North Korean nuclear weapons, 2024

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Bulletin By Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight | July 15, 2024

North Korea continues to modernize and grow its nuclear weapons arsenal. In this Nuclear Notebook, the authors cautiously estimate that North Korea may have produced enough fissile material to hypothetically build up to 90 nuclear warheads, but has likely assembled fewer than that—potentially around 50. To deliver the warheads, North Korea is enhancing and diversifying its missile force, most recently with new solid-fuel long-range strategic missiles, short-range tactical missiles, and sea-based missiles. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, associate director Matt Korda, research associate Eliana Johns, and program associate Mackenzie Knight.

This article is freely available in PDF format in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ digital magazine (published by Taylor & Francis) at this link.

North Korea—also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK—has made significant advances over the past two decades in developing its nuclear weapons arsenal. Since 2006, North Korea has detonated six nuclear devices, updated its nuclear doctrine to reflect the irreversible role of nuclear weapons for its national security, and continued to introduce a variety of new missiles test-flown from new launch platforms.

It is widely assumed that North Korea has operational nuclear warheads for its short- and medium-range missiles as well as possibly for its longer-range missiles, although the latter capability has not yet been publicly demonstrated. There is considerable uncertainty about which of North Korea’s missiles have been fielded with an active operational nuclear capability. However, it seems clearer from North Korea’s public statements and systems-testing that the country intends to field an operational nuclear arsenal capable of holding targets at risk in East Asia, the United States, and Europe.

In 2021, Kim Jong-un announced several key strategic goals for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, proposed as a five-year plan. According to Kim’s statement, these goals included: 1) producing “super-sized nuclear warheads,” 2) producing smaller and lighter nuclear weapons for tactical uses, 3) improving precision strike and range capabilities, 4) introducing “hypersonic gliding flight warheads,” 5) developing “solid-fuel engine propelled intercontinental, underwater, and ground ballistic rockets,” and 6) introducing a “nuclear-powered submarine and underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon” (KCNA 2021). North Korea appears to have made significant progress on these goals, and has since introduced more demands including the dramatic increase of missile production and “cutting edge strategic weapon engines” (Kim 2023).

Due to the lack of clarity surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program, agencies and officials of the US intelligence community, as well as military commanders and independent experts, struggle to assess the program’s characteristics and capabilities………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

North Korea’s nuclear policy

For decades, North Korea has made numerous statements and signals about its nuclear weapons policy, laying out its nuclear doctrine if deterrence fails. Such statements have more recently been codified in official declaratory policy. In 2013, for example, North Korea’s “Law on Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State” suggested a no-first-use policy, noting that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal would only be used “to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes” (KCNA 2013). Kim Jong-un officially declared a no-first-use policy in 2016 following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test.

Since 2016, however, North Korean statements and force posture changes have indicated a shift away from this no-first-use policy. Just two months after the policy was declared, the North Korean government issued a statement that North Korea would not be the first to use nuclear weapons “as long as the hostile forces for aggression do not encroach upon its sovereignty” (KCNA 2016b). In 2020, Kim Jong-un stated that North Korea’s nuclear deterrent “will never be used preemptively. But if […] any forces infringe upon the security of our state and attempt to have recourse to military force against us, I will enlist all our most powerful offensive strength in advance to punish them” (38 North 2020). Such caveats culminated in September 2022 when North Korea’s parliament codified in law North Korea’s right to launch nuclear weapons preemptively (Kim 2022). One year later, the North Korean government codified under the country’s constitution its right to “deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly developing nuclear weapons to a higher level” (Soo-Yeon 2023).

The abandonment of North Korea’s no-first-use policy coincides with the country’s recent efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons. Following development and demonstration of new long-range strategic nuclear-capable missiles, the pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons appears intended to provide options for nuclear use below the strategic level and strengthen its regional deterrence posture (KCNA 2022; National Committee on North Korea 2021). According to two analysts, Pyongyang now sees its nuclear weapons as useful not only for retaliation against an attack but also for potentially winning a limited conflict………………

………………….. Occasionally, North Korea has explicitly mentioned or signaled which targets it would hit with its nuclear weapons. These include US military bases in South Korea, the Asia-Pacific region, Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States.

………………………………………………………………….. despite occasional inflammatory statements, it appears highly likely that North Korea—as with other nuclear-armed states—would use its nuclear weapons only under extreme circumstances, particularly if the continued existence of the North Korean state and its political leadership were threatened.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program

Plutonium production operations

The Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, located in North Pyongan province, has been called the “beating heart” of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. At Yongbyon, North Korea produces plutonium at its five megawatt-electric (MWe) graphite-moderated nuclear reactor, which has been operating intermittently since 1986………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Uranium enrichment operations

Assessing the state of North Korea’s uranium enrichment operations is more difficult because the operational history and locations of several associated uranium enrichment facilities are unknown………………………………………………………………

Fissile material and warhead inventory estimates

Because of the prior access to the facilities at Yongbyon, analysts have a reasonable understanding of North Korea’s plutonium production capabilities. However, given the uncertainties about the operations at Yongbyon’s uranium enrichment facility and the possible existence of a second centrifuge facility, it is unclear how much highly-enriched uranium (HEU) North Korea has produced and how much uranium it might divert to military purposes, including for plutonium production. Still, this amount is known to be growing and it is clear North Korea is investing in the improvement of its fissile material production capabilities………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

The size of North Korea’s nuclear stockpile also depends on the weapon design and the number and types of launchers that can deliver them. Many experts also estimate that North Korea may have built a smaller number of nuclear weapons than what its stockpile of fissile material may suggest………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Nuclear testing and weaponization

After six nuclear tests—including two with moderate yields and one with a high yield—there is no longer any doubt that North Korea can build powerful nuclear explosive devices designed for different yields. North Korea’s latest nuclear test, conducted on September 3, 2017, had a yield of well over 100 kilotons and demonstrated that North Korea had managed to design a thermonuclear device or at least one that used a mixed-fuel (composite) design………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Potential land-based nuclear-capable missiles

Over the past decade, North Korea has developed a highly diverse ballistic missile force, including missiles in all major range categories…………………………………………………………………………………………

Short-range missiles…………………………………………………………………………………

Medium- and intermediate-range missiles North Korea is developing a new generation of medium- and intermediate-range missiles with improved accuracy, readiness, and maneuverability…………………………………………………………………

Intercontinental ballistic missiles

The most dramatic of North Korea’s recent developments has been the display and test launch of large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),…………………………………………………

Sea-based nuclear-capable missiles

Over the past decade, North Korea has worked to develop an increasingly sophisticated sea-based nuclear deterrent. ……………………………………………………………………..

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles……………………………………………

Submarine-launched cruise missiles North Korea is developing a new submarine-launched cruise missile, known as Pulhwasal-3-31. The system has been labeled a “strategic cruise missile”—implying a nuclear-capable status……………………………………………………

Other sea-based weapons North Korea appears to be developing an underwater weapon system………………………………………..

Land-attack cruise missiles North Korea appears to be developing a series of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)—………………………………………………… more https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-07/north-korean-nuclear-weapons-2024/