Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023

Bulletin, By Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight, November 8, 2023
The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, research associate Eliana Johns, and Scoville fellow Mackenzie Knight. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines the current state of global nuclear sharing arrangements, which include non-nuclear countries that possess nuclear-capable delivery systems for employment of a nuclear-armed state’s nuclear weapons.
ollectively, the world’s estimated 12,512 nuclear warheads belong to just nine countries. However, there are more than two dozen additional countries that participate in nuclear mission-related arrangements. While these countries do not have direct launch authority over any nuclear warheads, they play an important role in their storage, planning, delivery, and safety and use-control, and therefore merit a degree of scrutiny alongside their nuclear-armed peers.
Nuclear sharing: what it is and is not
A common misconception surrounding nuclear sharing is that it refers to one country simply handing its nuclear weapons or launch authority to another country. While there have been specific instances during the Cold War when the United States’ allies maintained a relatively high degree of control over the nuclear weapons stationed on their soil, this is no longer the case in peacetime.
Nuclear sharing, not to be confused with burden sharing, generally refers to the practice of allowing non-nuclear countries to operate specially configured launchers to employ a nuclear-armed state’s nuclear weapons in time of war. The nuclear sharing mission is a subset of a much broader range of nuclear-related activities that can take several forms (see also Figure 1 on original):
- Maintain nuclear forces to provide nuclear protection for non-nuclear countries;
- Permanently hosting another country’s nuclear weapons or delivery systems;
- Providing delivery systems to be capable of employing another country’s nuclear weapons;
- Providing conventional capabilities to support another country’s nuclear strike mission; or
- Cooperating with another country on nuclear planning and targeting.
In recent years, nuclear sharing arrangements have reentered the international spotlight. The United States is modernizing the infrastructure that supports its nuclear sharing mission in Europe and is preparing to deploy its new B61-12 gravity bombs to European air bases for delivery by US and allied aircraft. Meanwhile, following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia says it is transferring nuclear-capable delivery systems to Belarus, training Belarusian military personnel on how to use them, and claiming to have deployed Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory.
Participation in nuclear-related arrangements will increase in the coming years, as new NATO members Sweden and Finland join the Alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group and potentially decide to participate in NATO’s annual nuclear strike exercise, and countries like Poland and South Korea have advocated a role in the United States’ nuclear mission as well.
US-NATO nuclear sharing
The governance of US nuclear weapons deployments in Europe is administered through distinct types of parallel agreements with the host or “user nation:”…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Nuclear sharing during the Cold War………………………………………………………………………………..
Nuclear sharing today
Today, approximately 100 US nuclear weapons are estimated to be stored at six bases in five countries, with one additional base (RAF Lakenheath) currently undergoing modernization to potentially store nuclear weapons in the future.
The United States is preparing to replace all legacy versions of the B61 gravity bomb deployed in Europe with the incoming B61-12, which uses a modified version of the warhead used in the current B61-4 gravity bomb. In addition to US heavy bombers, the B61-12 will also be integrated onto US- and allied-operated tactical aircraft, ………………………………………………………………………………
—Kleine Brogel Air Base, Belgium……………………….
—Volkel Air Base, the Netherlands……………………………
—Aviano Air Base, Italy……………………………………..
—Ghedi Air Base, Italy……………………………….
—Lakenheath Royal Air Force Base, United Kingdom………………………………….
Nuclear sharing and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty………………………………………………. Nuclear authorization and consultation
Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Other nuclear arrangements and national views
South Korea and Japan………………………………..
Poland………………………………..
Sweden and Finland……………………………………
Belgium and Germany……………………………………….
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