2019 February 16 « nuclear-news

USA’s nuclear command, control and communications network (NC3) is vulnerable to electronic attacks and interference.

Report: Updating the military’s nuclear communications systems a complex and expensive challenge, Space News, by Sandra Erwin — February 14, 2019 Early warning and communications satellites that support the NC3 system are vulnerable to electronic attacks and interference.WASHINGTON — A new report released on Thursday on Capitol Hill makes the case for billions of dollars in investments in the nation’s nuclear command, control and communications network known as NC3.

The report was co-produced by the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute and the MITRE Corporation. It cautions that while the United States is investing in a new generation of nuclear missiles, submarines and bombers, it will lack a “credible nuclear deterrent if it does not also possess a nuclear command and control system that provides ‘no fail’ communications to nuclear forces in a future environment that will include unique threats and challenges.”

MITRE senior vice president William LaPlante, one of the authors of the report, said the NC3 system today works fine but it needs to transition to a new architecture so it can be integrated with the cutting-edge nuclear platforms that the Pentagon is developing such as the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and the B-21 stealth bomber. The problem essentially is that these are 21st century weapon systems whereas NC3 still uses technology from the 1970s.

The NC3 system includes warning satellites and radars; communications satellites, aircraft, and ground stations; fixed and mobile command posts; and the control centers for nuclear systems.

The report says the early warning and communications satellites that support the NC3 system are vulnerable to electronic attacks and interference. Satellite constellations such as the Space Based Infrared System and the Defense Support System are the basic tactical warning systems of the NC3 enterprise. The 1970s-vintage DSP satellites will be out of service in a few years. The newer SBIRS satellites are more advanced but the Pentagon worries that they could be targeted with counterspace weapons.

When SBIRS was conceived, the thinking was that satellites in higher geosynchronous orbits were off limits to attack. “Today, however, space, even in the geosynchronous realm, is no longer a sanctuary,” the report cautions. “Space congestion increasingly puts U.S. national security space assets at risk and has the potential to create radio interference for data transmitted to and from these assets. But most disturbing and profound is the end of space as a sanctuary domain — space is likely to be a battleground.”

The same concerns apply to communications satellites. ……. https://spacenews.com/report-updating-the-militarys-nuclear-communications-systems-a-complex-and-expensive-challenge/

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | safety, USA | Leave a comment

Dangers in Pilgrim nuclear waste shutdown – dry waste casks becoming stranded for decades?

The Future Of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station: Radioactive Waste And Many Questions By Sarah Mizes-Tan WGBH,

February 12, 2019 LISTEN Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station To Close In May

Built in 1972 on the shores of Cape Cod Bay, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station has been the subject of controversy and concern for decades. Now it’s scheduled to close in the next few months. This is part three of a three-part series on the plant as it heads towards permanent shutdown in mid-2019. Read parts one andtwo.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is nearly 50 years old. It’s moving toward a permanent shutdown in four months, but there are still concerns about safety. When a nuclear power plant closes, it leaves radioactive waste, and a lot of unanswered questions……..

As the plant ages, nuclear opponents are increasingly worried that an accident similar to the one in this drill could lead to a nuclear meltdown. Harwich resident Diane Turco, a longtime critic of the plant, is concerned that the consequences of a nuclear explosion would have far-reaching effects. She has overlaid an image of the radioactive plume generated after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi plant explosion on a map of New England.

“We superimposed that data over Pilgrim, and you can see where it goes,” she said.

The plume she points to would stretch from Long Island to Maine. And though the plant is closing soon, the risk for a nuclear meltdown still remains, even after it’s stopped generating power. One morning, Turco visited the plant to point out what she’s really worried about: the dry cask storage units, a cluster of concrete cylinders sitting next to the plant.

“We should not be able to be here. If somebody had bad intent, there’s the dry casks right there,” she said.

She’s worried that the casks, which contain radioactive material from the reactor, are too easily accessible and unprotected. An attack on the casks could result in a nuclear explosion.

“You could jump over here and be over there in two minutes,” she said. She pointed out a lack of security surveillance of the road passing by the storage casks.

To add to existing concerns, Entergy is now looking to sell the power plant to Holtec, a company that specializes in nuclear decommissioning — basically, shutting nuclear power plants down. It’s the same company that manufactured the dry cask storage cylinders that Turco pointed out. The company claims that it can decommission Pilgrim Nuclear in less time and for less money than Entergy is able to……https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2019/02/12/the-future-of-pilgrim-nuclear-power-station-radioactive-waste-and-many-questions

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | USA, wastes | Leave a comment

Nuclear modernisation in America – should go along with maintaining arms control treaty

Is there a way to save the ‘fraying’ nuclear consensus in Congress? Defense News By: Aaron Mehta 15 Feb 19, WASHINGTON — Following the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which called for long-term investment in modernizing America’s nuclear arsenal, Congress seemed to strike a general consensus on nukes: New investments in weapons would go hand in hand with arms reduction efforts such as the New START treaty.

It wasn’t perfect, and not everyone was on board. But on the whole, the balance allowed the investments in new bombers, nuclear warheads, long-range missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles to go through with little challenge from Democrats, while ensuring New START would receive support from Republicans.

Years later, the landscape looks very different, which could have major consequences as the Trump administration attempts to push its own priorities from the Nuclear Posture Review through a Democratic-controlled House………

The nuclear consensus was rocked early in the Trump administration, with President Donald Trump declaring after less than a month in office that the agreement was “a one-sided deal” and a “bad deal,” and pledged that “if countries are going to have nukes, we’re going to be at the top of the pack.”

The situation only got rockier with the January 2018 release of the Nuclear Posture Review, which called for the creation of two new nuclear capabilities — a low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile — that Democrats quickly denounced as the start of a new arms race.

The situation doesn’t appear to have improved for advocates of nuclear spending in the wake of November’s elections, which saw Democrats take the House and several veteran members of the Senate Armed Services Committee be replaced.

John Harvey, who as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs from 2009-2013 was one of the key authors of the 2010 NPR, said at the summit that he sees little change in the SASC’s stance toward modernization, as new members are largely in favor of the development plan. ………

“You should make clear that extending New START and continued Democrat support for modernization are a package. [Tell them] you can’t have one without the other,” Harvey said. Second, renew efforts to engage Russia on arms control initiatives that are in America’s security interests, including attempts to reduce “the large disparity of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons and more productive dialogue on strategic stability.” ……….https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2019/02/14/is-there-a-way-to-save-the-fraying-nuclear-consensus-in-congress/

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

How they work out nuclear liability – insurance and claims

Global Nuclear Liability Insurance And Claims, Mondaq

15 February 2019

Article by STA Law Firm

“……….power generation from nuclear reactors pose a more substantial threat of causing major mishaps and accidents which could potentially damage property, cause personal injury, and damage the environment on a magnanimous scale. The potential underlying risk has thrown a significantly challenging question before the political heads of the world – who will be liable for the damage caused by such a nuclear incident? Several nations have addressed the concept of nuclear liability insurance and compensatory claims made by the injured parties through legally binding international conventions or/and national laws which has been analysed in great length in this paper……..

How is nuclear energy liability insurance structured?……….

While structuring insurance for nuclear reactors, the only factor which ought to be considered is the high potential perils associated with installation and operations of nuclear fission and fusion. This drastically differs from the risk associated to that of other industries of global sectors. The fundamentals of any nuclear liability insurance are:

I. Channelling of liability on the operators: The nuclear operators are liable for all damages caused by a nuclear incident notwithstanding fault liability.

II. Trans-border nationality: A nuclear energy disaster affects not only the country in which it is located but the surrounding states as well. Hence, national laws are augmented with international conventions which are needed to defend the cross-border inflictions of such disasters.

III. Limited liability: Limited civil liability concept has been incorporated by the international conventions on the basis which the national laws have been formulated, putting a maximum cap limit on the nuclear operators, beyond which the state will take up the liability.

(Detailed explanation is provided in the latter part of this article)

Due to such high-risk and strict liability, the nuclear operators opt for third-party civil liability insurance which finds its root in either of the two forms:

I. National Insurance Pool:

To cover the potential liability of the nuclear industry, many insurers agreed to pool their resources for the associated high-potential risks. A pool is where a group of insurance companies jointly participate to a fixed percentage in the insurance of a particular risk or class of business. These are created in the circumstances involving risks which, in practicality, cannot be provided by any individual insurer on a stand-alone basis. In most countries, national insurance pools have been formed based on the requirements laid down by the federal laws (based on international conventions), pooling together insurance for the domestic nuclear operators.II. Mutual Insurance Associations: The USA (the Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited) and Europe (the European Mutual Insurance for Nuclear Installations) have insurance associations which deal with the physical damage and liability in the event of a nuclear accident which is set up by the nuclear industry itself.

Principles or fundamentals governing Nuclear Liability Insurance:

In recognition of this exposure caused by nuclear accidents, the international conventions and nuclear liability insurance were formulated in the light of the seven fundamental principles:

I. Strict Liability:

The operator is directly and strictly liable for the damage caused by the nuclear incident. The aggrieved need not prove that the operator was negligent or at fault. Only the link between the damage caused and the nuclear incident needs to be demonstrated. The operator is liable for any damage resulting from a nuclear event at his installation, in principle irrespective of its cause.

II. Channelling liability to the operator (Exclusive liability):

All liability arising from the damage caused by a nuclear accident is channelled to the operator, thereby protecting the rights of the public. The operator is exclusively liable for damage resulting from a nuclear incident. He is held liable to the exclusion of any other person, regardless of who caused the damage. Hence, the damage is charged to the operator himself and not the suppliers. The channeling of liability might seem unfair as it means that the operator could be liable even if a third party were negligent or at fault. The victim of a nuclear incident can only present his claim to the operator of the installation causing damage or his insurer. Furthermore, such exclusive liability brings certainty in insurance claims as the compensation settlements would be quick, and avoids costly and time-consuming claim procedures. Had the situation been otherwise, then insurers would have to hold separate pools or covers for every party involved in the nuclear reactor chain.

III. Limitation of liability in Time:

This is an important concept because the injury caused by a nuclear incident may not manifest for several years. Ergo, a limitation period is intended to help the claimant where the consequences may not reveal for several years; thereby not divulging them of their right to seek damage, and at the same time it protects the rights of the operators and insurers by not exposing them of liability for an indefinite period. For example, in the UK, the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 states that any claim made after 10 years (from the date of occurrence of the nuclear incident) but less than 30 years, will be made directly to the government instead of the insurer or the operator.

IV. Limitation of Liability in Time:

The amount of liability charged to an operator under the principle of strict and exclusive liability is capped to a limit to shelter them from the full risk amount. This concept is introduced to bring a balance or quid pro quo status against the strict and exclusive liability. Beyond the limit, the state covers the liability amount.

V. Insurance or other _nancial security:

Operators are obligated to carry financial security to cover their potential liability amount in the event of a nuclear incident. Usually, insurance pools tend to third-party claims. However, in certain situations, operators take the liability on themselves and cover the same by providing financial security in the form of government guarantees, bank guarantees, letters of credit, mutual fund, operators’ pooling etc.

VI. Jurisdiction:

Jurisdiction over claim actions lies exclusively with the courts of the country where the nuclear incident occurred. The courts of other contracting states will not be competent to hear the claims. Judgements made by the competent court will be recognized and enforced in other contracting countries. This principle is only useful when many states have ratified either the same convention or a bridging convention. Victims may, on first impressions, see it as an advantage to be entitled to sue all possible parties in different courts for nuclear damage. However, it is pertinent in the victims’ best interest to disburse compensation equitably.

VII. Applicable Law:

The applicable law is the national law of the competent court that has jurisdiction. The federal law must also be applied without discrimination on the grounds of nationality, domicile and residence. The applicable law principle helps prevent costly and lengthy arguments about which law applies, especially with regard to the complexities of the national and international rules surrounding the conflict of laws.

International Conventions:

A nuclear accident causing trans-boundary damage has led to the development of international conventions to ensure that victims have a readily available justice system.

I. Paris Convention:

The nuclear industries liability regime was founded in 1960 by the OECD’s Paris Convention. Which requires national legislation to be passed for it to be ratified. Although this convention recognizes strict and exclusive channeling of liability, it specifies certain exceptions, which rebuff the liability of the operator. Following are the exceptions: ………… http://www.mondaq.com/x/781188/Insurance/Global+Nuclear+Liability+Insurance+and+Claims

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | business and costs, legal | Leave a comment

Legality of Holtec’s Interim Spent Fuel Repository Application Called Into Question

— Gina G. Scala, Sandpaper, Feb 13, 2019, Opponents of an interim spent nuclear fuel repository proposed by Holtec International, the Camden-based company seeking to jump start the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station decommissioning should a license transfer be granted by the feds, say the company is putting the cart before the horse when it comes to seeking approval for the southeast New Mexico site. In fact, Caroline Reiser, a fellow with Emory Law School’s Turner Environment Law Clinic who appeared on behalf of Beyond Nuclear at an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board legal proceeding last month, called the application illegal.

“This adjudicatory body does not have the authority to review a license application that is based on an illegal premise,” she said during the first day of a two-day legal proceeding on the application. “Although Holtec presents it as an alternative, the mere inclusion of the Department of Energy as an option to be responsible for spent nuclear fuel transported to and stored at the proposed facility is illegal.”

Citing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Reiser said the federal government cannot take title to privately produced spent nuclear fuel until a final repository is operational.

“The law is clear,” she said. “There is no dispute that no final repository is operational, let alone even licensed; thus Holtec’s application is based on an illegal presumption, and application should be dismissed.”

Indeed, the DOE unceremoniously rejected its own plans for a federal repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada almost a decade ago. It was the same site the DOE selected in 2002 as its long-term solution for housing spent nuclear fuel from the nation’s commercial nuclear power plants as well as U.S. Navy reactors.

“The interim repositories are viewed as a storage bridge until a permanent repository is opened,” Neil Sheehan, Nuclear Regulatory Commission public information officer for Region 1, said recently. “At this point, it is not clear when, or if, that will occur.”

He said the federal agency isn’t actively reviewing the Yucca Mountain application because more funding to do so is needed.

“We need to conduct a hearing on the proposal,” Sheehan said.

In the meantime, Reiser said Holtec’s application attempts to skirt the issue of who may legally own nuclear waste it proposes to store.

“The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is Congress’ comprehensive scheme for the interim storage and permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated by civilian nuclear power plants,” she said. “It is the result of brilliant and wise balancing on the part of Congress that establishes distinct responsibilities for the federal government and private generators regarding spent fuel with the ultimate goal that nuclear waste will end up underground in a permanent repository.”………..

Holtec and its opponents had until Feb. 11 to provide additional information for consideration. There is no time frame for a decision from the ASBL on the proceedings.

Three administrative judges from the NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board presided over the session. The board may hold adjudicative hearings on major licensing actions by the NRC, but is independent of the NRC staff. A board’s rulings may be appealed to the commission, a five-member board that sets NRC policy.

gscala@thesandpaper.net https://thesandpaper.villagesoup.com/p/legality-of-holtecs-interim-spent-fuel-repository-application-called-into-question/1800897

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | USA, wastes | Leave a comment

India’s submarine rivalry with China in the second nuclear age

The Strategist , 15 Feb 2019|Ramesh Thakur There are substantially fewer nuclear weapons today than at the height of the Cold War. Yet the overall risks of nuclear war—by design, accident, rogue launch or system error—have grown in the second nuclear age. That’s because more countries with fragile command-and-control systems possess these deadly weapons. Terrorists want them, and they are vulnerable to human error, system malfunction and cyberattack.

The site of great-power rivalry has shifted from Europe to Asia with crisscrossing threat perceptions between three or more nuclear-armed states simultaneously. With North Korea now possessing a weaponised ICBM capability, the US must posture for and contend with three potential nuclear adversaries—China, Russia and North Korea.

The only continent to have experienced the wartime use of atomic weapons, Asia is also the only continent on which nuclear stockpiles are growing. The total stockpiles in Asia make up only 3% of global nuclear arsenals, but warhead numbers are increasing in all four Asian nuclear-armed states (China, India, North Korea and Pakistan). None of them has yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, although China is a signatory. Asia stands alone in nuclear testing in this century.

The Cold War nuclear dyads have morphed into interlinked nuclear chains, with a resulting greater complexity of deterrence relations between the nuclear-armed states. Thus, as I’ve previously argued, the tit-for-tat suspensions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by the US and Russia has a significant China dimension. The nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan is historically, conceptually, politically, strategically and operationally deeply intertwined with China. While Pakistan’s nuclear policy is India-specific, the primary external driver of India’s policy has always been China.

……….the race to attain a continuous at-sea deterrence capability through nuclear-armed submarines is potentially destabilising in Asia because the regional powers lack well-developed operational concepts, robust and redundant command-and-control systems, and secure communications over submarines at sea……… https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-submarine-rivalry-with-china-in-the-second-nuclear-age/

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, India, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Nuclear Waste Handling Bill Under Scrutiny

https://www.kxnet.com/news/minot-news/nuclear-waste-handling-bill-under-scrutiny/1776201036, By: Jim Olson Feb 12, 2019 ND – A state Senate committee will continue discussions this week on a bill that spells out North Dakota’s regulation of nuclear waste storage.

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | USA, wastes | Leave a comment

Trump Declared National Emergency Today — Mining Awareness +

Strange that no one is asking what the true motive of this emergency declaration, and appear to be taking it at face value as relating to a campaign promise. Clearly there is another agenda and likely multiple other agendas. Is this a formal coup d’etat? Today, it will also function as a diversion to “Mueller’s […]

via Trump Declared National Emergency Today — Mining Awareness +

February 16, 2019 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

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