AUKUS – Australia-United Kingdom-United States nuclear pact endangers us all.

Agreement is proliferation nightmare
By Jemila Rushton https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2024/07/21/agreement-is-proliferation-nightmare/—
Australia arms up with UK and US help
The following is a statement to be delivered on July 23 at the 2024 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee event in Geneva by Jemila Rushton, Acting Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia. It was endorsed by a number of groups, including Beyond Nuclear. It has been adapted slightly for style as a written piece rather than oral delivery.
We gather in uncertain and dangerous times. All nine nuclear armed states are investing in modernizing their arsenals, none are winding back policies for their use. The number of available deployed nuclear weapons is increasing. We do not have the luxuries of time or inaction.
Against this background where the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ongoing concern, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America continue to further develop AUKUS, an expanded trilateral security partnership between these three governments.
AUKUS has two pillars. Pillar One was first announced in September 2021 and relates to information, training and technologies being shared by the US and UK to Australia to deliver eight nuclear powered submarines to Australia. Vessels which, if they eventuate, will utilize significant quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It also allows Australia to purchase existing US nuclear submarines. Currently, Australia is committing billions of dollars to both US and UK submarine industry facilities as part of the AUKUS agreement, potentially enabling the further development of nuclear armed capability in these programs.
Two years ago, during the 2022 NPT Review Conference, many governments expressed concern that the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal would undermine the NPT, increase regional tensions, lead to proliferation, and threaten nuclear accidents in the ocean. There remains an urgent need to critique the nuclear proliferation risks posed by AUKUS.
The Australian decision to enter into agreements around nuclear powered submarines was made on the assumption that it would be permitted to divert nuclear material for a non-prescribed military purpose, by utilizing Paragraph 14 of the International Atomic Agency’s (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). The ‘loophole’ of Paragraph 14 potentially allows non-nuclear armed states to acquire nuclear material, which would be removed from IAEA safeguards.
Australia’s proposed acquisition of large quantities of HEU outside of usual IAEA safeguards and scrutiny jeopardizes nonproliferation efforts and fissile material security. This conference has the mandate to prepare recommendations for the upcoming Review Conference to strengthen rather than weaken the global nonproliferation regime by moving to close the Paragraph 14 loophole. States represented here should negotiate the closure of the Paragraph 14 loophole in the NPT, as it permits Australia and other non-nuclear armed states to obtain nuclear-powered submarines and potentially weapons-grade HEU.
To eliminate the risk of non nuclear weapons states acquiring nuclear weapons grade HEU, all states, including AUKUS members, should refrain from sharing the technology and materials that will be transferred if Australia and others acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The paragraph 14 loophole undermines the NPT and needs to be closed.
Pillar Two of AUKUS plans to enhance the joint capabilities and interoperability between the partners, and may draw in other countries to AUKUS. This move is vastly out of step with a strong sense of Pacific regionalism and the long-standing commitment to a Nuclear Free Pacific. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) is being put under strain in this agreement. It is of grave concern that currently Japan, Canada and Aotearoa/New Zealand are actively considering their engagement with AUKUS Pillar 2.
We are concerned that the AUKUS trilateral partnership, and any further expansions will exacerbate regional tensions, fuel an arms race and increase risks of war in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly involving China and the United States, and will increase the danger of nuclear escalation in any such conflict.
Within Australia, First Nations communities have expressed deep concern about the imposition of new military and radioactive waste facilities on their lands. First Nations and broader communities across Australia and throughout the Pacific have noted that AUKUS is part of a rapid militarization of the region, and raises the ever-present threat of nuclear conflict. Recognizing the disproportionate impacts of previous nuclear activities on First Nations or Indigenous Peoples, and the on-going legacies of nuclear weapons testing and activities in the region, there is deep concern for what AUKUS will mean for sovereignty of Small Island States and its impacts on Indigenous lands and Peoples.
The fuel for HEU naval propulsion reactors is weapons-grade, and the spent fuel is weapons-usable. HEU is the most suitable material for ready and rapid conversion into a nuclear bomb. While removing HEU from a submarine would not be an easy process, the possibility of diverting such material for weapons purposes cannot be ruled out. Meaningful safeguards are extremely limited when the material is on a stealth platform that can disappear for six months at a time.
With the entry into force of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), there is a mandate to strengthen existing non-proliferation mechanisms. By joining the TPNW, governments can legally confirm that they will not acquire or host nuclear weapons, nor assist with their use or threat of use. We affirm that AUKUS members should make firm their commitments to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by joining the TPNW as a matter of urgency.
Jemila Rushton is the Acting Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia
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