing them to constantly evaluate if they are under a conventional or nuclear strike………………………………………………..

,…………………………………………….. Senator Edward Kennedy drove this issue home in 2003 when he argued on the Senate floor, “Some may say that smaller weapons are less dangerous than the larger weapons already in our arsenal. But these nuclear weapons are actually more dangerous… [and they are made] more usable by lowering the thresholds for the first use of nuclear weapons.”

Kennedy warns that this view is deceptive, “Nuclear war is nuclear war is nuclear war. We don’t want it anywhere, anytime, anyplace. Make no mistake, a mini-nuke is still a nuke. ……………………………………………………………………………

…………………………Nuclear Brass Tacks

On the whole, the extremely high costs of these weapons will be a significant factor in the coming defense spending crisis. Spending $1.7 trillion dollars on new nuclear weapons over 30 years – about the total cost of all U.S. student debt – is unsustainable.²⁹

The U.S. defense industrial base has so far proven itself incapable of actually absorbing all of the new nuclear spending. Even if it could, the risks of rampant waste and production delays challenge the industry’s ability to produce these weapons. It thus becomes difficult to say whether or not the United States is actually reaping any benefit from this modernization effort while actively encouraging its rivals to also make new nuclear investments to maintain their own perceived deterrent.

Indeed, national security establishment leaders have been so concerned with whether they can spend more money on nuclear weapons, there has been very little consideration of whether they should.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Conclusion

Among the lessoned learned from the first Cold War, the conflict demonstrated that simply possessing more nuclear weapons did not make the United States any safer. While humanity survived the last nuclear arms race, that outcome was far from certain, and the prospect of a new game of nuclear chicken in the Pacific or Europe should be viewed with as much cynicism as can be mustered………………………………………………………………………………… https://www.stimson.org/2024/americas-nuclear-weapons-quagmire/

August 9, 2024 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | USA