The United Nations Security Council takes up Space Security – it might have been best if it had not

As the international community’s dependence on space-enabled services grows exponentially, the disconnect between space powers on rules for responsible behaviour in outer space can only be a matter of great concern.

Open Canada, BY: PAUL MEYER , Adjunct Professor of International Studies and Fellow in International Security, Simon Fraser University, Senior Advisor, ICT4Peace, Director, Canadian Pugwash Group, Fellow, Outer Space Institute 17 JUNE, 2024

It may come as a surprise that until this April the United Nations (UN) Security Council had never taken up the issue of outer space security despite the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Outer space has become an increasingly important environment for global well-being with a wide array of space-based services underpinning many critical civilian activities from telecommunications to navigation to remote sensing of the Earth. The world is also experiencing an exponential growth in the numbers of satellites in orbit driven primarily by the private sector and the launch by companies such as “Starlink” and “One Web” of “mega-constellations” to ensure global Internet connectivity. Many stakeholders in the use of outer space also recognize that preserving this environment for peaceful purposes, in line with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, means ensuring that it is kept free of man-made threats.

Regrettably, just as global society is discovering ever more benefits from outer space activity, leading space powers are characterizing it as a “war-fighting domain” while accusing one another of having been the first to “weaponize” this vital if vulnerable environment. The ethos of cooperation imbued in the Outer Space Treaty with its stress on space activity being “in the interests and for the benefit of all countries”; its insistence on each party paying “due regard” to the rights of others and its prohibition on the stationing of nuclear weapons or other WMD in orbit, is currently under severe strain. Hostile rhetoric, accusations of nefarious intent, development of anti-satellite weapons and other so-called “counter-space capabilities” plus the abuse of consensus-based diplomatic processes have generated an atmosphere that is not conducive for states agreeing on cooperative security measures even when these are urgently needed.

To the degree that space security has been addressed by the UN in the past it has been a preserve of the General Assembly and the 65-member Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, both of which have had the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) item on their agenda since the early 1980s…………………………………………

Part of the problem has been that since it last negotiated an agreement in 1996 the Conference on Disarmament has been a largely moribund body, unable to agree and implement a basic programme of work let alone negotiate anything. This dysfunctionality is sustained by its consensus-based decision making that essentially gives each of its members a de facto veto over any decision. As security perspectives and threat perceptions differ amongst the member states no common ground has emerged for any new agreement. Specifically, on the PAROS item an East-West divide has existed for decades over how best to proceed.

In 2008, Russia and China put forward a draft treaty on “The Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or use of Force against Space Objects” (better known by its acronym PPWT). In the view of its sponsors it is essential that a legally binding agreement is concluded that will ban all weapons in space. The United States (US) and its allies have raised objections to the Sino-Russian treaty ………………………………

This gap in positions could be bridged with a modicum of good will and a willingness to compromise on preferred positions, but neither quality is much in evidence these days. Instead, a decision was made to transfer the unresolved debate over PAROS to the Security Council which had never addressed the issue before……………………………………………….

The US and Japan, along with numerous co-sponsors, introduced this April a draft resolution on Outer Space and WMD with a principal call for all states to adhere to the ban on placing WMD into space. At the April 24 Security Council meeting slated to consider this issue, Russia offered up an amendment to the US/Japan resolution. The amendment stipulated that states “take urgent measures to prevent for all time the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force in outer space, from space against Earth and from Earth against objects in outer space”; and called for “the early elaboration of appropriate reliably verifiable legally binding multilateral agreements” (i.e. like the PPWT). The amendment failed having received only 7 positive votes whereas 9 are required in the Security Council.

This set the stage for a vote on the US/Japan resolution which garnered 13 positive votes, one abstention (China) and fatally a veto from Russia. In an effort to turn the tables on the US, Russia introduced a new resolution of its own which incorporated much of the text from the US/Japan resolution, but reinserted the language of its amendment. When this resolution went to a vote at a May 20^th Security Council session it failed (like the amendment) to garner sufficient support with a repetition of the earlier split 7-7 vote. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

More promising than the combative machinations in the Security Council has been the creative approach shown in the recent UN Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on “Reducing Space Threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. This group convened for a few weeks in 2022 and 2023 with a final session in the week of August 28 to September 1. Due to disruptive and frankly spiteful behaviour by the Russian delegation no concluding report could be achieved (the group operating by consensus) and even the usual anodyne procedural report was blocked by the Russian representative who openly delighted in the group’s failure.

Despite this egregious conduct the OEWG benefited from the active participation of those present and the rich menu of proposals that were presented, any one of which, if adopted, would make a positive contribution to the security situation in outer space…………………………………….

Notable among these proposals were restraint measures on any destructive action against satellites and refraining from “any other non-consensual act that destroys or damages the space objects of other States”; refraining from “any deliberate act that interferes with the normal and safe operation of the space objects under the jurisdiction or control of other States”; refraining from “any acts that would impair the provision of critical space-based services to civilians” and ensuring “that satellites under their jurisdiction and control or operating on their behalf do not rendezvous, physically connect or physically damage with satellites under the jurisdiction and control of another State, or operate in proximity to, without prior consultations and consent”. Agreement on such conflict prevention measures is the type of action which would really benefit the international community.

In lieu of further polemics between Russia, China and the US it would be helpful if concerned middle powers, such as Canada, and non-governmental stakeholders spoke out on the need to take up some of these specific proposals and seek agreement on them. Let’s put aside the tired and sterile debates over the desired scope and status for space arms control and embark on a purposeful effort to develop cooperative security measures for outer space. The international community deserves no less. https://opencanada.org/the-united-nations-security-council-takes-up-space-security-it-might-have-been-best-if-it-had-not/—